











**Government of Bengal**

**Report of the  
Land Revenue Commission  
Bengal**

**Vol. V**

**Replies to the Commission's questionnaire  
by Government Officers and their oral evidence**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Pages.

(For questionnaire see Appendix II in Volume II.)

W. H. Nelson, Esq., C. S. I. (I. C. S., retired), Member, Board of Revenue, Bengal—

Reply to questionnaire	..	..	..	..	1-9
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	9-23

L. R. Fawcus, Esq., C. I. E., I. C. S., Commissioner of a Division—

Memorandum	..	..	..	..	24-27
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	28-32

F. W. Robertson, Esq., C. I. E. (I. C. S., retired), Commissioner of a Division and ex-Settlement Officer—

Reply to questionnaire	..	..	..	..	33-35
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	35-41

Memorandum by Rai Bahadur B. B. Mukherjee, Ex-Director of Land Records and Surveys, Bengal

42-47

Rai Kalipada Maitra Bahadur (B. C. S., retired), Manager, Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad's Estate—

Reply to questionnaire	..	..	..	..	48-84
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	84-91

Rai J. N. Sircar Bahadur, B. A. (B. C. S., retired), Manager, Coasimbazar Raj Wards Estate—

Reply to questionnaire	..	..	..	..	92-164
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	164-172

Rai M. N. Gupta Bahadur, M. A., B. L. (B. C. S., retired)—

General Note	..	..	..	..	173-234
Reply to questionnaire	..	..	..	..	235-248
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	248-269

Memorandum by Khan Sahib Kazi Mohammad Mohiuddin (B. C. S., retired)

270-271

Babu Jogesh Chandra Chakrabarty, Khas Mahal Officer—

Reply to questionnaire	..	..	..	..	272-303
Oral evidence	..	..	..	..	303-308

Memorandum by Babu Satya Charan Haldar, Khas Mahal Officer

309-310

Reply to questionnaire by Satya Charan Haldar and Maulvi K. Ahmed, Khas Mahal Officer

311-324

Oral evidence of Babu Satya Charan Haldar and Maulvi K. Ahmed

324-334

Reply to questionnaire by Babu Prafulla Chandra Mitra, Khas Mahal Officer

335-343

	Pages.
<b>A. H. Porter, Esq., I. C. S., Magistrate-Collector—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	344-356
Oral evidence .. .. .	356-364
<b>M. M. Stuart, Esq., I. C. S., Magistrate-Collector—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	365-372
Oral evidence .. .. .	372-377
<b>S. K. Dey, Esq., I. C. S., Magistrate-Collector—</b>	
Memorandum .. .. .	378-387
Oral evidence .. .. .	387-395
<b>Reply to questionnaire by Khan Bahadur Md. Mahmud, Magistrate-Collector</b>	396-400
<b>Reply to questionnaire by Rai Rebati Mohan Chakravarty Bahadur     (Magistrate-Collector, retired) .. .. .</b>	401-406
<b>S. C. Mitter, Esq., B. Sc., A. M. I. E., Director of Industries—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	407-411
Oral evidence .. .. .	411-422
<b>M. Carbery, Esq., M. A., B. Sc., D. S. O., M. C., Director of Agriculture—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	423-425
Supplementary questions and answers .. .. .	425-437
Oral evidence .. .. .	437-443
<b>S. C. Majumdar, Esq., B. Sc., M. I. E., Chief Engineer, Irrigation     Department—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	444-446
Supplementary questions and answers .. .. .	447-452
Oral evidence .. .. .	452-461
<b>Khan Bahadur Maulvi A. M. Arshad Ali, Registrar, Co-operative Societies—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	462-469
Supplementary questions and answers .. .. .	469-473
Oral evidence .. .. .	473-478
<b>Khan Bahadur Maulvi Ataur Rahamn (Assistant Commissioner of Income-     tax, Calcutta, retired)—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	479-487
Oral evidence .. .. .	488-494
<b>Finance Department—</b>	
Reply to questionnaire .. .. .	495-500
Supplementary questions and answers .. .. .	500-518
Oral evidence .. .. .	518-527
<b>Notes collected by Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee, during his tours in Madras     and some Bengal districts .. .. .</b>	528-587

**Reply by Mr. W. H. Nelson, C.S.I., I.C.S., Member,  
Board of Revenue, Bengal.**

**Q. 1.** In talking of duties and obligations of the zamindar it is essential to distinguish between statutory duties which were laid on the zamindar and expectations regarding the results of the policy adopted. Their necessary duties have all been laid down by statute. Tenancy Act insures that they behave with "good faith and moderation" to raiyats.

The Permanent Settlement did not take away any of the rights of the tenants.

**Q. 2.** Permanent Settlement gave the zamindar power to choose his tenants initially on lands at his disposal. (VIII of 1793, section 52.)

Once settled he loses control of the land as practically all settlements are permanent. The tenant gets a permanent hereditary interest—a demise rather than a lease. (Bengal Tenancy Act, section 23.)

**Q. 3.** The landlords, including the very large body of small proprietors and tenure-holders, have played an enormous part in the general development of Bengal since the Permanent Settlement.

They have provided an upper and middle class who have readily assimilated western ideas and education. They have made possible the rapid development of local self-government and the extraordinarily rapid political development of the last few years. All Bengal's great men have (probably) been of this class. Economic development is not so striking. The country is mainly agricultural. Methods and implements remain the same. Still there has been since the Permanent Settlement continuous progress in agricultural prosperity accompanied by great extension of cultivation and rapid growth of population. Agricultural prosperity and extension of cultivation is not due to anything the landlords have done. Presumably they did what they could to extend cultivation as extension was greatly to their interest.

I do not think they have failed to perform the functions expected of them. I should say that the expectations of the Permanent Settlement had been fulfilled.

**Q. 4.** There was a great controversy about this in the years preceding the Permanent Settlement. (See Shore's Minute of 2nd April 1788, quoted in Harington's Analysis, p. 228 onwards.)

There is no doubt whatever that the landlords were proprietors of the soil.

Property in the soil in Bengal is seldom absolute. The only absolute proprietor is a small revenue-free holder who holds his entire grant in his own possession.

The zamindar's property is subject to payment of revenue.

In order to arrange for cultivation and management he may grant a lease to a patnidar or other dependent talukdar. This is a demise rather than a lease. The talukdar gets a permanent hereditary transferable interest. The zamindar has parted with the land for ever. His property rights are represented by the annual rent he receives. Very much in the same way as settlement with a cultivating raiyat is a demise rather than a lease. The raiyat acquires a permanent hereditary transferable property and the land ordinarily goes out of the zamindar's possession and control for ever. [Sections 23, 26, 26B, 178 (1) (g); 178 (8) (a), (b), (c) and (d) Bengal Tenancy Act.]

It is possible to measure the property of the different grades of proprietors in terms of money. For the sake of illustration assume that—

Government revenue is Re. 1 per acre;

Patni rent Rs. 2 per acre; and

Raiyat's rent Rs. 3 per acre.

Assume the value of the produce is Rs. 40 and the economic rent Rs. 15. Economic rent means the difference between the gross produce and the sum which compensates the raiyat for his labour, seed, manure, cost and depreciation of cattle and implements, interest on capital employed and all legitimate outgoings. Then the proprietary rights of the raiyat are measured by an annuity of Rs. 15—Rs. 3 = Rs. 12, of the patnidar by an annuity of Re. 1; of the zamindar by an annuity of Re. 1; and of the Government by an annuity of Re. 1 per acre.

**Q. 5.** The raiyats were not necessary parties to the Permanent Settlement contract between the Government and the landlords.

In the question perhaps 'tenants' should read 'raiylats'. The rights of dependent talukdars were secured by statute at the Permanent Settlement (VIII of 1793, section 51). The rights of raiylats were not secured by statute but by custom. Legislation for the purpose was foreshadowed in Regulation I of 1793. The rights of raiylats had been considered. (Harington, Vol. 3, p. 458.) The custom governing raiylats' rights was embodied in Statute in 1859 and 1885. The Tenancy Law of Bengal is to be looked on as part of the Permanent Settlement.

If we use the term Permanent Settlement to include the law for the protection of raiylats which sprang directly from the legislation of 1793 then it is possible to maintain that the principal gainers from the Permanent Settlement are the raiylats and not the zamindars.

The raiyat is the real zamindar—he appropriates 80 per cent. of the unearned increment of the soil. This is due to the principle settled in the Great Rent Case and the success of the restrictions on enhancement. I am speaking of enhancement proper and excluding abwab

and illegal exactions which are not fixed charges. They were important in the past but soon will be entirely a thing of the past. Abwab was no doubt a substitute for enhancement. Zamindars did not regularly take advantage of the law about enhancement; and the record-of-rights reveals many tenants getting the benefit of the presumption in section 50 (2), Bengal Tenancy Act.

Had there been no Permanent Settlement all the estates of Bengal would have been temporarily settled with their proprietors continuing the practice that then existed.

It is possible that had there been land revenue and rent settlements at regular periods throughout the province since 1793 the tenants would be paying a higher average rent than they are paying now. (See Statement IX.) I do not go by the statement entirely: it is misleading for comparison as most of the large khas mahals are in the most fertile districts of the province—Chittagong, Noakhali, Bakarganj, 24 Parganas, Midnapore. But I should say there would have been a more level incidence and a considerably higher average.

The phrase “permanently crippled the financial resources of the country” is an exaggeration.

**Q. 6.** This question cannot be answered with any exactness. I believe that in the first half of the 19th century there was great competition amongst landlords for tenants. As prosperity increased the populations grew; more land was brought into cultivation and this again led to increased population; and this again to increased demand for land.

After conditions settled down to an era of agricultural prosperity the main stimulus to increase of cultivation came from the raiyats. The raiyats have most to gain from increase of cultivation.

**Q. 7.** The figure of 3 crores for the rent roll at the time of the Permanent Settlement rests I believe on returns filed by the zamindars themselves. It is more than probable that they would understate their rent roll if they thought they could escape detection. The present rent roll of 12 crores is less than what one would expect. Paddy sold for annas 8 a maund in 1793 and is now Rs. 2 a maund. The rent roll expressed in terms of paddy is the same as it was in 1793. This takes no account of the increase in cultivation. I have no idea of the extent to which cultivation has increased since 1793. But the figures suggest that the incidence of rent now is much less than it was in 1793.

Obviously enhancement judged from the average has been moderate.

**Q. 8.** Yes. The Tenancy Act has secured this.

**Q. 9.** I find it difficult to understand this question.



There is only one criterion of an improved estate—an improved rent roll.

An improved rent roll may be procured by extension of cultivation or by enhancement of rents. The limit of extension of cultivation has long been reached.

• Is it the intention to reproach the landlords for not enhancing rents?

Extension of cultivation was not a duty laid on the landlords—it was an expectation which naturally arose from the terms of the settlement and which has been fulfilled.

**Q. 10.** By the Permanent Settlement the State has lost revenue. But apparently nothing like so much as is sometimes suggested.

Statement IV indicates that if temporary settlements had continued the State would have been getting 12 annas an acre instead of 9 annas from the total area now permanently settled. An extra 73·75 lakhs.

Comparing the figures in Statement IX and Statement IV it appears that in temporarily settled estates landlords of all grades receive Rs. 4-6 as rent and pay not more than Re. 1-4 as revenue per acre. They therefore appropriate Rs. 3-2 per acre. In permanently settled estates they appropriate on the average less than Rs. 2-7 per acre of the average rent of Rs. 3 per acre paid by the raiyat.

From Statement IX, I conclude that *prima facie* the raiyats on the average are better off with a Permanent Settlement.

If the above conclusions are reliable the State has been losing about 73 lakhs a year less the considerable cost of a settlement establishment large enough to cover the whole province in 15 years. This sum has been spent in subsidising a leisured class which has made great contributions to the social, political, artistic and economic life of the province.

**Q. 11.** (i) It has already been shown that this is an exaggeration. The raiyat appropriates about 80 per cent. of the unearned increment. Out of the balance the zamindar gets about 70 per cent. and the State 30 per cent.

(ii) The Permanent Settlement has encouraged subinfeudation. Is it certain that subinfeudation is a bad thing? Subinfeudation cannot be prevented and is encouraged when the public assessment is moderate. In Bengal creation of a tenancy is equivalent to a sale.

Freedom of transfer covers both sub-lease and sale.

(iii) The figures suggest that enhancement has been moderate.

(iv) There are good landlords and bad landlords. I should say that the landlord who acted as an overlord was usually a good landlord. Mild harassment and oppression used to be common almost entirely in

the form of illegal exactions. The chief sinners are the subordinate collecting staff who are prone to abuse their authority. Slackness is more common than tyranny.

**Q. 12.** I do not advocate the abolition of the Permanent Settlement on any of these grounds.

If you want to get rid of the zamindari system you must compensate them. Logically you must buy out all zamindars and tenure-holders.

Looked on simply as a business transaction this would be most inadvisable. It would almost certainly result in a loss. All high rents would have to be reduced; it is not certain that low rents can be increased. In fact, the present condition of the market for land suggests it would be a very bad investment for the State or for any one to purchase zamindari at the present time.

The root of the matter seems to be that the Tenants' Party feels that the rights of the zamindars stand in the way of reduction of rent. If reduction of rent is the ultimate aim then to buy out the landlords on the basis of their existing rent roll would mean a huge loss. The proposal to revert to temporary settlements has little to recommend it.

Are the raiyats prepared to submit to a general settlement of rents? This would entail cutting down high rents and enhancing low rents throughout the province.

The complex tenure system is a grave difficulty.

Compensation would have to be given to proprietors and tenure-holders on the basis of existing profits. It would be extremely difficult to assess compensation.

Cost of the settlement establishment necessary to bring the whole province under Land Revenue Settlement in a 15-year cycle would be very high.

**Q. 23.** Occupancy right of raiyats was a customary right long before it became a statutory right.

**Q. 24.** The occupancy raiyat always had proprietary rights. He was of course not the sole outright proprietor. His proprietary rights have gradually been defined in—

Act X of 1859.

Great Rent Case 1865.

Act VIII of 1885.

Act IV of 1928.

Act VI of 1938.

The whole scheme of tenancy legislation 1793-1938 is based on the fact that an occupancy raiyat has proprietary rights. Every section

in Chapter V defines or secures a proprietary right. Under section 65, his proprietary right is security for his rent.

**Q. 25.** I am doubtful about extending the grant of rights of occupancy to more than one grade of tenant.

• I see no reason why there should not be freedom of contract below the grade of raiyat. This does not rule out occupancy rights—it would be left to contract and custom.

Section 48G, B. T. Act, gives occupancy rights to people who have them by custom.

Section 48C, B. T. Act, is sufficient protection for under-raiyats.

It is not essential that the actual cultivator not being the raiyat should have occupancy rights by statute. He can get them from the raiyat by paying for them.

**Q. 27.** No. No.

**Q. 32.** No. They need no protection. They pay the full competition rent for the land.

**Q. 33.** I think the barga system is necessary.

**Q. 34.** There is no use giving occupancy rights to bargadars. As they pay the full competition rent their rights in the land are worth exactly nothing.

**Q. 35.** This is a difficult question.

If land is very fertile a barga tenancy may be profitable, e.g., there is nothing to choose between rent free land producing 12 maunds an acre and barga land producing 24 maunds.

I suggest that the bargadar might get the first 8 maunds and after that 1/3rd of the crop.

**Q. 37.** It is not possible to forbid transfer except to agriculturists.

**Q. 38.** 5 acres. But I am not sure what "economic holding" means. 5 acres of ordinary land producing about 18 maunds per acre will support the normal family (5) and can be cultivated without assistance of hired labour.

**Q. 39.** (a) Holdings are often small but an individual usually holds several.

(b) Probably.

**Q. 40.** There is no practical remedy.

**Q. 42.** I am not sure that accumulation of large areas in one hand is undesirable.

**Q. 52.** If one had a free hand in revising all rents in Bengal the correct principle would be to fix the rent as a certain proportion of the economic rent.

The economic rent is the surplus after giving the cultivator a living wage and paying all expenses of cultivation. In a sense then, the proper maintenance of the cultivator is the first charge on the land and the rent comes out of the surplus. The economic rent has to be fixed on the supposition that the cultivator is fully employed—that he has enough land to occupy him fully.

The difficulty is to determine the economic rent. To calculate the price of the average gross produce and subtract a sum equal to the cost of the cultivators' labour and all the expenses of cultivation is not practicable.

There are various ways however in which we can get an approximation. The highest competitive rent for similar land in the neighbourhood is probably something near the economic rent.

The actual rent plus interest on the price of similar land in the vicinity is a guide, e.g., the rent is Rs. 3 per acre and similar land sells for Rs. 100 per acre. The full rent is then Rs.  $3 + 6 =$  Rs. 9, taking interest at 6 per cent. 6 per cent is a very moderate figure to take; the rate at which the raiyat can borrow in the locality is the proper figure.

A share of the produce is an unsatisfactory method of fixing rent.

Beyond a certain outturn the economic rent rises very rapidly. Assume that a cultivator can make a fair living by cultivating a sufficient quantity of land bearing 12 maunds of paddy per acre but has nothing to spare and assume that the cost of cultivation remains the same whatever the outturn; then the rent of land producing—

			Mds.	Rs.
12 maunds per acre is	..	..	Nil	..
14 maunds per acre is	..	..	2	= 4
16 maunds per acre is	..	..	4	= 8
20 maunds per acre is	..	..	8	= 16

Every additional maund above 12 goes entirely to increase the economic rent.

As rent is paid in money it is essential to adjust the rent continually to the price of crops.

It is hardly conceivable that we should ever have a free hand in adjusting all rents in Bengal. In any case the theory above would have to be reduced in practice to something like this—

	Per acre.
	Rs. a.
Up to 15 maunds per acre	... 3 0
15—20 maunds per acre	... 4 8
Over 20 maunds per acre	... 6 0

**Q. 53.** Present rents are not based on any general principles. We have—

(a) Old customary rents fixed long ago. In Hooghly and Howrah they are as much as Rs. 6 an acre. In other places they are much less.

(b) Rents fixed at a time when land was being brought under cultivation and there was a demand for cultivators, e.g., in Mymensingh often Rs. 2 an acre or less for valuable land.

(c) Rents in the neighbourhood of towns which have been forced up by competition.

(d) Rents settled during the jute boom. Rents of Rs. 20 or more an acre have been reported from Pabna.

(e) Rents in recently settled areas. In Sundarban lots Rs. 6 per acre is the prevailing rate.

(f) Rents for special crops, e.g., mulberry, though mulberry is no longer grown.

Except in new chars there is seldom occasion to fix initial rents on a wide scale. In temporarily settled estates rents are periodically adjusted.

In fixing rents originally I think custom is the main element. Settlement made more or less at the current local rate. The capitalized value of the difference between the customary rent and the true rent is taken as salami.

**Q. 55.** I would recommend a readjustment mainly to equalize the incidence of rent. It could not be done without a revision of the record-of-rights and very careful and detailed local inquiries and inspection of crops.

**Q. 57.** Rent should be alterable at intervals of ordinarily not less than 15 years and not more than 20 years, but might be reduced in case of a marked fall in prices within these periods.

**Q. 58.** I would not recommend an income-tax on profits. All lands should pay rent.

**Q. 59.** I do not think the principles and procedure are defective. The present law is that the existing rent is fair and equitable.

**Q. 62.** Tenants who require their whole crops for their own consumption must submit to enhancement—the same as any one else. All raiyats must be treated alike in the matter of enhancement and payment of rent whether they own 1,000 acres or 1 acre.

**Q. 63.** There is some difference in the theory of rent in a private estate and in a Government estate.

In a private estate old rents can be adjusted under section 30 (b) or 38, B. T. Act, at intervals. New rents are entirely a matter of contract.

In a Crown estate the correct theory is that rent is a tax and at each revision the Crown has a free hand. There are certain principles which govern enhancement of rents in both cases; there are also principles of taxation which govern rents in a Crown estate—especially equality of incidence.

In Crown estates equality of incidence is important. In a private estate the landlord is only concerned to get the maximum legal rent in each particular case.

If the whole province became a Crown estate rent would become a tax and equality of incidence would be necessary.

I doubt whether the principle of prevailing rates is applicable to private estates nowadays.

**Q. 64.** There is a provision for reducing rents. (Section 38, B. T. Act.)

I doubt if a provision for limiting rents at new settlements would be effective.

**Q. 67.** Yes. Settlements of revenue are made with this object.

**Q. 68.** No.

**Q. 69.** In theory justifiable—in practice wrong—but it depends on the facts of each case.

**Q. 71.** In most permanently settled estates the rent roll is more than double and may be twenty times the revenue. The zamindar is not going to give remission of Rs. 1,000 to earn remission of Rs. 100. So he does not ask for remission of revenue.

It is seldom necessary to grant remission in khas mahal areas in Bengal. I do not think it is true to say that remission is not ordinarily given to a sufficient extent in khas mahals.

Rule 197, Tauzi Manual, gives the scale used.

**Q. 81.** Yes.

Assuming one man with his family (5 in all) can cultivate 5 acres and that there are 500 cultivated acres per square mile, we get that 500 per square mile is a sufficient agricultural population.

**Oral evidence of Mr. W. H. Nelson, C.S.I., I.C.S., Member, Board of Revenue, Bengal, on 6th February 1939.**

Before the proceedings commenced the Chairman referred to the news of Mr. J. B. Kindersley's sudden death. He recalled the valuable

services which Mr. Kindersley had rendered to Government and at his instance a resolution of condolence was moved by the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan and seconded by Khan Bahadur Abdul Momin. The members then stood in silence in memory of Mr. Kindersley. It was also resolved to address a letter to Mrs. Kindersley, conveying the Commission's sympathy in her bereavement.

In reply to the Chairman, Mr. Nelson said that originally the zamindars were denied the right of making settlements beyond a period of ten years, but in practice they made settlements of a permanent nature, and later, it was conceded that they had the right to do so under the Patni Regulation.

The Permanent Settlement Regulation laid down that they were to act with "good faith and moderation" towards their tenants. It was true that for more than fifty years after the Permanent Settlement there was no tenancy legislation to protect the interests of the tenants; that was a period during which the zamindars were fighting for their existence against the Sale Laws, and had to get Government support to strengthen their hands against the raiyats by giving powers of distraint.

The Chairman then referred to the "Government of India's Land Revenue Policy" which indicated that there had been rack-renting. Mr. Nelson said that this was true to some extent. Prior to the tenancy legislation, most raiyats were only recognized as tenants-at-will, and the zamindars had a free hand in selecting their tenants, subject to custom. These powers eventually led to an agitation for greater protection of the raiyats.

Generally speaking, he was of opinion that as population has increased, there has been a continuous increase of agricultural prosperity, and the condition of the tenants to-day is undoubtedly better than what it was at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

It was his impression that at the Permanent Settlement the raiyats were paying as much rent as they could afford to, i.e., as much as the land could bear.

Broadly speaking, he thought the expectations of the Permanent Settlement have been fulfilled.

Asked whether there was any analogy between the landlords in Great Britain and those in Bengal, he pointed out that property in India is different from property in England. The landlords in Bengal had certainly not behaved like English landlords, as Lord Cornwallis had hoped they would. But he thought it incorrect to say that landlords in Bengal had done nothing to improve their estates and mentioned the excavation of tanks in West Bengal as an instance of the fact that the landlords in Bengal have taken an interest in the improvement of agriculture. He would not say that they have done a great deal, and

if it was an expectation that they should improve their estates in the same way as the landlords in England have done, then that expectation has not been fulfilled.

The position of the raiyats had not materially changed at the time when tenancy legislation was first introduced, although it had probably improved with the rise in prices.

He thought that abwabs will very soon be a thing of the past, though payments in the nature of tips, i.e., small gratuities to the collection staff, will never be stopped as they are more or less voluntary payments. He agreed that the tenants are sometimes defrauded over weights in the case of produce rents but he considered that they are in a stronger position to-day to resist. The day is over when impositions like levies for marriage ceremonies can be realised. Cases are very rarely brought by tenants against landlords' agents for exacting abwabs, because individually the tenants are not strong enough to stand against the zamindars.

Regarding question 7, he said that the average rent paid by the raiyats in terms of produce is less to-day than what it was at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

Referring to his answer to question 9, he said that in "improved rent roll" he included security that rent will be regularly collected, and cited instances where landlords had made such improvements as are implied in the question. He maintained that an improved rent roll is a necessary criterion of an improved estate.

He thought it difficult to say whether tenants in permanently settled areas are better or worse off than khas mahal tenants; but comparing their average rent with that in temporarily settled estates and khas mahals, the raiyats in permanently settled areas are *prima facie* better off in the sense that they pay a lower average rent.

In some temporarily settled areas Government has effected very large improvements, e.g., in the Duars, and in the Sundarbans where embankments have been built. Though the level of khas mahal rent appears to be higher than that in permanently settled areas it is not certain that the tenants are actually paying a higher rent, because most of the khas mahal lies in the most fertile part of Bengal.

He did not wish to suggest that the Permanent Settlement was the best possible arrangement that could be made, but it had worked well, and the raiyats have undoubtedly gained in the long run. Since 1850 their position has become progressively stronger, and to-day they are in a very strong position indeed.

His reply to question 11 was based on a hypothetical instance. He explained "unearned increment" which, he said, depended on the theory of rent. A cultivator gets more out of land than he puts in, and his income from the produce exceeds all outgoings in the form of cost of



cultivation, labour, etc. Economic rent is the difference between the two, and the present level of rent is much below the economic rent. There are various indications of the economic rent, such as the price the raiyat is willing to pay. Pressure of population, he agreed, is a very important question and one which will become increasingly important in the future.

He considered that *bona fide* subinfeudation is not necessarily an evil. When a zamindar grants a patni or permanent tenure, he practically parts with his land;—it is more than a mere lease, it is almost equivalent to a sale;—it is a demise for all time.

People in the mufassal who are fairly well-to-do, and other middle-class people who have made some money, generally invest in land. These people are useful because they are interested in the development of the locality, although they are largely rent-receivers. The system has produced a middle class which is an asset to the province and conditions in India being what they are, it is difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise. Restriction of the Government demand tends to create a large margin for subinfeudation. Conditions are not the same elsewhere as in Bengal. The system is a delegation of responsibility, which is ultimately fixed on the permanent tenure-holder above the cultivator. But if he is a small man, his responsibility is less.

On the whole he was in favour of retaining the Permanent Settlement. It has worked well on the whole, and it is not possible to obliterate the results of a system lasting a century and a half. There must be some continuity and one could not break entirely with the past.

State purchase of zamindaris would be unprofitable, and subsequent enhancements of rent would not be practical politics. But it would not be right on the part of the State to undertake such an operation merely with the object of making a profit; there must be other grounds of policy.

It is an exaggeration to say that the Permanent Settlement has crippled the finances of the province, but he agreed that had temporary settlements continued, Government would be getting more land revenue to-day.

If it were decided to buy out the zamindaris, they would certainly have to be compensated. This, he thought, would probably be an unprofitable proposition for Government. In order to compensate them according to the scale of the Land Acquisition Act, they would have to be given 15 per cent. above the sum payable on account of the value of their estates. All permanent tenure-holders, at fixed rents, would also have to be bought out. It is not essential that Government should be directly above the raiyats. There are tenure-holders in the khas mahala, and there is no particular reason why tenure-holders, whose rent is enhancible, should be bought out.

He could offer no practical solution to the problem of uneconomic holdings and fragmentation which has resulted from the laws of inheritance. The essence of the problem is that rent is a tax on land. The lighter the tax, the more people have; but as population increases, and more people have to be maintained out of the produce a demand arises for reduced rent. But every reduction might lead to a demand for further reduction, and in process of time people might even require to be given the cost of cultivation. The only solution is to fix a moderate rent and insist on its regular payment. He did not apprehend a social breakdown in the next 20 years or so. Bengal, he thought, will go on as she has done for a long time, but political difficulties might arise from the fact that the source of subsistence of the majority of the population is being taxed. The proper land policy should however be a moderate rent and insistence on regular payment. People with uneconomic holdings who are unable to pay their rent cannot be helped. Interference with the laws of inheritance will not really affect the problem. So long as the population increases it makes no difference whether they inherit or not; they have got to be provided for.

He thought that the barga system or something like it is necessary. There are people like widows and minors who cannot themselves cultivate. Bargadars are tenants-at-will. It is true that they may not put their best into the cultivation of barga land, but there is no reason why they should not prove to be good cultivators if they are properly supervised. It does not matter if they are given rights or not, because their rights are of no value. They are already paying the maximum economic rent for their land. They do not need to be protected. No one would turn out a good bargadar and nobody covets their rights or holdings.

He considered that a share of the produce is an unsatisfactory basis for fixing raiyati rent. It would be almost impossible to produce a rule of thumb which would provide a completely satisfactory method of fixing rent. Custom is the main ingredient in the level of rents. It governs rents in khas mahals in the sense that rents are fixed with reference to the existing rate, and the rate for similar lands in the neighbourhood.

It would be too revolutionary to substitute a tax on agricultural incomes for rent; but there might be no objection to the levy of such a tax in addition to rent.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Muazzamuddin Hosain he said that at the Permanent Settlement the khudkasht raiyats held at pargana rates. He thought that they were few in number. Khan Bahadur Muazzamuddin Hosain quoted from the Court of Directors' Despatch, dated the 19th September 1792, to indicate the intention that the rents

of raiyats were to be as permanent and secure as the revenue of the zamindars. Mr. Nelson said he did not know of such a statement.

He said there is no doubt that the effect of the Permanent Settlement has been to subsidise a middle class in Bengal. He did not agree that the Permanent Settlement has killed industry; it is a well-known fact that profits from investment in land are not high. The Khan Bahadur quoted from a Minute of Lord Cornwallis to show that the zamindars were not the proprietors of the soil. Mr. Nelson referred to his answer to question 4 and said that as soon as a zamindar let out land to another, he parted with the proprietary right.

The raiyats were a party to the Permanent Settlement, and Government held a power-of-attorney for them. The present Government might abolish the Permanent Settlement but they have not acquired the province "free from encumbrances."

The raiyats' rents are now fixed, and the only possible means of enhancement is on the ground of a rise in prices. It therefore follows that in terms of produce, the raiyats' rents are fixed. Rents were enhancible before the Permanent Settlement. Before 1859, there was no statutory ground or procedure for enhancement of rent. He was certain that pargana rates were enhancible. Before 1793 all rents were enhancible because the revenue was enhancible. As raiyats always resisted enhancements, it was easier to realise them in the form of abwabs. It is true that the Permanent Settlement has been a financial loss to Government—although he was not prepared to say to what extent. If temporary settlements had continued, the landlords would possibly have got a larger percentage of profits, as they do in the case of 99-year leases in the Sundarbans.

Between 1793 and 1859, the law did not specify the grounds for enhancement but there was no doubt whatever that raiyats' rents were enhancible. He imagined that the grounds of enhancement which were then legal were not the same as the grounds of enhancement nowadays, and that the quotation which the Khan Bahadur had made from the Court of Directors' Despatch was their opinion at the time. It was an admitted fact that a zamindar could improve his estate by growing more valuable crops, and if a raiyat grew such crops, e.g., mulberry instead of paddy, he was liable to have his rent enhanced. This ground for enhancement is not now admissible. In terms of produce the incidence of rent is much less nowadays than it was at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

He thought that the figure for the incidence of revenue in temporarily settled estates given in the Statements provided is very low,—possibly owing to the very small revenue that is still derived from some of the Sundarban estates.

The fact that a holding is very small does not mean that a tenant has no other land. He did not agree that tenants with small holdings should pay no rent. That theory overlooked the fact that the tenant holding an acre of land possesses property worth Rs. 200 or so.

He was not prepared to give an opinion whether the price of land has gone down or not.

It would be a complicated matter to calculate the compensation to the zamindars and tenure-holders if their rights were purchased by Government, but it might be possible to do so. Instead of purchasing, Government might experiment by taking a permanent lease of some zamindaris.

He could not say what would be the cost of establishing a computation branch similar to that of the Settlement Department.

An occupancy holding can be sold for anything up to Rs. 100 a bigha. That is what it is worth. The right of occupancy of a raiyat could be called a proprietary right inasmuch as it has its value, and is heritable and transferable.

He said he was not certain that subinfeudation is an evil. No legislation can defeat an economic law. If a man can make profit by subletting, he will certainly do so. Even if the law forbids it, he will find a way of evading the law. Occupancy rights have nothing to do with the tilling of the soil. Originally they were given to protect the raiyat, who was presumed to be the tiller of the soil, but tenure-holders also have occupancy rights. "Occupancy rights" mean that a man cannot be turned out except by civil suit—not even for non-payment of rent. The rights which a cultivator should get depend on several factors, such as the level of his rent and what was his contract. If he took a lease for two years, he may be turned out when it expires. He may also have rights by custom. He should not be protected simply because he is a tiller of the soil. A well-to-do raiyat has a right to be indolent if he wants to. If he can afford it, there is no reason why he should not sublet.

Asked whether his theory of economic rent was based on the assumption that a cultivator must first be given a living, Mr. Nelson said he had defined, not recommended, economic rent. The figures given by him were illustrative, and were based on the assumption that a tenant holds 5 acres. He did not agree that tenants having less than five acres should be exempted from payment of rent, and explained that he had merely taken a hypothetical case, when he assumed that 12 maunds per acre was the amount necessary to recoup the raiyat for his labour, and all other outgoings. Theoretically such land could not afford to pay rent. Land on the margin of profitable cultivation can afford to pay rent as soon as prices rise. The raiyats pay only a fraction of the economic rent, and should be able to pay it in bad or good years.

Rents have been enhancible by statute since 1859. He referred to the preamble of Act XI of 1859 which clearly shows that the customs existing at the time were simply codified.

He could not suggest a solution for the problem of uneconomic holdings. To give land to landless labourers or tenants with insufficient land would amount to charity. There is no reason why the State should give them land any more than it should give them bicycles. There is no practical solution for the problem of increasing population in agrarian legislation alone.

Rents are reducible under section 38, Bengal Tenancy Act, and should be reduced where they are too high, e.g., there are lands which used to grow valuable crops like mulberry and now grow paddy: the rents for mulberry were high and have not been reduced. In khas mahals the tendency has been to have a flat rate. This does no harm if the rents are moderate. The ideal method would be to assess each plot on its productivity but this would not be practical.

In 1859 and 1885 it was proposed that rents should be one-fourth of the produce. The difficulty about trying to prevent settlement at high rent is that a landlord can always realise salami, representing the capitalised value of the difference between the economic rent and the customary rent settled.

Rupees 15 or Rs. 20 an acre may be a perfectly legal rent, but Settlement Officers should have power to reduce high rents if they are held to be inequitable. As a matter of practical law, it cannot be said that a tenant holding insufficient land should hold it at a low rent. His rent must be governed by the general laws: nobody should get special terms. This did not mean that the revenue policy of Government should not take into consideration the economic condition of the people. What he said was that one should not take into account the circumstances of individuals.

The value of land cannot be affected by legislation. In his opinion, enhancement on the ground of rise in prices is perfectly fair. The fact that landlords are not responsible for the rise in prices does not affect the question. The present level of rent is so low that a raiyat can normally pay two years' rent from one year's crop. In khas mahals also the rent is moderate and it should rarely be necessary to grant remissions.

In reply to Khan Bahadur M. A. Momin, he said that remission in khas mahals has increased very much in the last year or two. In his opinion it was not entirely necessary. There is a regular system of remission in districts which are liable to famine. Bengal, broadly speaking, is not liable to famine. He entirely agreed that the correct policy is to collect as much arrear rent as possible every year and to remit the balance once for all.

He agreed it is difficult to say that zamindars should not grant remission where it is deserved, but according to their contract, the zamindars are not entitled to any remission from Government.

If the zamindars and tenure-holders are bought out, they will either spend the money or invest it. If they invest, they will naturally invest in land. That means that they would become owners of raiyati land. The result would be that many middle-class people would become raiyats under Government, and the actual cultivators would be those who would hold under them.

He agreed that as a general principle cultivators should have security. In the case of bargadars it is difficult to limit their share of the crop in such a way that they will have some interest in the land. A raiyat has got some land which he wants either to cultivate or to let out to a bargadar. There would not be any serious objection to a bargadar paying say 45 per cent. of the crop instead of 50 per cent.; but the principle remains that there must be somebody at the bottom of the scale who cannot sublet.

He would not insist that everybody below the raiyat should be governed by contract but saw no reason to the contrary.

If the zamindari and intermediate interests are bought out he doubted whether a happier state of things would ensue, because all the raiyats have votes and land would become a part of politics.

Regarding the comparative advantages of tenants in khas mahals and under zamindari management he said it is the fashion nowadays to say that a tenant under a landlord is better off because a private landlord has no certificate powers, and sometimes tenants are allowed to get into arrears for 4 years or so. Personally he thought that the khas mahal raiyat is probably better off.

He doubted whether the purchase of zamindaris and tenures would be a source of profit to the State.

In his opinion it is not legitimate for the State to undertake such an enterprise simply in order to obtain increased revenue. That would be merely in the nature of a speculation. The State has no right to buy out a zamindar who is not willing to sell.

If the Permanent Settlement is really an economic evil, there might be a case for ending it, but the mere fact that it has impaired the resources of the province would not be a legitimate ground.

He did not consider it morally wrong that tenants' rents should be enhanced, and the whole increment should go to the zamindar.

He did not agree that before the Permanent Settlement, and after it until 1859, the rents of raiyats were unenhancible except for the

benefit of the State. Before 1793 there was no settlement of rent when a settlement of revenue was made. When settlements were made, the State simply enhanced the revenue and left the zamindar to make what he could.

Section 50 (2) of Bengal Tenancy Act is the theory of lost grant. Generally speaking all rents were enhancible. If one finds that a rent has not been enhanced for 20 years, then there is something curious about it. If rent has never been enhanced the presumption is that it is not enhancible. The point was considered at the time of the Permanent Settlement and the decision was that rent should be left to custom. That will be found in Harington's "Analysis."

Rents which were by custom unchangeable are still fixed.

In reply to the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur, he said that extension of cultivation was a natural process in the interest of both zamindars and tenants. The probability is that both parties are responsible for extending cultivation because it is so much to the interest of both. The expectation of the Permanent Settlement had more or less been fulfilled in this respect. Regulation VIII of 1819 might be repealed, but not with retrospective effect.

On the whole he was not in favour of giving one month's time to the zamindars for payment of revenue, in the same way that this concession is allowed to patnidars. On principle he was against any relaxation of the Sale Law.

If the whole province became a khas mahal the occupancy raiyats would become landlords and would be free to sublet to under-tenants. Nothing would prevent subletting, and if occupancy rights were given to all under-raiyats the result would be the existing system on a lower grade. He thought this was a reasonable criticism of the proposal to buy out the landlords. It is impossible to limit the size of raiyati holdings.

He could not recollect any case in which the gross rental is lower than the land revenue. If rent were to be reduced below the level of land revenue, then revenue would also have to be reduced. He agreed that in Burdwan the incidence of revenue is high.

He considered that when there is a serious fall in prices, reduction of rent is much more important and urgent than enhancement of rent when there is a rise in prices, because the landlord can wait for his enhancement, but the raiyat cannot afford to wait for a reduction.

Rents are lower in Bengal than in any other province. This is clear when they are expressed in terms of produce and considered in relation to the gross produce of the land especially where they have

been reduced to produce rents. The grounds and procedure for enhancement of rent in the Acts of 1869 and 1885 were equitable, and it was for the benefit of the raiyats that the Acts regularised the whole procedure.

He was in favour of the simplest possible method of realising rent. The whole basis of the land revenue policy ought to be that moderate rents should be fixed and that they should be realised promptly.

Generally speaking, rent in Bengal is low: the average is a little more than Re. 1 per bigha.

In reply to Dr. R. K. Mukherji, he did not agree that the peasantry as a whole is insolvent, or that cultivation is unprofitable under present conditions. He could not suggest any remedy for the improvident who are growing poorer, and did not agree that the State has any responsibility in laying down the standard of an economic holding, or providing land up to that standard.

It was desirable that every family should have at least 5 acres of land. The larger the holding, the greater would be the profits, as the costs of cultivation would be proportionately less.

He agreed that fragmentation is undesirable, but thought that it is not possible to check it.

He was not in favour of reducing rents as a measure designed to assist the tenants. Rent is a very small fraction of their budget. He agreed that the general price level of all commodities should be taken into account as well as the price of paddy, but pointed out that paddy is still the main staple food crop. The level of prices has a greater effect on the incidence of rent than any other factor.

There can be no general rule fixing a proportion of the produce as a fair rent. If 1/6th is taken as the standard, the result would be that rent would be far too high in the poorer classes of land and far too low in the fertile classes. A fixed fraction of the produce is not a reliable guide. He thought that the Madras practice of taking half the net produce might be rather severe. The present level of rent in Bengal might be described as one anna in the rupee.

The barga system indicates that the maximum rent which the land can bear, is half the produce. Personally he would prefer an acre of barga land in a fertile area like Bakarganj to an acre of rent free land in an unfertile district like Bankura.

He would have no objection to a tax on agricultural incomes on income-tax principles, i.e., above certain limits.



Government is justified in spending a portion of its land revenue from the khas mahals on improvements there, because the raiyats stand in the position of tenants as well as tax-payers.

Section 38, Bengal Tenancy Act, provides for the reduction of rent. Produce rents are not affected by the changing prices of commodities.

If payment of rent in cash or kind is made optional, the tenants would all prefer to pay in cash when prices rise, and in produce when they fall. It would not be feasible to collect rent in kind on a large scale. State-marketing might be possible, but he was not an authority on the subject.

With some exceptions subinfeudation is practically universal in Bengal. There are of course many landlords who have a number of khas raiyats. The tendency to subinfeudation arises when rent is low and a profit can be made by subletting. Subinfeudation in itself is not an evil. In effect it has led to the distribution of wealth among a larger number of people.

Bengal is probably the richest province in India. This view is supported by the printed statistics showing the yield per acre.

(At this point Dr. R. K. Mukherji asked for a statement to show the amount of land revenue, i.e., intercepted by zamindars and tenure-holders. At the instance of the Chairman it was decided that on receipt of an official intimation from the Secretary giving details of the calculation required, Mr. Nelson would arrange with the Director of Land Records to supply the figures in due course.

In reply to Sir F. A. Sachse's suggestion Dr. Mukherji agreed that khas lands would be valued at the prevailing raiyati rents.)

In connection with the proposed purchase by Government of zamindaris and intermediate tenures Mr. Nelson did not agree that any distinction should be made between the original landlords with whom the Permanent Settlement was made and those who had purchased estates subsequently.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Hashem Ali Khan, he said although he had no definite data, he thought that the rents payable after the Permanent Settlement were the same as those just before. Compared to pre-Permanent Settlement days rents are at present lower in terms of paddy. The price of paddy was lower at the time of the Permanent Settlement possibly owing to the scarcity of money.

There can certainly be cases where rents have not been enhanced, since the Permanent Settlement; but rents have always been enhancible, and from time to time have been enhanced.

So far as his information went, the yield per acre has not generally decreased since the Permanent Settlement. Fertility has decreased in some areas where rivers have silted up; in other areas it has definitely increased.

Generally speaking, tenants are far better off to-day than in 1793: they have now got a much higher standard of living and pay lower rents in terms of produce. Probably there was little debt at the time of the Permanent Settlement because the tenants had no security and consequently no credit. He could not say what is the total agricultural indebtedness to-day, but thought that in many places indebtedness is slight. He could not give a general figure for the average cost of cultivation per acre. He considered 5 acres should be a sufficient minimum for a man with a family of four or five to secure a reasonable living. He agreed that the cost of cultivation has gone up since the Permanent Settlement but was not sure if manuring was required at that time.

Prior to the Permanent Settlement there was no such thing as the road or public works cess. The zamindars were responsible for the roads and for the rural police. They were relieved of police duties at the Permanent Settlement. At the time of the Permanent Settlement the question for decision was whether the settlement should be permanently made or whether temporary settlement should be continued. The system of temporary settlement had more or less broken down at that time.

After revenue sales encumbrances are generally annulled. If there is no bid, Government can purchase for one rupee, and if a bid is made which does not cover the arrear, Collectors have powers to buy the estate for Government at that figure.

If the Permanent Settlement is abolished Government revenue would be increased, but it was very difficult to say exactly how much surplus would be available as it depended on so many factors such as the cost of acquisition, management, etc. On the whole he was not in favour of abolishing the Permanent Settlement, because with the Permanent Settlement people knew where they stood, whereas the alternative might prove hazardous. If the Permanent Settlement is retained, he could not suggest any means of increasing land revenue except from khas mahals and temporarily settled areas.

Rural credit has been disorganised by the Debt Settlement Boards, and during the last year or two the price of land has fallen to a great extent, as a result of which there has been a slump in the price of zamindaris. He could not say exactly what would be the purchase price to-day. He did not agree that the zamindars have done nothing to improve agriculture. The raiyats also have property in the land, and should also effect improvements on their holdings.

Once things settled down again there is no reason why people should not invest in land as before.

In reply to Sir F. A. Sachse, Mr. Nelson said he was under the impression that the majority of raiyats at the Permanent Settlement were tenants-at-will, i.e., the khudkasht raiyats were a minority. One gets the same impression from Regulation VII of 1822, and from the fact that there was a large number of migratory raiyats who wandered about from place to place looking for the best land. The khudkasht raiyats probably paid higher rents than the paikash raiyats.

He agreed that most zamindari staff is underpaid, but mentioned that some zamindars have recently increased the salary of their staff. He doubted whether the collecting staff gets as much as annas four in the rupee now a days. It is true that they get something; he could not give the exact figure.

He explained that by "unearned increment" in his reply to question 11 he referred to the economic rent, i.e., the surplus over and above all costs of cultivation:—for example, if two holdings, otherwise equal, produce 12 and 20 maunds of paddy, and all the costs of cultivation are represented by 12 maunds, the economic rent of the latter holding would be the difference of 8 maunds, or Rs. 16.

He agreed that in giving tenants occupancy rights the legislation assumed them to be the actual tillers of the soil. To protect all grades of under-raiyats presupposes a sanction to subinfeudation, and an admission that the raiyat is holding at a very low rent. If there is room underneath him for several grades of under-raiyats, then he must be making too big a profit. Protection cannot be extended indefinitely: it has got to stop somewhere.

Until recently there never has been a serious fall in prices, and section 38 (1) (b), Bengal Tenancy Act, is only beginning to operate in Government estates.

There is no reason against the State bidding in revenue sales except that it rather implies that Government is investing in land. Government might try the experiment of taking permanent leases of some zamindaris. That could be done without much expense.

The existing rules do not give too much protection to separate accounts. It is difficult to avoid the large number of separate accounts. It would be much better to make it obligatory for landlords to keep their own accounts, and to appoint common agents. The main difficulty is that they do not trust one another.

When a tenant gets into arrears all reasonable means should be taken to make him pay as soon as possible, provided the rent is fair.

If the demand is fair it is easier to insist on punctual payment. Zamindars should be given something as near as possible to the certificate procedure.

Replying to the Secretary, he agreed that whereas reductions of rent under section 38 (1) (b), Bengal Tenancy Act, are now being made in khas mahals and temporarily settled estates, it is difficult for tenants in permanently settled estates to get similar reductions because the Civil Court procedure is cumbrous and expensive. He was in favour of having a cheap and summary agency—preferably Revenue Officers. Civil Court procedure for the recovery of arrear rents is also slow and expensive. Provided that the rents are fair, the landlords should be allowed something like certificate procedure, and the object should be to enforce it after each harvest.

Replying to the Chairman, he said provided proper control is exercised, there would be no objection to allowing landlords something like certificate procedure. He thought that the court fees in rent suits, —particularly where the sum claimed is large,—are capable of reduction.

**Memorandum by Mr. L. R. Fawcus, C.I.E., I.C.S.,  
Commissioner, Dacca Division.**

The vast field covered by the questionnaire makes it impossible, as I am sure the Commission realises, to deal with it all adequately in the intervals of other official work, and the question arises on what points can views be most usefully submitted. Personally I find the historical questions most interesting, and have reluctantly abandoned the idea of discussing them as I realise that mere "*ipse dixit*" views would be of little value unless reinforced by references to authorities and reports which I have neither the library nor the leisure to collate. The reluctance is less, however, owing to the fact that the Commission includes several members who themselves are probably the best living authorities on these questions.

Perhaps therefore the most useful form this note can take will be to discuss certain points of the questionnaire from the standpoint of actual experience gained in revenue work.

In question 19 it is asked in effect whether khas mahal tenants are better off than zamindars' tenants and whether they themselves consider it a benefit to have Government as their direct landlord. I should say "yes" definitely, in spite of the fact that while the certificate procedure was in force Government tenants had to pay their rent more promptly and regularly than the tenants of landlords who had not the benefit of this procedure. A khas mahal tenant always considers himself a privileged person owing to his connection through the tahsildar and Khas Mahal Officer with the Magistrate-Collector. For example in the not infrequent cases of dispute with neighbouring zamindari tenants over a fishery or an indefinite char land boundary, although the final decision is impartial, the Government tenant knows quite well that his case is going to be put up to the best advantage by the experienced Deputy Collector who looks after the khas mahals and if the worst comes to the worst and a civil suit is filed his interests will be fully looked after by Government.

Again in the question of abwabs, in spite of the increasing stringency of their legal prohibition, the khas mahal tenant always has been and still is less liable to these exactions than the zamindar's tenants.

Remission and suspension of rent in case of real natural calamities is more promptly and freely given by Government than by most private landlords and this more than counterbalances the capricious relaxations in the matter of rent which the latter give to useful or favourite tenants.

A programme of improvements in such matters as water supply or educational facilities is the rule in Government estates—but the exception in zamindari mahals, and though Government peons are by no

means beyond reproach, the little finger of the *burkandar* used to be—  
and in out of the way places probably still is—thicker than the peons' *lāns*.

Further instances could be cited and in spite of a denial of the fact which I recently heard given to the Commission by an experienced officer, I have little doubt that any tenant who was given the choice would prefer to hold his land directly under Government. I need hardly, in fairness to many landlords, add that such abuses or omissions as I have suggested to occur in their estates are generally to be laid at the door of their subordinate officers, though there have been unfortunately notorious exceptions.

**Q. 22.** In the case of purchase of zamindaris and tefures there should not be much difficulty in dealing with homestead and khas lands. The question arises in an analogous form often enough in settlement proceedings when it is decided for some reason to hold a temporarily settled mahal khas for a period of years or to give it in *ijara*. The owners pay rent for such lands like ordinary tenants at a valuation which will be covered in the event of Government purchase, by the compensation they will receive or as a matter of grace they may be permitted to hold them rent free. The main difficulty is, and presumably will be, the treatment of lands cultivated by bargadars which the zamindar or tenure-holder claims to be his khas khamar lands, but this is a problem with which Settlement Officers are familiar and it will not be hard to carry out whatever policy Government adopts for the treatment of these lands. Presumably the khas khamar claims will be narrowly scrutinised and their recognition strictly limited.

**Q. 52 et seq.** Much could be written on the principle of determining fair and equitable rents. The old idea of pargana rates has died hard. Presumably these rates were in their inception the rates at which tenants could be found to take up land when the competition was not for land but for tenants to settle on the land, and though tenancy legislation from the Rent Act of 1859 onwards has modified this conception of rent, the raiyats themselves still speak of the “*জামদার নিয়ম*” as something tangible and comprehensible to them, and Settlement Officers in fixing fair rents frequently take such village rates into their consideration. Under the physical conditions of Bengal economic rent is indefinable; the frequent changes of the courses of rivers and the building up of a deltaic area has left in innumerable villages alternate tracts of high and low land, and it stands to reason that in a dry year the low lands will bear the best crops while in a year of flood or heavy rainfall the high lands will be benefited and the low lands submerged into infertility. Actual value of produce thus becomes an unstable factor in estimating what annual rent a tenant can pay—and the village rate which generally varies according to the height of the land, represents more nearly what a tenant can pay for his land, averaging the chances

of a good crop over a number of years. Of comparatively recent years however competition for land, as noted above, has taken the place of competition for tenants and this has been the most powerful factor in modifying the old customary rates, and, in conjunction with the somewhat unsatisfactory procedure for raising the rent on the ground of a rise in the price of staple food crops, must have been an important factor in the economic deterioration of the tenantry. I speak of the latter ground for raising the rent as unsatisfactory, for although it is a fair enough procedure when the tenant can produce enough food crops to earn the cash value of them by sale of a considerable proportion, now-a-days holdings are so small, that in many cases the majority of the food crop is utilised for subsistence and a comparatively small amount, if any, is available as a money crop.

It follows from the above considerations that if an attempt were made to adjust rents on a fair and equitable scale throughout the province, probably the most satisfactory procedure would be to base them on Tables of Rates framed on the lines laid down in section 104B of the Bengal Tenancy Act—giving the Revenue Officer power to reduce existing rents so as to adopt them to the rate appropriate to the tenants holding.

In this connection the point raised in question 73 with regard to the decrease in productivity of the soil is relevant and interesting. Owing to the fluctuations in crop outturn attributable to natural causes to which I have referred above, also owing to the difficulty of making accurate deductions from crop cutting experiments, and the absence of comparative data extending over a long period conclusive proof on this subject is unattainable. Nevertheless the known geological and hydrographical facts of deltaic action of great rivers lead, I believe, inevitably to the conclusion that the fertility of the present area comprised in Bengal is decreasing and the rate of the decrease is a question which is assuming more and more importance as time goes on.

The course of the Ganges from the United Provinces to the confines of Bengal is more or less an east and west one between the Himalayas on the north and the hilly country of Chota Nagpur and Rajmahal to the south, the river being kept in an eastward course by the latter trammels. Once clear, however, of the eastern limits of these latter hills the river in past times followed the natural slope of the country southward to the sea and, as the Adhiganga (original Ganges) and the Bhagirathi, built up a delta comprising the present area of western Bengal. As this area was gradually raised the main Ganges stream has forsaken these old beds and has continued its eastward course building up central Bengal till it has met the two great southward flowing rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna in eastern Bengal. No further eastward trend is possible as the hilly tracts adjacent to

Tippera obstruct it and the three great rivers the Ganges, the Meghna and the Brahmaputra are pouring silt, disintegrated from the heights of the Himalayas by the frost and rain prevalent there, into a sort of basin bounded on the west by the Chota Nagpur hills, on the east by the Tippera hills and on the north by the Himalayas. This process as far as can be humanly foreseen must build up the present jute and paddy growing areas of central and eastern Bengal into a less fertile and drier land analogous to the western Bengal districts and there is every likelihood that the process will go on with increasing rapidity as the saucer gets fuller and fuller. This is the process which logically must now be diminishing the productivity of the soil and, in spite of the considerable efforts which are being made by introduction of improved strains of crops and artificial fertilisers to improve the out-turn, must eventually make it impossible for the vast agricultural population of the tract to gain even sustenance, let alone a comfortable livelihood, from their ancestral occupation. Nor is there any likelihood of a decrease of the pressure of population on the available land, for the laws of nature are exerting themselves to the detriment of Bengal in another way. Its warm humid climate has a direct twofold physiological effect. On the one hand it favours multiplication of the human race (as long ago as Vedic times the Bangas or Bengalis were spoken of as "the eaters of fish and the progenitors of many children"), and on the other hand owing to the above climatic conditions which are analogous to those of a bacteria culture tube—the germs of epidemic diseases such as Typhoid, Malaria and Cholera have found an environment in Bengal which has resulted in continual and devastating outbreaks of these diseases. So long these two forces of nature balanced each other; the climate produced and the climate destroyed. Within the past fifty years, however, the spread of scientific knowledge and successful sanitary precautions have neutralised the destroying force, but the creating force has continued unchecked—and indeed encouraged by the social opinions and customs of the people, and whereas, before, families of ten were born and four survived to eat the fruits of the land, now-a-days families of ten are born and seven survive to find that the fruits of the land are not sufficient for them. This then it would appear from the above considerations is the crux of the problem of the tenantry of Bengal—an inexorably diminishing fertility of the land and a steadily increasing pressure of population on it. The remedy, so far as remedy is possible, obviously lies to a great extent outside the scope of the revenue laws however drastically amended but in the amendment of them I would suggest that the cardinal point to be recognised and faced is that so long as the mountains stand where they do, and the rivers flow and the sun shines, the land of Bengal will become less and less able to support an agricultural population and that population less and less able to be as of old the main source of revenue to the province.



**Oral evidence of Mr. L. R. Fawcett, C.I.E., I.C.S., Commissioner,  
Dacca Division, on 14th February 1939.**

In reply to the Chairman, Mr. L. R. Fawcett said that he was definitely of opinion that tenants generally would prefer to come under Government. Provided that Government administration is properly carried out, he thought that it would be better for the tenants themselves and for agricultural economy.

He was surprised to hear that the average rent in Bengal is as little as 1/16th of the gross produce: he would have thought it was a larger proportion.

Under the present conditions he considered that rents could not be enhanced to any considerable extent and that in some places its incidence is too high. Roughly speaking, under-raiyats pay double the raiyati rent, and it is difficult for most of them to make a living.

In reply to the Chairman's question whether holdings are not too small, he said that the pressure of agricultural population is now too great. The economic conditions of cultivators are also affected by prices, e.g., if the price of jute rises to Rs. 8 they are reasonably well off, while if it falls to Rs. 3-8 they are badly off. Paddy he regarded as a subsistence crop and not as a money crop. It is not usual for most tenants to have a large surplus of paddy for sale.

He agreed that holdings have become too small and that the position may further deteriorate unless steps are taken to check the present tendency. The size of holdings could not however be altered unless the laws of inheritance are changed. Fragmentation through inheritance is a natural process. He would prefer to provide other occupations for the excess agricultural population rather than to interfere with the laws of inheritance. He mentioned that when the Royal Commission on Agriculture recommended consolidation of holdings he had considered the problem and come to the conclusion that there is no practical way of checking fragmentation resulting from inheritance.

As regards the latter part of his reply regarding the effect of deltas formed by large rivers, he said the fact must be faced that deterioration will continue except at the mouth of the delta where new land is being formed. It is probable that the same conditions will eventually prevail as now exist in the tract between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers which even in historical times was a fertile area. He mentioned that the Bakarganj Settlement Report contained a sketch map showing the land round the Meghna as it had been formerly, as it was at the time of the Settlement, and as it might be in future years. In eastern Bengal the process will be the same as it has been in western Bengal, where the rivers have built up the land round them and produced deterioration in fertility.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Muazzamuddin Hossain, he said that by the phrase "the rate appropriate to the tenants' holdings" he was not referring to the size of holdings, i.e., whether holdings are economic or not, but to their productivity. In his opinion it was preferable to have rent fixed according to a table of rates rather than to fix it in relation to rise and fall in prices.

In reply to Dr. R. K. Mukherji, he did not agree that the khas mahal management is more mechanical and less humane than samindari management. Mr. M. M. Stuart's Khas Mahal Report might express a different view from his own, but he adhered to his own opinion based on more than twenty years' revenue experience. There is a much closer relation between Government and its tenants than between an average landlord and his tenants.

He did not claim to be a scientific expert but he had studied geology and had written some articles on the subject. In his opinion it is very difficult to check the silting up of rivers. Government is now considering the problem of river training.

The cultivating classes are not seriously affected by the price of paddy: those who have to use the entire produce to feed their families are not in a position to sell any portion of it. The real economic difficulty is that the fertility of soil is tending to decrease while the population is steadily increasing. He agreed that even if improved methods of cultivation could be introduced they would not solve the problem so long as holdings remain too small.

The principal causes of the present economic conditions are:—

- (1) natural causes, i.e., climatic conditions and delta formation;
- (2) decrease of fertility; and
- (3) pressure of population on the land and fragmentation of holdings.

There are also external factors which affect the economic condition of tenants in Bengal—e.g., the world depression of recent years which naturally had its repercussions in this country.

He was not in favour of payment of rent in kind instead of in cash.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Abdul Momin, he said that the tenants would prefer to come under Government but there would be considerable difficulties in buying out the landlords and intermediate tenure-holders and he thought that it would probably operate unfairly on the landlords. He agreed that it would not be impossible to have a raiyatwari system.

He doubted whether the removal of landlords and tenure-holders would result in a decrease in litigation: certainly the number of criminal

cases would not be affected. At present some khas tahsildars do their best to settle petty disputes, it is possible that there might be less litigation if the whole province became a khas mahal.

He could not say exactly what is the percentage of the cost of collection in khas mahals. He had not seen the latest Land Administration Report but the practice was always to aim at a maximum of 10 per cent. The cost of management ought to be less, if the State manages compact khas mahal blocks instead of scattered areas. The same principle will apply in a comparison of cost of management in Court of Wards' estates: some estates are compact, some are scattered.

He thought that there might be difficulties in the way of Collectors bidding for estates in revenue sales. It would hardly be possible for the Collector to have the same knowledge of the estates' financial possibilities as the persons who might be bidding against him.

Consolidation of holdings has been proposed by the Royal Commission on Agriculture but he had considered it at the time to be impracticable. He doubted whether consolidation would be easier if the landlords and tenure-holders are removed. Consolidation is not carried out at present in khas mahals and his experience is that tenants always cling to their ancestral holdings.

Generally speaking, rents are not capable of being increased now.

In reply to the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan he said there was no doubt whatever that enhancements of rent were made before the Permanent Settlement. The asal jama was the old assessment which had been fixed by Todar Mal, and subsequent to this many settlements had been made at which the asal jama was increased. In his opinion it would be a mistake to say that rents were fixed in perpetuity at the Permanent Settlement and could not be enhanced thereafter.

He would consider it unfair to the landlords to break up the zamindari system. His opinion that khas mahal management is better than zamindari management was made irrespective of the question of buying out the landlords.

He thought that it is a question for an actuary and not a Revenue Officer to decide what should be the fair rate of compensation if the landlords and tenure-holders are bought out. He hesitated to suggest any figure himself because he was not in a position to give any data in support.

If Government took a permanent lease of a zamindari it would be in the position of a permanent ijaradar under the landlord; the patnis and other tenures would continue and could not be annulled without paying compensation.

The proposal to take away the occupancy from the area transferred by raiyats would be an infringement on the right of transfer which is one of the incidence of occupancy right. It would also be taking away from individual enterprise. We protect aboriginal tenants from unthrifty transfers on the ground that they are not competent to look after their own interests, but the same ground would not hold good in other cases.

He agreed that in temporarily settled estates Government takes upto 70 per cent. of the assets as revenue. He could not say why the Saharanpur rules laid down by Lord Curzon in 1902 have not been followed in Bengal: these he believed, limit revenue to 50 per cent. of the assets.

He considered that the Government policy of effecting improvements in khas mahals is more regular than the improvements effected in zamindari estates. The latter are more in the nature of individual cases of munificence. Government has a regular programme of improvements which goes to the Board of Revenue for sanction, whereas improvements in zamindari estates are rather sporadic.

In reply to Sir Frederic Sachse, he agreed that if the Commission's figures showing the average value of produce are correct, then the average rent would be about 1/15th of the produce. If the value of the produce is only Rs. 30 an acre in some areas, rent would be about 1/10th of its value. He could not say if this proportion is smaller than in the other provinces.

If the price of jute remains at Rs. 8, the condition of the cultivator will certainly improve, but the increase in price will not entirely solve the economic problems. It is possible that the price of paddy may go up in sympathy with the price of jute. During the jute boom of 1925 the standard of living undoubtedly went up in eastern Bengal. Corrugated iron houses were erected by many tenants and now-a-days one can get biscuits and good tea in villages where there were certainly none twenty years ago. There is no doubt that the tenants have acquired a higher standard of living.

He agreed that there are tenants who pay as much as Rs. 10 an acre for land which grows only paddy in districts like Howrah and yet make a living in spite of the high rent. He thought, however, that much depends on the probability that the land in question will produce a good crop. In some Sundarban lots in Khulna the rent is Rs. 10 an acre but a similar rent would never be obtained in areas like Chandkhali where the success of the crop is not so certain.

Drought and floods are of regular occurrence in Bengal: three years ago relief had to be given in Dacca on account of drought and this year on account of flood. He agreed that owing to the floods in Pabna this

year the tenants might have been compelled to grow rabi crops which they would not otherwise have grown. He thought there was scope for extension of the cultivation of rabi crops in districts like Bakarganj and Chittagong. Kalai is not a money crop: it only just pays for the cost of labour. Rabi crops which would be good money crops are potatoes, tomatoes and tobacco. He agreed that as holdings are getting smaller and smaller, conditions are going from bad to worse.

He agreed that if the zamindars are bought out, it would be, on the whole, an advantage if the fisheries are taken over by Government, but legislation on subjects such as protection of fish would be of value even if the fisheries remain in the zamindars' hands. The fish industry is a useful standby in times of famine.

The process of delta building by big rivers might certainly provide more land along the coast of the Bay of Bengal, though that would not help tenants in districts like Mymensingh.

He thought that it will result in hardship if separate accounts are not allowed, because one co-sharer who is negligent in the payment of revenue would be able to make things much more difficult for the other co-sharers. Separate accounts should also be allowed to tenure-holders who are liable to be sold up under Act VII of 1868. Partition might solve the difficulty of separate accounts, but a more summary procedure would have to be introduced. Under the present system partition proceedings often take five or six years.

In reply to the Secretary he said that he had always been in favour of granting certificate procedure to zamindars and if certificate procedure is restored, he would certainly be in favour of extending it to them.

He agreed that reductions of rents, which are now being made in khas mahals and temporarily settled estates cannot be readily obtained by tenants in permanently settled estates because Civil Court procedure is expensive and cumbrous. He doubted, however, whether reductions could be effected by Revenue Officers because of the time involved in enquiring into individual cases. It would be simpler to carry out reductions under the section 105 procedure along with re-settlements.

In reply to Sir Frederic Sachse he said he was strongly of opinion that the record-of-rights should be kept up to date. Government can do so now by a notification under section 101, Bengal Tenancy Act. He believed the popular objection to a programme of district re-settlements is the fear of levy of recovery costs. If the province became a khas mahal, there is no doubt that the record-of-rights would have to be maintained.

**Reply by Mr. F. W. Robertson, C.I.E., I.C.S. (Retd.),  
ex-Divisional Commissioner and ex-Settlement Officer.**

**Q. 1.** The description of the duties and obligations of the zamindars after the Permanent Settlement was concluded as given in question 1 appears to be exhaustive.

**Q. 6.** In general the increase in area brought under cultivation since the Permanent Settlement is due to the increase in population and the enterprise of tenants and not to the initiative and the pecuniary or other assistance of the landlords.

**Q. 7.** The increase in the rent roll of the permanently settled area is due mainly to the increase in cultivation and to reclamation of waste lands and to some small extent to enhancement of rents.

**Q. 11.** (ii) It is doubtful whether the Permanent Settlement has been the direct cause of subinfeudation or whether it could have been prevented under any other system.

(iii) There has not been any great enhancement of raiyati rents.

**Q. 16.** State purchase of zamindaris would undoubtedly greatly affect the social structure of Bengal in that it would destroy the present landholders as a class.

**Q. 17.** If it is proposed to abolish the zamindari system it seems desirable that all interests between the zamindar and the raiyat should be abolished at the same time.

**Q. 18.** In the event of cultivating raiyats holding directly under Government by the purchase of zamindari and intermediate rights a very large and expensive organisation would be necessary to perform the duties of management and collection.

**Q. 19.** It is doubtful whether the raiyats would prefer to come under Government or that khas mahal raiyats enjoy any advantages over raiyats in private zamindaris.

**Q. 20.** The Permanent Settlement did undoubtedly encourage subinfeudation, but it is very doubtful whether subinfeudation could have been avoided under any other system.

**Q. 25.** I can see no reason why the right of occupancy should be confined to one class of tenant only.

**Q. 29.** The number of bargadars, etc., is in my opinion increasing. Landlords ordinarily endeavour to resettle lands which have come into their hands by purchase or otherwise on a produce rent.

**Q. 35.** One-fifth would seem to be a reasonable proportion on the produce to be paid by bargadars.

**Q. 37.** Experience in the Duars khas mahals of the Jalpaiguri district would go to show that it is impossible to restrict transfer to genuine agriculturists.

**Q. 38.** The size of an economic holding must vary according to the fertility of the soil and the number of crops which the soil can produce annually. Ordinarily from 4 to 5 acres would be the minimum size of an economic holding.

**Q. 39.** It is a fact that the size of many raiyati holdings is uneconomic. The laws of inheritance, the statutory rights of transfer and the increase in the population all tend to further subdivision and fragmentation of holdings.

**Q. 40.** Consolidation of holdings is certainly desirable, but there seems no practical way of achieving it except by settling with the raiyats of neighbouring lands such lands as may fall in the care of khas mahals and Wards estates.

**Q. 46.** There is no reason to suppose that the framers of the Permanent Settlement intended that rents or rates of rent should remain fixed for ever. To fix rents for ever would appear to be unreasonable in view of the fluctuation in the value of money.

**Q. 49.** I can see no reason for reducing rents of tenants. Existing rents are very low, mainly because the value of money has largely decreased. To benefit the cultivators what is required is to increase their capacity to pay.

**Q. 53.** Whatever may have been the original method of fixing rents, there can be little doubt that now in Bengal rents are lump rents.

**Q. 55.** In my opinion it would be most dangerous to interfere with the existing structure and to endeavour to readjust all rents.

**Q. 56.** It is difficult to give an opinion without an intensive study of the question. One-fifth of the produce has been regarded as a reasonable share of the produce to be paid as rent.

**Q. 57.** The statutory limit of 15 years would seem to be a reasonable period.

**Q. 58.** Undoubtedly the proportion of agriculturists liable to pay income tax on agricultural incomes would be small and the number would tend to diminish. This would be an objection to the proposal to substitute income-tax for the present system of land revenue.

**Q. 61.** There seems to be no objection to the principle of enhancement of rent on the ground of rise in prices. It is natural that rent should be enhanced as the value of money decreases.

**Q. 62.** I can see no reason for the proposal that no such enhancements should be given in the case of tenants who require the whole of their crops for their own consumption.

**Q. 71.** Such remissions are seldom given. The probable reason is that it is difficult if not impossible to secure that these remissions will be passed on to the tenants.

**Q. 75.** The only reason why the amounts spent by Government for improvements in khas mahals have been small of late years is the financial stringency.

**Q. 89.** The machinery available to the landlords for the realisation of their dues is certainly at present too costly and cumbrous. As long as these dues are admitted and are not in dispute it should not be compulsory for landlords to go to the Civil Courts to realise them.

**Q. 90.** Provided the Public Demands Recovery Act is judiciously administered under proper supervision there is no reason why it should prove either harassing or objectionable. When it has proved so it is almost always due to faulty administration.

**Oral evidence of Mr. F. W. Robertson, C.I.E., Chairman, Public Service Commission, Bengal, on 10th February 1938.**

In reply to the Chairman, Mr. Robertson said it is true that more subinfeudation exists in Bengal than elsewhere. When he said it was difficult to stop subinfeudation, he was thinking particularly of the Duars where Government had attempted to stop subinfeudation but had failed. He agreed that the large margin between the present average rents and the economic rent is one possible reason for subinfeudation, and another is that it is impossible to prevent land from passing into the hands of mahajans.

He said he was opposed to the State purchase of zamindaris and that it would not be a business proposition. He did not understand the object of the State purchase—if it was for the benefit of the cultivators, obviously it would be impossible to enhance rents. He thought that the landlords would probably be satisfied with 10 years' purchase. It might be possible to work out a scheme for the purchase of zamindaris and tenures so long as the rents are not reduced. Rents are at present very low and there is no case for a general reduction. There has not been a great deal of enhancement in permanently settled estates and the purchasing power of money has greatly decreased.



since the Permanent Settlement. It would require an elaborate organization to convert the province into a khas mahal. He thought 8 per cent. would be too low a figure for management costs as overhead charges would increase. At present the Collectors supervise khas mahal work but if the whole province became a khas mahal, they would be unable to supervise the whole area and a special staff would be necessary. He mentioned that in the United Provinces, the system is to correct the maps and records in the fields while collection of rent is made. He could not say what is the supervising staff there.

He thought that the abolition of landlords would have an unfortunate effect on the social structure of the province. He agreed that most people invest money in land, and that it would be a good thing if they could be got to invest in industry.

The number of bargadars is on the increase. He considered it undesirable that the barga system should spread as it is uneconomic. He agreed that in many cases it results in occupancy raiyat going down in the social scale. He thought that half of the produce is too high a proportion, although in many cases landlords supply cattle and seeds. He thought it wrong that there should be such a wide difference between cash rents and produce rents. He had suggested one-fifth as that was the maximum under the commutation rules.

He agreed that holdings are decreasing in size and will continue to do so as long as the laws of inheritance remain unchanged. He considered that it would be difficult to alter them. The agricultural population has increased and has nearly reached the maximum possible limit. In a short time there may be a danger of agrarian revolution. When similar conditions existed in Europe, there have been industrial revolutions and it has been possible to accommodate the people in towns, but he doubted whether that would be likely to happen in Bengal.

The average rent in Bengal is low. To reduce it from, say, Re. 1 to annas 12 a bigha would do no practical good to anybody. Progress is only possible if rents increase. Higher rent is an incentive to higher production but first of all the tenants' capacity to pay must be ensured. A programme of agricultural development by the State has become necessary.

The landlords have been finding it increasingly difficult to realise rent. Now-a-days they can go to Debt Settlement Boards for realisation of their rents but he did not know if that had effected any improvement. Certificate procedure is not unfair provided it is rightly administered. It has sometimes in the past been administered unsatisfactorily because Collectors had too much to do, and had naturally to depend on their subordinate officers. The procedure is good in

itself. It is also cheap, and desirable provided it is efficiently and properly administered.

In reply to the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, he said he did not approve of subinfeudation. It tended to create a class of parasites—a kind of pensioners. He thought that when the value of money decreases, rent should increase and that this was a natural law. If the landlords are bought out the result might be that there will be a class of agricultural raiyat directly under the State provided the mahajans could be eliminated, but he agreed that many raiyats will not themselves cultivate. There would certainly be a class of raiyat who could give lands in barga or engage labourers. He did not support the suggestion that raiyats should lose their occupancy rights in land sublet by them: there is no reason why both the raiyat and the under-raiyat should not have occupancy rights. He was in favour of giving certificate procedure to all landlords and thought that it would work quite satisfactorily. Certificate Procedure can only be used when the rent claimed is admitted. He considered that the only possible method by which the State could raise more money was to tax agricultural incomes. He agreed that in temporarily settled estates the revenue is 60 or 70 per cent. of the assets, but he did not agree that no income-tax should be charged, or that it should be on a lower scale, in estates where the percentage of land revenue is high. He would not have a higher rate for estates where the percentage of revenue to the assets is only 30 per cent. but thought that income-tax would have to be imposed on the net income of the landlord. This might operate harshly in some cases but he did not think that the percentage of profit could be taken into account, because much of the land of the province had, since the Permanent Settlement, changed hands for good consideration, and it would not be fair to take into account the settlement made with the original proprietor.

In reply to Mr. B. K. Chowdhury, he said that the extension of cultivation was a matter of history. He thought it was due mainly to extension of cultivation by the tenants but it might vary from district to district. He doubted if there was any authority to show whether landlords or tenants were responsible for extending cultivation. It would vary from district to district and was entirely a matter of opinion.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Momin, he said that abolition of the Permanent Settlement would not do any good to anybody except that it would simplify the administration. The results, he said, would depend on the efficiency of the administration. He was not certain that it was desirable to bring the tenants directly under the Government. It was true that in some cases landlords and middlemen are parasites but ultimately it would not do any good to remove the landlords as a class. The efficiency of zamindari management varies. In

some districts, like Rangpur, they live on their estates—in other districts they do not. Some landlords undoubtedly benefit the community—others do not. Those landlords are most beneficial now-a-days who take an interest in local politics, for example, the Raja of Dighapatia and Raja Bahadur of Chakdighi who are Chairmen of District Boards. He agreed that the Permanent Settlement has resulted in financial loss but if landlords are removed, it is difficult to say whether it would be of real profit to the State unless it is known what rate of compensation is going to be paid to the zamindars. He thought that there will probably be a profit if compensation is paid at 10 years' purchase. He was not in favour of converting the Permanent Settlement to temporary settlements. He did not agree to the proposition that because the tenants were concerned with the extension of cultivation and the State had got no share in the increased assets, the State might morally appropriate a larger percentage of the revenue. That proposition was based on the premise that the present zamindars are the successors of those existing at the time of the Permanent Settlement. He did not agree that the result would be the same by introducing temporary settlements, and by imposing a tax on agricultural income, on the ground that increased income would come from the land in both cases. Temporary settlement would affect the zamindars, whereas a tax on agricultural income would affect tenure-holders also. He thought that if the zamindars were given the option of allowing the State to buy their zamindaris or of having temporary settlement or paying a tax on agricultural income, they would prefer to be bought out, but they would not agree to have the Permanent Settlement converted to a temporary settlement without compensation.

If the province became a khas mahal, collection charges would be higher on account of the increase of overhead charges. In Court of Wards estates, the collection costs, including law charges, are often 15 per cent. If the middlemen are eliminated it does not follow that all the raiyats will cultivate. Even now a proportion of them do not cultivate. He mentioned that during the cultivation season, there is a regular exodus from Bankura to Hooghly and Burdwan. He suggested one-fifth of the produce because that was the maximum payable under the commutation rules; but the value of the produce varies from district to district and some land produce two or even three crops. If the outturn in Bankura was calculated at 15 maunds an acre and the price of paddy at Rs. 2 a maund, he was not prepared to say that Rs. 6, i.e., one-fifth should be the maximum rent. The general average of rent is certainly lower than one-fifth. There might be cases where it is as high, but as a general rule it is much less.

He thought it very doubtful whether raiyats in permanently settled estates would prefer to come under Government. There can be no progress without enhancement of rents and he thought that it was true.

as a general proposition that where rents are lowest the people are most backward. It is after all a question of supply and demand whether rents are high or low. He agreed that a simpler system was desirable in land revenue administration.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Hashem Ali Khan, he said that certificate procedure is used in khas mahal estates and had been used quite widely in permanently settled areas. When he was Commissioner, certificate powers were freely given to permanently settled proprietors. He thought that the tenant's attachment to the system of the Permanent Settlement is largely sentimental. They feel that they will get remissions from the landlords in bad years and such remissions have undoubtedly been given. Certificate procedure could safely be extended to all tenure-holders provided it was properly administered and only applied to rents which are admitted. The record-of-rights would have to be maintained in order to secure it. He agreed that if the value of money decreased, it is right in theory that revenue as well as rent should be increased. He also agreed that if the land administration system could be simplified, there would be a decrease in litigation. He suggested that the best way of improved prosperity is to increase the capacity of people to pay taxes. He would depend on the efficiency of the administration whether or not it would be a profitable transaction to buy out the landlords. He thought that there was little distinction between a raiyat who cultivates through bargadars and one who sublets on cash rent. One reason for subinfeudation is the difficulty that a raiyat finds in borrowing money. He agreed that it is desirable to check subinfeudation but thought it is practically impossible, and instanced the failure of Government to prevent the purchase of land in the Duars by non-agriculturists. He agreed on the whole there has been a tendency during the last 50 years for landlords to leave zamindaris and to live in towns.

In reply to Khan Bahadur M. Hosain he said that if the landlords are bought out, it is very problematic whether they will use the compensatory money they receive only to finance industry. He was not aware that the cost of management in raiyatwari areas in Madras is 8 per cent. but he thought that if the whole of Bengal became a khas mahal, there would be an increase in overhead charges and that the percentage would be higher. He said if it is desired to give occupancy rights to the "agriculturists" it would be very difficult to define the term exactly. In the Duars the definition of the word has been that the major portion of the agriculturists' income must be derived from agriculture, but that has not prevented purchase by mahajans. He thought that the agricultural system would be upset if in future purchase by non-agriculturists is prohibited and that it would be dangerous to restrict occupancy rights to the tillers

of the soil. In both cases, legislation on these lines would be very difficult to administer. If rents are never to be enhanced, all possible means of progress would be cut off. He was in favour of enhancement on the ground of rise in prices but as prices had decreased during the last ten years that was not now a possible ground. He thought that legislation to prevent all enhancements will do a great deal of harm to the country.

In reply to a quotation from a Despatch of the Court of Directors, dated September 1792, implying that the intention was to fix rent as well as revenue, he said he could not say what was the intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement. In reply to another quotation from a Minute by Lord Cornwallis, he said that because Lord Cornwallis said something in 1793, it does not necessarily follow that it holds good to-day. Lord Cornwallis was not in a position to know what was the exact status of landlords and tenants. In practice it was impossible to find out whether remissions of revenue are passed on to the tenants. He thought that in the matter of remission, tenants in permanently settled estates are better off than in khas mahals. Landlords ordinarily give remissions in bad years and temper the wind to the shorn lamb more than the Government does. He thought legislation to enforce remission by landlords would be most unwise. It is much better to watch progress of events for some time before introducing legislation.

In reply to Dr. Mukherji, he said he did not know of any incentives which have been given by the landlords to the tenants to extend cultivation. Extension of cultivation is generally made by the tenants encroaching on neighbouring waste lands. It may be true that some landlords have brought in tenants from outside to cultivate waste lands and have given them land rent free for two to three years. The expectation at the time of the Permanent Settlement was that cultivation would extend because it was to the landlords' interest. Subinfeudation is general but not universal. There are good many landlords who have a number of khas raiyats. When he referred to landlords and middlemen as "parasites" his meaning was that by buying out intermediate interests, a number of landlords and tenureholders would become parasites. If landlords were given certificate powers, the realisation of rent would be as punctual as in khas mahal estates. The bargadar's share varies probably between half and one-third depending on whether or not the landlord supplies cattle and seed. He thought that the payment of rent in kind would be a very retrograde step. If the value of produce falls by 50 per cent. and the price of the articles which the tenants have to purchase by only 10 per cent., that would not necessarily mean that the tenants are unable to pay rents in cash. Their present rent is so low that it makes no practical difference. If produce rents are fixed the tenants would be

worms off. He did not see how the State could interfere to prevent uneconomic holdings. If a man has 50 highas of land and after three generations his descendants hold uneconomic areas there is no means to prevent it: nor can the State prohibit the purchase of areas which are less than the size of economic holdings. If a man purchases one bigha that does not mean that he has not got other economic holdings. The only possibility is to increase the tenants' paying capacity. He did not think it possible to interfere with the laws of inheritance and transfer. One way of improving matters is to increase the yield. The Co-operative Department should also help the tenants by providing marketing facilities. This is an important problem in rural areas. If a tax is imposed on agricultural incomes, a minimum would have to be fixed.

His statement that revenue as well as rent should increase if prices go up was a statement based on principle. It did not mean that he proposed to abolish the Permanent Settlement. He would only say that to that extent the Permanent Settlement was unwise.

In reply to Sir F. A. Sachse, he agreed that part of the salary of the Board of Revenue and Commissioners is included in the cost of khas mahal administration and that the cost of administering the whole province as a khas mahal would not be higher than that in the Court of Wards estates. The tahsildars would have compact areas. Only supervising officers would incur travelling allowance for their touring. This would be in the nature of touring within a settlement block. There would not be tours to distant and scattered areas, as in some Court of Wards estates. If the province becomes a khas mahal, it would be essential to maintain the record-of-rights. This might possibly be done in the same way as in the United Provinces. Government as landlord would be in a better position to check fragmentation of holdings and to bring about consolidation. The revision of the record-of-rights would not perhaps be very expensive as it might be carried out by a largely increased khas mahal staff. He agreed that a raiyat who has sublet part of his holding should not be penalised by taking away his occupancy right and thus encouraging him to let the land in barga.

**Memorandum by Rai Bahadur B. B. Mukherjee,  
ex-Director of Land Records and Surveys, Bengal.**

**Q. 1.** Should the Permanent Settlement remain or go?

**Q. 2.** Is State purchase desirable?

**Q. 3.** Is there any justification for completely 'demolishing' the present society of Bengal who form the bulk of the tenure-holders and, if so, what is to be the substitute?

The three questions are inter-dependent, hence are taken up together. It is presumed that the first question implies that not only the fixity of revenue of the Permanent Settlement ought to go, but also the zamindari system, and that includes the intermediate tenures created as part of the system between the zamindars and the raiyat.

One has to remember that the zamindari system existed long before the advent of the British rule. It was recognised in all the discussions at and after the Permanent Settlement that there were at least two distinct classes of zamindars, one of whom included the territorial chiefs (such as the Maharajadhiraja of Burdwan, Maharaja of Susang) and the ancient landed families (such as the Natore Raj, the Dinajpore Raj and others).

This type was neither the creation of the British rule nor was it the result of the Permanent Settlement. The other type too had included many who though they might have come at varying times during the Moghul and Pathan supremacy were associated with land and the land-system for generations before the transfer of the Dewani (*see, for example, the history of the Raj Nagar Raj in the Birbhum Final Report; of the Jemua Raj in the Murshidabad Final Report; of the Nadia Krishnagore Raj in the Nadia Final Report of settlement operations*). The Permanent Settlement was devised not so much for the good of the zamindars as for reasons of State, to ensure stability in administration and certainty of revenue (Land Revenue was then as now the chief source of revenue of the State).

The latter was essential to save the State from bankruptcy on account of the growing demands on the resources for reasons of administration as well as for the profits of the East India Company. The assessment made was extremely high and had a disastrous effect on the zamindars. The rigour with which the revenue assessed at such a high pitch was realised ruined most of the old landed aristocracy, and only a few survived the onslaught by diverse ways of sub-letting, or parting with lands of the estate in blocks which were constituted into different revenue paying estates. The history of the land revenue administration at the time bears out in full the disastrous effects of the

assessment made. With the stability in administration ensured by the certainty of the main source of revenue, though brought about by painful consequences on the landed interest holders who undertook the certain payment; with the growth of population, and the general improvement in the country, the chaos was checked. The interest in land, which was the main economic urge round which society grew in India ever since the earliest days of history and through the Muhammadan regime which hardly made any radical change therein, reasserted itself. Rights in land grew up again, legal enactments clarified the positions and bettered the rights, and made them more dynamic and of more value; and during these 150 years land rights developed into the main sources of investment and as the most stabilising economic forces for society.

The large percentage of population depending upon land in some shape or other is a proof of the influence of the land system on the social organism as a whole in Bengal. It is essential to bear this in mind when one is asked to deal radically with it. Rights in land were created and developed for the zamindars, intermediate tenure-holders and cultivators for ages past, but in the modern sense the legal and statutory rights were created for near about a century and a half. Society is very largely dependent on such rights: numerous investments, innumerable contracts, and large expenditure of money and labour have been made on the assumptions of what had been the clear and unmistakable statutory laws of the land. To pull down that structure will have repercussions so widespread that the consequences are certain to be chaos and anarchy, and may mean miseries and upheavals difficult to foresee with clearness.

The fact that political and economic forces have smothered other avenues of economic self-expression is largely the reason why even agriculture and interests in land are getting unremunerative. It is futile to hold the Permanent Settlement responsible for evils which must be traced to other definite politico-economic causes. Such causes will not be in the least affected: on the other hand the effect will be aggravated if a large number of people, who had adjusted themselves to the rights determined by the laws of the land, are uprooted without a demand being created for their rapid absorption elsewhere.

It will be more or less like the uprooting of the tenantry in England from agriculture, sheep rearing, and wool production at the end of 17th and in the beginning of the 18th century without the corresponding active demand on men and labour brought about by the industrial revolution. It is certain to lead to tremendous upheavals and chaotic anarchy.

We may now examine the concrete proposals as to the expectations of benefit.



The zamindars and tenure-holders have to be bought off. Normally even at the present rate of interest on promissory notes near about 30 times the profit (net) should be fairly paid. As bonds are subject to depreciation over which the zamindars or tenure-holders have no control the capital will always be uncertain and may be worth little if the credit of the Government is seriously affected—a rather not improbable contingency judged by the present circumstances. It has been stated that even if the capital value paid be 15 times, the State will suffer loss and not gain. Hence a reasonable compensation can never be less than 30 times the net profit and even that with a probability of loss to the persons whose interests are bought off will mean loss and not gain to the State. If it be urged that the compensation given be small or less than 30 times it will mean forcible expropriation of vested rights in property legally acquired and legitimately developed according to the unequivocal laws of the land. It must be remembered that in the largest majority of cases the rights in the different stages have been not the rights of individuals who were called upon to contract at the time of the Permanent Settlement but rights bought or acquired in open market at the value prevalent at the time of acquisition, and hence represented legitimate investment sanctioned by the laws of the land, and thus were lawful rights which no State could acquire without adequate compensation. If expropriation of rights legitimately acquired in property be accepted in principle it will be the end of social order and the principle cannot be restricted only to rights in land, but is bound to be extended to all other rights in property, to profits from industry, commerce and the like.

So far as Bengal is concerned the rent rate in the largest majority of cases is demonstrated to be low. If acquisition of proprietary rights direct by State leads to enhancement of the cultivators' rent, it may by screwing up the rents lead to gain by the State as an ultimate result. In view however of the poverty of the cultivators the wholesale enhancement of rent is an impossibility. The trend is rather towards placing an embargo on enhancement, and towards anything that may bring about a still further lowering of rent (compare the amendment of 1938 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the appointment of the committees for reduction of rent). If it be intended to nationalise the land it will mean still further displacement of human labour and further complication in the field of unemployment.

In view of all these facts, the safest and best course will be to leave the Permanent Settlement and the zamindari system which have such complicated ramifications throughout the entire social and economic fabric of the country untouched by any frontal attack. If the land system is at all to be experimented on it is preferable to evolve a system of optional sale. If the State and private parties agree the interests may be bought by Government. If the system be helpful

to the parties as well as to the State, voluntary transactions will grow in number and the State purchase if found suitable will be carried on without undue haste and resultant complications at a pace to which all parties concerned will have time to adjust themselves.

It must be remembered that the direct contact of State with the cultivators in Bengal is not without its potential dangers in the political sphere. In the existing circumstances the main source of revenue—the land revenue secured through the zamindars according to the terms of the Permanent Settlement—remains unaffected by any mass movement. For example, the financial stability of the State in Bengal was absolutely unaffected even at the height of the non-co-operation movement. Once all these buffers are removed, the class-conscious and economically unstable cultivators of Bengal will have the most effective weapon ("no rent" campaign) to bring the Government to its knees and completely upset the stability of the social organism.

**Q. 4.** Can the lakhirajas (revenue-free estates) be legally taken back by compensation or otherwise?

Rights in them are rights in property. The objections to the interference with rights in property here are as urged in the case of the Permanent Settlement. Many of the present holders have acquired the rights by payment of the market value and are entitled to full compensation. In the badshahi and non-badshahi grant resumption regulations, the State gave definite assurances for the safety and inviolability of certain types of grants. These have been enjoyed as revenue-free since then.

There is nothing to prevent a law being passed for their resumption. Where the grants were for certain specific purposes of a public nature which no longer hold good the moral objection would be less to such law being passed, but the objections to the forcible acquisition of rights in property established by the laws of the land would persist as urged in the case of Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 5.** Should the curtailment of occupancy rights be advocated?

I am afraid it is too late in the day to advocate the curtailment of such rights. As a matter of fact the development of the rights of the cultivators for a century and a half is at once the justification for refuting objections to the Permanent Settlement. The one power however which must be taken is to prevent the acquisition of occupancy rights by under-raiyats. Such rights before 1928 were restricted to a small minority, but the amendment of 1928 attempted to spread them

downward almost unchecked. Such a diffusion of the right of occupancy will complicate the position of all concerned worse than the sub-infeudation of intermediate rights has done.

**Q. 6.** Is there any possibility of future increase of revenue within the framework of the Permanent Settlement? If so, should there be any local cesses where the rate of revenue is less than in parts of western Bengal?

I have already stated that I do not think that the Permanent Settlement should be disturbed at this stage of the economic evolution of the country. Neither the system nor the fixity of assessment should be tampered with. [The incidence of assessment of revenue is the result of various forces and a really fair formula can hardly be evolved. If however the Government be bent upon doing something it has to evolve a formula to determine the percentage of assets it would like to claim as revenue. After the formula is evolved, the incidence of each estate has to be examined, and the margin of profit has to be determined.] This formula, and the assets to which it is to be applied must need periodical revision, for circumstances alter radically from time to time.

**Q. 7.** Agricultural cess how to be imposed?

If agricultural cess is to be imposed for national planning it must be based on land which should include the holdings of non-agriculturists.

**Q. 8.** A cess for revival of cottage industries how can be imposed and what rate should the Government, the landlords and the tenants pay?

It is certainly necessary to find employment for the unemployed hours of the cultivators. But the moot point is what should be done to provide it. Withdrawal of population from land for large scale industrial undertakings, withdrawal of such population for wider use of trade and commerce, or employment in cottage industries are the various alternatives. In the matter of the development of cottage industries it has to be considered whether the latter might be subsidiary to large scale industries as in Japan or might be complete products in themselves. (As. Gandhiji's charka.) Nothing has yet been evolved and determined upon. The mere provision of funds is not the one thing necessary. Funds may be raised to be wasted if cottage industries sought to be developed have no survival value.

I should think that it will be putting the cart before the horse if we can't first develop the ways to resurrect cottage industries, before

providing a cess for taxation. I would suggest that it may be laid down that should in any region potentialities for development of live cottage industries exist, the union boards may with the approval of the Government impose a cess. The rate will be on the basis of an estimate to develop the cottage industries provided the State can contribute half and the other half is to be raised from landlords of various grades and raiyats. The latter two should contribute in equal shares and the assessment should in no case exceed a cess at a definite rate, say half an anna per rupee of rent. In according approval to such proposals of the Union Board the Government must take into consideration the incidence of revenue and rent and the margin of profits left to the cultivators, the tenure-holders and zamindars in such a region.

**Reply by Rai Kalipada Maitra Bahadur, B.C.S. (Retd.),  
Manager of the Estate of the Nawab Bahadur of  
Murshidabad.**

**Q. 1.** I venture to submit that the duties and obligations of the zamindars, as enumerated in question 1, are almost exhaustive. To my mind there may be one omission and perhaps one over-statement. Along with Regulation I, forty-eight more Regulations were passed on the same day amplifying the liabilities of the proprietors. Customs and usages also were not annihilated.

I have not been able to get hold of all these 48 Regulations. While the zamindars were certainly required to conduct themselves with good faith and moderation towards their subordinate tenants and while they were further enjoined to see that their own officers did likewise, I have not been able to get hold of any data to lead me to think that they were to "extend to their subordinate tenants the same generous treatment which they were to receive from Government." The zamindars, so far as I am aware, were never required or expected to grant to their tenants fixity of rent, fixity of tenure and free sale—the rights which were recognised or granted to the zamindars.

No arrangement between the Paramount Power and the zamindars can legally affect any subsisting right of third parties, if they had any. This is a simple principle of jurisprudence. The question really is if the raiyats in 1793 had actually any recognised rights, not to speak of the right of fixity of tenure, fixity of rent and free sale. I will deal with this later on in reply to appropriate questions.

**Q. 2.** The Permanent Settlement conveyed to the proprietors powers to choose their tenants and to regulate the usage of the land excepting, of course, where the mokarari tenants or tenants protected by patta were already existing. I have not found authority for holding a contrary view. Whatever might have been the rights of the zamindars in the pre-Permanent Settlement days, once they were formally recognised by a statutory proclamation as actual proprietors of the soil, their right to disposition of particular plots of land became unquestioned subject, of course, to previous commitments or subject to any enactment to be codified later on to regulate the zamindar's relationship with his tenants as provided for in section 8 of Regulation I of 1793. I confess, I cannot follow the 2nd part of this question, viz., the zamindar's liability to foster the economic interest of the province.

The zamindars were certainly expected to extend cultivation and thereby to foster the economic interest of the province. There was no

liability on their part to foster the economic interest in any other way, so far as I am aware.

Q. 3. A comparison of the state of the country in 1793 and 1893 will by itself supply the answer, if the zamindar did anything. From my personal observations and experience as an Assistant Settlement Officer extending over 17 years both in East Bengal and West Bengal, I am in a position to record that in order to extend cultivation and develop the countryside, the zamindars in the districts often allowed the raiyats to hold land free of rent for a term of years. They even sometimes paid for building huts for the raiyats. In some cases, the homestead land of such a raiyat was not assessed to rent even when his cultivated lands were fully developed and assessed. The zamindars had to excavate the irrigation tanks and construct embankments. I do not see wherein they failed. If there is any failure in any estate that particular individual proprietor is at fault. But that is no reason to haul up the entire body of the zamindars over the coals. It was in the interests of the zamindars to develop their own estates so that they could themselves enjoy the fruits of their own industry and resourcefulness. I am not aware of cases of zamindars committing their economic and financial suicide in this respect.

Q. 4. The question, if the zamindars were actual proprietors of the soil before the Permanent Settlement or they were made proprietors only in 1793, is as old as the Conquest. Mr. Justice Field in paragraph 28 of his Introduction to Bengal Regulations very correctly stated that "No attempt to define their positions and rights could now possibly succeed and this for two reasons. In the first place, the new status which we gave them by the Permanent Settlement in 1793 has affected many of the traces of the previous state of things. The old foundations were buried beneath the new structure. In the second place, it may be doubted if their position and rights were ever capable of exact definition."

It is now a matter of history that before Lord Cornwallis made his historic Proclamation, the whole question was discussed threadbare and decision taken. The memorable controversy between Mr. Grant, Sheristadar and Mr. Shore (Lord Teignmouth) over this question fills a volume in the constitutional history of our Anglo-Indian Empire. The records of this controversy, the contemporaneous writings of Mr. Harington and the later records, all go to show on a proper and careful analysis that the zamindari rights in the pre-Permanent Settlement days were held by three classes of persons:—

(a) Independent Chieftains or tributary chiefs who submitted to the sovereignty of the Moghuls and were holding their zamindari neither as rent collectors, nor as Feudal Lords but as an appanage to their quasi-sovereign right, e.g., Maharaja of Susang, zamindars of

Haibatnagar in Mymensingh (descendants of Isa Khan), Rajas of Ramgarh, Lalgah, Parchaytgarh, Kultikri in Midnapore, zamindars of Chandradwip, Raikuts of Jalpaiguri, etc.

(b) Hereditary zamindars, e.g., Maharaja of Nadia, Maharaja of Burdwan, Maharaja of Dinajpur, Raja of Putia, Maharaja of Natore, Raja of Taherpur, Raja of Kakina, zamindars of Tapa, zamindars of Panga, zamindars of Burdhankuti, Raja of Narajote, zamindars of Muktagacha, etc.

(c) Those, who were in origin mere rent collectors, appointed by the Nawab Nazims but by efflux of time, became hereditary rent collectors imitating or arrogating to themselves the status of the hereditary zamindars.

Instead of making any invidious distinction, Lord Cornwallis thought it fit to treat them all alike and to declare all of them as actual proprietors of the soil. Mr. Shore was strongly of opinion that these zamindars had proprietary rights and Lord Cornwallis agreed with him in his views. If anybody suffered by this generalisation, the State suffered inasmuch as the State could have asserted the proprietary right of the State or the Lord Paramount of the soil in respect of the zamindaris of the third degree. And this generalisation might as well have affected the sentimentality of the old Feudatory Chiefs and the real landed aristocracy when they found themselves bracketed with the landholders of the 3rd degree. But there is evidence to show that the zamindars of all degrees were mortgaging and selling their interests, creating rent free grants and permanent mokarari tenures and showing them in their quinquennial returns and the State recognised these grants in limitation of the State demand. So it is difficult to find fault with the authors of the Permanent Settlement, so far as it related to the recognition of the proprietary right of all these zamindars. Then again, we find that whenever any of these zamindars proved recusant and their estates were held khas or let in farm, they were used to be given malikana or proprietary allowance in recognition of their proprietary right. It is on record that Rani Bhawani of Natore was given a malikana allowance of as much as Rs. 48,000 a year. So the proprietary right of these zamindars were unquestioned and unquestionable. I do not understand what useful purpose can be served now, after a century and a half, by raising this question particularly as I find that 90 per cent. of the estates formed in 1793 have already changed hands. 90 per cent. of the proprietors of the present day have acquired their estates in revenue sales or private sales after the solemn declaration of the Government of the day. This polemical discussion will lead us nowhere. It will not detract the value of the zamindaris anymore than a piece of diamond will lose its value because in origin it was but a piece of charcoal.

5. Conceding for the sake of argument that the conferment of the proprietary right on the zamindars of the third degree as described before was a blunder, I do not see how this contract or proclamation which is sacrosanct, inviolate and inviolable, can now be abrogated; nor do I see how can they be reconverted to the status of rent collectors and dismissed after a lapse of a century and a half. Such a proposition militates against my own juridical notion and can only be comparable with the treatment that is now being accorded to the Semitic race in Nazi Germany. No civilised State can seriously think of indulging in such like acts of expropriation.

It is unquestioned that the permanent fixation of the State demand once for all crippled the financial resources of the country in the sense that no prospect was left of augmenting the land revenue of the province. But what is the land tax in Great Britain? How does it compare with the total revenue of the country? What good was gained by commutation of tithe? After a lapse of 150 years, it is so easy to call in question the propriety of the Permanent Settlement and to characterise the authors of that Settlement by any adjective you like; but they had their reasons and cogent reasons for fixing the State demand for ever. Unless the State demands were permanently fixed forever at the time and had the zamindars been left at the tender mercy of the revenue gatherers for five generations, these zamindars in their turn would have likewise raised the raiyati rent according to their sweet will. Compare the raiyati rents in the zamindari area in Bengal with the rent obtaining in the temporarily settled areas or khas mahal areas in Bengal and for the matter of that with rent prevailing in any other country of the world. The statistics supplied by the Land Revenue Commission will show that the incidence of raiyati rent in the zamindari area in Bengal is Rs. 3 per acre against the gross produce of Rs. 49 per acre. Where else in India or for the matter of that anywhere on the face of the earth the incidence is so very low? According to Hindu Law, it is 1/6th of the gross produce of the soil. According to Saracenic System of Land Settlement—Murabali System which obtains in the whole of Turkey—it is 1/3rd. What is the ratio according to the old Roman Law? It is 1/4th or 1/7th excepting in case of olive yards or vineyards. So I submit this low incidence of rent in zamindari area in Bengal is directly attributable to fixation of the State demand for ever.

Now I come to the argument that the tenants were no party to the arrangement. If a zamindar is to grant a patni or ijara of a mahal, it is a matter with which a third party has not got anything to do. The principle of "self-determination" is not even a quarter of a century old and it has not passed on to this side of the Suez Canal. So, I submit that the tenants had no say in the matter unless there was any



After quoting from the letter of the Collector of Midnapore the Committee observed:—

“The Committee conceives it has now been shown, that the great transfer of landed property, by public sale and the dispossession of zamindars, which were observed to take place in an extreme degree, during several years after the conclusion of the Permanent Settlement of the land revenue, cannot be altogether ascribed to the profligacy, extravagance, and mismanagement of the landholders; but have to a certain extent, followed, as the unavoidable consequences of defects in the public regulations combined with inequality in the assessment, and with the difficulties, obstructions and delays with which the many nice distinctions and complex provisions of the new code of regulations were brought into operation, among the very numerous, but for the greater part, illiterate inhabitants of the Company's provinces, who were required to observe them.” (p. 59 Fifth Report).

The fact is also mentioned in para. II of the letter of the Court of Directors, dated 15th January 1819, an extract from which is reproduced below:—

“When we bear in mind the fact stated by Mr. Roche in his Minute recorded on your revenue consultations of the 12th August 1815 that subsequently to the period of the Permanent Settlement “probably one-third, or rather half, of the landed property in the province of Bengal may have been transferred by public sale on account of arrears of revenue, etc.....”

When it was humanly possible, revenue was paid punctually and after the unsettled period of transition was over, irregularities or defaults were rare. The object was attained after all the big zamindars had been ruined and reduced to beggary. The statement annexed in reply to questions 10 and 11 will show how high the percentage of collection nowadays is in permanently settled estate in comparison with the temporarily settled estates.

**Q. 4.** The original zamindars were the descendants of Rajas who were the proprietors of the soil. Sir John Shore in his Minute, dated 18th June 1789, (para. 374), observed:—“Formerly their services were required for the defence of the State against rebellion or invasion, when they possessed the means of furnishing this assistance. This obligation was principally upon the principal zamindars; but was binding upon all.” It will be seen that even in the times of the Mahabharat the principle of proprietary

right and actual possession of the Raja was well recognised and the Emperor of All India only realised tribute from him. Whoever wanted to be the Emperor over all the Rajas and potentates of Bharatbarsha had to perform the Aswamedh Jajna or horse sacrifice and a preliminary condition was that he should first of all subjugate the hosts of Rajas all over India and he had to do it systematically in all the directions of the compass. In the detailed description given in the Mahabharat of the Aswamedh Jajna performed by the five Pandavas, it will be found that 4 of the brothers proceeded in 4 directions North, East, South and West and methodically subjugated every Raja in the direction allotted to him. The conquest of the eastern countries was allotted to Bhim Sen and he penetrated as far as the Orissa coast and in the north-east up to the Brahmaputra river which is specifically mentioned. He conquered the Mlechhas or aboriginals who inhabited the sea coast and the Kings of Tamralipta (Tamluk), Karbat, Sumbha, etc., and also the country bounded by the Brahmaputra and exacted tributes from all the kingdoms but did not disturb the possession of any of the kings. There was no annexation and each Raja was left in possession of his kingdom provided he paid a tribute. Some did it immediately on the approach of the Pandavas without a fight whereas some resisted and fought sanguinary battles and were overcome and tribute was forcibly realised but even these were left in undisturbed possession of their lands. There is a description of those who submitted without a fight and those who had to be conquered in battle and generally descriptions are given of the tributes paid or exacted from each. The title of the Raja was never disturbed. The Pathan Emperors found the zamindars and so did the Moghul Emperors and the English after them. (Cf. extracts of para. 370 of Sir John Shore's note of 18th June 1789 quoted in the last two paras. of this answer.) What the Moghul Emperors did was to deprive them of their military powers and they were not allowed to repair their fortresses but they were not disturbed so long as they paid the State dues regularly. Those who opposed the Moghuls were defeated in battles and deprived of their zamindaris and their lands were distributed in jagirs for the maintenance of the army and civil and military officers. It is in record that on many occasions zamindaris were purchased by the Emperors for the creation of jagirs and also whenever a loyal zamindar was deprived of his zamindari, a malikana or proprietary allowance was given to him. This practice has been continued by the British Government. It is not a new principle introduced by the British but confirmation of the custom they found in vogue. The tenants derived their interests from the zamindars and were not the proprietors. The only class of tenants who had some stability were the khudkasht kudeemee raiyat.

In the great Rent Case (Thakurani Dasi vs. Bisheswar Mukherjee) Thevor J. observed as follows:—

“But when Regulation XI of 1822 was passed, the use in section 32 of that law of the term *khudkast kudeemee raiyat*, or resident and hereditary raiyat with a prescriptive right of occupancy, to designate the cultivator who was not liable to eviction on a sale for arrears of revenues.....”

Thus whatever rights the best class of raiyats, i.e., the *khudkast kudeemee raiyat*, acquired was derived from the zamindars and he had a prescriptive right (*vide* paras. 389, 406, 407 of Sir John Shore's Minute, dated 18th June 1789 reproduced in answer to question I) but the mass of raiyats had no right at all and were constantly evicted. In para. II of the letter of the Court of Directors, dated 15th January 1819, it was observed that Mr. Roche's Minute of 12th August 1815, showed that probably one-third or rather one-half of the landed properties in the Province of Bengal, may have been transferred by public sale on account of arrears of revenue and for this fact “we can readily perceive how prodigiously numerous must have been the instances in which engagements between zamindars and raiyats were annulled.” The majority of the present body of the tenants are therefore of fairly recent origin and neither they nor the older class created by the zamindars can have any claim to proprietary right. Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the zamindars had no valid proprietary title at the inception, some thousands of years back, they had no doubt acquired a prescriptive right in the long era when dynasty after dynasty came and went. (*Vide* paras. 370 and 371, of Sir John Shore's Minute, dated 18th June 1789, reproduced in the last two paragraphs of this answer.) They were recognised by every one of them except for a brief spell of 3 years of Murshid Kuli Khan's regime (1722-25 A.D.) who tried to do without them. His successor Shah Suja restored the old order. In a Privy Council case (*Free-mason vs. Fairlie* I.M.I.A. 305 at page 341) the Lord Chancellor observed as follows:—

“I think it is impossible to read these articles, which were prepared obviously with great caution and consideration by persons well acquainted with the subject, and possessing every means of obtaining most accurate information on it, and as far back as 1793, without coming to the conclusion that the zamindars and talukdars were owners of the soil.”

In the Fifth Report there is a clear record of the fact that the zamindars in Bengal used to exercise the rights of a proprietor and differed from the zamindars of Bihar. After dealing with the province of Bihar, where the practice was for the State to receive the

entire produce of the land and to give shares out of it to the zamindar, the tenant and the collecting agency, the conditions in Bengal are described in the following words:—

“The difficulty was increased by a difference which had originally prevailed in the mode of forming the assessment of Bengal from what has been described as the practice in Bihar. In Bengal instead of a division of the crop, or of the estimated value of it, in the current coin, the whole amount payable by the individual cultivator, was consolidated into one sum, called the assul or original rent; and provision made for the zamindar, the village accountant, the mundul and the other inferior officers, by other means than by a division of the zamindari portion of the produce. This was effected, either by grants of land, or by the privileges of cultivating on lower terms than the rest of the inhabitants, and partly in money; a mode which, as it afforded the officers of Government no interest in the accuracy of the village accounts, rendered the fabrication or concealment of them, the more feasible. *It, moreover, placed the zamindar in a condition more consistent with European notions of proprietary right in the soil, than could be inferred from the portion of his produce, shared with the officers of Government; and was, perhaps, the foundation of much of that difference of opinion, which appeared in the official discussions on that topic, under the Supreme Government at the time.*”

*The extract quoted above is a finding of fact and not a mere expression of opinion.*

It is clear that the hereditary zamindars had the proprietary right from before the Permanent Settlement but in many cases temporary farmers in possession were recognised in the Permanent Settlement as zamindars and treated as such. There was a process of levelling up and both were put in the same category.

The findings of Sir John Shore in his minute, dated 18th June 1789, are reproduced below:—

“370. I consider the zamindars as the proprietors of the soil, to the property of which they succeed by right of inheritance, according to the laws of their own religion; and that the sovereign authority cannot justly exercise the power of depriving them of the succession, nor altering it, when there are any legal heirs. The privilege of disposing of the land, by sale or mortgage, is derived from this fundamental right, *and was exercised by the zamindars before we acquired the dewany.*”

“371. The origin of the proprietary and hereditary rights of the zamindars is uncertain; conjecture must supply what history does not mention; they probably existed before the Muhammadan

conquest, and without any formal acknowledgment, have acquired stability by prescription. I do not admit the sunnud, which the zamindars sometimes receive, to be the foundation of their tenure; which, though it may acquire confirmation from it, exists independent of this deed. The origin of the possession of some zamindaris may be traced to a grant, but the inheritance goes on, without it."

**Q. 5.** The solemn pledge given at the Permanent Settlement was reaffirmed by Governors in reply to civic addresses presented to them. The agreement was between the proprietors of the soil and the Government who represented the tenants and there was no occasion to consult the tenant directly, but Government was not unmindful of his interest. His rights as found by Sir John Shore were summarised in paras. 389, 405 and 407 of Sir John Shore's Minute, dated 18th June 1789, reproduced in answer to question 1. While recognising the proprietary right of the zamindar Government made a clear declaration that steps would be taken to protect the tenant and to see that the zamindar did not realise more than what he was entitled to by contract. Even during the Moghul period the tenants were never consulted. Jaffar Khan as well as his successors added imposts over the zamindari assessment, the total of such assessments between 1722 and 1763 being Rs. 1,17,91,853. There were contracts between the State and the zamindar and the latter was left free to distribute the addition over his raiyats in any way he considered proper. The State was not interested in that. The direct receipt from land revenue has undoubtedly been restricted to a certain extent by the Permanent Settlement but this loss has been more than compensated in other directions. This Settlement established peace and enabled the population to recover from the effects of the famines of 1770-71, 1784, 1786 and 1787 and brought back prosperity which was reflected in higher receipts from other sources such as customs, excise, forests, etc. The other advantages gained have been fully described in reply to question 1. Apart from the legal aspects of the case, annulment of the Permanent Settlement without giving proper compensation to the

- landlords is not a practical proposition. It does not mean only the repeal of Regulation I of 1793 but of the entire tenancy legislation up to date which is all based on it. There will be a complete social revolution. A vast body of middlemen have been created who to a great extent depend upon their income from land. If their interests are all acquired, as a necessary corollary to the annulment of the Permanent Settlement, the entire social structure will be altered. These middlemen form the bulk of the bhadralok middle classes and they will be driven by want to join the communists or socialists. Their ranks will be swelled by the

dispossessed zamindars and also the large body of tenureholders and tenants at fixed rates who will have to give up their long cherished rights. Communists and socialists are gaining strength daily and a sudden large access of strength to their ranks will render administration extremely difficult. If the rent of the tenants is increased and the fixity of rent ignored, the entire body of them will range themselves against the Government.

The increase in revenue to be obtained by the annulment of Permanent Settlement and elimination of middlemen and removal of law about fixity of rent in certain cases will not be very high. According to the Land Revenue Administration Report of 1936-37 the areas of land and income from different classes of estates are as shown below :—

		Area in sq. miles.	Revenue in lakhs.	Revenue per sq. mile.
			Rs.	Rs.
1. Permanently settled estate	..	58,386	2,15	367
2. Temporarily settled estate	..	5,211	26	500
3. Government estate	..	5,710	71	1,243

The utmost that can be expected will be 1,243—367 or Rs. 876 per square mile increase in 58,386 sq. miles or about 511 lakhs but from this will have to be deducted—

- (1) interest on capital outlay incurred in acquiring all interests,
- (2) cost of periodical revisional survey at Rs. 950 per sq. mile,
- (3) cost of agency to be employed in undertaking the resettlement,
- (4) cost of direct management including cost of enquiries into the extent of diluvion, alluvion and deterioration of land,
- (5) average loss for remission and abatement of revenue in bad years.

It is a well known fact that the percentages of collections in estates under the direct management of Government are very much below what they are in permanently settled estates. In order to demonstrate this, I compiled a comparative statement, from the Board's Annual Land Revenue Administration Reports, showing the demands, collections and the percentages of collections in the 2 classes of estates for the last 6 years. It will be seen from copies of it annexed in replies to questions 10 and 11 what a huge amount always remains outstanding in Government estates as arrears and also that the percentages of total collections on total demands in

Government estates are about half of what they are in permanently settled estates. It shows that total rent demand in Government estates may be a very large amount on paper, but standard of actual collections is low and for this reason if the permanently settled estates are brought under direct management after removal of all intermediate holders, the demand on paper may show great increase but actual collections will be much below the paper demand.

**Q. 6.** The immediate result of the Permanent Settlement was disastrous both for the zamindar and the tenant. As the assessment of revenue was on the expected increase from reclamation of about 1/3rd of the previously cultivated lands thrown out of cultivation by the famines of 1770-71, 1784, 1786 and 1787, the big zamindaris were unable to bear the strain and all the old zamindaris were ruined and split up. After each sale the new zamindar evicted all tenants except khudkasht kademee or made fresh settlements. Conditions were therefore very much unsettled. To make the reply self-contained I am again quoting the extract below to show the extent of these changes, from para. II of the letter of the Court of the Directors, dated 15th January 1819:—

“When we bear in mind the fact stated by Mr. Roche in the Minutes recorded on your revenue consultations of the 12th August, 1815 that subsequently to the period of the Permanent Settlement ‘Probably one-third, or rather one-half, of the landed property in the Province of Bengal may have been transferred by public sale on account of arrears of revenue’ we can readily perceive how prodigiously numerous must have been the instances in which engagement between zamindars and raiyats were annulled.”

It is not to be expected that so long as condition like that described above prevailed there would be any improvement. Mr. Ascoli estimates that by 1802 the increase of cultivation in Dacca was about 6½ per cent. and that it was typical of the province. It took at least 40 years for the zamindars to settle down and since then progress has been rapid. The zamindars had the greatest incentive to extend cultivation as this was the only way by which they could save their estates. Increase of cultivation required costly protective embankments and irrigation works, the capital for which the tenants did not possess. In reclaiming jungles also, capital was necessary and generally the zamindars employed middlemen who found the capital and organised the work and for which allowance was made in fixing the rent payable by them to the zamindars. I can say from personal experience that the greater part of the Rungpur district was reclaimed in this way by creating big jotes and giving 50 per cent. margin of profit to the jotedars. It may be said therefore that a great portion of the extension of cultivation was due to the initiative of the zamindars. In some cases such areas were

cleared by the tenants themselves, who were given concession during the period of reclamation. In the absence of any statistics it is not possible to indicate the exact proportion of the increase due to the 3 causes mentioned in the question but considering the circumstances it may be estimated that more than half was due to cause (iii).

**Q. 7:** Not possible to estimate proportion in the absence of statistics but it may be pointed out that the increase would not have taken place so quickly, if peace and tranquility had not been assured by the Permanent Settlement and also if District Officers had not been set free from their continual preoccupation with revenue settlement and revenue collections. Temporary settlement whether with zamindars or farmers would have retarded progress and there would have been no incentive for undertaking costly works of protection and improvement and oppression on tenants would have been inevitable. Trade and commerce would have been depressed all round. The increase was the result of the conditions brought about by the Permanent Settlement and the factors stated in answer to question 6 (iii).

**Q. 8.** Immediately after the Permanent Settlement, it was the zamindars who needed protection. All the big zamindaris were dismembered and most of the old zamindars were ruined and reduced to beggary (*vide* extracts from Fifth Report quoted in reply to question 3). The tenants were defiant and the zamindar was unable to collect his rents and his estates were sold. There was no question of generosity in the Permanent Settlement but a case of pressing need which impelled the Government to this course and the immediate result was the disruption of nearly all the ancient aristocratic families. This state of affairs continued for several years until the Regulation VII of 1799 was passed which gave the zamindar the power of distraint. This led to oppressions. The main trouble was that the Government did not implement the declaration about granting of pottas to tenants. The Regulations passed were ineffective and so long as there were no records of rights, grant of pottas was not practicable. It is true that Regulation VIII of 1793 contained detailed instructions as to what the pottas should contain (sections 56 to 61). Prohibitions were imposed against exactions of abwabs and penalty for infringement was provided (sections 54 and 55) but all these proved infructuous. The Court of Directors in their letter, dated 15th of January 1819, summed up the causes of failure of the Regulation VIII of 1793. It was observed that "original Pottah Regulation (VIII of 1793) was also materially defective, in making no sufficient provision for the ascertainment of the rights in which it professed to secure the ryots by their pottas." Act X of 1859 removed many of the grievances and took away the zamindar's right of distraint. Although Lord Cornwallis had declared in the most emphatic terms that it was the duty of the State to protect the tenants



(vide extract from his Minute, dated February 1790, para. 2 quoted in reply to question 2), subsequent Governments failed to do this effectively. So far as the rents payable by the tenants were concerned it may be said that generally they were moderate. In the Cossimbazar estate, the biggest single estate is in Rangpur district with a rent-roll of Rs. 5,59,432. The rate at which rents are generally paid by the old tenants is Re. 1 to Re. 1-4 per local bigha. In a small percentage of cases it is Re. 1-8 per local bigha. These work out to As. 8 to As. 12 per standard bigha. The main crops are jute and winter paddy. The former is a very valuable crop. In many districts like Burdwan, Nadia, etc., lands are going out of cultivation on account of the ravages of malaria and the zamindar has to try his best to keep the tenants by making concessions as much as possible. Many villages once very populous are now wildernesses and the haunt of wild animals. It is only in areas where land has still some value that rents are fairly high. Figures were compiled in the Revenue Department when I was the Assistant Secretary for 11 districts from district settlement reports. The result is noted below. In some reports the rates of rents paid by undertenants to tenants are available and these also are noted below:-

Name of district.	Average rate of rent per acre of raiyat.						Average rate of rent of under-raiyat.
	At fixed rent.	Occu- pancy rai- yat.	Non- Occu- pancy rai- yat.				
	Rs. a.	Rs. a.	Rs. a.	Rs. a.	p.		
Bankura	2 14	1 12	2 0	2	9	0	
Midnapur	3 10	3 2	3 8	5	7	6	1st grade
				6	3	5	2nd grade
Jessore	1 5	2 7	2 8	3	14	0	
Khulna	2 6	3 6	3 8	5	0	0	
Faridpur	2 9	2 9	2 10	3	12	3	1st grade
				4	0	0	2nd grade
				4	6	5	3rd grade
Bakargunge	3 2	4 9	4 8	7	0	9	1st grade
				7	13	4	2nd grade
				9	14	7	3rd grade
Dacca	2 3	2 13	2 13	3	6	0	
Mymensingh	1 14	2 12	2 12	5	0	0	
Rajshahi	2 8	3 5	3 5	5	13	0	
Tippera	3 12	3 2	3 6	7	0	0	
Noakhali	5 3	4 4	4 8	6	9	0	
Murahidabad	2 15	3 7	4 8	9	4	7	(a) For those with occupancy right. Rate for under-raiyat without occupancy right is 4-12-6.
Birbhum	3 7	3 14	4 0	8	11	6	(b) For those with occupancy right. Rate for under-raiyat without occupancy right is 5-4-2.

The averages given above do not indicate that there are high rents on a large scale. The general tendency is moderate though there are no doubt black sheep in the flock. My experience shows that whenever there is any rate which is higher than what the land can bear it is bound to be sold up in time and the zamindar gets it back on his hands by khas purchase with a loss of arrears of rent. It is not to the interest of a landlord to resort to rack-renting as it is a shortsighted policy which involves loss in the end and moreover creates discontent which renders collections difficult and if rent is not collected, payment of land revenue has to be made by incurring debts. So far as my information goes, all the big zamindars follow the policy of moderate rent and punctual collection. Now-a-days specially when the tenants are more or less organised and imbued with socialistic ideas—only in respect of the classes above him—the zamindar is obliged to follow a policy of conciliation and rack-renting is becoming an impossibility. The worst offender in this direction is the tenant who sublets his land on cash rent as the Table above will show.

Generally speaking the tenants under a private zamindar are much better off than in an estate under the direct management of Government. The tenant can extort concessions by threats from a zamindar and the latter has to submit as he must pay the land revenue punctually and has to take whatever he may get, even if the demands made of him are unreasonable.

The answer to the question is that the expectation, so far as punctual payment of revenue and moderation towards tenants are concerned, has been fulfilled and it may be said that the tenants have now got concessions at the expense of the zamindars which were never contemplated at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

The views expressed above are amply corroborated by the findings of the late Director of Land Records in connection with the settlement of Murshidabad district—the Final Report for which was published late last year. This officer had probably the largest experience of revenue settlements first as Assistant Settlement Officer, then as Settlement Officer and then as Special Land Revenue Settlement Officer and lastly as Director of Land Records and Surveys and his findings should, therefore, carry weight and the report is also of great value as it is recent and embodies the experience up to date. Some extracts are quoted below:—

“The question as to how far the Permanent Settlement as a legal measure was detrimental to the tenantry has been much debated. Sir J. Colebrooke has been quoted to have expressed on ‘the melancholy errors of the Permanent Settlement,’ ‘on the sacrifice of the Yeomanry, etc.’ I am afraid, as far as I could judge from a somewhat intensive study of the conditions in this district, the charge cannot in my opinion

be fully endorsed. Rarely one meets a village where the tenantry has not continued for generations. It is easier to trace old connection of the peasantry with a village than that of the landlord. That the tenantry could hold to their lands from a time prior to the safeguarding Bengal Tenancy Act is a proof that the circumstances were not so unfavourable as are sought to be made out. The village rights exist—except in the case of pasturage—no worse than what existed before. In the matter of common pasturage more tenants are found to take up and break down such land for tillage than the landlords could ever expect and for this Permanent Settlement in my opinion is 'less' responsible than various other circumstances with which the Permanent Settlement had little or no connection. This will be borne out by a study of the circumstances in the temporarily settled or even khas mahal estates. It was asserted that 'the Permanent Settlement left the zamindar to make his settlement with them on such terms as he might choose to require.' The continuity of the tenantry from father to son for generations is a proof that in the largest majority of cases the terms were not unfavourable. The average rent rate is about rupees three and odd per acre. Judged by the outturn and the rent rates in the temporarily-settled estates in the Province this is not high. Here, too, his terms cannot be said to have been harsh, while in every village one may get from any old tenant that in the majority of cases in the past, the relation between the landlord and the tenant was sweeter and much more friendly evincing greater good will on either side than what could be claimed to-day. If people's verdict be any evidence—to my mind there can be no better evidence—the position has gone from bad to worse in more recent times when tradition was lost and law was substituted to regulate the relation. For all that Permanent Settlement cannot by any process of logic be held responsible. Black sheep there were, are and must be in future. The exchange of patta and kabuliyats—which was the one omission to which all the alleged ills of the tenantry are attributed could have availed little when large ignorance, little education, still less capacity for organised action were the order of the day. Those who know how in spite of the strictest injunctions of law to-day rent receipts in proper form are not granted, and abwabs are collected must realise that law is incapable of enforcing what can only be enforced by organised and educated social sense. The Permanent Settlement by securing the necessary conditions of growth has done more than anything else to create the beginning of that social sense. The clear provisions in the Permanent Settlement regulations have enabled the Government to step in and protect the cultivators and now that a piece of legislation like this is entirely in the hands of the people it is up to them to speed up the perfection of what in the largest interests can be held to be conducive to the real welfare of the country as a whole.

My conclusion is that the Permanent Settlement as a fiscal measure did nothing to the detriment of the raiyats. It took away no rights which the tenantry then possessed, deprived them of no security which they otherwise had. The processes of rent realisation in the beginning had to be made harsher as were the processes for the realisation of land revenue but much of that hardship was due to rationalisation of business methods which had to come. On the other hand, I believe that the ultimate effect of the Permanent Settlement certainly was for the good of the tenantry, as the rate of rent in Bengal is lower than that of other provinces, viz., Punjab, United Provinces, and others. It provided the State at once with the moral background to interfere whenever it thought that the tenants had a grievance and the tenancy legislations embody in the main the effect of the strenuous endeavours in the interests of the actual tiller."

**Q. 9.** The first part of the question has been dealt with in para. (3) of reply to question 1 and also in replies to questions 2 and 3.

The other duties imposed were maintenance of correct accounts and granting of rent receipts which have been generally fulfilled.

Absenteeism is of recent origin and has not affected the policy followed by the zamindars. Most of the big zamindars are resident but they can reside in one place only while their zamindari are very much scattered and cover a wide area and in such cases it matters little whether he resides in a town or village within his zamindari or in a town outside it, unless he has the energy to inspect and come into touch with all parts of his zamindari. If a zamindar is energetic he will inspect all parts of his estate and it is immaterial whether he starts on these tours from a village within the zamindari or a town outside it. So far as the big zamindars are concerned "absenteeism" has no meaning. The temperament of the zamindar is of greater importance than the place of his residence. Most of the big zamindars do very little of touring but employ managers and depend upon them. I know of some zamindars who employ managers but keep a very close watch over them and in order to do so they come in touch with the tenants. Petty zamindars who manage their own estates without the help of a manager necessarily remain in touch with the tenants. Besides this, the recent Acts of the Government have given power of exchange to the tenants, but the Government does not recognise any exchange by landlords.

**Q. 10.** The Permanent Settlement was the outcome of pressing necessity (*see* reply to question 1). The old tenants have benefited by getting their rents fixed in cash on the basis of assets at the time of Permanent Settlement. Considering that the price of paddy at the time of Permanent Settlement was about 8 annas per maund, the rates prevalent now-a-days is about 4 times that. Rents in some cases have

been enhanced at 2 annas per rupee at intervals of 15 years but this has not affected their profits materially. The reason why they are hard up is that the purchasing power of the rupee has decreased and wants have increased. Limitation imposed by tenancy legislation has placed the tenants in a position and has given them rights and privileges which they never enjoyed even under the Moghul rule. It can be said that the Permanent Settlement taken along with the subsequent tenancy legislation has materially improved the lot of the mass of tenants. A middle class of bhadraloks has been created and they are the intelligentsia of the country. After the disastrous years, which immediately followed the Permanent Settlement, were over and most of the original zamindars with whom the Permanent Settlement had been made had disappeared, their successors benefited, until socialistic tendencies disturbed the peaceful atmosphere. The cry nowadays is not so much due to any injustice according to old ideas but the growth of socialistic and communistic doctrines and the preaching of modern popular leaders against the unequal distribution of wealth and the moneyed class in general. If the future aim be a policy of appeasement towards the socialists and communists, there is no reason why the zamindar should be singled out and the other property owners and owners of unearned wealth should be left untouched. If the doctrines are followed to their logical conclusion there should be no individual ownership of land or house or any other property and no inheritance. The cry now seems to be that the zamindars must be deprived of their unearned wealth but the same principle is not to be followed any further down nor is any other class to be touched.

The reply to the question is that the system did the greatest good to the largest number so long as revolutionary doctrines did not permeate society. It has been pointed out in reply to question 5 that any attempt at bringing down the entire social structure which has been evolved in the last 150 years would end in a cataclysm.

The present tenancy laws are all for the tenant and it is the zamindar who needs protection. The tenants have gained considerable advantage at the expense of the zamindars and the zamindar has not gained anything worth mentioning at the expense of the tenant.

The reply to the question is that when the Permanent Settlement was effected the question of greatest good for the largest number was not at issue. The main problem for consideration was how to assure the punctual realisation of the largest possible amount of land revenue that could be then demanded. Experience, however, shows that the measure has been for the greatest good for the largest number, i.e., the masses, the middlemen and the zamindars.

Another point to be considered is that actual collection in permanently settled estates is far more satisfactory than in estates under the direct management of Government and it is, therefore, more advantageous to the State also. Figures are given in the statement annexed at the end of this question showing collections in permanently settled estates and Government estates in the last 6 years. It has been compiled from the Board's Annual Land Revenue Administration Reports. It will be seen what a huge amount of arrears always remains outstanding in estates under direct management and how the percentage of total collections on total demand in such estates is generally about half or even less than half in comparison with permanently settled estates. In direct management the total rent roll on paper may be very high but actual collection will be less than what it is now under Permanent Settlement.

The present unrest is mainly political and also to a certain extent because the country is very poor and there is not enough national wealth to go round to everybody to make the nation prosperous. The policy of robbing Peter and paying Paul may temporarily satisfy the class benefited but even if the policy is followed the masses will ultimately realise that the removal of the hated class has not left them very much better off and the main problem must be the increase of national wealth. Any temporary palliative will be ineffective and only fan the flame of class hatred.

The late Director of Land Records in his Final Report on the settlement of the Murshidabad district has observed in para 105:—

"But it can hardly be denied that its economic and political effects on the whole was satisfactory. It gradually stabilised habits, standardised life. Though the security of the tenants was not made safe by the statutory contracts—which later had unfortunate effect—yet at the time when there was more quest for tenants than for land the situation itself was a substitute for law."

"Stabler conditions increased the population, converted the quest of landlords for tenants to a ceaseless quest of tenants for land....."

"It is not improbable that a cynical nationalist economist of the future may even attribute to the self-imposed limitation of the executive Government, a part of the progress which Bengal unquestionably enjoys. He would probably argue that it tended to conserve automatically a part of the wealth which in taxation would have gone out of his country for expenditure over which constitutionally, till of late, the people had no control. He might even attribute to this measure a part of that culture and general well-being which the people of Bengal—its peasantry, its middle class, its landlords, and even its much abused

mahajads and lawyers enjoy. The question of the abrogation of the Permanent Settlement, therefore, needs to be approached with the utmost circumspection....."

Year.	Total Demand.		Current Demand. *	
	Permanently-settled estates.	Khas Mahals.	Permanently-settled estates.	Khas Mahals.
1931-32 ..	2,32,43,736	99,61,730	2,15,56,925	62,30,304
1932-33 ..	2,43,78,514	1,16,16,894	2,15,53,131	64,16,819
1933-34 ..	2,52,81,101	1,35,52,480	2,15,31,443	66,09,714
1934-35 ..	2,51,50,753	1,49,32,873	2,15,14,560	68,18,527
1935-36 ..	2,45,62,219	1,49,01,445	2,15,01,774	71,70,109
1936-37 ..	2,44,11,784	1,33,88,505	2,14,98,926	71,00,040

Year.	Total Collection.		Percentage of total collection on total demand.		Percentage of collection on current demand.	
	Permanently settled estates.	Khas Mahals.	P. S. Estates.	Khas Mahals.	P. S. Estates.	Khas Mahals.
	(b)	(a)				
1931-32 ..	2,04,20,976	47,87,414	88.12	48.05	94.73	76.84
1932-33 ..	2,06,18,800	46,00,204	87.80	40.11	95.57	72.63
1933-34 ..	2,16,37,609	52,86,419	85.58	39.00	100.49	82.39
1934-35 ..	2,20,83,115	67,85,600	84.57	44.26	103.17	99.51
1935-36 ..	2,16,14,328	74,39,383	87.85	49.11	100.52	103.75
1936-37 ..	2,22,67,413	74,59,032	91.21	55.46	100.35	106.04

(a) Includes interest.

(b) Does not include interest though interest is now being realised—Nor are amounts realised as penalties for exemption from sale shown.

**Q. 11.** (i) and (ii) Without statistics it is not possible to state what percentage is appropriated by the classes above the tenant. The total amount appropriated is shared by the zamindars and the middlemen which included *de jure* raiyats who have let out their lands on cash rent. These middlemen form the bulk of the middle class gentry of the province. Exact figure about the number of such middlemen is not available.

It may be true that 75 per cent. or 80 per cent. is absorbed between the cultivator and the State but it is necessary to examine whether it is for the greatest good of the largest number. Between the actual cultivator and the State there are sometimes as many as 20 to 30 intermediate holders. At the very bottom is the tiller of the soil. Above him there are in some cases 2 or more grades of under-raiyats. On the top of these is the *de jure* raiyats. Then above him are layer after layer of tenure-holders. If the object of the State be to reach directly the income from the soil it will be necessary to do away not only with the zamindar but the *de jure* raiyat who has let out his lands to under-raiyats and also the top grades of under-raiyats. Subinfeudation

existed during Moghul times, and there were jaigirs and tenures like *ayamas*, *maddamash*, *altamgha*, etc. During the Dewani period also there was subinfeudation. Sir John Shore in para. 180 of his minute of 18th June 1789 observed:—

“A zamindar possessing an extensive district having made a settlement with Government, relets, in portions, to several farmers; they again make over their leases, in whole or in part to others; and these again, to renters of inferior denominations.”

Subinfeudation existed from before but the Permanent Settlement gave an impetus to it.

Another point to be considered is that under direct management, the rent-roll may show a very high figure but it has been found in practice that a very large amount always remains outstanding in Government estates under direct management and the percentage of total collection in these estates on the total demand is generally half or even less than that in permanently settled estates. This will be clear from the comparative statement annexed at the end of the preceding question. It has been compiled from the Board's published Annual Land Revenue Administration Reports.

The existing order of society has been evolved from conditions brought about by the Permanent Settlement. The extinction of the zamindars and middle class will create a new order—probably socialistic—the result of which it is difficult to foresee. It is certain that there will be bitter class war and unsettled conditions will prevail for the long period of transition. The dispossessed zamindars and middlemen will swell the rank of the communists and if the intention is to realise the entire income from land direct from the tillers of the soil after removing all intermediaries including *de jure* raiyats, the existing laws about fixed rents will have to be abolished and this will affect the masses. Considering the appalling state of unemployment it would be highly impolitic to deprive such a large body of men of the means of their livelihood. Please also see reply to question 5.

(iii) No. See reply to question 8 where it is fully dealt with.

(iv) The tenants are better off under private zamindars than in estates under direct management. (See reply to question 8.)

There are complaints about the corrupt collecting agency but even under direct management, the class of agency now employed by the zamindar will have to be employed by the State also. So long as national characteristics do not change the collecting agency will behave



in the same way under State employment as under private employment. Whenever the agents of the private zamindar are oppressive, the tenants appeal to the zamindar and failing him move the Government. The zamindar is more amenable to threat and persuasion, there being a personal factor, than the State, which is merely a machine, by organised body of raiyats as he must collect sufficient money to pay land revenue and cannot afford to displease the tenants and the latter can, therefore, get the best terms from him. The present day zamindar shorn of all his previous powers and most of his privileges, is not what the term overlord ordinarily connotes nor is he burdensome.

**Q. 12.** The grounds are without any substance as explained in replies to previous questions and based in many cases on wrong assumption and this question therefore does not arise.

**Q. 13.** Anything which contributes to the welfare and prosperity of the largest number of the people cannot be described as a "loss". There may be a loss according to mathematical calculation but on the whole it is a gain to the people. Ultimate individual wealth alone contributes to the wealth of the nation and on that depends all prosperity. Attention ought to be directed to the most important and basic question whether it is conducive to the best interests of the people at large. In reply to question 8, it has been shown that the zamindars have acted with moderation towards the tenants and how it is more advantageous for them to be under a private zamindar than directly under the State. The welfare of the zamindar is bound up with the welfare of the tenants and the main goal of both is the same. He is a human being whereas the State is a machine. He is a buffer between the State and the people with a leaning towards the latter and his removal will be prejudicial to the interests of the tenant. Apart from the legal aspect of the question, it has been shown in reply to question 5 that it is impracticable to do away with the Permanent Settlement without a social and economic revolution which will inevitably result in the socialists and communists gaining the upper hand. The present unrest is due to the spread of revolutionary doctrines which lay the greatest stress on the unequal distribution of wealth and the inequity of any one enjoying unearned wealth. These are considerations which do not affect the zamindar alone but the capitalist as a class and all those who enjoy properties by inheritance. For the present the zamindar has been singled out and zamindar-baiting has become a popular pastime. In the printed handbills distributed broadcast by the Krishak Samities (peasant associations) the zamindars are abused in choice epithets like blood-suckers, etc., and resolutions are passed in a similar strain. The tenants are already a privileged class and for them the ordinary law in the Indian Penal Code against promotion of

class hatred is apparently in abeyance. If, however, full effect is given to the doctrines on which the attacks on zamindars are now being based, the capitalists and all persons enjoying unearned wealth should go and this will include the grades of tenants who do not cultivate lands themselves as well as those who inherit properties. The financial aspect of the thing also needs serious consideration. Direct management will involve heavy costs in revisional settlements, costs of collections, maintenance of protective works and undertaking of irrigation works and works of improvement and also losses in the shape of remissions and abatements for failure of crops, deterioration, diluvion, etc. It ought to be ascertained what the net increase may be after allowing for all these. On the basis of figures in the Land Revenue Administration Reports of the last 6 years it will be seen that the percentage of collections in khas mahals is much lower than in permanently settled estates (*vide* statement annexed in answer to question 10). Investigations on these points and also regarding the cost of acquisition of the interests of the zamindars and middlemen and also the annual charges for interest and sinking fund on the capital outlay, are essential before any of the alternatives suggested can be properly examined. Without any data on this all important point, the present discussion is more or less academic and of theoretical value only. For these reasons, I consider the alternatives suggested in (i) and (ii) to be highly injudicious.

(ii) Temporary settlements were found by experiment to be unsatisfactory, as the temporary lessee having no permanent interest was always inclined to extract as much as he could during his tenure and leave the estate ruined. This led to oppression and malpractices. Moreover, costly agency will have to be entertained for periodical revisions of the record of rights with a view to accurate assessment and the Collector's time will be monopolised by the work of revisional settlements and general administration will suffer.

Sir John Shore in his minute of 18-6-1789 fully discussed the three alternative systems of collection (1) directly by the State, (2) through farmers, and (3) through zamindars. Most of the arguments used by him against (1) and (2) still hold good and deserve careful consideration. For facility of reference, I am herewith annexing extracts of the paras. 154 to 164 of his Minute.

(iii) The imposition of a tax on agricultural income seems undesirable. I am not competent to express an opinion on the legal aspect of the thing but it will involve the breach of a solemn pledge. It is bound to be highly unpopular, as it will affect not only the zamindars but a considerable body of middlemen and all aspects of the question have to be thoroughly examined before any decision can be arrived at.

Besides this, the landlords pay a higher tax to the State in the shape of revenue and cess than the other moneyed classes do in the shape of income tax.

### Appendix to Question 13.

*Extract from Sir John Shore's Minute, dated 18th June 1789.*

• • • • •

154. There are three modes by which the revenue of the country may be realized for the State. First, by employing officers for this purpose on the part of Government, to collect them immediately from the raiyats or lower denomination of tenants, without the agency of the zamindars or farmers. This mode of management is usually termed khas, the inferior agents and receivers under the Collector are chosen by him, and have fixed salaries allotted to them.

155. The due and successful administration of this plan, supposes sufficient knowledge and experience in the Collector employed, with respect to the rent and land, to regulate all the detail of the settlement and collections as well as time and application to go through with it, the mofussil account should be examined, the charge of the inferior agents, whether employed to collect the rents of a village or pergunnah should be inspected and curtailed where exorbitant, the number must be regulated and the rent of each village and indeed of every raiyat ought to be adjusted.

156. The advantages attending this mode of settlement, in speculation are these:—The Collector has it in his power to reduce the cesses where they are burthensome, and to equalize the assessment paid by the lower classes of raiyats, it affords him an opportunity of ascertaining the resources of the district, to acquire a knowledge of any improper reductions which have been made in the rental, to afford relief where wanted, to encourage improvement, and to establish such regulations as he may deem best calculated for the security of the cultivators of the soil, against present exaction and future oppression.

157. It ought also to be the most productive, by bringing to the account of Government the profits of intermediate farmers and contractors, as well as the produce of their frauds and embezzlements.

158. The objections to the plan and its disadvantages are these:—That it présumes a degree of knowledge, experience and application in the Collectors, which is rarely to be found or attained: It may exist in those of the present day, without any assurance that it will be found,

in their successors. The selection of proper inferior agents depends upon them; and their fidelity and exertions, from the dewan and officers in his cutchery to the lowest deputy, will be in proportion to the ability and vigilance of the superintending officer. If incapable of examining the accounts of his agents, and of detecting the fallacies of them, he will be exposed to constant imposition, and the public loss will be proportionally great. The same effects would follow from indolence.

159. The Government is not secured, with respect to its revenues, by any specific engagements; it must stand to all losses and accident of seasons; where the raiyats fail or are unable to pay, there is no remedy, and the annual amount of the revenues must be subject to considerable variation. The native officers employed in the detail of the business are only bound to a responsibility generally for the faithful discharge of the trust reposed in them, and to account for what they collect.

160. The Board of Revenue can exercise little control over this mode of management, but must rely upon the conducting officers; the detail is too minute for their inspection.

161. Where the operation is applied to the lands of a zamindar, he remains idle; or, what is worse, employs himself secretly to counteract the success of the Collector, and a subsistence must be allowed him by the Government.

162. In general it will be found, that the settlements attempted upon this plan, have proved unsuccessful under our administration. It was, however, often executed by the Mahomedan Government, who entered into all the details of the business, and examined the accounts of the aumil or collector with rigour and minuteness. Whether, for this reason it ought to be attempted by us, or not, remains to be decided. (185).

163. In the execution of a khas settlement, as usually performed, details which I have described are seldom entered into; and it means little more than delegating authority to the Collector of a district, to conclude specific engagements with farmers or with petty landholders for the rents of the several pergunnahs and divisions, instead of entering into an agreement for the revenues of the whole zamindari, with the proprietor of it. These engagements are more or less detailed, at the discretion of the Collector. The principal advantage attending this mode of management, is the probability of larger receipts. That, rests upon the supposition, that the zamindar declines engaging for the revenue of his lands, and that the resources of them, are equal to the assessment on them, as well as to furnish a provision to the zamindar upon the Collector's knowledge of these emoluments, and upon his ability to collect them. With regard to the persons with whom he may

enter into engagements, a comparative advantage may arise to them; that of a better security from contracting with Government, than with the zamindar, but this ought not to be the case, where the Collector knows and discharges his duty. In other respects, the plan combines many of the evils attending the farming system which is now to be considered.

164. The conveniences of collecting the revenues by farmers are, few and small; whilst the disadvantages are, many and great. It is certainly easy and simple to contract with a farmer for the revenues of a district: and this is all that can be said for it. Experience proves that it is fallacious in point of security for the farmers and securities both fail; and that it is oppressive in its execution. The engagements with a farmer, from a deficiency of local knowledge in the officers of Government, can seldom be made with sufficient precision to prevent impositions on his part; and the subsequent attempt to redress them, generally affords him grounds for claiming remissions. A temporary farmer never looks to future improvements: and the system opens a door for the introduction of persons in the management of the collections, who ought ever to be excluded; those who are in the service of Europeans, and participate their influence: But as it stands universally condemned, there is no occasion to detail inconveniences, which are acknowledged. The partial admission of farmers may perhaps take place on the grounds of necessity, as a remedy against greater evils.

**Q. 14.** I do not advocate (i) or (ii), but there can be no question that compensation should be paid if it is decided to expropriate the zamindars unless the Russian method of dealing with the *kulaks* is adopted and the zamindars are driven out in a body to some wilderness after being deprived of all their properties, and then left to starve. Clause (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is a bar to the acquisition of any landed property without compensation. Land as defined in that section includes immovable property of every kind and any rights in and over such property. Compensation should be on the basis of market value of the property. Market value is generally calculated by a certain number of years' purchase on the net profit. Many factors tend to determine the question how many years' purchase should be adopted for a particular estate. Estates forming a compact block are more valuable than scattered properties. Then again 16 annas interest in a village is more valuable than a joint undivided fractional interest. Facilities of communication is another factor and facilities for irrigation another. There should also be compensation for any costly works of improvement such as embankments, excavated irrigation channels, and tanks, etc. The principle of section 82 of the Bengal Tenancy Act which provides for the payment of compensation

for raiyats' improvements in case of eviction should be extended to zamindars or tenureholders who are expropriated and compensation should be paid to them for such improvements. The form of payment should be either cash or bonds with a guaranteed rate of interest, the rate being not less than 5 per cent.

To calculate the total cost of acquisition of the interest of the zamindar and middlemen it is necessary to ascertain the profits of each zamindar or tenureholder after deduction of management charges and land revenue or rent payable to superior landlords. Then it will have to be determined for each case how many years' purchase should be given. Without these data, the total cost cannot be calculated.

**Q. 15.** Redeemable would be preferable if there is no financial difficulty. The period should be the shortest possible. Interest should not be less than 5 per cent.

It should be understood that I do not advocate the expropriation of zamindars and the answers above are not to be taken as implying that I am a supporter of expropriation.

**Q. 16.** A complete social revolution with the communists on the top. For detailed reasons please see replies to question 5, 13 and 21.

**Q. 17.** If the object is to reach the income from land and do away with middlemen who absorb portions of it, all of them will have to be eliminated. On this principle the raiyat under the Government should be the cultivating raiyat and not the *de jure* raiyat.

The answer to the last part of the question cannot be given until the financial aspect of the thing has been thoroughly examined. It will be necessary to examine what the cost of the acquisition will be and then expenses under the following heads will have to be ascertained:—

- (a) Capital outlay necessary for acquisition and cost of interest and sinking fund on capital outlay.
- (b) Cost of maintenance of records and periodical revisional surveys.
- (c) Collection charges.
- (d) Cost of maintenance as well as new construction of protective and irrigation works and works of improvement.
- (e) Cost of permanent survey establishment for measurement of alluvions, diluvions and deteriorations due to sand deposit, etc., and also of areas affected by flood and drought and for splitting up holdings, measuring lands for new settlements, settling boundary disputes, etc.
- (f) Cost of agency for supervision and check of works in (e) above.
- (g) Cost of agency for carrying out resettlements with tenants involving reassessment and execution of leases.

- (h) Additional grants for hospitals, dispensaries, schools, etc., to replace grants now paid to them by zamindars.

Then, losses due to remissions and abatements for failure of crops, deterioration and diluvion will have to be calculated and deducted from the gross profits. Estimated percentage of collection should also be calculated.

When figures for all the items mentioned above have been calculated and the amount of net profit ascertained, then only it can be said whether the proposed purchase will be more advantageous than the existing system.

**Q. 18.** (1) Survey and settlement agency for periodical revisions of records of rights. In the past the cost rate for this has been Rs. 900 to Rs. 1,000 per square mile.

(2) An agency to carry on the periodical resettlements with tenants.

(3) A permanent survey establishment to measure lands for splitting up holdings, settling boundary disputes, measuring lands for new settlements, areas affected by flood, drought or deterioration through deposit of sand or inrush of saline water, etc., and preparation of detailed statements after such surveys.

(4) Agency to supervise works mentioned in (3) above.

(5) Cost of establishment for maintenance of records.

(6) Cost of agency to carry out resettlements with tenants involving reassessments and execution of fresh leases.

(7) Engineering establishment for undertaking new works and maintaining existing protective and irrigation works and works of improvement.

(8) Overhead establishment for general supervision and prevention of abuses.

(9) Collecting agency.

When the costs under all these heads have been correctly calculated, then only it can be said what the estimated total cost will be. Without any data no forecast can be made, but I think it will be rather high.

**Q. 19.** The zamindar is not popular now as class hatred is being sedulously preached without any let or hindrance as a part of the political game but when the passion has spent itself and the matter is examined coolly on its merits it will be found that the tenants are best off under private zamindars.

The khas mahal raiyats enjoy no advantages over tenants under the proprietors. It will be found if statistics are collected that rates of rent in khas mahal are generally higher than those in private estates of.

the neighbourhood. Another point is that collections in Government estates are made more stringently than in private estates. The zamindar is amenable to reason and can be more easily influenced than the Government. The point of view of the zamindar is the welfare of the tenantry with which his own welfare is bound up but with Government such a consideration occupies a minor role and attention is directed more to the extraction of the largest possible amount of revenue.

**Q. 20.** The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative.

There is a confusion of ideas in the 2nd part of the question. The creation of the permanent tenures has not affected the position of the raiyats as they are entrenched behind the tenancy legislations and it is immaterial to them whether the man to whom he pays his rent is a tenureholder or a zamindar. Generally speaking the ordinary tenureholder other than the patnidar is treated more as a man belonging to the people than to the higher aristocratic classes and also as such tenureholders with small limited area under them, are in more intimate touch with them than the zamindar. The patnidar is more akin to a zamindar than a tenureholder although he is technically so. The ordinary tenureholder, however, belongs to a higher status than the petty cultivator and intercourse between them has a beneficial effect on the cultivator, socially and economically.

**Q. 21.** "Tenure" is a very wide term and includes the big putnis, as well as semi-zamindaris like the holders of the Sunderban Lots under 40 years' leases, as well as middle class people holding comparatively small areas. All tenureholders below the 1st degree will come under the last class. The first 2 classes mentioned above may be classed as zamindars. They belong to upper classes of society. If they are bought off they will soon be reduced to beggary as the compensation they may get will be very small in view of the present slump in the value of agricultural lands and they will never be able to recover their invested capital. The utmost they may expect to get will be a small amount calculated at the present slump rate which will soon melt away. So long as he has his landed property, he can have the assurance of getting his food supply for himself and his family from the produce of his property and there is no risk of actual starvation. Once this sheet anchor is lost his condition will be precarious. Landed property gives stability as well as social status and credit. He can raise money on it in times of stress and liquidate his debts in prosperous year. With the loss of his land, he will lose credit and in times of need he will be bound to spend out of the small capital he might have got as compensation for his lands. When his condition becomes desperate he will naturally join the ranks of the revolutionaries who are already in the field. The latter will daily gain in strength and



having removed the landholders out of their path make a dead-set of other moneyed classes and capitalists and persons enjoying unearned wealth and there will be discontent and class war all over the land and stable government will be a difficult problem, if not impossible. Trade and commerce will inevitably suffer. All respect for the upper classes will be gone and strikes will be the order of the day and industries will be crippled. The loss of prestige both of the Government and of the upper classes who held a commanding position all along is already sorely affected and the downfall will be very much accelerated by adopting a policy of appeasement *ad libitum*. Growing clamour of the revolutionaries may be appeased temporarily by holding out a sop in the shape of some concession, but the demands will go on increasing and larger and larger concessions will have to be made until a time will be reached when no further concession is possible and then there will be a clash. The zamindars and the landed classes may be the first scapegoat offered, but this will be a very temporary palliative. So long as means are not found to increase the national wealth by a popular Government working solely in the interest of the people, there cannot be any satisfactory solution and the suggested expropriation of the landholders will be taken as a victory for the revolutionary forces and infuse vigour into them for bolder actions. By the proposed measure there will be no increase in national wealth and on the contrary wealth, which is now confined to the country, will be transferred to sources from which they can be easily taken out of it. The lot of the masses will remain the same, as no part of the spoil will go to them but will be appropriated entirely by their rulers. The combined effect will be to hasten the end of capitalism and there will be a long period of chaos and semi-anarchy before things settle down again under a new order of Government.

The smaller tenureholders will be similarly affected. Some of them may earn something by manual labour but it will hardly be possible to find work for the large mass that will be set free from the lands. Discontent and unrest will be widespread and the days of peace and contentment will come to an end. The process of disruption has commenced and the proposed measure will hasten it.

**Q. 22.** The zamindars and the tenureholders should be given the option of retaining their homesteads and khas lands or of selling them to the State for fair value which should be determined by some expert and impartial tribunal.

Khas lands are of 2 classes—cultivated and uncultivated. As regards the latter the best way will be to refer to the record of rights where they are of fairly recent date. In districts where the records of rights are old and out of date, independent evidence will be necessary. All land not in the occupation of a tenant is khas and in case of dispute

Between the zamindar or tenureholder and a tenant regarding any plot or area the burden of proof should be on the tenant to prove his tenancy.

There is a large amount of holding purchased khas by the zamindar or tenureholder at rent or certificate sales, which nominally are the property of the zamindar or tenureholder by right of purchase and shall be treated as khas land. There are, however, some such lands in the actual possession of the outgone tenants who are mere trespassers and enjoy the lands rent free. Such lands ought to be treated as khas.

As regards khas lands under cultivation, the tests ought to be whether they are cultivated by—

- (1) ploughs and cattle belonging to the zamindar through his servants or hired labour,
- (2) bargadars or adhiars on annual leases,
- (3) through tenants-at-will of any other class.

In all such cases the land should be treated as khas.

**Q. 23.** Yes; occupancy right, as it is understood now, was created by the British by Act X of 1859. Previous to that the only permanent tenants were the "khudkasht". Their rights were, however, more limited than was conferred on them by the Tenancy Act. In the great Rent Case presided over by 14 Judges of the Calcutta High Court (Thakurani Dasi vs. Bisheshwar Mookerjee 3 W.R.), there is a very clear analysis of their rights. Extracts are quoted below:—

"These tenants seem, at the settlement practically and legally, though not by express Statute, to have been divided into two classes, the khudkasht kudeemee, and the simple khudkasht, or those who have been in possession of the land for more than 12 years before the settlement, and those whose possession did not run so long. Both by Hindu and Mahomedan Laws, as well as by the legal practice (Colebrooke's Digest of the Regulations, Vol. III, p. 4) of the country, 12 years had been considered sufficient to establish a right by negative presumption, that is, by the absence of any claim on the part of other persons during that period.....

"As I have observed above, it had become the practice of the Government for the time being, to collect various imposts from the zemindar, who again was entitled to collect them from the raiyats.....By section 54 of Regulation VIII of 1793, all proprietors of land and dependant talukdars were required to consolidate these charges with the Assal or original rate, into one specified sum. And by section 55 of the same law, proprietors and farmers of land of whatever description, were prohibited from imposing any new abwab or mathoot on the raiyats, and a penalty was exacted in case of any infringement of the provision".

The khudkasht kudeemee raiyat had the right to hold his land, so long as he paid rent at the pargana rate. This was a fluctuating rate for different classes of crop and a raiyat cultivating one class of crop had to take the permission of the zamindar for cultivating any other crop and if necessary pay higher rate.

The ordinary khudkasht raiyat was liable to eviction by a purchaser of the zamindari at revenue sale. It is observed in the same judgment:—

“It follows that these laws, Regulation XI of 1822, Act XII of 1841, distinctly gave the purchaser the power to eject a khudkasht raiyat whose tenure was created after the Permanent Settlement, and, if not ejected, they are liable to be assessed at discretion of the landlord.”

The paikash or non-resident raiyats were mere tenants-at-will, no matter how long they might have cultivated the same land.

By subsequent tenancy legislation, all these distinctions were done away with and one uniform class called occupancy raiyat was created and tenants who were ordinary khudkasht or even paikash came to enjoy almost all the privileges of a khudkasht kudeemee. The doctrine of a settled raiyat acquiring occupancy rights is altogether an innovation. Act X of 1859 provided for the rights of three classes:—

- (1) Certain tenureholders declared entitled to hold at fixed rents.
- (2) Certain raiyats declared to hold at fixed rates of rent.
- (3) Raiyats entitled to a right of occupancy.

The old classification was amended for the benefit of the raiyat and the rights of the zamindar have been systematically crippled by subsequent tenancy legislation in order to grant new privileges to the tenants. For a summary of the rights of tenants as they existed at the time of the Permanent Settlement, paras. 389, 406 and 407 of Sir John Shore's Minute of 18th June, 1789, reproduced in answer to Q. 1 may be read.

**Q. 24.** The allegation is totally unfounded. In answer to question 4, it has been explained that the zamindar was recognised as the proprietor from the earliest Hindu times and also during the Pathan and Moghul periods. This in itself rebuts the allegation in this question, but there is ample evidence to show that the cultivating raiyat had never any proprietary right. In the Moghul period there were three classes of raiyat:—

- (1) Khudkasht Kudeemee.
- (2) Khudkasht.
- (3) Paikasht.

No. (1) was the old resident raiyat with a right of inheritance. He derived his interest from the zamindar and was his creation and he was

entrusted to a patta from the zamindar. So long as he paid the rates at the pargana rate, he was not liable to eviction but he could be evicted if he refused to do so. He had no right of transfer by sale, gift, etc. In the great Rent Case (*Thakurani vs. Bisheshar Mookerjee*, 3 W.R.) 14 Judges of the Calcutta High Court who heard it found that "Khudkasht raiyats are simply cultivators of the lands of their own village, who, after being once admitted into the village, have a right of occupancy so long as they pay the customary rents, and therefore with a tendency to become hereditary, and with an interest in the produce of the soil over and above the mere wages of labour and the profits of stock, in other words above the cost of production."

The ordinary khudkasht raiyats were creation of a later date and during the period of Dewani of the East India Company they were liable to ejectment by the purchaser of the zamindari at a revenue sale. The Company was simply following the custom of the country and not introducing a new principle. The following extract from the same judgment makes the position quite clear:—

"Regulation XI of 1822 was passed, the use in section 32 of that law of the terms khudkasht kudeemee raiyat, or resident and hereditary raiyat with a prescriptive right of occupancy, to designate the raiyat who would not be liable to eviction or a sale for arrear of revenue, gave rise to the doctrine, that khudkasht raiyats who had their origin subsequent to the settlement were liable to eviction though, if not evicted, they, under section 33, could only be called upon to pay rents determined according to the law and usage of the country, and also, that the possession of all raiyats whose title commenced subsequent to the settlement was simply a permissive one, that is one retained with the consent of the landlord." (S. D. Decisions for 1856 pp. 617 to 628.) As regards the paikasht raiyat, he was merely a tenant-at-will.

None of the classes "of cultivating raiyats" mentioned above can by any stretch of imagination be called proprietors of the soil. As a matter of fact as a result of the Permanent Settlement, a prodigious amount of tenancies were terminated and renewed. The following is an extract from para. II of the letter of the Court of Directors, dated 15th January 1819:—

"When we bear in mind the fact stated by Mr. Roche in his minute recorded on your Revenue Consultations of the 12th August, 1815, that subsequently to the period of the Permanent Settlement 'probably one-third, or rather one-half, of the landed property in the province of Bengal may have been transferred by public sale on account of arrears of revenue', we can readily perceive *how prodigiously numerous must have been the instances in which engagements between zemindars and raiyats were annulled.*"

The term "proprietor" denotes the person who originally had the absolute right of use or disposal of the land. He may transfer portions

of his rights to another by contract, such as by lease to tenants or alienate in any manner he wishes. (See paras. 389, 406 and 407 of Sir John Shore's Minute, dated 18th June 1789, reproduced in answer to question 1.)

**Q. 25.** The occupancy right ought to be extended to all under-raiyats paying cash rent, no matter what his grade may be. It should not be extended to bargadars. See reply to question 32.

Originally the occupancy right belonged to the actual cultivators of the soil. In Act X of 1859 and also in the Act of 1868 this right belonged to those who actually held or cultivated the land as raiyat. Thus the right of the actual cultivator was recognised in the old tenancy legislation as well as in the Moghul period. A change was introduced by the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 which defined raiyat as one who *primarily* acquires lands for the purpose of cultivation with his own labour or by hired labour. The expression "hired labour" was added to the definition at the instance of the European indigo planters. The underlying principle of occupancy right being originally actual cultivation, logically the actual cultivator ought to get it as he acquires it by his own industry. The bargadar is not a raiyat but a hired labourer. (See answer to question 32.) Advantage was taken of the wide definition of a raiyat in the Bengal Tenancy Act by many tenureholders who claimed that the original purpose for which the land was acquired was cultivation although subsequently they might have sublet them to tenants.

**Q. 26.** A tenant who voluntarily parts with his rights for good consideration can not claim further protection against the under-raiyat. He should be bound by his contract. It would be an arbitrary act in violation of the Contract Act to attempt to annul rights created by the tenant himself.

**Q. 27.** At the time of the Permanent Settlement the contingency that non-agriculturists might come in was not visualised and there was no mention of them anywhere nor was any provision made to exclude or protect them. The Permanent Settlement was dealing with landed interest and the Government reserved the right to protect "the dependant talukdars, the raiyats and other cultivators of the soil," although it might have been the duty of the Government to protect all classes of people. Expropriation of agriculturists by non-agriculturists is becoming a serious problem and it has become necessary to protect the agriculturists but in doing so it will be found that for their sake, the non-agriculturists also should be protected within certain limits. The non-agriculturists who are now coming are generally the moneylenders who finance the tenants in their times of difficulty. But for the help rendered by them much of the land would have remained uncultivated. Unless Government is prepared to finance the agriculturists, the village

moneylender must be maintained but the abuses may be corrected by a Moneylenders' Act. If the provisions in such an Act be too harsh against the moneylender, he will stop lending and the agriculturists will suffer. Great circumspection is necessary in framing the Moneylenders' Act. Usurious rates ought to be cut down but at the same time he should be given facilities of realisation and the primitive village moneylender should not be called upon to maintain an elaborate and expensive system of accounts based on European ideas with which he is quite unfamiliar. There was no express provision in the Permanent Settlement regarding non-agriculturists, but there is no reason why they should be protected except in so far as it may be to the interest of the raiyat to protect them.

**Q. 28.** The answer to the 1st part of the question is an emphatic negative.

There should be provision for settlement of fair rent in urban areas on the lines of the provisions made in the Bengal Tenancy Act for settlement of fair rents of agricultural lands. The provision should extend to all lands which though not in urban areas are used for non-agricultural purposes. There are many instances of tenants holding lands under agricultural leases within municipal towns or big villages forming trade centres at the low agricultural rates and leasing them out in small parcels for the erection of jute godowns, shops, etc., at rates as high as Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 per bigha or even more. In the majority of such cases the lands were originally in rural areas and had been leased for agricultural purposes but subsequently the areas developed into big trade centres or towns and lost their rural character.

**Q. 29.** Yes; the main reasons are that lands are passing into the hands of non-agriculturists who do not cultivate lands themselves, and, secondly, as holdings are ultimately being split up by inheritance and sales, they are becoming of uneconomic size. The fact that bargadars and adhiars have no statutory rights has been no doubt helpful in increasing the tendency to bhag and adhi settlements. The Bengal Debt Settlement Act is very much hastening the process. As a result of the Act, moneylenders are not granting loans to agriculturists and when, therefore, the tenant needs money he has to sell outright at least portions of his holding. He generally becomes in such cases the bargadar under the purchaser. Other cases are:—

(a) In cases of new settlements of lands by zamindars, tenure-holders or *de jure* raiyats, the practice is to realise a premium for settling on cash rents. There is lack of cash and new settlements on cash rent are, therefore, smaller in number now and there is corresponding increase of settlement on bhag or adhi.

(b) Fall in price of food crops has the same tendency. A tenant is afraid of binding himself down to a fixed cash rent and prefers the sliding scale of the bhag or adhi system.

(c) Many holdings at high rates have been sold in court sales and no one is willing to take settlement of these at previous rates and where the zamindar is unwilling to bring down rates in the hope of better times, he lets out the land in barga or adhi.

(d) With increase of population the class of landless labourers has enormously increased and they are always very anxious to have some land to cultivate as bargadar or adhiar for getting their food grain.

(e) Continual subdivision of interest in a holding by the law of inheritance by which many individual cosharer becomes practically a landless labourer and he too is anxious to add to his income by cultivating lands in barga or adhi.

**Q. 30.** Please see reply to Q. 29. The suggestions in (i) and (ii) are correct. (iii) The occupancy right was originally a personal right, hence the occupancy holding could not be transferred. This was really meant for the preservation of this class of people who not only did not understand their own interests but were very low in the scale of life morally and intellectually, only with few exceptions. The social needs override individual needs. In matters like marriage or other social requirements, they spend a lot and generally far in excess of their means. The result is that they become indebted and are forced to transfer their holdings. Giving of free right of transfer temporarily eased the situation but is not a permanent remedy. There are many political and economic causes behind. Economic exploitation has been the root cause of the present troubles. If the poor tenants can weave their own cloths and manufacture their own salt as before there will be some relief. Economic and industrial developments will give them means of supplementing their income and are essential. The export of distress gold deprived the people of their last hording of money. In order to prevent further destitution of the cultivators, the object should be to devise means of restricting transfer instead of affording facilities for doing so.

**Q. 31.** Area normally held by a bargadar can be ascertained fairly accurately from the Appendices to the Final District Settlement Reports. The average will be 8 to 10 bighas.

The bargadars are mostly tenants with lands insufficient for their maintenance, who cultivate lands in barga to supplement their income and also include some landless labourers.

**Q. 32.** At first sight it seems that bargadars should have the occupancy right as they actually cultivate the lands but they are really glorified hired labourers and it is not advisable to extend the right to that class. They are hired labourers and should be treated as such. The only protection he needs is that he should get the stipulated share of wages and any attempt at cheating him out of a portion of it may

be made punishable. Any rigid rule about the proportion is undesirable. It should be regulated by the ordinary laws of supply and demand. There should also be corresponding penalty for a bargadar trying to cheat his employer by surreptitiously removing part of the produce. If they are given any right, it will be justifiable for all labourers to claim and get also rights in different spheres, e.g., a millhand in a mill, a tea-garden cooly in a tea-garden, and a house labourer in the house.

**Q. 33.** Considering that this system affords a means of livelihood to the landless labourer and also to small tenant having raiyati land insufficient to maintain him, it is an economically sound one and its extension should not be prevented. At present the barga settlements are made from year to year and the bargadar has no interest in improving the yield by using manures, etc. If he can be given leases for 2 or 3 years at least, there may be an inducement to him to take more care and try improvements. In order to encourage this, it is necessary to make it perfectly clear to all concerned that cultivation for a fixed period will not confer any right, as otherwise no one will be willing to let out for fixed periods. Giving occupancy right to bargadar will throw large quantities of land out of cultivation.

**Q. 34.** See reply to question 32.

Extension of right to the bargadars will lead the zamindars, tenure-holders and some classes of raiyat to let their lands lie fallow rather than lose control of them. The large number of bargadars who are mostly small tenants with insufficient lands and landless labourers will be deprived of their means of livelihood and considerable quantities of land will be waste and the owners of the lands, who now employ the bargadars will suffer loss of income.

(See replies to question 33.)

**Q. 35.** The proportion according to general custom is half. It should not be fixed by law and should be left to be regulated by the laws of supply and demand. In theory a zamindar or other employer of a bargadar may realise more than half but considering the present state of the country it can never be done in practice. The tenants have now organised themselves and just now their party are the rulers over the zamindars and the latter deserve protection more than the tenant. If a maximum limit is sought to be fixed by law, a minimum limit also ought to be fixed but any such attempt is undesirable.

**Q. 36.** It varies in different localities. In Rangpur and adjoining districts of North Bengal, the rate is between As. 4 to As. 8 per day and one meal.

Towards Burdwan and industrial centres it is as high as As. 8 per day during transplantation period plus one meal. At other times it is about As. 3 per day.



In Rajshahi it varies from As. 5 to As. 8 per day, the highest being in the transplantation season.

In Murshidabad it is As. 4 to As. 5 without meals.

In Mymensingh it is As. 6 to Re. 1 in the jute cultivating season.

The bargadars and under-raiyats are undoubtedly better off than the agricultural labourers and being possessors of land occupy a higher status in rural society.

**Q. 37.** Please see reply to question 30.

The answer to the first two questions is in the affirmative. Another prolific ground has been the Bengal Debt Settlement Act. No moneylender is now willing to lend money to a tenant on mortgage and whenever he wants money badly, he has to sell outright a portion at least of his holding. The moneylender is a necessary evil and his activities should be regulated and nothing should be done which may drive him out altogether.

The occupancy right was originally a personal right and therefore non-transferable. Unrestricted right of transfer was a move in the wrong direction and against the interest of the raiyat. Restrictions about such transfers to agriculturists only will be inoperative as very few agriculturists possess the necessary funds to acquire more lands. Some of the big tenureholders may have the funds but transfers to them will increase the number of bargadars or under-raiyats of other classes. If the field is thus restricted, value of land will deteriorate considerably. The tenants generally are illiterate and ignorant and have to be protected against themselves. The old rule about non-transferability seems to have been in the best interest of the raiyat. In cases of absolute necessity there should be some authority to decide this question. The suggestions made above are theoretically attractive but any attempt at giving effect to these is bound to meet with violent opposition from the very persons sought to be benefited, as tempers have been roused to such a pitch by incessant preaching of class hatred and zamindar-baiting in particular that cool reasoning can no longer be expected and the decision will be influenced by the passions roused and not by calm consideration.

**Q. 38.** Bighas 10 to bighas 15. The test should be as much as can be cultivated by one plough and one pair of bullocks. This varies from bighas 10 to bighas 15 according to the nature of the soil.

**Q. 39.** The replies to both the questions are in the affirmative. So long as the laws of inheritance remain as they are at present and the unrestricted right of transfer continues, there is no remedy.

**Q. 40.** Desirable—but not practicable on account of the Hindu and Mahomedan laws of inheritance and unrestricted right of transfer.

Consolidation should be made permissible whenever a tenant so desires and all lands with similar rights and interests may be amalgamated. Amalgamation should be for divided shares and should not be allowed for joint undivided shares as it will lead to confusion.

**Q. 41.** Yes—but the benefit will be of short duration. Under the operation of the laws of inheritance and as a result of the unrestricted right of transfer, fragmentation will commence very soon after consolidation. Facilities should be given to persons as well as to firms willing to start agricultural farms on scientific lines by mechanical ploughs and tractors. The number of such persons or firms cannot be many but they will serve as models. In order to make any such scheme successful, it is essential to have compact blocks. Those willing to undertake schemes like these may be helped by the Government.

**Q. 42.** As an abstract principle unequal distribution of wealth is undesirable. In other words, in theory communism is more advantageous to the masses than capitalism. Considering, however, the difficulties in the way, and the policy of the existing form of Government, it would be inconsistent to direct legislation for levelling up the inequalities in the case of agriculturists only. If the policy is changed and the process of levelling up is extended to all spheres, then only it may be consistent to attempt restriction against acquisition of large quantities of land by one person. Under present conditions it is desirable that effort should be made to promote collective farming. For the improvement of agriculture, co-operative collective farms may be started which will improve the methods of cultivation and give better crop outturns and such organisations may control marketing also and thus intercept the profit that now goes to middlemen. In this way alone, additional wealth can be secured for the tenants. There may be a marketing board consisting of elected representatives of these collective farms with some experts as co-opted members. The Central Board should be not only a Marketing Board but an advisory Board for all matters connected with cultivation. For instance they may decide which crop should be given preference in any particular year and as to what area should be sown with jute or sugarcane, etc. If the Central Boards and primary collective farms act efficiently, they may effect agricultural improvements and construct embankments and excavate irrigation channels by collective credit and collective effort.

With the same object in view, the promotion of large agricultural farms on scientific basis should be encouraged.

I am not in favour of legislative interference on the question of limit of the quantity of land to be held by any one. For the betterment of the condition of the masses, spread of education is essential so that they may help to improve themselves and attempt at eternal

spoon feeding and protection ought to be given up. A tenant is no longer the helpless creature he was in the olden days and he knows now how to assert himself and to organise for combined action. Unfortunately, however, these associations are concentrating their attention on politics which have a very remote and indirect bearing on the lot of the actual cultivators. The tenant will have to pay his rent whether the zamindar remains or goes and the channels in which the activities of the associations are now directed have no bearing on the immediate welfare of the members of it. Questions like crop selection, manuring, protective and irrigation works, marketing and promotion of cottage industries—in fact matters which may bring more wealth to the tenant, are not receiving any attention from the peasants' associations. Another direction in which these associations ought to take action is curtailment of expenses. With this object, cottage industries ought to be encouraged where there are facilities. I found that in the Sunderban reclaimed areas, the tenants are allowed to manufacture their own salt from the saline deposit on the soil but Government has imposed a limit to the quantity he may sell. It is not to the interest of the masses to have any such limit. Economic development is preached but in practice restrictions are put and many of the avenues by which the poor people can get some income are shut out against them. The present peasants' associations are all political organisations and not peasants' welfare associations but these are in their infant stage and may be expected to improve with experience. In any case, whether these associations properly function or not, State interference will complicate matters and is undesirable.

**Q. 43.** Coparcenary is certainly detrimental to good cultivation but it cannot be minimised without interfering with the laws of inheritance. Economics generally deal broadly with two kinds of cultivation—extensive and intensive. In Bengal cultivation is extensive, but in the absence of scientific knowledge intensive cultivation is not possible. The people are poor and do their cultivation in the primitive way. Coparcenary gives rise to division into smaller and smaller holdings and generally, what is worse, to smaller and smaller fractional interests in the same holding. No amendment of the Tenancy Act can minimise the evil so long as the laws of inheritance remain unchanged. The economic forces that have arisen in the country and are arising should not be restrained without due care and foresight.

**Q. 44.** Nothing can possibly be done under the existing laws of inheritance. (See answer to question 43.)

**Q. 45.** No. The numbers of joint landlords are very often as many as 40 or 50 for one undivided fragmentary joint interest. The total number of cosharers in the entire estate very often exceed one hundred.

If a joint landlord fails to make collection he alone suffers and there is no occasion for State interference. It would be better if easier methods of partitioning and exchange were made available.

. Q. 46. It was not contemplated by the Permanent Settlement that the rents of the khudkasht raiyats should be enhanced above the pargana rates and it was declared in section 8 of the Regulation I of 1793 that Government would protect the interests of tenants whenever necessary. Regulation VIII of 1793 was passed to give effect to this declaration and it was directed that the rents should be settled at the pargana rate and pattas given specifying the rates (*vide* sections 58 to 61). By sections 54 and 55 of the same Regulation the imposition of any abwabs or mathut was prohibited. In the great Rent case it was held that the rents of the khudkasht kudeemee raiyats "were, under no circumstances, not even on a sale for arrears of revenue, liable either to enhancement of rent, or eviction from their holding, so long as they paid the rents they had all along paid." Regarding khudkasht raiyats whose tenancy commenced subsequent to the decennial settlement it was held that "they were entitled to hold on at the rate which they have either expressly or impliedly contracted to pay, etc., and on a sale of arrears of revenue, they also are entitled to a renewal of their leases by a purchaser at the pargana rate." The decision of the High Court embodied their interpretation of questions of fact and the law as it then stood and was not an enunciation of any new principle.

In the case of paikash raiyats and new settlements made of reclaimed lands, the zamindar was given a free hand. It was not the intention that the rents of resident raiyats should be enhanced above the pargana rate and in practice this was never done. The average rates of rent now prevailing in some districts were calculated in the Revenue Department from figures in final reports of district settlement and the results are noted in answer to question 8:—

\* The figures show that the rate of rent for occupancy raiyat is generally very moderate. There are no doubt instances of high rent, but these are invariably in the case of new settlements and that such instances cannot be extensive is shown by the low average of the district rates. Some extracts are quoted below from the Final Report of the District Settlement of Murshidabad completed recently (p. 116):—

"As far as I could judge from a somewhat intensive study of the conditions in the district, the charge ('melancholy errors of the Permanent Settlement') cannot in my opinion be fully endorsed. Rarely one meets a village where the tenancy has not continued for generations. It is easier to trace old connections of the peasantry with a village than that of the landlord. That the tenantry could hold to their

lands from a time prior to the safeguarding Bengal Tenancy Act is a proof that the circumstances were not so unfavourable as are sought to be made out."

\*

\*

\*

\*

"The continuity of the tenantry from father to son for generations is a proof that in the largest majority of cases the terms were not unfavourable. The average rent-rate is about Rs. 3 and odd per acre. Judged by the outturn and the rent-rates in the temporarily settled estates in the province this is not high. Here, too, his terms cannot be said to have been harsh, while in every village one may get from any old tenant that in the majority of cases in the past, the relation between the landlord and the tenant was sweeter and much more friendly evincing greater goodwill on either side than what could be claimed to-day. If people's verdict be any evidence—to my mind there can be no better evidence—the position has gone from bad to worse in more recent times when tradition was lost and law was substituted to regulate the relation."

"My conclusion is that the Permanent Settlement as a fiscal measure did nothing to the detriment of the raiyats. It took away no rights which the tenantry then possessed, deprived them of no security which they otherwise had."

The description given above is typical and applies to all other districts of the province as the average low rates of rent still prevailing, as quoted in the statement in answer to question 8, amply testifies.

**Q. 47.** Fixity of rent was never contemplated at the time of the Permanent Settlement and the principle was quite unknown in the Moghul period and the early British period up to the year 1859. It was an innovation introduced for the first time in Act X of 1859. The first systematic revenue settlement of Bengal in Moghul times was that made by Todar Mall in 1582. He fixed a pargana rate for each pargana and his intention was that the resident khudkasht raiyats should be liable to pay rent at this rate. There were different rates for different crops and a tenant wishing to change his crop had to take the permission of the zamindar and enter into a fresh engagement. The non-resident raiyat was a tenant at will liable to ejectment whenever the zamindar pleased, and for him there were no special safeguards nor for new tenants. This idea underlay not only the Permanent Settlement but all subsequent tenancy legislation prior to the passing of Act X of 1859. The right of the khudkasht raiyat was a personal one and not transferable by sale or otherwise, but succession by inheritance was recognised. In Regulation VIII of 1793 provision was made for the interchange of pattas with khudkasht raiyats. Section 56 provided that it was desirable to settle the rent on the basis of the species of the produce likely to yield largest profit. "Where,

however, it is the established custom to vary the patta for lands according to the articles produced thereon, and while the actual proprietors of land, dependent talukdars, or farmers of land and raiyats in such places shall prefer an adherence to this custom, the engagements entered into between them are to specify the quantity of land, species of produce, rate of rent and amount thereof with the term of the leases and a stipulation, that, in the event of the species of the produce being changed, a new engagement shall be executed for the remaining term of the first lease, or for a longer period if agreed on; and in the event of a new species being cultivated, a new engagement, with the like specification and clause, is to be executed accordingly." In the great Rent Case the 14 learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court came to exactly the same conclusions. It was not contemplated that the pargana rate would continue to be the same till the end of the world and under all circumstances. The essential point is that rents for khudkasht raiyat should be paid at pargana rates. Mr. Grant has mentioned in his Minute that in those early days the price of rice was as. 8 per maund. More than 350 years have elapsed since the introduction of pargana rates by Todar Mall. Prices of food crops and all articles have gone up considerably since then. In a Minute, dated 29th November 1776, Warren Hastings remarked that "the price of coarse rice, which forms the principal consumption of the people, was five and a half times cheaper in the time of Sujah Cawn than it is now". (*Vide* page cccxviii in Firminger's Introduction to the Fifth Report.) In reference to this passage Mr. Firminger quotes the following Table:—

*Table of the purchasing power of the Rupee<sup>2</sup>:—*

	At Murshidabad in Sujah Cawn's time.	At Calcutta 1776.
	Mds. Sr.	Mds. Sr.
Rice, fine Bansephoot ..	1 10	0 16
First sort ..	1 23	0 18
2nd ..	1 35	0 21
Rice, Coarse, called Dama	4 15	0 32
Rice, Coarse, called Mansurah	5 25	1 0
Rice, Coarse, called Kurkashalle ..	7 20	1 10
Wheat, First sort ..	3 0	0 32
2nd sort ..	3 30	0 35
Barley ..	8 0	1 13
Bhoot, a kind of grain for feeding horses (gram) ..	4 35	0 20 to 22
Oil, First sort ..	0 21	0 6½
2nd sort ..	0 24	0 6½
Ghee, boiled butter—		
First sort ..	0 10½	0 3
2nd sort ..	0 11½	0 4

These prices are those prevailing at the two then biggest towns of Bengal. It was nowhere laid down that the pargana rate of Todar Mal was fixed in perpetuity. Such a conception would have been irrational. It is, moreover, a matter of history that jumma assessed by Todar Mal in 1582 at the pargana rates were added to from time to time. Various kinds of abwabs, like the twelve subadari abwabs, were added to the zamindar's jama from time to time and the zamindar was left free to distribute the addition to his jumma rateably on the raiyats. The amount of "Abwab Soubahadarry or Viceroyal Imposts, from 1722 to 1763,, amounted to Rs. 1,17,91,853 (for details see abstract No. 1 attached to Sir John Shore's Minute of 18th June 1789). There was no idea of fixity of the raiyat's rent in Moghul times. The rights of the raiyats were summarised by Sir John Shore in paras. 389, 406 and 407 of his minute referred to above. I have reproduced these paras. in answer to question 1.

**Q. 48.** As stated in reply to the last question, it was never contemplated that the rents of raiyats would be fixed in perpetuity. All that was intended was that the khudkasht raiyats will be liable to pay rents at the pargana rate but it was nowhere declared that the pargana rates introduced by Todar Mall in 1582 was fixed in perpetuity for all eternity. Such a supposition would be unreasonable. The paikashat raiyats were mere tenants-at-will and for new settlements also the zamindar had a free hand. The terms of paikashat raiyats and new raiyats were governed by contracts and what Lord Cornwallis was anxious to maintain was that no demands should be made beyond what was permissible according to the contracts. There was no intention to interfere in any way with the making of these contracts. An extract is quoted below from para. 2 of his Minute, dated February 1790, to illustrate this:—

"If Mr. Shore means that after having declared the zamindar the proprietor of the soil, in order to be consistent, we have no right to prevent his new abwabs or taxes on the lands in cultivation, I must differ with him in opinion unless we suppose the raiyats to be absolute slaves of the zamindar. Every bigha of land possessed by them must have been cultivated by them under express or implied agreement that a certain sum should be paid for each bigha of produce and no more. Every abwab or tax imposed by the zamindar over and above that sum is not only a breach of that agreement, but a direct violation of the laws of the country. The cultivator, therefore, has in such cases an undoubted right to apply to Government for the protection of his property and the Government is at all times bound to afford him redress."

The basis of the rights of the tenant was his contract and the avowed intention of Lord Cornwallis was to enforce the terms of the

contract and not to confer any new right on either party. This was implemented by sections 54 and 55 of Regulation VIII of 1793.

(d) Section 50(1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act was an innovation introduced for the protection of tenants as it was found that in practice it was impossible at such a long subsequent period to produce legal proof of the rate of rent prevailing at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The principle of fixed rent was an innovation introduced by Act X of 1859 for the benefit of the tenant on account of the difficulty of producing the necessary proof and action was necessary to make the provision operative, presumption was provided for, to help the tenant. The object of the legislature in providing for the presumption as to fixity of rent in this section was to provide an easy method of determination of the rights of the parties (*Nityananda vs. Nanda Kumar* 13 C.L.J. 115). The presumption, although it might in one sense be considered as a rule of evidence, is to the tenant in this province a cherished right granted to him so long ago as 1859 in consideration, it may be, of his general ignorance and incapacity to cope with the superior intelligence and ways and means of the landlord (*Prithi Chand vs. Shaikh Basarat*, 13 Cal. 30; 13 C.W.N. 1149; 10 C.L.J. 343). The rulings referred to above shows what has been accepted by the High Court to be the object of the section. There can be no presumption from this section that any such rule of thumb was contemplated by the promoters of the Permanent Settlement or that they had any idea of fixing rents in perpetuity.

(e) The intention of the Permanent Settlement in this connection was declared in the 3rd paragraph of section 7 of Regulation I of 1793:—

*"The Governor-General trusts that the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefits conferred upon them by the public assessment fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands, under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry....."*

It was not intended that the zamindar would enhance the rates of rent of khudkasht raiyats above the prevailing pargana rates. In fact provisions were made to guard against such a contingency by subsequent Regulations. It was however intended that the zamindar would enjoy the increase from introduction of new tenants for new reclaimed lands or by enhancements by contract from paikasht raiyats. As shown in reply to question 1, the assessment made at the Permanent Settlement was an advance assessment and the land was not then capable of bearing it as by the famines of 1770 and subsequent years more than 1/3rd of the population had died and about the same proportion of cultivated land had been thrown out of cultivation. Details:



have been given in the same answer of the disastrous effects of the Permanent Settlement on the big zamindars in Bengal. The main reason was that it was not possible to increase population quickly or to bring the extensive areas thrown out of cultivation by famines into cultivation immediately after the Permanent Settlement. Zamindaris were therefore sold up year after year until they could manage to increase their income to some extent by increase of cultivation. It was never intended that the State would share in the profits of acts mentioned in para. 3 of section 7 of Regulation I of 1793 (*vide* portion in italics in the extract quoted above).

It may be pointed out that the State at the time of introducing Permanent Settlement took a broader view of things and had the ultimate object of increase in national wealth in view as that alone could make trade and commerce prosper. An extract is quoted below to prove this from the observations of the Hon'ble Court of Directors (Reproduced in para. 10 of Appendix 18 of the Fifth Report):—

*"We find it convincingly argued, that a permanent assessment, upon the scale of the present ability of the country, must contain in its nature a productive principle; that the possession of property, and the sure enjoyment of the profits derivable from it, will awaken and stimulate industry, promote agriculture, extend improvement, establish credit, and augment the general wealth and prosperity."*

**Q. 49.** As stated in reply to questions 47 and 48 it was not the intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement that the rents of the tenants then existing would be fixed in perpetuity. There were three classes of tenants at the time, namely, khudkasht kudeemee, the old resident tenants, ordinary khudkashts, created since the Decennial Settlement, and paikash. The khudkasht kudeemee could hold his land so long as he continued to pay at the pargana rate. This pargana rate was not fixed in perpetuity. This class was not liable to eviction on revenue sale. The ordinary khudkasht was the new settler. He was made liable to eviction by purchase of the estate at a revenue sale. The intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement regarding new settlers can be judged from their treatment of the ordinary khudkasht raiyat created since the Decennial Settlement and also from section 52, Regulation VIII of 1793. The paikash tenants were tenants at will.

It will be more reasonable now to revise the pargana rate or to fix rates for areas smaller or larger than a pargana according to similarity of quality and conveniences and to cut down or bring up all rates to this level. Large tracts, such as the barind or rarih areas are of uniform quality and the same rate should apply to all such areas.

• In many places the old pargana rates are still generally in force. I can say this of Rangpur district but in districts where they are not traceable, new rates may be fixed.

• It may not be possible to legally prove the connection between the existing tenants and those existing at the Permanent Settlement, but it can be said who are old resident tenants and who are new settlers from village tradition. The trouble is that when there is tension of feeling, people are not likely to tell the truth but ordinarily it is a matter easy to find out.

It will be seen from the table of prices quoted in reply to question 47 how enormously prices have risen now since the Permanent Settlement and it would be unreasonable to go back to the level of those days now, in fixing rent.

**Q. 50.** No. In the first place, the assumption that it was the intention that the rents of either class of raiyats should remain unalterable is wrong. Reasons in support of this assertion have been given in answer to questions 47 and 48. The tenancy legislation was all along for the benefit of the tenant. It was the intention ever since 1859 to give him new rights such as rights of reduction of rent for fall in prices, loss of area, flood, drought, deterioration, etc. A *quid pro quo* was necessary and the zamindars were given corresponding rights of increase of rent. The personal right of occupancy was transmuted into a transferable interest and privilege after privilege was added to it. If the idea is to restore the conditions as they prevailed in 1793, it may be necessary not only to cut down the rates in some cases but to cancel all the privileges given to the tenant since then. Such a retrograde measure is not possible now as the present surroundings are quite different from what they were in 1793.

**Q. 51.** It was not the intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement that all future settlements of waste lands should be at the pargana rate (*vide* section 52, Regulation VIII of 1793). It was the avowed intention of Lord Cornwallis to preserve the sanctity of contracts. Extracts quoted and detailed reasons given in reply to questions 47 and 48 may be seen. The zamindar was declared the proprietor and he had full control over all lands subject only to rights created by himself by contracts. In those days areas available for cultivation were extensive but tenants were scarce and the zamindar could not afford to scare away tenants by imposing high rates. As the purchasing power of the rupee was then very high (*vide* table quoted in reply to question 47) and the rents were fixed in cash, they were for this reason very low.

**Q. 52.** (1) & (2). The systems are very difficult to work. The stumbling blocks are determination of the quantity of produce, the

value of the produce (it varies from month to month and some times from day to day and covers a wide range) and cost of cultivation. The amount of out of pocket expense of a cultivator is negligible but the value of his labour, cost of upkeep of cattle, etc., have to be calculated. On principle, the systems are sound but practical difficulties make them unworkable. Different Settlement Officers tried to calculate this with varying results.

(3) In spite of its disadvantages, this is most easily worked in practice and therefore desirable.

(4) On account of the present slump in market value of land the system will give abnormal figures now.

(5) Customary rates periodically revised according to the change in prices of staple products ought to give results satisfactory to both parties—the tenant and landlord—but it is a costly procedure.

(6) Most objectionable and should never be tried. In Cossimbazar estate at least in making new settlements, the rate of rent is never put to auction. Only the salami payable is put to auction.

**Q. 53.** It is not possible to answer this question without statistics. The productivity of the land is always taken into account. It is not my experience that in practice the rates differ greatly for lands of similar value in almost every village. Rack-renting is common in the case of under-raiyats but for *de jure* raiyats the rates are generally uniform. The majority may probably be described as lump rates, but they are always for a specified total area. For increase or decrease in area there ought to be provisions for increase or decrease in rent. According to High Court rulings, the principles laid down are unworkable and neither increase nor decrease can be proved except when there are registered documents.

**Q. 54.** (1) No.

(2) Customary rate, productivity, laws of supply and demand, quality of soil, marketing facilities, irrigation facilities, liability to floods and other natural calamities, and healthiness of the place. Malaria is depopulating villages in some districts and there is no demand for land in such places.

**Q. 55.** Yes; the principle will be uniform but rates will differ according to the class of soil, facilities for marketing, facilities for irrigation, prevailing prices of staple food crops, liability to natural calamities like floods, diluvion, drought, etc., and healthiness of the place. In districts which are being depopulated by malaria there are no applicants even if lands are offered free of salami and at quit rents. Lands in such districts are going out of cultivation and once populous villages are being converted to jungles.

Adjustment of rent cannot be done without a revision of the record of rights. Except in riparian areas where a fresh survey is essential, cost of revisional operations can be minimised by commencing from the attestation stage. There should be settlement of fair rents in these operations. Rates of fair rent for different classes of land will have to be determined first and then the village may be divided into different blocks, classified according to quality, and rents for all plots in a particular block, should be at the rate for that block. This was the practice in Bihar settlements but the system gave indifferent results as the Assistant Settlement Officers very often shirked their duty and avoided trouble by fixing rates after cursory inspection of a part of the village only. If the system is worked conscientiously it ought to give good results. Very close supervision by officers over the actual workings is necessary to ensure that correct rates have actually been applied to all plots and also that the calculations, plot by plot, are correct.

**Q. 56.** For cash rents it should be a sixth share of the average value of the produce as it is rigid and applies equally to lean years and good years. Half in case of produce rent as it operates on a sliding scale. Tenth share of the value of the produce may tend to increase existing rates of rent in some cases and lower in others. According to the Final Report of the Murshidabad District Settlement the existing incidence of settled raiyats' rent is about 4 per cent.

**Q. 57.** Rent should not be fixed in perpetuity. It may operate harshly both for the landlord and the tenant. The rents should be revised at intervals of 15 years. The revision should be on the grounds contained in the existing Bengal Tenancy Act. The needs of the State should certainly not be a ground for enhancement in any case.

**Q. 58.** No. It will be impracticable to calculate the income of an agriculturist and annual enquiries will be highly expensive and harassing and very liable to leakage and malpractices.

**Q. 59.** I do not consider the existing accepted principles and procedure for fixing fair and equitable rent to be defective.

**Q. 60.** It is true that the landlord does nothing in the case of improvement by fluvial action, but on the other hand the tenant also does nothing to earn the increase. The extra profit ought to be divided in the same proportion as in the case of the original rent in relation to the value of the produce. For instance, if the rent has been fixed at 1/10th of the value of the gross yield the extra profit by fluvial action ought to be divided in the same ratio, i.e., landlord 1/10th, tenant 9/10ths.

It is not possible to judge slight improvements or deteriorations through fluvial action in lands already under full cultivation and in

such cases no enhancements or reductions should be allowed. But when there are marked changes, such as when lands which were completely unculturable or very partially culturable and the rates of rent were for that reason fixed low, and become fully cultivable through fluvial action, enhancement should be allowed. Similarly, when lands under full cultivation at high rates go out of cultivation through fluvial action there should be reduction.

**Q. 61.** No. The corollary to disallowing enhancements on account of rise in prices would be similar disallowance of reduction on account of fall in prices. Rigidity is harmful both to landlord and tenant.

**Q. 62.** The underlying principle involved in this question is unsound and will lead to absurd results. The rule should apply equally to all and individual need ought not to be taken into account. If rates of rent are adjusted on the basis of individual needs there will be confusion and injustice. For instance, a man who is the head of a big joint family with say 30 members may require not only the entire produce but some extra income from other sources and he may very well claim under this doctrine that he will pay no rent at all. On the contrary a man having no dependents ought to be liable for high enhancements. Such a doctrine cannot be worked in practice and is not rational.

**Q. 63.** There should be a law for reduction on the ground of prevailing rates and there is nothing objectionable against a corresponding provision for enhancement on the same ground. If a raiyat had made improvements long ago, he must have been fully compensated by the increased yield. Section 77 of the Bengal Tenancy Act gives full right to the raiyat to make improvements and when both the landlord and tenant want to make the same improvement preference is given by this section to the tenant. If the tenant effects an improvement and is ejected he is entitled to compensation (section 82). The tenant enjoys the full benefit of improvements made by him and the landlord cannot claim enhancement of rent for this. No special rule is necessary for improvements made long ago. Salami is not advance rent (*Dinanath vs. Debnath* 13 W. R. 307). It is paid in consideration of the lease granted and rights conferred. The finding of the High Court in the ruling mentioned above is to this effect.

**Q. 64.** Non-interference should be the rule and interference the exception, except under very special circumstances.

There should be no attempt at fixing rents for new settlements. The ordinary laws of supply and demand and the sanctity of contracts should not be interfered with. A rigid rule about rates of rent will retard progress. There are many factors to be considered in fixing rent and

it is not possible to take into account all these in a rigid rule. Result of any attempt at fixing rates for new settlements will be the levy of very high rates of salami.

**Q. 65.** I do not consider that the law is defective but the spirit in which it is generally administered gives rise to complaints. A good deal of discretion is left in the hands of the Revenue Officers and in matters like these such discretionary powers are essential. In practice, however, it is found that in Government estates and temporarily-settled estates there is always a tendency to look more to the increase in revenue than to the interest of the tenant. The officer has an eye to his preferment in future career and there is an impression that merit is judged by the capacity to increase the revenue and if an officer succeeds in doing so he will get his reward by special promotions to higher services. On the other hand in permanently settled estates there is generally a bias against the zamindar as in these the officer gets more credit if he can pose as the saviour of the masses by showing preference to them. There may be an improvement if the settlement staff is made permanent with a self-contained cadre on time scale so that the officers may be less liable to be influenced by considerations mentioned above.

**Q. 66.** The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. The second part does not arise.

**Q. 67.** Revisional settlements of land revenue are invariably made with the object of enhancing revenue. This will be demonstrated if the results of the revisional settlements are examined. In every instance it will be found that there was a large increase.

**Q. 68.** No. The tendency is always in the opposite direction in the case of permanently settled estates but I have not got the records with me and I am unable to quote instances. An examination of the final reports of revisional land revenue settlements will throw light on this point.

**Q. 69.** No; because the tenants in such cases get the advantage of the lower prices to reduce rent. I have not heard of any legitimate grievance on this ground. Revisional settlements in permanently settled estates are unpopular as the tenants have to bear a portion of the burden. Land revenue settlements are not popular as they involve good deal of harassment for several years and some expenses not always legitimate—are unavoidable.

As a rule, however, revisional settlements should not be undertaken during a protracted period of depression as the recovery of cost becomes burdensome in such years.

**Q. 70.** I have no information on this point but, I think it is due to the situation of land, and market facilities.

**Q. 71.** The rules in the Tauzi Manual about remission and abatement of land revenue in permanently settled and temporarily settled private estates are inoperative not so much on account of any inherent defect in the rules but as a result of practical difficulties and the spirit in which they are administered. The rule is that the zamindar will give the same relief to the tenureholder or tenant as he himself gets. For example, if half his revenue is remitted, he will remit half the rent due for that year. One great difficulty is in estates in which there is considerable subinfeudation. The zamindar can extend the concession to the man from whom he gets his rent, i.e., the tenureholder of the 1st degree but it is impossible for him to see whether the tenureholder of the 1st degree is extending the concession to the one immediately below him and the latter again is passing on to the one next below and so on throughout the chain until the cultivating raiyat is reached. One solution may be to tackle the man at the top—the zamindar—and the one at the very bottom, the cultivating raiyat. Whenever Government grants remission to the zamindar, Government may issue a proclamation in the villages to the effect that the rents of the tenants for that year also are remitted in the same proportion as the revenue of the zamindar. The law may be slightly amended to give the Government the necessary power to remit rents of tenants in the same proportion as Government revenue and also to restrict Civil Courts and Certificate Officers from decreeing or realising any part of the amount so remitted by a proclamation, either on behalf of a zamindar or tenureholder of any degree.

It will be found that famine after famine has passed and test works were opened but no relief has ever been granted to zamindars or tenants under them. The rules in the Famine Code are evaded by refraining from declaring a famine and declaring a state of scarcity only. If famine is declared, elaborate measures have to be adopted, which are not only very costly but throw very heavy work on District Officers who generally do not relish such a prospect.

There are zamindaris in which subinfeudation is negligible and in which, therefore, the difficulties of transmitting the concession to the raiyat do not exist. Even in such estates no remission of revenue has ever been allowed.

In general administration there is always an eye to the revenue, an unexpected diminution in receipts from which may upset the budget and so far as my experience goes, remissions in Government estates are very grudgingly given and not to the full extent.

No amount of modification of rules will bring about an improvement until the point of view and spirit of the administration is changed. The sole consideration should be the welfare of the masses and not the effect on the budget or the wrath of the Finance Department.

**Q. 72.** (1) *Jute*.—Average yield is 12 to 15 maunds per acre.

Cost of cultivation—2½ rupees per maund. Ordinary expense per acre is about Rs. 30.

(2) *Paddy*.—Average yield 20 maunds per acre.

Cost of cultivation—By hired labour it is estimated between Rs. 5 and Rs. 10. In the case of a cultivator who cultivates with his own plough and cattle and does not employ hired labour, he incurs no out of pocket expense except the price of seed.

(3) *Sugarcane*.—Average yield is 600 maunds.

Cost of cultivation about Rs. 60 first year, in the subsequent years, half, i.e., Rs. 30. In districts like Burdwan a good deal of expenditure has to be incurred on irrigation—the cost being estimated at the rate of Rs. 30.

The estimate of cost given above is based on reports obtained from the Circle Superintendents of this estate. It is a curious coincidence that exactly the same figure is given in the Final Settlement Report of Murshidabad. A detailed calculation of the cost at every stage will be found on page 318 of the Report.

**Q. 73.** The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The reason is that manure is seldom used and the lands are becoming exhausted. Government have taken no steps worth mentioning. The Agricultural Department took some action towards proving to the tenant that cowdung manure gives best results if collected in pits. The effort was, however, sporadic and spasmodic and the result attained is negligible. So far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to popularise chemical manures. Distribution of improved seeds has been done to a certain extent specially in the case of paddy. It was, however, not done systematically in the entire province. In dealing with common pests the Agricultural Department is thoroughly inefficient and no help can be obtained from it. Except as a relief measure in times of scarcity, seeds or manure are never distributed free by Government nor advice given. No serious attempt has been made to improve the breed of cattle. Stud bulls are occasionally kept by district boards and also by jails but they are hardly accessible to the masses. The value of irrigation also needs demonstration. In Rangpur district potato is grown but the fields of potato are never irrigated and the potatoes grown under such conditions generally



attain the size of a marble and the yield is small. Another direction in which action ought to be taken is growing of additional crops to bring additional income. For instance, *kalai* or other pulses can be grown in paddy fields after winter paddy but the universal trouble is that the custom is that cultivators let loose all their cattle in the fields after paddy harvest and it is impossible to grow any crop after paddy. Stall-feeding of cattle is expensive but by joint action certain fields may be set apart by rotation every year for cattle grazing and crops grown in the rest. The tenants are very conservative in matters connected with cultivation and are averse to doing anything which their forefathers never did and they need guidance and expert advice. Government can do much to improve the lot of the cultivator apart from distribution of seeds or manure.

**Q. 74.** *Land Improvement Act.*—Very little advantage has been taken of it by the tenants. They are as a rule heavily indebted and do not wish to incur further debts. Zamindars from time to time want loans under the Act but they are difficult to obtain specially on account of inadequate budget provision.

*Bengal Sanitary and Agricultural Improvement Act.*—The first Act passed was very defective and therefore inoperative. Some advantage has been taken of the amended Act but not to any large extent.

*Bengal Rural Development Act.*—Practically a dead letter. Systematic propaganda is necessary in the early stages to make the provisions generally known. District Officers and Subdivisional Officers are the best agencies which can be utilised for actions under the Act until the benefits of it become known to the public. The agency of the Agricultural Department may also be utilised.

The Acts are not utilised as the people lack initiative and are very conservative. Cultivators as a rule do not want to do any thing which their forefathers did not do. Illiteracy is a great evil. The aim should be to popularise all the acts mentioned above and to induce union boards to take the initiative. Intensive propaganda by Government is necessary and in the beginning the initiative should come from the Government.

**Q. 75.** I have no information on these points.

**Q. 76.** I have no information regarding the first two questions.

As regards expenditure on improvement, there is a rigidly fixed percentage which is adhered to and all receipts from salami or any other source, such a sayer revenue are treated as land revenue and is spent on general administration or other State purposes. Receipts of salami are never earmarked for improvement.

**Khas Mahal Report, 1938, by Mr. M. M. Stuart, I.C.S., Special Officer,** shows that salami is realised in Government estates but he recommends that in case of diluviated lands the rate of salami should be reduced (p. 30).

**Q. 77.** The general policy of Government is responsible to a great extent for the uneconomic condition of the raiyat. The free right of transfer has done great mischief but the greatest mischief has been done by the Debt Settlement Act which has deprived the raiyat of the last vestige of credit. The general policy of the Government has made the tenant more improvident than what he was before. The idea has gained ground that if sufficient clamour is made Government will make any concession. The habit of payment of just dues when the tenant is in a position to pay has been completely lost and as a result of this all Co-operative Credit Societies, Loan Offices, Agricultural Banks, etc., have been wrecked. The source from which all these bodies used to get their capital—the middle classes—has been choked up. The village mahajan is a necessary evil but instead of trying to moderate his evils he has been driven out altogether. The zamindar has been deprived of his means of speedy recovery of legitimate undisputed dues by suspension of certificate procedure, and the result is that heavy arrears are accumulating and the burden will be too heavy for liquidation in future. Conditions now are chaotic. Attention ought to be concentrated on finding out ways of increasing the wealth of the masses and Government should, therefore, be in the interest of the people. This means that economic development in the interest of the people is essential. I may suggest the following as an illustration of the general proposition made above:—

(1) Introduction of additional crops and improving methods of cultivation by irrigation, use of improved seeds, manuring, etc.

(2) Marketing facilities to give a better return to the cultivator for his crops. My idea is that there should be combines or co-operative credit associations of the peasants to control the sales on the lines of the Rajshahi Ganja Society. There should be primary associations with 1 or 2 of more homogeneous villages and Central Boards above them and a Provincial Board on the top. Both paddy and jute may be controlled like this. The main object is to absorb the profit now enjoyed by middlemen.

(3) Promotion of cottage industries, specially spinning and weaving for home consumption.

(4) Improvement of sanitation and drainage.

(5) Rural development. Clearance of water hyacinth will not only provide employment for a large number of people but improve both sanitation and communications. Works like these can be undertaken

under the Sanitary and Drainage Improvement Act; the tenant and middlemen paying in proportion to the advantage. Nobody wants to take the initiative as it involves too much labour and the busy District Officer and Subdivisional Officer can hardly find time for such works. The work ought to be taken over by the Agricultural Department. Agricultural Department needs expansion and when expanded can take up items 1, 2, 4 and 5, 6, 7. The Industries Department can take up 3. The other items may be taken up by the respective departments of the Government.

(6) Improvement of tank and fisheries on scientific lines.

(7) Improvement of cattle.

(8) Establishment of a credit system through land mortgage banks or otherwise.

(9) Improvement of communications and arrangements for transport of produce to markets.

(10) Supply of drinking water and water for cattle.

(11) Spread of primary education.

(12) Establishment of dispensaries both veterinary and for the people through local bodies and with Government aid, when necessary.

In most of these there should be co-ordination of the activities of the Government, local bodies and the zamindar. Government may draw up general schemes and declare what help they expect in connection with each from local bodies and how much they propose to do themselves and to see that each does his share.

It is essential that the tenants should be trained to habits of punctual repayment in order that their credit may be rehabilitated and the institutions from which they used to get help may function once more. All these institutions and zamindars should be given power to realise their dues promptly. Until credit is re-established, economic development is not possible. Steps for increasing the wealth should be taken simultaneously.

**Q. 78.** (a) About Rs. 150 per annum for an average family of five with an economic holding growing paddy only. Sometimes there are incomes from side crops.

In para. 119 of the Murshidabad Final Report it is stated that incidence of rent represents 4 per cent. of the total value of crops. In para. 124 the average size of a holding is given as 5.25 of which 5 per cent. remains fallow. Net area on this basis is 5 acres. The value of the total produce on these figures works out to Rs. 375. This seems to be an overestimate. If the average yield of paddy is taken at 15 mds. per acre the yield of 5 acres should be 75 mds. and the value

about Rs. 150. This is for an average family of 5, the individual income being Rs. 30 per annum or about As. 1-4 per head per day. Where there is good crop the tenant can meet his bare requirements but has no reserve for emergencies like sickness, etc. The position is better in jute districts and in districts where other valuable crops are cultivated and also where the majority of lands is twice or thrice cropped. At a rough guess it may be said that about 50 per cent. of the cultivators can maintain themselves from their crop.

**Q. 79.** The present system and organisation for the preparation of land records is adequate. They are properly maintained in khas mahals and wards' estates. One difficulty experienced is that if mutations are noted in the printed records the civil courts generally decline to accept such corrected records in evidence. In order to satisfy the courts a double set of records are necessary but the expense of that would be prohibitive. The law may be amended to make such corrected records admissible in evidence. Maintenance may be made obligatory on private zamindars if given the power of certificate procedure by law but this will be operative only in districts where the records are of comparatively recent date and also only for tenants directly under the zamindar and in other cases only in respect of tenureholders of the 1st degree. It will not be possible to maintain the records of tenants under tenureholders.

It is possible to maintain the records by noting all changes but it will not be possible to note the crops of each plot each year. When a zamindar gets his rents from a tenureholder, it is impossible for him to get information about tenants under tenureholders.

**Q. 80.** Please see reply to question 77.

I have recommended items (i) to (iv) and several other measures.

I do not think that cattle insurance will succeed. The cattle are kept under such conditions and moreover they are liable to sudden wholesale death by floods and necessarily, therefore, the premia will be very heavy and a tenant will never agree to pay it.

**Q. 81.** The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative.

The second part cannot be answered in the absence of statistics. It is very easy to calculate the surplus population from available reports—

(1) Take the agricultural population from the last census reports including rent receivers and rent payers and agricultural labourers.

(2) Take the net cropped area either from the statistics of the Agricultural Department or by adding from the Final District Settlement

Reports as far as available. For the districts for which settlement is still in progress (Rangpur, Dinajpur, Howrah) the proportion of net cropped area to total district area may be taken in the same ratio as the average for districts for which such reports are available.

(3) Take a family of 5 as the unit for a holding of bighas 15 or bighas 20.

(4) Work out how many such families are required for cultivating the total net cropped area.

(5) Deduct the figure obtained in (4) above from the figure in (1) and the result will be the surplus population.

**Q. 82.** Establishment of industrial concerns is one solution but attention should also be directed on the points mentioned in reply to question 77. Establishment of industrial concerns will help the landless labourers and the small tenant but employment cannot be found for sufficient numbers to relieve the bulk of the cultivators. For them, attention should be directed to the points mentioned in reply to question 77.

**Q. 83.** Stability of tenancy legislation and debt legislation is essential. Frequent amendments to tenancy laws and Debtors Acts have made the tenants lose all credit. No improvement in the credit system can be expected so long as present conditions continue. The Acts meant to protect the tenant are damaging his credit and at present he has practically no credit. All organisations have been dislocated as a result of this loss of credit and the direct encouragement given to the tenant-debtors not to pay their dues. All the co-operative credit societies, which were at one time functioning efficiently, are now in a moribund condition. The village mahajan has been hard hit and is no longer willing to advance loans and the tenant has to sell part of his land to raise money. The debt settlement boards have made matters worse. There were at one time over 100 loan offices in Rangpur district, all of which have suspended payment in consequence of which the middle-class people who had put money in them have lost all their hard-earned savings and a very important source from which capital could previously be obtained for agricultural credit has been completely lost. Co-operative credit societies also used to get a considerable portion, if not the bulk, of their capital from deposits by middle class people. For these societies also this source is now completely dried up. By recent legislation all the efficient organisations that existed have been killed. In all legislations both sides of the question ought to be examined. It must be recognised that the village mahajan is a necessary evil and indispensable. His abuses should be controlled but he must be given reasonable facilities to realise his just dues if it is intended to maintain this institution. Similar facilities for realisation

ought to be given to the co-operative societies, loan offices, agricultural banks, etc. One sided legislation destroys credit. Debt settlements should be on equitable lines and on fixed principles and it should not be left to the whim of the ill-educated and ignorant President of a Board to do what he pleases.

**Q. 84.** I have no statistics to check the percentage mentioned. The only remedy is to fix the maximum rate of interest. The question does not arise now as the village mahajan, co-operative credit societies, loan offices, etc., have all stopped granting loans and the tenant has to sell his land in order to get money. The drain has been stopped but the tenant is being and will be sold out. Agricultural credit must be rehabilitated and consideration of questions relating to the defects of such organisations is useless now. When such organisations come into existence again, their workings may be regulated and defects cured.

**Q. 85.** If the societies had been backed and realisation of their dues enforced and a habit of repayment of debts inculcated, they would have been very useful. The rate of interest charged by the co-operative societies is not too high in view of the rates at which they themselves have to raise capital. The societies have practically ceased to function as all their capital is frozen up. There are some debtors who are unable to pay but the majority are in a position to pay but will not pay as they are confident that Government will always extinguish their debts by a stroke of legislation or executive order. I am not aware of a single society which succeeded within the short time it functioned in clearing the debts of its members. If these societies had been helped to grow, such a result might have been attained in time but being frozen up they are practically non-existent. The bulk of the capital for these societies used to come from private depositors but as they have practically lost all their investments, no one is likely to invest in them any more and it will no longer be possible to tap this source for capital to finance such societies.

**Q. 86.** Debt Settlement is operating very badly. The principal defects are—

(1) Paucity of suitable men for the post of President.

(2) Inordinate delays. Presidents are sometimes deliberately sitting over cases as they themselves or their near relatives are debtors. Delays of over 1 year are very common. The creditor has to attend every day, a number of Boards, only to be told that the case is adjourned. No reasons are generally given for these adjournments. Sometimes they are due to want of a quorum but generally because the President tries to put off the evil day as long as he can.

(3) There are no fixed principles in fixing instalments. Government ought to lay down general principles. For instance, in the case of rents, Government should declare that out of the instalments fixed rent should be paid first along with the current rent.

(4) Another defect is in the method of service of notice on the creditor. The procedure for it is not prescribed. It is sent by ordinary post and if for wrong address or wrong description of the name the notice does not reach its destination the creditor gets no information and the case is decided *ex parte*. The Boards never satisfy themselves that the notice has been served. The tenants seldom know the names of all the co-sharer landlords and the bulk of them get no notice.

(5) The law does not say what should be the remedy for co-sharers who are not named by the debtor and therefore on whom no notices are issued at all and who get no information. In the first place notices should be issued by registered post with "acknowledgment due". The case should not be heard until acknowledgments are received. Co-sharers to whom notices are not issued should not be bound by the decisions and should be at liberty to re-open the case when they come to know of the proceeding.

(6) Section 8 (1) provides that the debtor may file applications before the Board having jurisdiction over the place where his property is situated. In the case of rents this gives a handle to the debtor to harass the landlord. For instance in the case of mauza Frasergunge in the Sunderbans in 24-Parganas district, most of the big jotedars are people of Midnapur, Calcutta, etc., and they have filed applications before Boards in Midnapur district in different places like Tamluk, Contai, etc., and it is difficult for the Tahsildar at Frasergunge to produce the necessary papers and other evidence in so many distant places. For rents, the jurisdiction should be of the Board constituted for the area in which the land is situated.

(7) No guiding principles are laid down in the Act to decide the proportion in which the debt is to be cut down. It may be laid down that all compound interest should be disallowed and the rate of interest cut down within limits which should be prescribed by the Act. Some indication should also be given of the period to be allowed.

**Q. 87.** They will be failure unless punctual repayment is made obligatory. At present the tenant has no credit and such banks will be more like benevolent charitable institutions rather than business concerns. In order to make them function they must be relieved from the jurisdiction of Debt Settlement Boards. The impression now common is that all debts and even arrears of rents can be wiped out by executive order or legislation, if sufficient clamour is made. Last month a crowd of about 1,500 people came to Rangpur to see the Collector.

Their prayer was wiping out of arrears and reduction in rates of rent. No Government Official has the courage to say that the arrears cannot be wiped out. So firm is the idea in Rangpur district that tenants who are in a position to pay are withholding payment as they fully expect that all arrears will be wiped out by Government and it is more profitable to accumulate arrears. So long as ideas like these are common, no bank can function. People won't repay in the expectation that Government will clear all debt by legislation. Contracts now are scraps of paper.

**Q. 88.** So far as I am aware these banks also are not functioning as their prosperity, as in the case of co-operative credit societies, depends upon free circulation of money for which punctual repayment is essential. If capital is frozen up, no bank, or co-operative credit office, or loan office or mahajan can continue to function.

So long as punctual repayment cannot be enforced, there can be no improvement.

**Q. 89.** The machinery available for amicable realisation is not costly or cumbrous but the procedure for realisation through civil courts is cumbrous and more costly to the tenant. The reason why the tenants hate certificate procedure is because it is effective. Mr. M. M. Stuart, I.C.S., who was appointed Special Officer to investigate the conditions prevailing in the khas mahal came exactly to the same conclusion. An extract from page 8 of his "Khas Mahal Report", 1938, is quoted below:—

"When the debt of one person to another is not in dispute it has been considered unnecessary to use full civil court procedure for its realisation. The existence of a settlement record has normally put the existence of the debt of rent beyond doubt. It is not on account of injustice that certificate procedure has become so unpopular but on account of its greater efficiency."

\* Again on page 10 of the Report:—

"The chief advantage the tenant had in zamindaris was being able to get into arrears."

It may be explained that in realising rent through a civil court, a plaint has to be filed and the amount payable is determined and there is a decree. Separate application has then to be filed for execution of the decree. In certificate procedure the certificate is equivalent to a decree and the proceedings therefore starts from the decree stage.

The greatest harassment and increase in costs both in rent suits and certificate cases are due to the extreme degree of corruption that prevails among court peons. At every step he has to be paid something. For service of notice there are fixed rates. A report of personal service can be obtained without stirring out from headquarters by satisfying the



peon. If a peon does not get his perquisite, service will never be personal. If a distress warrant has to be executed he must be paid sufficiently. If the judgment-debtor outbids the plaintiff and pays more than what the latter has paid, the distress warrant will be ineffective or very partially so and the distress warrant will be issued over and over again increasing the cost. There is nothing to choose between the civil court peon and the certificate peon. So long as there are persons to tempt the peon for gaining undue advantage the evil cannot be checked. Executive action alone cannot eradicate it unless there is public opinion to back it and bribe giving is taken as seriously as bribe taking.

**Q. 90.** The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. As was found by Mr. Stuart, the Special Officer, it is so unpopular because it is effective. He came to the conclusion after extensive local investigations. Please see extracts from the report quoted in answer to last question.

Summary procedure like certificate procedure should be allowed when there is no dispute about the demand.

**Q. 91.** Most of the laws have been explained and fought and they have reached a settled condition, so the codification should be according to the different rulings of the High Courts and in such a way as may not create again an unsettled condition. Codifying them in a new form or the repeal and replacement of the old Regulations and earlier Acts are not necessary for the same reasons.

**Q. 92.** Impossible to answer within the time allowed. At least 6 months' time is necessary to investigate this and give opinion in detail.

**Q. 93.** So far as the Cossimbazar Raj Ward's Estate is concerned the annual loss is:—

	Rs.
1342 B.S.	... 17,426
1343 B.S.	... 17,437
1344 B.S.	... 17,520

Average Rs. 17,461 per annum.

Considering that the rent roll of the portion of the estate in which collections are made directly from tenants is Rs. 13,20,721 the amount of loss is not considerable.

The estimate of loss to landlords is 8 to 12½ per cent. of their gross income.

The economic effect of the Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938 on tenants, has been that the tenantry is being taught non-payment of their dues by different Acts, viz., Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1938, Bengal Moneylenders Bill of 1939, etc., and the tenants are losing all credit.

## Reply by the British Indian Association.

Calcutta, the 17th January 1939.

From—S. C. Ghosh Maulik, Esq., C.I.E., and P. N. Singh Roy, Esq., Joint Honorary Secretaries, British Indian Association, Calcutta,

To—M. O. Carter, Esq., M.C., I.C.S., Secretary, Land Revenue Commission, Bengal, 8, Clive Street, Calcutta.

We are thankful to you for sending us a copy of the questionnaire issued with your Circular No. 1, dated the 15th December, 1938, inviting replies thereto on or before the 17th January, 1939.

The questionnaire, our Committee finds, though not comprehensive, takes note of the growth of the land system through various tenancy and other legislations. The problems raised are grave and have direct relation to the historical, social, and economic forces of the last century and a half. In submitting the reply within the time-limit of one month, our Committee felt great difficulties whereunder it had to work. The Committee does not claim that it has been able to devote its attention equally to all the questions. In many cases, details could not be worked out; in others, only a fringe of the problem has been touched. Nevertheless, it has tried to do all that it could in the circumstances. It has discussed and examined the questions in their logical bearings without any pretension to sweeping generalisations.

Our Committee had to work under a heavy sense of responsibility. In the business of agriculture, landlords are the dominant partners, but their rights have been crippled from time to time. To present the case of landlords is at once difficult and delicate; the time chosen for the investigation of the land problems, so vital for the province, is not also opportune. It is to be recognised that the time-spirit is working to the prejudice of the landlord-tenant system; destructive doctrines are finding support in the programme of political parties; the principle of private property is being discounted; the agitation in the countryside is putting obstacles in the path of harmonious development and orderly progress. In this background of hostility and indifference, the land system is working. The system is criticised not necessarily for its defects but in pursuance of an ideology, hostile to and subversive of the given basis of class relations. We are sure that the Commission will hold the scales even and judge the system and make suitable recommendations so that it may smoothly function in the collective interest

of the nation. The Committee, however, submits its replies with a view to providing the Commission with materials for an adequate evaluation of the prevailing land system.

*Regulations of 1793 to be taken as a whole.*

**Q. 1.** The Permanent Settlement of 1793 forms the basis of the land system of the province of Bengal. To assess its importance and significance, the objects sought to be achieved and the rights specifically granted should be clearly understood. On a true appreciation of the objects set out, and the rights confirmed, depends the adequate evaluation of the Settlement. Before our Committee proceeds to explain the rights and obligations of zamindars and raiyats, it likes to emphasise the point that Regulation I of 1793 does not exhaust the contents of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal; it is the basic declaration which is to be supplemented by other written Regulations and unwritten usages of the country. On the 22nd March, 1793, the Governor-General in Council issued a Proclamation notifying to all the zamindars that the jama assessed upon their lands under the rules for Decennial Settlement was fixed for ever and that they were thenceforth to consider themselves proprietors of the soil. Within six short weeks from the date of this Proclamation—on the 1st of May 1793—forty-eight Regulations were passed by the Governor-General-in-Council, the first enacting into a Regulation the several Articles of the Proclamation and the whole constituting a comprehensive code for the fiscal and judicial administration of Bengal. The respective interests of zamindars and raiyats in the lands under the Permanent Settlement can only be determined by a collation and critical examination of the various provisions of the Cornwallis Code, but there were left numerous matters, especially those concerning the rights of cultivators, where the Regulations had been purposely silent leaving them to be ascertained by reference to customs and usages. To understand the Permanent Settlement aright, both written Regulations and un-written usages shall have to be determined with scientific precision.

The rules for the construction of Regulations were provided in Regulation XLI of 1793 which were in conformity with English maxims: (1) that one part of a Regulation is to be construed by another so that the whole may stand; (2) that if a Regulation differs from a former Regulation the new Regulation virtually repeals the old one as far as such difference extends, provided the new Regulation is couched in negative terms, or by its matter necessarily implies a negative; (3) that the rescission of a Regulation which rescinds another revives the original Regulation.

*Custom to determine the rights left indefinite.*

\* To know the express law on the subject the entire Regulations of 1793 shall have to be looked into; to know matters where the Regulations are silent, customs shall have to be relied on. But the rights which have been determined stand undisputed, and in the absence of express provisions of law, custom which is the "ever surviving law of the East" will determine the rights and interests, left indefinite. Sir Henry Maine observes that "the foundation of a custom is habitual practice, a series of facts, a succession of instances, from whose constant recurrence a rule is inferred." This view of the case is essential for understanding the rights and obligations of zamindars and raiyats, derivable from the Permanent Settlement of 1793.

Our Committee finds that some of the objects of the Permanent Settlement are recited in the question under reply; they are extremely inadequate so as to hamper a correct perspective of the Settlement. The Settlement was rendered inevitable for fiscal, administrative and revenue purposes; it was also necessary for the sake of establishing and stabilising British Empire in India. The Committee does not propose to detail the objects of the Settlement at this stage, but it must be recognised that it was not a hurried measure, nor was it the outcome of the gasping and short-sighted policy of a Provincial Government; but it was deliberately imposed by the highest authority as the only best method in broad-basing the Administration upon the principles of justice.

*Rights and obligations conferred by permanent Settlement on zamindars.*

The Committee begs to state below specifically some of the rights and obligations of the zamindars conferred by the Permanent Settlement, which are not referred to in the question—

• (1) The zamindars were confirmed as "proprietors of land" (sections 2 to 8 in Regulation I of 1793); their right was declared to be "proprietary right" in section 6, Regulation I, and "property in the soil" in section 7, Regulation VIII of 1793, whereas talukdars had no such right and were not, therefore, entitled to a separate settlement (section 7, Regulation VIII).

---

"In a word, it is to be taken as a fundamental principle that the intention of the legislature is invariably to be accepted and carried into effect, whatever may be the opinion of the judicial interpreter, of its wisdom on justice. If the language admits of no doubt or secondary meaning, it is simply to be obeyed. If it admits of more than one construction, the true meaning is to be sought, not on the wide sea of surmise and speculation, but from such conjectures as are drawn from the words alone, or something contained in them; that is, from the context viewed by such light as its history may throw upon it, and construed with the help of certain general principles and under the influence of certain presumptions as to what the Legislature does or does not intend."—P. B. Maxwell's "On the Interpretation of Statutes."

(2) The revenue payable by them was permanently fixed (sections 3 and 4, Regulation I).

(3) They were empowered to transfer their property by sale, gift or otherwise without the previous sanction of Government (section 9, Regulation I).

(4) They were confirmed in their possession of the nankar, khámar and nijjote lands, whether they accepted the Settlement or not, provided they paid the apportioned revenue (section 39, Regulation VIII).

(5) Those who finally declined to accept the Settlement were allowed a malikana in consideration of their proprietary rights (section 54, Regulation VIII).

(6) They were empowered to "let the remaining lands of their zamindaris or estates, under the prescribed restrictions, in whatever manner they may think proper" (section 52, Regulation VIII).

(7) They were ordered to revise and consolidate all the existing abwabs and mahtoots with the "assul" rent into one specific sum (section 54, Regulation VIII).

(8) They were ordered to grant pattas to raiyats for a period not exceeding 10 years and to determine rents in specified modes (sections 56 to 60, Regulation VIII, and section 2, Regulation XLIV of 1793).

(9) They had the power of ejecting all raiyats khudkasht or paikashit, having a right of occupancy or not, but not having "right of property or transferable possession" for arrears of rent even without recourse to law (*vide* clause 7, section 15, Regulation VII of 1799).

(10) Their power to summon and, if necessary, to compel the attendance of their tenants was maintained (clause 8, section 15, Regulation VII of 1799).

(11) They were invested with the powers of distraint of not only the produce of the land but of all personal property and cattle of the defaulting raiyats (section 2, Regulation XVII of 1793).

(12) From 1799 they were empowered to realise rent from undertenants and dependent talukdars by summary arrest and summary sale of the undertenures (sections 14 and 15, Regulation VII of 1799).

(13) From 1812 they were free to grant leases for any period of time or perpetuity (section 2, Regulation V of 1812).

(14) Phulkur, Bankur, Jalkur belong to the proprietors (preamble to Regulation XXVII of 1793).

(15) Purchasers at revenue sales got the estates free of all encumbrances and engagements with talukdars, tenants, and raiyats, and were entitled to receive "whatever the former proprietors would have been entitled to demand according to the established usages and rates of the pargana or district" (section 5, Regulation XLIV of 1793).

• The Regulations define in their own way the rights and obligations of zamindars, and the rights of raiyats, mostly undefined, must be subordinate to the rights of zamindars. Raiyats thus do not prove to be the dominant partners.

*Provisions of Regulations regarding raiyats.*

The main provisions of the Regulations with regard to raiyats were as follows:—

(1) Raiyats are mentioned in Regulation I of 1793 only with reference to "good faith and moderation" of para. 3, section 7, and "protection and welfare" of clause I, section 8.

(2) The disputes between landlords and raiyats are referred to the Civil Court (preamble to Regulation II of 1793 and section 59, Regulation VIII).

(3) The abwabs are to be revised and consolidated with the "assul" rent into a specific sum (section 54, Regulation VIII).

(4) No new abwab or mahboot is to be imposed on the raiyats (section 55, Regulation VIII).

(5) Landlords and raiyats will find it for their mutual advantage to enter into agreements in every instance for a specific sum for a certain quantity of land, but where it was the established custom to vary the patta for lands according to the articles produced thereon, this was allowed to be done (section 56, Regulation VIII).

(6) Rent by whatever rule or custom it may be regulated and rate and proportion when it is payable after survey of the crop and measurement of the land are to be specifically stated (section 57, Regulation VIII).

(7) A specified form of patta is provided for (section 58, Regulation VIII).

• (8) Pattas of khudkasht raiyats are not to be cancelled except on proof of collusion, or that the rents paid by them within the last three years have been reduced below the rate of the nirikbundi of the pargana or that they have obtained collusive deductions or upon a general measurement of the pargana for the purpose of equalising and correcting the assessment (section 60, Regulation VIII).

(9) Patwaris are to be maintained to keep accounts and to submit them to the Collector, the object of these accounts being to facilitate decision of suits in the Civil Courts between the proprietors and farmers and persons paying rent or revenue (section 62, Regulation VIII).

(10) Receipts for rent are to be given (section 63, Regulation VIII).

• (11) In cases of desertion of raiyats the unpaid rents are not to be levied on the remaining raiyats (section 63, Regulation VIII).

(12) Instalments of rents are to be adjusted according to the time of reaping and selling the produce (section 64, Regulation VIII).

(13) Grain, cattle, and all other moveable properties of raiyats are liable to distraint (section 2, Regulation XVII of 1793).

(14) Dewani Adwalut to punish illegal distraint (section 11, Regulation XVII of 1793).

(15) Corporal punishments on defaulters are prohibited (section 28, Regulation XVII of 1793).

(16) If the raiyats omitted or refused to take pattas, a notification in writing specifying that pattas according to the form approved under the established rules were ready to be granted was considered a tender of pattas and entitled the proprietors to demand rent (section 5, Regulation IV of 1794).

(17) In cases of disputes Dewani Adwalut is to determine the rate of the pattas according to the rates established in the pergunnah for lands of the same description and quality (section 6, Regulation IV of 1794).

#### *What the "rights of raiyats" mean.*

The "rights of raiyats" call for comments. Sir John Shore definitely pointed out that "with respect to the raiyats, their rights appear very uncertain and indefinite." In the foregoing paragraphs the Committee has tried to show that the Regulations of 1793 give specific directions on certain points as to how the raiyats were to be dealt with, but they are silent on many important matters. In fact, the Regulations had to leave them indefinite as it was a baffling task to clear the path of exploration in the maze of discreet and indiscreet customs. "The constitution of the Moghul Empire", to quote Shore, "despotic in its principle, arbitrary and irregular in its practice, renders it almost impossible to discriminate between power and principle, fact and right; and if custom be appealed to, precedents in violation of it are produced." In tracing a system under successive administrations where rights were often sacrificed to power, it is extremely difficult "to explore those usages which have subsisted for the greatest length of time with the fewest variations and infringements." Lord Cornwallis was also impressed with the complications of the problems arising from "the endless subordinate variations in the tenures or conditions of raiyats, the different rates of rent due to arbitrariness of the Government, differences in the qualities of soil and nature of the produce, different standards of measuring the land, and endless and contradictory customs," which, to quote the Collector of Rajshahyee, were "beyond the investigation not merely of a Collector but of any man who has not made it the business of his life."

*Village record of rights broke down.*

• The rights and obligations of the resident cultivators were maintained by a system of village and pargana registers. The village register in Lower Bengal was kept up by the patwari whose accounts were checked and formulated by the pargana kanungo.<sup>1</sup> The Moghul revenue system broke down in the eighteenth century as "the bow was strained till it snapped." The village record of rights, accordingly, failed, and it rather became "a record of obligations rather than of rights." The Company after obtaining Diwani in 1765 attempted to correct the abuses resulting from the breakdown of the village record of rights by establishing the system of pattas or leases which also failed. The office of kanungo was abolished as "part of the changes embodied in the Permanent Settlement." Lord Cornwallis, without attempting to incorporate the endless varieties of the customary rights of raiyats in the Regulations of 1793, left them undefined in the hope that the Courts of law will interpret the customs in a right manner and restore them, whenever any departure therefrom will be found. The Patta Regulations were recommended to obviate the objections to the Permanent Settlement arising from the undefined state of the rights of raiyats.

Our Committee desires to lay stress on this view of the case to understand the implications of the question, if the Permanent Settlement did take away any existing rights from tenants. The rights and obligations of zamindars and tenants are to be obeyed so far as they are found in the Regulations; the undefined rights and interests received authoritative interpretations from the Courts of Justice and the common law which grew up since the Settlement of 1793. "Every zamindar who had not established a patwari in each village within his estate to keep the accounts of the raiyats, as required by the original rules of the Decennial Settlement of the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, was immediately to appoint one in each village, unless in such instances as the Board of Revenue might deem it unnecessary to have a separate one for each" and the registers of these reformed patwaris were to furnish evidence "to facilitate the decision of suits in the Courts of Judicature between proprietors and farmers of land and persons paying rent or revenue to them."<sup>2</sup> This gathers strength from the inherent difficulties as "it is almost impossible for us at this late period to discover whether any particular act was condemned as a clear violation of right, or merely as a wrong and unjust act done in exercise of a right."<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>"The Patwari is employed on the part of the husbandman to keep an account of his receipts and disbursements; and no village is without one of these. The Kanungo is the protector of the husbandman; and there is one in every pargana"—*Ain-i-Akbari*, Gladwin's Translation.

<sup>2</sup>Sir William Hunter's *Bengal Records*, Vol. I.

<sup>3</sup>Phillips' *Land Tenures of Lower Bengal*, 1876.



*Raiyati rights subordinated.*

The raiyati rights were merged in the recognition of the zamindars as proprietors of the soil with complete powers of alienation and other subsidiary incidents granted by the Regulations. Lord Moira put the case very pithily when he observed that "the under-proprietors were considered to have no rights, except such as might be conferred by patta." It may be mentioned that the khudkasht raiyats who had been in possession of the land for more than 12 years before the Settlement had certain prescriptive rights and they were not liable either to enhancement of rent, or eviction from their holding, so long as they paid the rents which they had all along paid. They were, however, protected by the Permanent Settlement. The other classes of tenants, such as the simple khudkashts and paikashts, had no such right.

*Section 52 of Regulation VIII of 1793.*

**Q. 2.** In the answer to Question 1, it has been shown that the 52nd section of Regulation VIII of 1793 provides as follows:

"The zamindar or other actual proprietor of land is to let the remaining lands of his zamindari or estate, under the prescribed restrictions, in whatever manner he may think proper."

The remaining lands refer to the lands remaining over and above the lands held by mokararidars, istemrardars and dependent talukdars who are protected from an increase of jama.

The first forty-seven sections of the above Regulation lay down rules as to the persons with whom the Settlement should be made, as to the lands included in the Settlement, the payment of malikana and other matters concerned with the exact relation between the Government as receiving revenue and the actual proprietors as paying revenue. There were also directions as to what talukdars, mokararidars and istemrardars were to be considered actual proprietors and as to what talukdars, mokararidars and istemrardars were to be regarded as lease holders (subordinate to actual proprietors). The forty-eighth section provides that after the conclusion of Settlement by Government with the zamindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors, they are to enter into engagements with the several dependant talukdars. Section 49 provides for mokararidars and istemrardars who had held lands at a fixed rent for more than 12 years or contracted for payment at a fixed rent with the zamindar or actual proprietor, and declares that these two classes are not liable to be assessed with any increase. Section 50 declares that the second class of mokararidars and istemrardars (that is, those who have contracted for a fixed rent) are not to be protected against Government if the zamindari be held khas or let in farm. Section 51 lays down rules to prevent undue exactions from dependent talukdars. Then comes section 52 and it is obvious that the

remaining lands exclude those of dependent talukdars, mokararidars and intemrardars.

The "prescribed restrictions", mentioned in the 52nd section, are to be found in sections 53 to 64 of Regulation VIII of 1793, and the principal provisions have been recited in the answer to question 1 while indicating the rights and obligations of zamindars and tenants. The restrictions generally regulate the form of pattas, the mode and manner of payment of rent and other matters incidental thereto. The expression, "let", in the 52nd section of the said Regulation meant and included letting to raiyats for the purpose of cultivation. Beyond enunciating general principles, these restrictive rules did not descend down to details, as it was well-known that the customary rights of raiyats varied in different places and that they were also intricate.

*Raiyats not entitled to undisturbed possession.*

Regulation XLIV of 1793 prescribes that no proprietor should fix the jama of any taluk for a term exceeding ten years, or let any lands in farm or grant pattas to raiyats or other persons for the cultivation of lands for a term exceeding ten years. The preamble to the Regulation states: "It is essential that proprietors of land should have a discretionary power to fix the revenue payable by their dependent talukdars, and to grant leases or fix the rents of their lands for a term sufficient to induce their dependent talukdars, under-farmers and raiyats to extend and improve the cultivation of their lands." Commenting on these provisions which formed part of the Code of 1793, Justice Field observed: "If the raiyats or any class of raiyats were entitled to continued and undisturbed possession, these words would have no meaning as applied to them."

On the 15th August 1811, the Collector of Chittagong wrote as follows: "In thus protecting the raiyats his landholders should not be precluded from the inherent privilege of giving him due warning to quit, either at the expiration of any existing lease, according to the terms of the patta, or at such specific period of the year as would be least detrimental to either party in settling their accounts, which, of course, would be about the time of the punya" (first collection of rent at the beginning of the year).

*The Court of Directors' opinion.*

The Court of Directors<sup>2</sup> arrived at the following conclusion in 1819: "The inference seems unavoidable, that the persons with whom the

<sup>1</sup>Justice Field observed that the term "let" was not a very appropriate expression to be used in respect of khudkasht raiyats who were already on the land and to whom it was intended that pattas should be given.

<sup>2</sup>Para. 53 of Revenue Letter to Bengal, 1 Revenue Selections, p. 360, quoted by Field in "Landholding and the Relation of Landlord and Tenant."

Permanent Settlement was made, and those who by inheritance or purchase may succeed them, are authorised by the existing law to oust even hereditary raiyats from possession of their lands, when the latter refuse to accede to any terms of rent which may be demanded of them, however exorbitant."

*Raiyats not empowered to transfer holdings.*

The rights of the raiyats at the time of the Permanent Settlement have never been put by any competent authority as empowering them to sell or mortgage the holdings. Shore observes in his Minute of 28th June, 1789, that the raiyats have no power to sell or mortgage the right of possession in the soil, and the statement is supported by Mr. Harrington (*vide* his Analysis, Vol. III, page 460) who observes: "On the whole, therefore, I do not think the raiyats can claim any right of alienating the lands rented by them, by sale or other mode of transfer, nor any right of holding them at a fixed rent, except in the particular instances of khudkasht raiyats who, from prescription, have a privilege of keeping possession as long as they pay the rent stipulated for by them."

The foregoing observations establish the following points:—

(1) Subject to specific written restrictions, landlords can let the lands to raiyats for the purpose of cultivation in any manner they like.

(2) Landlords can alter provisions and engagements at the time of renewal of pattas and can oust the hereditary raiyats, if the latter refuse to accede to the terms.

(3) Landlords can oust the raiyats, if the latter fail to pay the stipulated rents. Landlords have the inherent privilege of giving the raiyats due warning to quit at the expiration of any existing lease.

(4) Raiyats cannot transfer the lands rented by them. The Regulations of 1793 undoubtedly did not authorise landlords to dispossess cultivators capriciously, but the powers of rejecting bad tenants and of accepting good tenants on their terms, unless expressly forbidden, stood undisputed.

*Judgment of Justice Phear regarding the rights of raiyats.*

In the legal construction of the Permanent Settlement Regulations it was taken for granted that "whatever the raiyat has, the zamindar has all the rest which is necessary to complete ownership of the land: the zamindar's right amounts to the complete ownership of the land subject to the occupancy raiyat's right, and the right of the village, if any, to the occupation and cultivation of the soil, to whatever extent these rights may in any given case reach. When these rights are ascertained there must remain to the zamindar all rights and privileges

of ownership which are not inconsistent with or obstructive of them. And amongst other rights, it seems to me clear that he must have such a right as will enable him to keep the possession of the soil in the persons who are entitled to it, and to prevent it from being invaded by those who are not entitled to it."

*The power of the zamindar to choose tenants more frankly recognised by subsequent legislations.*

\*The power of the zamindar in the matter of choice of his tenants was more frankly recognised in the subsequent legislative measures which were adopted not to reverse the process of law but to give definite legal shape to the intentions of the Permanent Settlement. They were as follows:—

(1) Clause 7, section 15, Regulation VII of 1799, provides, among other things, that "if the defaulter be a lease-holder or other tenant, having a right of occupancy only so long as a certain rent, or a rent determinable on certain principles according to local rates and usages, be paid without any right of property or transferable possession, the proprietor of whom such tenure is held, or the farmer or other person to whom such proprietor may have leased, or committed his rights, must be understood to have the right of ousting the defaulting tenant from the tenure he has forfeited by a breach of the conditions of it." This could be done without recourse to law.

(2) Section 2, Regulation V of 1812, authorised the landlords to grant leases for any period of time or perpetuity.

(3) Under section 32, Regulation XI of 1822, the landlords were expressly declared entitled to eject all raiyats except khudkasht, kudeemee raiyat or resident and hereditary cultivator, having a prescriptive right of occupancy and hereditary transferable tenures existing at the time of the Settlement, though they were subject to enhancement.

(4) Under section 26, Act 1 of 1845, the power to eject all tenants except khudkasht or kudeemee raiyats having rights of occupancy at fixed rents or at rent assessable according to the fixed rules under the Regulations in force was preserved.

*Full right of zamindars in unoccupied lands.*

In the matter of unoccupied land the landlords' power of letting on whatever terms they thought proper was absolute, subject, of course, to the written restrictions. "They had," as Sir Richard Garth, then Chief Justice of Bengal, observed in his Minute, dated 8th January 1880, "almost as much freedom in that respect as landlords have in

---

Judgment of Mr. Justice Phear in *Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhury V. Ishaan Chandra Sen*, 13 B.L.R., 274, at p. 288, Quoted by Mr. Phillips in his "Land Tenures."

England. The terms upon which they let the land were a matter of contract, and the principle of demand and supply (whether of raiyats or land) usually regulated these terms.....It is certain that before the passing of the Rent Law in 1859, a landlord could, and did, almost at pleasure, rid himself of objectionable raiyats."

*Permanent Settlement was not given full play in the regulation of the usage of land.*

Our Committee is of opinion that the Permanent Settlement was not given full play in the regulation of the usage of the land. The Permanent Settlement Regulations left many things uncertain and it was natural and necessary that in all things for which the Legislature did not make provision, the new course of things under British rule would create a practice and an usage which adjusted and regulated the relations of zamindars and raiyats in an excellent manner. Under a despotic Government no settled common law can grow up but it was expected that well-defined customs would be built up after the Settlement to fill in the blank. In fact, a new common law came into existence to which practical operation was given by a strong Executive and by means of the Courts of Justice. The Permanent Settlement led to the "growth on all sides of the sense of individual legal rights, of a right not vested in the total group, but in a particular member of it, who has become conscious that he can call in the arm of the State to force his neighbours to obey the ascertained rule." In this wise, it was left more to the Courts of Law and to the Executive to regulate the usages, as indiscreet usages could easily be discouraged by them. The Permanent Settlement had the best of intentions but some of them were defeated because all the provisions were not set in full play. Accordingly, Sir George Campbell<sup>1</sup> lamented: "On the whole my impression is that the principles of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal were in the main good and sound, and that the ground for subsequent complaints is to be found not so much in those principles as in the failure to carry them out, and in the ideas which afterwards arose from a misinterpretation of them."

Within a few years after the introduction of the Permanent Settlement two things became clear—

*Unscientific usages sanctioned by the tenancy legislations.*

- (1) the failure of the Patta Regulations,
- (2) the absence of effective machinery for prompt realisation of rents.

It was a very common experience that the raiyats were in arrear of rents without forfeiting the right of possession. Various unscientific

---

<sup>1</sup>In a Cobden Club Paper, entitled "The Tenure of Land in India," published in 1881.

usages came into being which were later on formally confirmed by the tenancy legislations. Through the help of tenancy laws and courts of justice, non-cultivating and defaulting raiyats appeared on the scene, although their existence was sought to be stifled by the Regulations of 1793. The customary right of transfer of holdings by occupancy tenants which grew up in the nineteenth century through the connivance of the courts of law led to the fragmentation of holdings, and proletarianisation of actual cultivators. The practice of subinfeudation among raiyats received recognition from the Tenancy Acts and thereby perpetuated unscientific land tenures. Our Committee will have fuller opportunity to discuss these matters elsewhere in this memorandum, but it begs to place herein on record its view that the Permanent Settlement Regulations were not allowed to build up scientific usages through the fondness of raiyats for everything that becomes and is customary and through the imperfect revenue policy of Government embodied in the tenancy legislations. In India everything gets customary very quickly and easily, and the passion for customs and usages is often lyrical: legislations in contravention of customs are little respected.<sup>1</sup> That was one of the main reasons for the breakdown of some of the excellent provisions of the Permanent Settlement Regulations. The Settlement undoubtedly gave powers to zamindars for regulating the usages of the country by virtue of the inherent right of proprietors, but they were handicapped by the Courts of Law, the Executive and the rent laws adopted from time to time. The moment the declaration was made that the zamindar was the actual proprietor with complete powers of alienation, "the rights of all subordinate holders were necessarily derivative therefrom; and the ascertainment, definition, and enforcement of them immediately fell within the province of the public Courts of Justice."

*The social and economic condition of the country at the time of the Permanent Settlement.*

\* Q. 3. The Permanent Settlement was made with zamindars at a time when the country lay prostrate, economically and socially. To understand the part played by landlords in its economic development, it is relevant to know the extent of exhaustion of the resources of the country. The economic effects of the battle of Plassey were devastating. The English captured political power in 1757 but did not acquire it in form. The exhaustion of the resources of the country took place in the following manner:—

(1) Mir Jafar promised in the Treaty to pay large sums of money as compensation to the Company and to other inhabitants of Calcutta

---

<sup>1</sup>As late as 1880, the Rent Law Commission reported that the majority of tenancies in Bengal and Behar depended upon custom rather than contracts. "More admiration is accorded to the ingenuity with which a contract is broken than to the honesty which respects its binding force."

for their losses at the time of Sirajuddowla's capture of the town which amounted to £2,150,000 in 1757. He made large presents to the Company's servants which were estimated at £1,238,575. During the period 1757 to 1765 the business of making and unmaking Nawabs in Bengal brought to the Company and its servants no less a sum than £5,266,166 (exclusive of Clive's Jaagir).

(2) The total amount of drain to England during the period 1757 to 1780 appears to have been something like £38,000,000.<sup>1</sup> The total amount of "investment" during the fifteen years from 1766 to 1780 was £12,360,264.<sup>2</sup>

(3) Since 1757 the import declined, and it is said that Bengal was deprived of the usual import of about £780,000 of bullion every year. The declining trade of Bengal with Persia and the Red Sea reduced the import of bullion from about £250,000 to £50,000 per annum. After the despatch of the annual tribute to Delhi, there was hardly any currency enough left in Bengal to carry on any trade.

(4) Burdwan was plundered by the Mahrattas in their invasion of Bengal in 1741-42, and "crowds of the inhabitants of the country on the western side of the river crossed over to Calcutta" and implored the protection of the English who obtained permission from Ali Vardi Khan to dig an entrenchment round Calcutta, the remains of which are still to be seen and are called the Mahratta Ditch. That part of the country was laid waste, and the Mahrattas carried off the booty. It was a sudden invasion with appalling consequences in the country.

(5) The goods of the country merchants were heavily taxed: the European servants of the Company received exemption from the inland duties in their trade. Thus the Indian traders were ruined and the Nawab defrauded of a large part of revenue. The oppressions of the gomasthas of the Company's servants in buying goods and commodities and forcing raiyats, merchants and weavers to accept a fourth part of their value are recorded in history. "On account of the oppression on the weavers, the monopolistic power of the Company and unfair competition of the Company's servants in the inland trade, the indigenous merchants and manufacturers were little benefited by the increased exports which resulted from this drain."

---

<sup>1</sup>Vide Dr. J. C. Sinha's "Economic Annals of Bengal." Digby refers to the drain of Indian Treasure varying from five hundred to one thousand million pounds to England between Plassey and Waterloo. According to Professor Hamilton, the drain to England was in the form of goods but it did not bring in any profit to the industries of Bengal.

<sup>2</sup>The most serious evil of the financial system of the Company was the application of the revenues of the country to the objects of trade. A certain portion of the territorial revenue of Bengal was set apart every year to be employed in the purchase of goods for exportation to England. This was called the investment. The figures of the annual investment of Bengal, year by year, from 1766 to 1780, are given by Dr. P. N. Banerjee in his "Finance in the Days of the Company" from the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, 1783.

(6) The raiyat's income was materially reduced after 1757. The total revenue in Bengal including abwabs during the first half of the eighteenth century was much lower than what was demanded and actually collected after the Diwani. The invasion of the inland trade by the Company's servants and gomasthas compelling raiyats to sell their products at an arbitrarily low price and to buy their goods at an enhanced price, the extortionate revenue demand and the unwise policy of farming to the highest bidders having no lasting interest in and affection for the raiyats, the decline of the weaving industry providing a supplementary income—all this impaired the raiyat's power of producing wealth.

(7) The great famine of 1769-70 "forms indeed the key to the history of Bengal during the succeeding forty years." One-third of the population, estimated at ten millions, disappeared, and one-half of the cultivators and payers of revenue perished with hunger. When plenty returned in the following years, it returned to "a silent and deserted province," and the country continued to fall out of tillage.<sup>1</sup> "For the first fifteen years after the famine depopulation steadily increased." One-third of the land lay uncultivated.

#### *Tasks placed before zamindars.*

When zamindars were given formal recognition of their proprietary right in the Settlement of 1793, the country lay exhausted: the population was sparse and the cultivators decimated in large numbers; indigenous trade was in its decline and Indian treasury depleted; the raiyat's powers of producing wealth and purchasing goods were impaired; a portion of the country lay uncultivated and a greater portion was covered with jungles "infested by wild beasts." At this hour of crisis, zamindars under the Permanent Settlement found themselves fastened with the responsibilities of improving the zamindaris; extending and encouraging agriculture; making payments of land revenue (which formed ten-elevenths of the rental) to Government with certainty, without murmur and without any chance of remission; increasing the number of the reservoirs, embankments and other artificial works to guard against drought and inundation; and of finally courting and encouraging raiyats to do their allotted work of

<sup>1</sup>"In a year when thirty-five per cent. of the whole population and fifty per cent. of the cultivators perished, not five per cent. of the land tax was remitted, and ten per cent. was added to it for the ensuing year (1770-71)."—Sir William Hunter in "The Annals of Rural Bengal." The steady growth of the land-revenue demand even after the famine adds poignancy to the story. The land revenue figures are:

	£
1771-72	2,341,951
1772-73	2,298,441
1773-74	2,438,405
1774-75	2,777,870
1775-76	2,818,017



cultivation under a sense of security. At that period there was no other agency for carrying on the welfare work in Bengal. Government had no money: the ideology of Government was not attuned to attending to the social and economic needs of the country. The purposes of the Administration were chiefly concerned with the expansion and stability of the British Empire in India.

*Evidence of Mr. Pattle.*

The evidence of Mr. Pattle, a former member of the Board of Revenue, explains the position lucidly:

"The country brought under the Decennial Settlement was for the most part wholly uncultivated. Indeed, such was the state of the country from the prevalence of jungles infested by wild beasts that to go with any tolerable degree of safety from Calcutta to any of the adjacent districts, a traveller was obliged to have at each stage four drums and as many torches; besides, at this juncture, public credit was at its lowest ebb, and the Government was threatened with hostilities from various powerful Native States. Lord Cornwallis's great and comprehensive mind saw that the only resource within his reach in this critical emergency was to establish public credit and redeem the extensive jungles of the country. These important objects, he perceived, could only be effected by giving to the country a perpetual land assessment made on the gross rental with reference to existing productiveness and therefore promising to all those who would engage the encouragement of an immense profit from extending cultivation. Admitting the sacrifice was very great, I think it cannot be regretted when it is considered what difficulties it conquered, and what prosperity it has introduced and achieved. For my part, I am convinced that our continuance in the country depends on the adoption of that measure, and that our stability could not otherwise have been maintained."

*Birbhum, a prosperous land before the famine, became practically a sequestered and an impassable jungle.*

The state of Birbhum<sup>1</sup> may be recited here as an illustration. In 1765, four years before the famine, Birbhum had been cultivated by close on six thousand rural communes, each with a hamlet in the centre of its lands. In 1771, only four thousand five hundred of these little communities survived the effects of famines. In 1771 more than one-third of the cultural land was returned in the public accounts as "Deserted"; in 1776 the entries in this column exceed one-half of the whole tillage, four acres lying waste for every seven that remained under cultivation. Birbhum which was rich and prosperous before

---

<sup>1</sup>Figures taken from Hunter's "The Annals of Rural Bengal."

1770 was practically a sequestered and an impassable jungle in 1780 through its forests."

*Because of zamindars lands became saturated with capital and labour.*

Birbhum more or less represented the state of the country in the year 1793. Since then, the country has prospered: agriculture was extended and improved; population increased; roads and bridges were repaired; public embankments, reservoirs and tanks were considerably multiplied; swamps and jungles were cleared; public revenue was placed on a secure footing; indigenous trade recovered; in a word, lands became saturated with capital and labour. After the famine of 1770 there was more land awaiting cultivation than there were husbandmen to till it. The peasant, who had the advantage over the zamindars because of the increase of waste lands and paucity of tillers, had to be "courted to undertake cultivation", as Francis put it in 1776. "The province cannot be re-peopled by Act of Parliament." Zamindars had to "entice away tenants by offering protection against judicial proceedings" and to farm at very low rents. Before the famine of 1770, non-resident raiyats were vagrant and adventurous and "wandered wearily through the province because they could nowhere find land." But during the last quarter of the 18th century resident cultivators even joined the non-resident class to obtain better terms, as that was a period when cultivators could bid on their own terms. For the sake of improving and extending cultivation which was essential for the due payment of land revenue, zamindars offered favourable terms, and often it was stipulated that for a certain number of years there would be no rent as the jungles had to be cleared and that there would be full rents only thereafter.

*The country flourishes under the Permanent Settlement.*

\* A writer<sup>1</sup> in the Calcutta Review observed in 1853: "A man may go for miles in any direction, east and north of the metropolis, and see

<sup>1</sup>This writer who is quoted by Ashutosh Mukherjee in his paper, "The Annals of British Land Revenue Administration in Bengal" is described in 1853 by Sir John Kaye as one of the ablest men then in India. The writer's further observations are extremely interesting: "What strikes the eye most in any village or set of villages in a Bengal district is the exuberant fertility of the soil, the sluttish plenty surrounding the grihasta's (cultivator's) abode; the rich foliage, the fruit and timber trees, and the palpable evidence against anything like penury. Did any man ever go through a Bengalee village and find himself assailed by the cry of want or famine? Was he ever told that the raiyat and his family did not know where to turn for a meal; that they had no shade to shelter them, no tank to bathe in, no employment for their active limbs? Considering the wretched condition of some of the Irish peasantry, or even the Scotch, and the misery experienced by hundreds in the purlieus of our great cities at Home, compared with the condition of the raiyats, who know neither cold nor hunger, it is high time that the outcry about the extreme unhappiness of the Bengal raiyat should cease."

plains succeeding to plains, where there is not one bigha of unproductive soil, and where many thousands of bighas give their return of two crops in the year, without irrigation, and without that careful labour which seems indispensable in the Upper Provinces to successful agriculture. More new bazars will be found to have been established within the last thirty years than old bazars to have decayed. The circulation of money in the interior of such district is very considerable. The number of men who derive competence and consequence from the soil is large. Is it fair to say that all these results are independent of the Perpetual Settlement?"

*Report of the Commissioner of Burdwan division, 1883.*

On the 20th of October, 1883, the Commissioner of the Burdwan division reported to the Government of Bengal as follows: "The Bengal of to-day offers a startling contrast to the Bengal of 1793; the wealth and prosperity of the country have marvellously increased beyond all precedent under the Permanent Settlement. .... A great portion of this increase is due to the zamindari body as a whole, and they have been very active and powerful factors in the development of this prosperity."

*Official extracts regarding the contributions of zamindars for the welfare of the country.*

Our Committee takes the liberty of making relevant extracts from the official reports regarding the conduct of zamindars in the matter of nursing the country with their benevolent works:—

*Burdwan division.*—"The Lieutenant Governor is glad to see the favourable account that Mr. Buckland has been able to give of the conduct of the zamindars in this division. No zamindar of importance has come under the unfavourable notice of Government. On the other hand, many zamindars remarkably distinguished themselves during the late scarcity for munificence and charity. The Lieutenant Governor has already acknowledged their liberality. The Maharajahdhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, as usual, comes first in works of benevolence and public spirit. The title of Rajah has recently been conferred on Ram Ranjan Chuckerbutty of Hetampur, on Bissessur Malia of Ranne-gunge, and the title of Ranee on Horo Sundari Debya of the same place, in recognition of their good services and munificence during the past year."—(*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 18th August 1875).

"There is but little to notice especially under this head where there are so many public spirited landowners as there are in the Burdwan division, it would be invidious to name any unless, indeed, it be His

Highness the Maharaja of Burdwan, who is always foremost in assisting Government and setting a good example to the whole province." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 2nd October 1878).

• "As a body they (zamindars) are men of enlightenment and public spirit, and the absence of agrarian disturbances testifies to the good understanding which exists between them and their tenantry." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 24th September 1879).

*Presidency division.*—"The conduct of the zamindars has been with few exceptions worthy of praise. There were no serious quarrels with tenants in any district. In Nuddea the zamindars have shown great interest in education and in the future of the Krishnagar College..... In Moorshidabad Rao Rajendra Narain Rai of Lalgola is distinguished for charity to the poor and kindness to his tenants, while the name of Maharani Swarnomayee stands foremost in Bengal for works of charity." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 19th September 1877).

"There are so many good zamindars in the Presidency division that it would be almost invidious to select any for special favourable mention." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 2nd October 1878).

*Rajshahi division.*—"The leading zamindars of the division did their duty most creditably in alleviating the distress occasioned by the failure of the harvests, and the Lieutenant Governor has already acknowledged the good services thus rendered." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 6th October 1875).

"In Dinajpur the resident zamindars are described as being inclined to assist education, and from Rungpore the report is favourable. The munificence of Rajah Promothonath Roy of Dighapatia in Rajshahi in offering the large sum of one lakh and a half of rupees for the proposed Rajshahi College, has been suitably acknowledged by Government." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 30th August 1876).

• "In Pabna the Tagore family were, as heretofore, foremost in good works." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 19th September 1877).

*Dacca division.*—"The Lieutenant Governor has read with satisfaction the testimony borne by the Collector of Mymensingh to the kindness and consideration which the district zamindars, as a body, have shown in forbearing to press their raiyats for rent during this year of difficulty. The Collectors of Dacca and Faridpur have recorded similar remarks. These circumstances reflect credit on the zamindars as a body, and are duly appreciated by Government." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 25th November 1874).

"The conduct of zamindars is noticed as having been generally worthy of their wealth and position." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 1st September 1875).

"The, Dacca district has suffered a loss in the death of Rajah Kali Narain Roy, who both in public and private life was a man deserving of the highest praise. To Nawab Abdool Gunny and Asanoollah the town of Dacca owes a debt of gratitude. In Mymensingh the Alapsing zamindars, Raja Surjakanta Acharjea and several others are specially mentioned and generally the zamindars in the district are said to have lived on good terms with their tenantry and one another during the past year." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 25th September 1878).

*Chittagong division*.—"His Honour recognises the favourable testimony borne by the Commissioner to Baboo Kantapersad Hazaree and Abdool Mallom of Chittagong and Baboo Annodapersad Roy of Tippera for their liberality and public spirit." (*Supplement to the Calcutta Gazette*, 3rd September 1873).

*Zamindars formed the only agency for the welfare work of the Province.*

The foregoing extracts are made only to show that the liberality and public spirit of the zamindars as a body were known throughout the country and received ample recognition from Government. Zamindars were, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the only agency which was responsible for the welfare work of the province. The establishment of *hats* and bazars by zamindars led to the increase in the prices of agricultural produce; the construction of roads and their maintenance were possible due to the liberal spirit of landlords, and they gave an impetus to better marketing resulting in more money incomes for agriculturists; the spending of money for preventing epidemic diseases through landlords' subsidies to dispensaries and to local physicians, was of incalculable help to the rural people. They encouraged education, opened charitable dispensaries, constructed reservoirs, tanks and embankments, improved sanitation, repaired roads, showed liberality to raiyats whenever they were in distress, gave impetus to indigenous trade and industry through their patronage, and helped the growth of a virile middle class and contented tenantry. In the second half of the last century they were equally essential, although Government began to show a slight visible interest in rural welfare by imposing roads and public works cesses and introducing local self-government in a modified form. The various Acts passed during the second period of the nineteenth century and the transference of the Government into the hands of the British Crown after the Sepoy Mutiny undoubtedly indicate a change of policy, but all the same the services of landlords were as essential as when they were needed in the formative period of the social and economic history of Bengal, that is, in the first half of the nineteenth century.

*Minute of Sir Richard Temple on the services of landlords during the great famine of 1874.*

Bengal witnessed a great famine in 1874. The services of zamindars during the famine with regard to carrying on the relief works, dispensing charitable relief, suspending or remitting rents, showing special liberality in diverse ways and taking an active part in the administration of relief were commendable, and any enlightened community could be proud of the services thus rendered. Our Committee makes the following quotation, rather *in extenso*, from the well-known minute of Sir Richard Temple, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, with a view to indicate the zamindar's useful role in the hour of crisis for the country:—

"In most cases it is probable, and in many cases it is certain, throughout the distressed districts, that the zamindars and landholders of all classes have suspended the collection of a considerable portion of their rents. In other words, most of them have had their income seriously curtailed for a year or more. Many of them must have previously been living up to their income; and this should not excite any surprise, as they have families and numerous persons dependent on them. Their position in native society is such as to entail many expenses, such as are unavoidable in the joint family system, but are not at once obvious to Europeans who may have a more restricted standard of the family unit. All these circumstances must be considerably remembered when a general estimate is formed of their services in the cause of humanity. They must all<sup>o</sup> have suffered at least temporary pecuniary loss, and some must have undergone grave inconvenience. Large numbers, perhaps many thousands of lesser landholders, who cannot be formally designated as distressed, must nevertheless have suffered a severe distress, the full degree of which will never be exactly known. It will be found, too, that for the period of the famine and scarcity, the land revenue is paid in by the zamindars in a manner which is satisfactory and creditable to the working of the Permanent Settlement.

"In most cases the zamindars have refrained from asking for payment of the compensation money to which they would be by law entitled on account of the land taken up for relief roads. The value of these gifts cannot be precisely stated, but it must be very considerable. The relief roads extended over a length of about 6,000 miles. Of this length, a large portion must have been carried over lands belonging to private landlords, most of whom have abstained from demanding compensation. This circumstance redounds to the honour and public spirit of those concerned.

"Further it is hardly possible to include in this record the names of petty landholders, village notables, and cultivators, jeyt-raiyats, mundals, and others, who have given their time, their knowledge and influence, their unpaid exertions and labours, to the service of relief. These meritorious persons are scattered all over the lately distressed districts. They cannot be particularised name by name, as such a catalogue would include so many hundreds—even some thousands; but their merit and worth have been great in the aggregate and should be duly remembered.

"As a general fact, I may mention that the total of the sums taken out by zamindars, landholders, and merchants, both European and Native—chiefly by Natives—as advances from the public treasury amounts to forty lakhs of rupees, or £460,000; partly for improvement of the land, partly for the benefit of the tenantry, partly for importation of grain. These advances will doubtless be punctually repaid. They were taken by the recipients not at all for their own benefit, but for the sake of doing good offices to those with whom they were connected by ties of fellowship, of neighbourhood, or of social relation. The magnitude of the sum total represents a great effort made by the upper classes of society on this occasion.

"The subscriptions handed over by the people of Bengal to the Relief Committees, central and local, amount to nearly one hundred thousand pounds sterling. This large subscription has been given in great part by the landholders over and above other expenditures they may have incurred, or losses they may have suffered, in connection with the scarcity."

*Evidence of Mr. W. Robinson.*

Mr. W. Robinson, Relief Commissioner of Dinajpore, pointed out that "there can be no doubt that by far the greatest part of those who have paid their Government revenue during the past year have had to borrow the money to do so, and this alone must have been no slight strain on the resources of some of them."

The Minute of Sir Richard Temple mentions the specific services of various landlords and without going into details, the services of some of the important zamindars, referred to, are mentioned as illustrations of the high testimony given above—

*The Maharaja Bahadur of Burdwan.*—"He opened relief houses in different parts of the Burdwan district and at one time he was relieving 4,000 persons daily. He is believed to have expended on relief works and charitable relief more than £20,000; and the Commissioner reports that his 'charities were limited only by the demand on them'."

• *Ranee Swarnamoyee of Cossimbazar.*—"Her munificent subscriptions towards schools, hospitals, and other public improvements have on many occasions been acknowledged by Government. This year she helped her tenants and aided the Government relief officers in every possible way. She imported grain and distributed it in her villages, remitted or suspended the rent of distressed raiyats, and made herself responsible for the payment of Government advances."

*Mussumat Sham Mohinee of Dinajpore.*—"She refrained from collecting rents during the year of scarcity. She bought and distributed to her tenants about £5,000 worth of rice and seed grain; caused tanks to be dug on her estate; gave land free of charge to her villagers for their tanks; maintained a relief house where, from first to last, about 90,000 persons received relief; and made herself responsible for the repayment of advances of grain made by Government to her raiyats."

*Baboo Bissessur Melay.*—"He executed relief works for the convenience of his villages at a cost of about £10,000, distributed charitable relief daily at a poor house near his home, and was personally active in directing the due administration of his own charities and of the Government relief operations."

*Baboo Ram Runjan Chuckerbutty of Beerbhoom.*—"He expended £1,400 on relief works, remitted £3,100 (or one-tenth of his yearly rents), maintained for four months a relief house where 250 persons were fed daily and subscribed largely to relief funds."

*Baboo Jyekissen Mookerjee and Rajkissen Banerjee.*—"They undertook a considerable number of relief works, they helped their raiyats and remitted or suspended rents. The Commissioner writes that in the Hooghly District Baboo Jyekissen Mookerjee was, as usual, the first and foremost in his exertions for the good of the people and in support of the officers of Government."

• *Raja Jotindra Mohan Tagore.*—"He granted to his raiyats remission of rent to the amount of £4,000, distributed seed grain and money, gave £200 and some land for relief works, opened a dispensary at his own cost, and contributed towards medical relief generally."

*Rajah Promothanath Roy of Dighapatia.*—"He was conspicuous above all other zamindars of Bogra for his liberality. He executed considerable relief works at his own cost, maintained four relief houses, at which 1,400 people were fed daily, advanced money and seed grain largely to his raiyats and abstained from pressing them for rent."

#### *The picture in 1874 and that in 1770.*

The services of zamindars are recounted to contrast the position in 1874 with that obtaining during the great famine of 1770. In 1770 the rights of zamindars were being annihilated by the policy of farming



to the highest bidders. If the crops perished, the people died. At that period the natural scarcity passed in a direct and unmitigated form into actual pressure: "the actual pressure was in proportion to the natural scarcity and the natural scarcity to the actual pressure." There was no agency to lessen the pressure. The country had then no Permanent Settlement, and accordingly, ten millions of people died. But in 1874 the entire resources of the landholding community were pooled towards relieving the pressure arising out of scarcity, and as such there was no story of rank starvation and death. If the zamindar was "the master of the situation, he was also the patron; if he stood above, he also stood behind his raiyats." That was because zamindars as a body were permeated with the feeling that the service of one's fellows was a religious obligation; to repudiate it was impiety.

*The sacred mission of private property fulfilled in Bengal.*

In Bengal, property has never been intensely individualistic, breaking all social bonds and draining the sap of community. The services, rendered by zamindars in the economic development of the country, lay emphasis on the positive aspect of private property, which was significantly expressed by Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore in the following way: "Property is a medium for the expression of our personality. Most often and for most men, property is the only frame that can give a foundation for such creation of a personal world. It is not merely money, not merely furniture; it does not represent merely acquisitiveness but is an objective manifestation of our taste, our imagination, our constructive faculties, our desire for self-sacrifice..... Through this creative limitation which is our personality, we receive, we give, we express; our highest social training is to make our property the richest expression of the best in us, of that which is universal, of our individuality whose greatest illumination is love. Property is the unity of wealth that makes for communal prosperity when it is alive to its function. Our wisdom lies not in destroying separateness of units but in maintaining the spirit of unity in its full strength." Our Committee has only tried to show that through the vehicle of private property in agricultural land, zamindars have manifested their desires for sacrifice, and expressed their richness of heart in the services of the raiyats and countrymen. Lapses of particular individuals cannot and should not convict the community as a whole.

*Landlords maintaining traditions of liberality under severe handicaps.*

Our Committee agrees that "the bark which protects the interior of a tree must be as living as that which it contains. It must not stifle the tree's growth, but must expand in response to the inner compulsion." There was no lack of vitality in the institution of landlordism;

it was quick with life and liberality. It is true that the old liberality and vitality are falling off, although landlords are trying hard to live true to themselves and true to their obligations. It is not true to say that they have failed to live up to their expectations, but at the same time, it is true that "there is much wood that is dead and diseased and that has to be cleared away." The landlords of to-day are maintaining their recurring family grants to charitable institutions, continuing their lakhiraj grants, subscribing liberally to the Funds ear-marked for the welfare of the country, extending help and patronage in times of scarcity, which is more often caused by droughts (as put by the Indian Famine Commission, 1880, in its report). They are still exercising healthy influences in the cause of ordered social progress. But an allowance must be made to the effect that the luxury of a liberal policy is not possible, when landlords themselves are in distress, and are losing their old powers of accommodation.

As illustrations our Committee desires to set below contributions of some of the distinguished Houses of Bengal. It is not possible to get even a rough estimate of the expenses made by the different noble Houses of Bengal towards the economic regeneration of the country. Many landlords consider all this as charities and keep no records of them. The charities of the late Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandy of Cossimbazar exceed Rs. 3 crores; his manifold charities and liberal contributions for the economic development of the country are well known and too recent to be forgotten by his countrymen. The annual recurring grants of expenditure of some of the estates are as follows:—

The Burdwan Raj Estate, Rs. 3,08,382; the Hetampore Raj Estate (Birbhum), Rs. 73,138; the Dinajpore Raj Estate, Rs. 94,950; the Gouripore Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 56,767; the Puthia Raj Estate, Rs. 53,435; the Santosh (6 annas) Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 26,420; the Chakdighi Estate, Rs. 15,390. In this way, all the distinguished Houses in Bengal spend annually crores of rupees for the country even in these days when landlords are shaken by bad collections and economic distress.

Towards the cause of education the contributions of some of the Houses are given below: the Burdwan Raj Estate, Rs. 24,98,784; the Gouripore Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 11,76,717; the Dighapatia Raj family, Rs. 5,19,737; the Chakdighi Estate (Burdwan), Rs. 7,24,400; the Santosh (6-annas) Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 5,30,028; the Lalgola Raj Estate (Murshidabad), Rs. 3,98,034; the Ramgopalpur Raj Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 2,83,855; the Puthia Raj Estate (Rajshahi), Rs. 1,95,307; Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy's Estate (Murshidabad), Rs. 2,26,743; the Hetampore Raj Estate (Birbhum), Rs. 1,54,660; the Utterpara Estate (Hooghly), Rs. 6,62,500; the Dinajpur Estate, Rs. 82,650.

Towards the cause of medical help, the contributions of some of the Houses are as follows: the Burdwan Raj Estate, Rs. 16,80,474; Raja Kamala Ranjan's Roy's Estate, Rs. 6,37,714; the Lalgola Raj Estate, Rs. 5,82,073; the Santosh (6-annas) Estate, Rs. 7,77,040; the Ramgopalpur Raj Estate, Rs. 4,85,680; the Chakdighi Estate, Rs. 5,34,000; the Utterpara Estate, Rs. 2,84,500; the Gouripore Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 2,86,778; the Hetampore Raj Estate, Rs. 1,48,428.

Towards the construction of roads: the Burdwan Raj Estate, Rs. 6,44,200; the Ramgopalpur Raj Estate, Rs. 5,20,315; Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy's Estate, Rs. 1,26,875; the Chakdighi Estate, Rs. 1,40,000; the Utterpara Estate, Rs. 1,27,500.

Towards religious charities: the Burdwan Raj Estate, Rs. 1,57,00,000; the Gouripore Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 15,93,190; the Ramgopalpur Raj Estate, Rs. 37,43,194; the Puthia Raj Estate, Rs. 4,16,750; the Santosh (6-annas) Estate, Rs. 2,15,950; the Lalgola Raj Estate, Rs. 2,00,346; the Hetampore Raj Estate, Rs. 1,00,000; the Dighapatia Raj Estate, Rs. 7,725.

Towards industrial and agricultural improvement: the Burdwan Raj Estate, Rs. 59,12,474; the Dighapatia Raj family, Rs. 4,54,000; the Gouripore Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 2,11,242; Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy's Estate, Rs. 6,27,818; the Utterpara Estate, Rs. 2,58,000; the Chakdighi Estate, Rs. 1,73,000; the Ramgopalpur Raj Estate, Rs. 94,950.

Towards water supply: the Gouripore Estate (Mymensingh), Rs. 2,78,624; the Lalgola Raj Estate, Rs. 1,56,944; the Santosh (6 annas) Estate, Rs. 1,45,575; the Ramgopalpur Raj Estate, Rs. 1,26,618; the Utterpara Estate, Rs. 1,47,500; the Puthia Raj Estate, Rs. 1,11,379.

The above list, as will be found, is fragmentary; even the figures in respect of the estates referred to under particular heads, although collected from the estates concerned, are not exhaustive. Moreover, Bengal is dotted with distinguished Houses, such as those mentioned, and every House has to its credit lakhs of rupees spent for the economic development of the country, apart from remissions or suspensions of arrear rents and interests thereon in seasons of calamity and scarcity. Our Committee does not pretend to indicate all the ways through which their charities, contributions, patronage, subsidies and other welfare activities pass; they are varied and too numerous to be recited here. The above figures are only given as rough illustrations in defence of the contention of our Committee and in the hope that they will, even in an imperfect way, indicate the nature of useful role played by the landlords of Bengal. No other community can possibly be proud of greater achievements; no other community is entitled to greater appreciation from the "grateful" Bengal.

*Functions expected of zamindars under Permanent Settlement.*

The functions expected to be performed by landlords at the Permanent Settlement for the economic development of the country may be stated as follows:—

(1) The proprietors of land will "exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands," "the encouragement of agriculture is essential to the welfare of these provinces." (*Vide* Regulation I of 1793) and preamble to Regulation II of 1793.)

(2) The proprietor "shall have the means of increasing the number of the reservoirs, embankments and other artificial works by which, to a great degree, the untimely cessation of the periodical rains may be provided against and the lands protected from inundation." (Preamble to Regulation II of 1793.)

(3) The proprietors shall find it to their interest to improve the estates. (Preamble to Regulation II of 1793.)

*Chief impediments to landlords in playing their part.*

Our Committee has tried to indicate that in the nineteenth century they performed the functions expected of them truly and admirably, and that they did make themselves useful and constructive in other spheres, which were not mentioned in the Regulations, or contemplated by the authors thereof. But unfortunately things have moved on generating forces, which handicapped landlords in the wise pursuit of their benevolent activities. Some of the chief impediments are set out below, and they are enough to show how and why zamindars are experiencing difficulties in carrying on their services to countrymen in general, and to their raiyats in particular:—

(1) The Permanent Settlement, the historical forces and the social necessities led to a policy of subinfeudation among landlords. In this way, the incomes of large landlords were reduced. The Hindu law of succession among all sons splits up the estates. Failing sons, a widow succeeds on a very limited tenure;<sup>1</sup> and in Bengal, daughter and other female relations also succeed after the widow, when there are no sons. The Muhammadan law of inheritance creates a great complication of shares. The law gives to every share holder the right of partitioning off his shares. Thus there is a system of

---

<sup>1</sup>"The tenure of Hindoo widows is peculiar in the extreme. They have no power to administer for useful purposes, so as to give leases, etc., beyond their own lives, but under Brahmin-made laws they can do many things in favour of Brahmins and for superstitious purposes. They are constantly in the hands of Brahmins, and constantly trying to make away with the estates for the benefit of their own relations, or of their Brahmin friends, to the prejudice of the husband's heirs. Altogether the tenure is a most noxious one, and gives rise to half the litigation in Bengal."—Sir George Campbell in his paper, "The Tenure of land in India." Under Act No. XI of 1938 (passed by the Indian Legislature) a Hindu dying intestate, his widow shall be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son.

inheritance leading to constant subdivision of rights, without division of tenures; a vast system of subinfeudation among landlords, and the perplexing and injurious widow holdings. The incomes of every share holder go on decreasing in the process of time.

(2) There is a cycle of bad seasons in agriculture. Indian famines are caused by droughts. Agriculture, for the most part in Bengal, depends on rains, and occasional scarcities are not infrequent. Landlords are to discharge their revenues irrespective of bad seasons, and on those occasions they are either to borrow or draw on their savings. All this goes on encumbering the estates. In this wise, the economic solvency of landlords wears off as time goes on. When capitalism is in its hey day, it can afford to be liberal. "Capitalism in distress cannot afford the luxury of a liberal policy." To go on with a liberal policy of reform in a period of acute decline is extremely difficult. Concessions of the older type are only possible when the margins of capitalist achievement are wide enough to permit them.<sup>1</sup> The deterioration of the margins of landlords through natural and economic causes forms the key to the understanding of the sacrifice of the old liberality of landlords.

(3) Through the process of subinfeudation, especially among raiyats, which has been accelerated by the tenancy law, landlords have lost active touch with actual cultivators; they are also prevented from any access to the holdings, and necessarily from making improvements thereon; when occupancy raiyats intervene and discharge their dues regularly. The only restriction is that occupancy tenants will not render the holdings unfit for cultivation; subject to that restriction, occupancy tenants are not bound by the advice of their landlords, nor could they be forced to improve tillage or lands on terms preferred by landlords. The restrictions, put forward by the Tenancy Act, go to stifle the landlord's initiative, and even when they desire to introduce improvements or invest capital in specific lands, they are helpless before the legal powers of occupancy raiyats.<sup>2</sup> Even if occupancy tenants show carelessness in cultivation, landlords have to sit idle.

(4) Under cover of tenancy legislations landlords' powers of enhancing rents were rigidly circumscribed. It is a very common

---

<sup>1</sup>Vide Harold Laski's "The State in theory and practice." The tenantry becomes angry at the suspension of the concession. "grievances are thus multiplied and vociferous; the men who feel them clamour for the continuance of the concessions, which, in the past, could be granted without undue hesitation or effort. But to grant them in an epoch of crisis is to call for the voluntary surrender of privileges from those in whom their habitual possession has a veritable religion of ownership. What once seemed reasonable now begins to seem destructive."

<sup>2</sup>This point of view was stressed by Professor S. G. Panandikar in "the Wealth and Welfare of the Bengal Delta." According to him, the courts should be given the power of compelling the tenants (1) either to have their occupancy rights bought out by the landlords, or (2) to accept other land of equivalent value in exchange, or (3) to pay the extra rent on the completion of permanent improvements. P. 313-313.

experience for landlords that the difficulties of proving the increased productivity of lands through their improvements are insurmountable. The Bengal Tenancy Act requires the registration of an improvement. The discretion of Court in the matter of enhancing rent on this account is great. Human nature being what it is, it is not likely for a prudent investor to risk his capital for the distant and faint chance of enhancing his rent under the stringent provisions of the Tenancy Act. By the Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938, all such provisions have been suspended.

The Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, on the other hand, stresses the need for taking away the restrictions on enhancement of rent. It says: "The complaint that the larger landlords do little for the development of their estates on modern scientific lines is a very general one. In their defence, it may be pleaded with some truth that, in some province, the system of tenure or the tenancy law restrains them from obtaining unrestricted possession of a compact area, and in others, prevents them from securing a full and fair return from the proceeds of their enterprise. We would suggest that, where existing systems of tenure or tenancy laws operate in such a way as to deter landlords who are willing to do so from investing capital in the improvement of their land, the subject should receive careful consideration with a view to their enactment of such amendments as may be calculated to remove the difficulties.....Without any desire to engage in moneylending, many of them (landlords) assist their tenantry in a number of ways, and they should be actively encouraged to stimulate the interest of those who hold land under them in the value of improved seeds, implements and stocks. The reply that the increasing prosperity of the tenants, which may result therefrom, would not be reflected in any increase in the income of the landlord is difficult to encounter, but where the existing tenancy law imposes obstacles to progress which were not contemplated by its framers, the case for review gathers force" (para. 358). It is well-recognised<sup>1</sup> that the landlord's right to raise rent should not be curbed in the interest of agricultural progress.

(5) Through the operation of the tenancy law, defaulting tenantry can continue enjoying all the privileges. In this sense, default in payment of rent is encouraged. In the absence of effective machinery for realisation of rents provided for in the Tenancy Act, many of the

---

<sup>1</sup>"Any proposal to restrict the landlord's right to raise rent meets the fatal objection that this means intensifying the present shortage of capital in the industry. To the free working of the landlord-tenant system the landlord's right to raise the rent is essential. Refusal of that right removes his one economic incentive to improve his land. The psychological effect would be even more powerful. Deprived of any opportunity of getting more out of the land, he would inevitably sink less in it."—Rural Report of the Liberal Land Committee, England, 1924-25, p. 232.

landlords have decent incomes on paper, but in practice they are running from deficit to deficit, with the consolation of large outstanding balances in the form of arrear rents. The evils of arrear rents are discrediting the institution of landlordism. There are, however, economic causes and the countryside agitation, contributing to the non-payment of rent. The costly and ineffective law suits tell on the resources of landlords. Agrarian movement is taking a definite shape; a better knowledge among raiyats to avoid payments, coupled with their economic insolvency, is driving landlords to a desperate situation.

Our Committee begs to maintain that with all these severe handicaps they are maintaining a very good record of services; where they have failed, they have done so under sheer pressure of circumstances. The traditions of liberality have not yet died down.

**Q. 4.** Our Committee is of opinion that the zamindars were proprietors of land before the Permanent Settlement, and that they were formally recognised as proprietors, not converted into proprietors, by the Regulations of 1793. The origin of the proprietary and hereditary rights of zamindars cannot be stated with precision. In the fiscal machinery of the Hindus the rudiments of the zamindar could be found. During the period from the end of the eighth to that of the eleventh century Bengal was ruled for the most part by Kings of the famous Pala dynasty. The records of these kings refer to the payment in kind and cash. Documents regarding endowments frequently refer to "grampati" (the village headman) and the "kshetrapati" (the lord of the fields) and to the "dasagramika" (the officer in charge of 10 villages). In the early part of the twelfth century the well known Sena dynasty rose in power in Bengal, and it continued to hold sway till the close of that century when it was shattered by Muslim invasion. In the references in the Sena records there is a remarkable testimony to the wholesale substitution of cash assessments for payments in kind prevailing in other parts of northern India. The principle of cash assessments is helpful for the growth of intermediaries acquiring the status of landlords in process of time. In the oldest period to which historical records in northern Indian can carry us back, grants and assignments of lands of various kinds were known. These assignments, generally to the State Officers of all grades, and the collective assessment of villages through the headmen, facilitated the growth of landlords in Bengal.

*That zamindars were proprietors of the soil was confirmed by eminent authorities.*

In Akbar's time the zamindars of Bengal were "numerous, rich and powerful." They were not of his creation and existed with some possible variation in their rights and privileges before the Muhammadan conquests in Hindusthan, and, without any formal acknowledgement acquired stability by prescription. The new invaders, who

claimed the revenues of the country, from motives of policy and humanity, employed the ancient possessors of the land as their agents for the collection of the taxes of the State, and for this purpose they confirmed the former proprietors. Mr. Shore<sup>1</sup> after examining all the relevant documents and authorities is satisfied that according to the established principle of Moghul finance as practised in Hindusthan, "the rents belong to the Sovereign, and the land to the Zamindar." Gholam Hussain Khan, who was a great authority relied on by Shore, replied to a question as follows: "The Emperor is the proprietor of the revenue issuing out of the territory under his authority, but he is not the proprietor of the soil." Appendix No. 12 of Shore's Minute gives the authorities of Muhammedan law respecting landed property, and they say that "the Sovereign has a right of property in the tribute or rent," and that land will be "inherited like all other property."

Field in his Introduction to the Regulations points out that "there is a native Hindu saying that the land belongs to the zamindars and the revenue to the king and according to Muhammadan law, the Sovereign has a right of property in the tribute or revenue, but he who has the tribute from the land has no property in the land." This interpretation receives corroboration from what Phillips says in his "Land Tenures": "Whatever his (Sovereign's) rights may have been, he never claimed any right to the soil itself as part of his share, nor ever exercised a right to anything beyond the natural or accidental produce of the soil."

Before the Permanent Settlement large zamindars exercised civil and criminal powers and were also unmolested in the collection of revenue. On them rested the power of farming the lands, collecting the rents from the villages and keeping the accounts. They were independent of the interference of the Government in the details of fiscal and criminal administration. It was only when they were remiss in the payment of the sadar jama that officers were deputed to enforce the above payments.

"It appears upon a reference to all the correspondence of the times and is universally known that when the Diwani of the three provinces was ceded to us, the country was distributed among the zamindars and talukdars who paid a stipulated revenue by twelve instalments to the Sovereign power or its delegates. They assembled at the capital in the beginning of every Bengali year (commencing in April) in order to complete their final payments, and make up their annual accounts; to settle the discount to be charged upon their several remittances in various coins for the purpose of reducing them to one standard, or adjust their concerns with their

---

<sup>1</sup>Minute on the rights of zamindars and talukdars, recorded on the proceedings of Government in the Revenue Department, 2nd April 1788, reproduced in Harington's Analysis.



bankers; to petition for remission on account of storms, drought, inundation, disturbances and such like; to make their representations of the State and occurrences of their districts: after all of which they entered upon the collections of the new year; of which, however, they were not permitted to begin receiving the rents from their own farmers, till they had completely closed the accounts of the preceding year, so that they might not encroach upon the new rents to make up the deficiency of the past." (William Boughton Rouse).

Mirza Mohsin, an experienced Muhammadan officer during the early English regime, bears his testimony to the hereditary tenure of zamindars: "At present the children of a zamindar take the land possessed by their fathers and grandfathers as an inheritance; it is done upon the strength of an ancient custom and institution; according to which the zamindar of the father was transferred by sanad to the son."

Zamindars, according to him, were invested with three offices—the preservation and defence of their respective boundaries from traitors and insurgents, the tranquillity of the subjects; the abundance of cultivation, and increase of revenue; the punishment of thieves and robbers, the prevention of crimes and the destruction of highwaymen.

The Fifth Report stated:—"The zamindars of Bengal were opulent and numerous in the reign of Akbar, and they existed when Jafar Khan was appointed to the administration; under him and his successors their respective territorial jurisdictions appear to have been greatly augmented and when the English acquired the Diwani, the principal zamindars exhibited the appearance of opulence and dignity."

*The hereditary rights of zamindars, coupled with the right to alienate land by sale, gift or otherwise, make them proprietors.*

Land being a species of that property which is deemed transferable in all countries, the proprietorship of it may be obtained in the same manner as that of any other property of a similar nature by gift, sale or inheritance. "He who obtains land by gift, sale or inheritance is the proprietor of it; and he whose ancestors have been in the possession of it from generation to generation, beyond the memory of man, is to all appearance the owner of it." (Reply of Gholam Hossain Khan.) "In consequence of paying the revenue, of submitting to the authority of the Sovereign and of succeeding to the inheritance of a zamindari by lineal descent, with power of alienation by gift or sale, a zamindar becomes the proprietor of the lands of his own zamindari." (Reply by the Royroyan.)

---

<sup>1</sup>Whoever possessed a tract of land for which he paid revenue was, literally speaking, a zamindar. But as this word is of Persian origin, it is most probable that the Persians, when they originally invaded Hindusthan and assumed the reins of Empire, introduced the term zamindar, and applied it to the deposed Rajas from whom they exacted revenue. (From the Answer of Gholam Hossain Khan.)

*Proof of alienation and hereditary rights of zamindars,*

Proofs of the powers of alienation and hereditary character of zamindars are given below, and they will go to decide that ownership resided in them—

(A) The sales of zamindari land prevailed both in Bihar and Bengal before the Company's accession to the Dewani. The lands of the zamindars in balance were sold in discharge of the rent in arrears. In Bengal the process was as follows: "the officers of Government under the provisional authority were directed to prepare a statement exhibiting the annual rent of the zamindari and the arrears, and the draft of a bill of sale for the amount. The dismissed zamindar was to sign to the bill of sale, and the price of the zamindari was received in discharge of the arrears."

Instances of sales of land by zamindars and talukdars extracted from the record of the Canoongoes are found in Harington's Analysis (p. 104 in the abridged edition). In 1687 A.D. several villages and portions of the zamindari of Gopy Rehmun Choudhury were, by him, sold to Ramnarain Roy. The permission granted by the Emperor Aurangzeb to the English to purchase Cuddalore and other towns establishes the right of property in zamindars. The terms of the firman from the Emperor Furukhseer in 1717 to the agents of the English Company contain that "the Company's factory is established in Calcutta and the sum of Rs. 1,195-6 is annually paid on account of the rents of the talukdari of Calcutta, Sutanati and Govindapore, formerly procured from the zamindars." The Nazim Jafar Khan purchased the zamindari of the town of Murshidabad and kismut Chunacolly from Mahomed Aman, the talukdar, with the produce of his jaigir and named it Assudnagar, and had it entered in the royal registers, and those of the Canoongoes, so that after the decline of his fortune, a pittance might be left from the profits of the land, after discharging the royal rents, for the subsistence of his descendants. When Casim Aly ceded Burdwan and other districts to the Company, he made over the rents of them only; and in defining the power which the English were to exercise over Burdwan, called the zamindari of Tilluk Chand, he directs that they shall keep the zamindars and tenants in their places. "A zamindari being absolute and hereditary property on the condition of paying a revenue to Government, a zamindar has possessed the power, for a long time past, to alienate, give away, or sell his zamindari land, and Government has uniformly acknowledged it". (Answer by the Royroyan to Question 10.)

(B) The hereditary character of the zamindar during the Muhammadan period was undoubted. The zamindar possessed hereditarily,

and the succession to a zamindari was by inheritance. Gholam Hossein, who is the author of a much esteemed history, in reply to questions put to him enunciates the position as thus: "If a zamindari be the actual property of any person, his heir has an undoubted right to succeed to it, nor is the sanction or permission of the ruler necessary, unless there be a disagreement among the heirs, or a doubt regarding the inheritance. The eldest son succeeds in the first instance, and after him the eldest of his sons, whose uncles and brothers have villages allowed them for their support according to their respective exigencies. Many of the former as well as present zamindars succeeded to their paternal inheritance without the express sanction of Government and continued to discharge the established revenue without molestation. I know of no person so unfortunate nor can it be supposed possible that the ruler should set aside the rightful heir without a sufficient cause, such as rebellion, notorious profligacy, or incapacity. In the case of incapacity, he should be dispossessed but should have a malikana allowed him for his maintenance." (Replies to Questions 6, 7 and 8.) The same position is established by the answers of the Royroyan, as can be gathered from the following: "The succession to a zamindari is by inheritance. For a long time past zamindaris have descended in the line of inheritance. The revenue is the right of Government, and the soil the inheritance of the zamindar; hence a zamindari is hereditary. During the existence of an heir and as long as he paid up his revenue, the ruling power never granted the zamindari to any other person" (Replies to Questions 2, 5 and 8).

Shore<sup>1</sup> observes: "I have clearly shown that the zamindars of Dinajpore, Burdwan, Nuddea and Luskerpore were founded before the Viceroyalty of Jafar Khan. It was the same with Mahomedshahy, Jessore, and many others." He has shown that those families succeeded lineally. (*Vide* Shore's Minute in Harington's Analysis).

In the plan for a future settlement of the revenues, recorded by the Governor-General, Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell on the 22nd of April 1775, it is observed that, "both by the Mossulman and the Gentoo laws, inheritance should be divided amongst the sons in equal proportions; yet it has been established by custom that large zamindaris shall not be divided but be possessed entirely by the

---

<sup>1</sup>Shore remarked in the following strain: "For my own part, the further I have carried my enquiries, the more firmly I am convinced that the state in which we received the rich provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa was a general state of hereditary property, modified certainly according to the nature and customs of the Government which has prevailed there, but, nevertheless, existing with important benefit to the possessors, according to the universal sense of the people; sanctioned by the constant practice of the native princes and established by immemorial usage from one end of the country to the other.....I differ from him (Grant) fundamentally in many articles of fact, justice and expediency."

eldest son, who is to support his younger brothers. On the contrary, it is usual for the small zamindaris to be divided amongst all the sons; but in many parts of the country the custom prevails that the eldest should have something more than the others."

The hereditary and proprietary character of landlords is attempted to be controverted on an appeal to the sanad or grant which is pronounced as the sole ground of rights and privileges of zamindars. Shore holds that sanad is not the sole foundation of zamindari tenure. In fact, zamindari sanads were never conferred at discretion or upon aliens to the prejudice of the heir by kindred; they confirmed the existing rights but did not create them. It is the principal zamindars who applied for sanads and received them; inferior landlords succeeded according to their own laws of inheritance and without any sanad.

#### *Evidences of Francis and William Boughton Rouse.*

Accordingly, Philip Francis observed that sanads were a kind of feudal fiction, "of which the Sovereign in fact never pretended to avail himself, as constituting a right to assume or transfer the possession. When he (Sovereign) grants Jaigirs or lands for religious purposes, his order is addressed to the zamindars, chowdhuries, and talukdars. The land continues to be deemed a part of the zamindari; the Sovereign only grants the revenue of it." The permanent appropriation allowed under the denomination of nankar for his subsistence, and the receipt of an allowance (malikana) by the dispossessed zamindar cannot be reconciled to the idea of a fluctuating office, as stressed by Mr. James Grant. Mr. Boughton Rouse whose Tract (An inquiry into the nature of zamindari tenures in Bengal) was dedicated to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas (then President of the Board of Control), with an observation that he knew of the mind of the latter to have "long been satisfied on the subject of the hereditary title of the zamindars to the lands which have been continually occupied by them and their ancestors, nor less upon the expediency of confirming them even if their positive claim were dubious," introduces his own view of the state of landed property in Bengal which corresponds, in substance, with that of Shore whose researches, into the rights of landholders, definitely place him as a great advocate of their proprietary character.

#### *Firman of Emperor Alamgir.*

If we examine the firman issued by the Emperor Alamgir to Mohummed Hossain in the year 1668-69, containing directions for

---

"I have examined a sanad of the year A.D. 1728, shortly after the death of Murshid Quli Khan, when the tide of the zamindar's fortunes was still at a low ebb, in which the right of the dispossessed zamindar to receive an allowance from his estate is distinctly recognised. This clearly implies an interest greater than that of a temporary official removable at will"—Ascoli in "the Early Revenue History of Bengal," page 43.

the collection of khiraj or revenue, we find zamindars<sup>1</sup> being definitely described as proprietors. The firman reads that "if there be a tract of forest land the proprietor of which is forthcoming, you will confirm it to him and not allow another to take possession." This establishes that there was a proprietor, other than the actual cultivator, and the proprietary right was directed to be respected throughout the firman.

Philip Francis, Shore, Cornwallis and the Court of Directors—they together were responsible, more or less, for getting the proprietary right of zamindars recognised in the Permanent Settlement. Their conclusions are given below in support of the contention of our Committee.

*Francis' Minute.*

"The land is the hereditary property of the zamindar. He holds it by the law of the country on the tenure of paying a certain contribution to Government."—(Francis' Minute on the 22nd January, 1776). The following note is added to Mr. Francis' Minute of the above date:—"The inheritable quality of the lands is alone sufficient to prove that they are the property of the zamindars, talukdars, and others to whom they have descended by a long course of inheritance. The right of the Sovereign is founded on conquest, by which he succeeds only to the state of the conquered prince, unless, in the first instance, he resolves to appropriate or transfer all private property, by an act of power, in virtue of his conquest. When the Moghuls conquered Bengal, there is no mention, in any historical account, that they dispossessed the zamindars of their lands, though it is frequently observed that, where they voluntarily came in and submitted to the new Government they were received with marks of honour, and that means were used to gain and secure their attachment.....Mahomed Reza Khan, in his State of Bengal, affirms that the Princes have no immediate property in the lands, and that they even purchase ground to build mosques and for burying places. In addition to this evidence, it is material to observe that the late administration (of 1772 and 1773) which either dispossessed most of the zamindars of the management of the lands or took no measures to restore them, constantly described them as the hereditary proprietors, and on this principle has allowed them a pension, or a tithe of gross produce, for their support."

---

<sup>1</sup>The firman is published as Appendix 13, relied on by Shore, in Harington's Analysis. The phrase "Arbab-i-Zemeen" is used and according to undisputed authorities the meaning of "arbab" which is plural of "rub" is lord or master and not cultivator. Thus "rub-ul-aras" is rendered by Professor Wilson in his glossary of Indian terms into proprietor or master of land while "Arabi-i-Zemeen" is similarly rendered. Both Shore and Harington understand the word in this

*Minute of Shore.*

"I consider the zamindars as the proprietors of the soil, to the property of which they succeed by the right of inheritance, according to the laws of their own religion; and that the Sovereign authority cannot justly exercise the power of depriving them of the succession, nor of altering it, when there are any legal heirs. The privilege of disposing of the land, by sale or mortgage, is derived from this fundamental right, and was exercised by the zamindars before we acquired the Dewani." (Minute of Shore on the 18th June, 1789.)

*Lord Cornwallis' Minute.*

"Mr. Shore has most ably, and in my opinion, most successfully, in his Minute delivered in June last, argued in favour of the rights of the zamindars to the property of the soil.....Although, however, I am not only of opinion that the zamindars have the best right, but from being persuaded that nothing could be so ruinous to the public interest, as that the land should be retained as the property of Government." (Lord Cornwallis' Minute, dated 18th September, 1789.)

"I admit the proprietary right of the zamindars and that they have hitherto held the collection of the internal duties." (Lord Cornwallis' Minute, dated 3rd February, 1790.) •

*Court of Directors' letter, dated 20th August, 1788.*

"It seems to be admitted, on all hands, that hereditary descent and succession (and in many cases mortgage and alienation) have long been usual in Bengal; and that notwithstanding the various revolutions at Delhi and in the provinces, this rule has rarely been interrupted but for acts of atrocity, which might incur forfeiture, default of revenue, or failure of heirs. This doctrine is confirmed, instead of weakened, by the account of the four principal zamindaris prepared by the dewan and delivered in by Mr. Cowper. Moreover, we believe it is a fact that many of the present zamindars are the lineal descendants of those persons who possessed the lands before and under the conquest of Bengal by the Emperor Akbar about two centuries ago. In like manner, it is certain that the idea of an hereditary tenure has been sanctioned by repeated discussions in the British Parliament. It has been recognised also by the undeviating practice of our Government in Bengal, and of all the Dewani

Courts since possession of the country; and that not as mere acts of grace or personal partiality, but as the dues of justice yielded to those having a fair right to demand them.”—(Extract of a letter from the Court of Directors, dated 20th August, 1788, paragraphs 28 to 32.)

*Passages in the Regulations confirm that the pre-Settlement zamindar was a proprietor of land.*

It is found that the Statute 24 Geo. III c. 25, sec. 39, which is the basis of the Permanent Settlement, read in the light of the instructions issued by the Court of Directors, assumed that zamindars had proprietary rights in the soil. Even from the passages in the Regulations themselves the inference is irresistible, that the pre-Settlement zamindar was, in the opinion of the Government of Lord Cornwallis, a proprietor of land. The preamble to Regulation XI of 1793 recites that “a custom originating in considerations of financial convenience was established in these provinces under the native administrations according to which some of the most extensive zamindaris are not liable to division. Upon the death of the proprietor of one of these estates it devolves entire to the eldest son or next heir of the deceased to the exclusion of other sons and relations.”

*Judgment in Freeman v. Fairlie.*

This view of the case was very forcibly put in *Freeman v. Fairlie* (1 Moore's Indian Appeals, p. 341) when the Lord Chancellor delivered judgment in 1828: “Still notwithstanding these circumstances and these charges, I think it is impossible to read those articles (referring to the Regulations of 1793) which were prepared obviously with great caution and consideration by persons well acquainted with the subject, and possessing every means of obtaining the most accurate information on it, and as far back as the year 1793, without coming to the conclusion that the zamindars and talukdars were owners of the soil, subject only to a tribute, such as I have said, to Government..... Looking at these documents and opinions, and considering, with the best intentions in my power, these papers they confirm, most strongly, the opinion I should have derived from the Permanent Regulations, namely, that the proprietors of the soil had a permanent interest in it at the time when the English established themselves in that settlement.” This standpoint was confirmed by the Privy Council in “*Ganga Gobind Mandal v. the Collector of the 24-Parganas* (vide II Moore's Indian Appeals, page 359).”

*Controversy between the Supreme Court and the Company's Government.*

"In this connection, an interesting controversy<sup>1</sup> between the Supreme Court and the Company's Government with regard to the legal status of zamindars may be mentioned. The Company's Government, whenever they found it convenient to set aside the rights of zamindars, affected to represent them as mere agents of Government in the collection of land revenue. The Supreme Court held that if the zamindars were the agents of the Company's Government in the collection of land revenue, they were persons in the service of the Company, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction of the Court which was vested by section XIV of the Regulating Act. The Supreme Court issued writs at the suit of individuals against zamindars. The credit of the zamindar was shaken, and collections of land rent began to fall. Sir John Day, the Advocate General of the Government, was of opinion in 1779 that "the zamindars were landholders and held their lands and right by inheritance." The issue came to the forefront in the case of Raja of Cassijorah, a prominent zamindar in Midnapore, *vs.* Kashinath Baboo. The discussion which these transactions evoked in England resulted in an Act of Parliament—the 21 Geo. III, Cap. LXX—by the 9th section of which it was expressly enacted, "that no person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, for or by reason of his being a landowner, landholder or farmer of land, or of land rent, or for receiving a payment or pension in lieu of any title to, or ancient possession of, land or land rent, or for receiving any compensation or share of profits for collecting of rents payable to the public out of such lands or districts as are actually farmed by himself, or those who are his under-tenants, in virtue of his farm, or for exercising within the said lands and farms any ordinary or local authority commonly annexed to the possession or farm thereof, within the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, or for or by reason of his becoming security for the payment of the rents reserved or otherwise payable out of any lands, or farms of land, within the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa." Thus the theory, put forward by some of the Company's servants that landlords were merely persons in the service of Government for the collection of land-revenue, had to be abandoned by them.

*Before the Permanent Settlement there were powerful and independent traditional zamindars of Bengal.*

Before the Permanent Settlement, it was possible to name twelve traditional Bhuyas or original zamindars of Bengal, who held hereditary status in their respective territories. They were powerful



chiefs who had been exempted from full subjection like the frontier Rajas of Birbhum and Bishnupur. Like the Raja of Burdwan, there were many zamindars, chiefly in the outlying and frontier districts, who won for themselves a partial and intermittent exemption by armed resistance. Such zamindars "held princely courts, maintained their own bodies of armed followers, dispensed justice in their territories or estates, and handed down position from father to son. But all of them paid a tribute or a land tax to the Muhammadan Government at Murshidabad." These peculiarities are to be found in the political history of the Lower Provinces. "The part of Bengal which passed under the Company's administration by the Diwani grant of 1765 had never been strictly subjected to the revenue system of the Moghul Empire. Imperfectly conquered by the early Delhi power in 1203, its Governors threw off the northern yoke in 1340. During the next two hundred years, Lower Bengal was ruled by a succession of twenty independent kings who relied to some extent on the local Rajas and zamindars to maintain them against external attack or reconquest. After its conquest by Akbar in 1576, it became an outlying province of the Moghul Empire, into which even that great Sovereign did not find it possible to carry out his detailed revenue settlement." About the middle of the seventeenth century, every territorial magnate became as independent as he could, and every important zamindar tried to set up as a territorial magnate. When Lower Bengal came under the sway of Murshid Kuli Khan (1704-1726), the zamindars suffered a severe setback, but again after the decline of the Moghul Empire, they became powerful and their rights and claims could hardly be resisted. There were Houses which continued from the very early period, although "most of the considerable zamindars in Bengal may be traced to an origin within the last century and a half," as was observed by Shore in 1788.

#### *Different grades of landlords.*

If this be true that a general state of hereditary property existed in Bengal and was vested in the zamindars before the Permanent Settlement, it was interesting to observe the irreconcilable conflict of opinion among certain observers as to the title of zamindars. This can only be explained by the fact that the expression, zamindars, was merely a convenient general term which included landlords of different kinds. From the answer of the Royroyan we learn that "Zamindaris are of various kinds. Some are obtained by inheritance, some by clearing the country of wood, some by ejection of the former possessor for ill behaviour, some by purchase and some in trust. There is a difference in point of rank between the superior and inferior landlords." Sir William Hunter attempts to remove the confusion by

classifying the Bengal zamindars before the Permanent Settlement into four grades—

- (a) the first class represented the old Hindu and Mohammedan Rajas of the country, previous to the Moghal conquest by the Emperor Akbar in 1576, or persons who claimed that status,
- (b) the second class were Rajas or great landholders, most of whom dated from the 17th and 18th centuries,
- (c) the third class were persons whose families had held the office of collecting the revenue during one or two or more generations and who had thus established a prescriptive right,
- (d) the fourth class was made up of revenue farmers who, since the Diwani grant in 1765, had collected the land tax for the East India Company under the system of yearly leases, then of five years' lease, and again of yearly leases, and they acquired the *de facto* status of zamindars.

*Grant cannot be taken seriously.*

The first two classes had a social position "resembling the Feudatory Chiefs of the British Indian Empire but that position was enjoyed by them on the basis of custom, not of treaties." Our Committee maintains along with Field, Hunter and others that "it is these fundamental differences in origin which have led to such contradictory statements, alike in Indian History and in Indian law-courts, as to the title of the Bengal Zamindars." On the basis of the facts shown above, it involves a definite strain on history to accept the statement of Mr. James Grant, Chief Record Keeper of Bengal, that the Bengal zamindars were "no more than annual contracting farmers or receivers of the public rents." Mr. Grant and advocates of his point of view, had, perhaps, their eyes fixed on "annual revenue farmers" after 1765, without looking into the general state of property in Bengal. Shore politely refuses to take Grant seriously. If observers before the Permanent Settlement could indulge in views, similar to those of Grant, "it is not surprising that the views of Indian historians and the pleas of Indian lawyers, should be equally contradictory at a later period, after the wave of the Permanent Settlement had passed over Bengal and submerged the pre-existing state of things."

---

<sup>1</sup>"In one point of view, the zamindars, as descendants of ancient independent Rajas, or as the successors of their descendants, seemed to have been tributary princes. In another light, they appeared to be only officers of Government. Perhaps their real character partook of both; and they might, not inaptly, have been compared to kings nominated by the Roman republic to administer conquered kingdoms."—Colebrooke's "Remarks on the Husbandry and internal Commerce of Bengal", page 43.

*Permanent Settlement confirmed the rights of landlords without creating them.*

Our Committee holds that the Permanent Settlement was made "according to the laws and constitution of India," and as such the Regulations of 1793 confirmed the rights of landlords without creating them. They did not introduce foreign ideas so far as the notions of ownership were concerned. The Despatch of the Court of Directors of the 12th April 1786, definitely proves that Lord Cornwallis was sent out to introduce a Permanent Settlement according to "the laws and customs of India" and according to the local system of land rights in Bengal. When this is true, the description of Bengal landlords before the Permanent Settlement as being not owners of the lands is erroneous.

*Permanent Settlement, a solemn written contract.*

**Q. 5.** Our Committee holds that the Permanent Settlement is a solemn written contract<sup>1</sup> between the State and the landholders. It is also a contract for the benefits of which the majority of the present landholders of Bengal have admittedly paid full value. Nor was it originally a contract without valuable consideration.<sup>2</sup> The landholder of 1793 engaged to discharge regularly the revenue in all seasons, without any reference to drought, inundation or other calamity of the season; the revenue at that time represented ten-elevenths of his rent roll, a proportion which is unknown in any canon of taxation. The Sale Law of the Cornwallis Code providing for the attachment and sale of the defaulter's real or personal property to liquidate the arrears of Government revenue was a heavy price paid for the contract. One of the objects of the codification of the Regulations was thus expressed: "A code of Regulations framed upon the above principles will enable individuals to render themselves acquainted with the laws upon which the security of the many inestimable privileges and immunities granted to them by the British Government depends and the mode of obtaining speedy redress against every infringement of them" (Regulation XLI, 1793). It was on the faith of those Regulations that the people accepted the agreement, bought and sold, gave and took, made permanent provisions for families and institutions and endowments for sacred and charitable purposes; it was

<sup>1</sup>Ashutosh Mukherjee, an eminent jurist, observed: "It is as much a contract as the promissory note of the Secretary of State for India. It is, of course, a much more complex contract, and different minds may well put different constructions upon it, but it is still essentially a contract."

<sup>2</sup>According to English law, an agreement to assign leasehold property, the assignee taking upon himself to pay the rent and perform the covenants of the lease, is never looked upon as a "nudum pactum", but always considered to be an agreement for valuable consideration. *Price v. Jenkins*, Law Rep. 5 Chancery D. 619.

on the assurance conveyed by the Regulations that the people laid out their hard earned money in taking permanent leases and spent capital to make improvement, as "land was made the most desirable of all properties."

*Conveyance not to be abrogated without compensation.*

The Settlement was neither a simple ordinary contract, nor a simple ordinary enactment, but a solemn conveyance, designed by Parliament,<sup>1</sup> executed by the Court of Directors,<sup>2</sup> and delivered by the then Governor-General.<sup>3</sup> The rights of zamindars were confirmed for considerations, pecuniary, political and economic, past, present and future, and as such cannot be altered or modified without the consent of the party affected or without due compensation being made.

*The Settlement thrust on zamindars.*

It is not true to say that the zamindars, independent talukdars and other actual proprietors were consulted about the arrangement. The Government offered terms which imposed heavy responsibilities on the zamindars. The Government was prepared for the contingency that some of the zamindars would decline to accept them. Accordingly, it was provided in Regulation VIII of 1793 that "an allowance in consideration of their proprietary rights" might be awarded to the zamindars who might refuse to engage for the jama required from them. (Section 44.) The Settlement was thrust on the zamindars *volens volens* in the interest of the Government; the great majority of them entered into the agreement placing implicit reliance on the honour of England and looking more to the distant future than to the immediate present. They were moved by "the magic of property and perpetuity." The people of the country had an extraordinary love for land.

---

<sup>1</sup>Pitt's India Act of 1784 gave directions "for settling and establishing, upon principles of moderation and justice, according to the laws and constitution of India, the permanent rules by which the respective tributes, rents and service shall be in future rendered and paid to the said united company by the said Rajas, Zemindars, Polygars, Talookdars and other native landholders." (Section 39.)

<sup>2</sup>The Court of Directors in a letter to the Government of Bengal, dated 12th April, 1786, gave definite directions for the observance of the Parliamentary Legislation of 1784 and wrote: "We desire that you will consider this clause of the Act of Parliament with a most minute and scrupulous attention, and take special care that all measures adopted by you, in the administration of our revenues, may be consonant to the sense and spirit thereof."

<sup>3</sup>Lord Cornwallis arrived on the 12th September, 1786, and brought with him a letter, dated 12th April, 1786. The Regulations of 1789 for the Decennial Settlement were promulgated and he was authorised to declare that subject to the approval of the Directors in England, the jama would remain fixed for ever. The Proclamation which announced the permanency of the Settlement was embodied in Regulation I of 1793.

*Government as Sovereign Power contracted with zamindars.*

The contention that tenants were not consulted, has no validity in so far as the solemnity and sacredness of the pledge is concerned. It is strange that it is urged in responsible quarters that as raiyats were not a party to the arrangement, embodied in the Settlement of 1793, their rights could not be affected, nor were they bound by it. Raiyats are in fact "estopped" from urging such a plea, as Government were a party not merely as an ordinary contracting party but as Sovereign. Government have the right to affect or modify the rights of raiyats, and if the contract entered into by Government and landholders affects raiyats in any way, it does not and cannot become void on that account. Accordingly, the argument that raiyats were not parties to the Settlement does not nullify the contract between the State and landholders. It is to be borne in mind that the main contracting party was the State which had definite sovereign powers in regulating the rights of the third party.

*British Empire in India built up by Bengal's money.*

The question under reply raises another common place charge that the Permanent Settlement has crippled the financial resources of the country. In the answer to question 3, our Committee has shown that Permanent Settlement has released the wealth, enterprise and energy of landlords for the amelioration of the exhausted state of the country which was palpably visible in 1793.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the Permanent Settlement has yielded the greatest amount of land revenue which was not possible by any other settlement, and by ensuring prompt realisation of the unvarying quantum of revenue, it has rescued the Administration from the risk of uncertain collections and stabilised the British Empire in India. It is a matter of history that it would not have been possible without the aid of the Permanent Settlement to screw £3,235,259, in 1794-95 as land revenue out of the gross revenue of £5,937,931 from the Government of Bengal. It is also an open historical fact<sup>2</sup> that "in India an Empire had been acquired, wars had been waged, and the administration had been carried on at the cost of the Indian people; the British nation had not contributed a shilling. The trading company which had acquired the Empire had also drawn their dividends and made their profits out of

---

<sup>1</sup>"In Bengal, where the revenue of the State has had the form of land rent, the management of public finances has a more immediate influence on agriculture than any other part of the administration. The system, which has been adopted of withdrawing from direct interference with the occupants, and leaving them to rent their fields from landlords, will contribute to correct the abuses and evils which had formerly rendered the situation of the cultivator precarious." "Oxbrooke in 1794.

<sup>2</sup>R. C. Dutt's Economic History of British India.

the revenues of the Empire for two generations. When they ceased to be traders in 1834, it was provided that the dividends on their stock should continue to be paid out of the taxes imposed on the Indian people. And when, finally, the Company ceased to exist in 1858, their stock was paid off by loans which were made into an Indian Debt. The Empire was thus transferred from the Company to the Crown, but the Indian people paid the purchase money."

*Bengal's Surplus and deficits of Bombay and Madras.*

If the figures of the Indian revenue receipts and expenditure from 1793 to 1837 are examined, it is to be found that Bengal with "an increased, steady, and unvarying income from the soil, due to the Permanent Settlement," paid the expenses of ambitious wars and annexations in northern and southern India; Madras and Bombay never paid the total cost of their own administration during these years; Great Britain never contributed any thing towards the acquisition of India. During the administration of the Company, land was the staple source of income of the Government of Bengal, and from 1795 to 1810, Bengal showed a definite surplus whereas Madras and Bombay showed deficits. Bengal contributed land revenue to the extent of more than 230 millions sterling during the years between 1793 and 1834, whereas Bombay and Madras together contributed only a little over 126 millions sterling. The total revenue of Bengal during the period of 1792-93 to 1808-9 exceeded the total charges by £27,409,097. For the same period the deficiency in Madras amounted to £11,193,883 and the total excess of expenditure in the Bombay Presidency amounted to £18,387,745. During the period 1814-15 to 1828-29, the total Bengal surplus amounted to no less than £28,374,534; the Madras deficit being £3,086,384; the deficit in the Bombay Presidency amounting to £16,223,922. In consequence of the large surplus realised from Bengal there was, during the fifteen years ending 1828-29, notwithstanding the deficit at the other two Presidencies, an excess of revenue over expenditure in India as a whole amounting to £9,064,228 or an annual average of £604,281. In the thirties and forties of the last century there were apparent deficits in Bengal. But this was due to the entire charge of the Government of India being shown against that province. But so far as the provincial accounts proper were concerned, annual surplus was exhibited by Bengal. The public debt of India tended continually to grow because of wars. The largest portion of the debt was raised in Bengal. But the whole of the Bengal debt was not really due by that Presidency. The other Presidencies often raised their loans in the city of Calcutta. Besides, as the charges of the other Presidencies considerably exceeded their revenues, it is to be presumed, that a part of the loans of Bengal

must have been raised in aid of the wants of Bombay and Madras.<sup>1</sup> All this was possible for Bengal to provide, because of the Permanent Settlement, ensuring high land revenue demand and other demand and other returns from agricultural and commercial expansion. Accordingly Mr. R. C. Dutta remarked: "It may be said with strict truth that the conquests of Lord Hastings like the conquests of Lord Wellesley were made out of the resources furnished by permanently settled Bengal."

*Indirect returns from the Permanent Settlement.*

Thirdly, it is repeatedly urged that the Permanent Settlement is a "financial mistake" and that it is "a sin against posterity." But it is forgotten that "no amount of direct and indirect land revenue could bear any proportion to the increased sources of revenue which will directly and indirectly be gradually developed by the Permanent Settlement."<sup>2</sup> Colonel Baird Smith who was appointed to inquire into the causes of famines of northern India in 1860 observed with reference to the question of Government's loss due to the Permanent Settlement that "there would be no real sacrifice but, on the contrary, a marked increase of the public resources from the creation of the increased private property to which it is conceived that a Permanent Settlement of the public demand must lead."<sup>3</sup>

The apparent financial loss was compensated for by increased cultivation, improved productiveness of land, augmented wealth and prosperity of the peasantry, improvement and increased value of landed property. There were indirect returns from the increased wealth and prosperity of the country. The Permanent Settlement created prosperous middle classes and contented tenantry. Because of the comparative wealth of her middle classes and raiyats, Bengal can afford to pay more as customs duty. The sale of imported goods is greater in Bengal and that indicates the higher purchasing power of the Bengalees. The consumption in Bengal of cotton manufactures, foreign liquor, and tobacco, machinery, articles of food and drink, cutlery, hardware, etc., is comparatively high. If we take a pre-depression period, which brings out the full play of normal factors, say, 1925-26, Bengal contributed more than 26 crores to the Central Government under various heads, such as, income-tax, customs, salt,

<sup>1</sup>Vide Dr. P. N. Banerjee's "Indian Finance in the Days of the Company," Chapter III.

<sup>2</sup>Minute of R. Money, Junior Member of the Board of Revenue of the North-Western Provinces, dated 1861.

<sup>3</sup>"The reviving prosperity of the country (Bengal), its increased wealth and rapid improvements are unquestionably due to the Permanent Settlement"—Colebrooke in 1808.

"In Bengal where independent of its exuberant fertility there is a permanent settlement, famine is unknown"—Bishop Heber in 1826. Good many authorities are quoted by R. C. Dutt in his "Economic History of British India."

and opium and excise, whereas Madras with a population of more than 42 millions (nearly as Bengal's) contributed 6 crores, Bombay, more than 23 crores, and U. P. more than 1 crore only. Be it noted that Bombay is a manufacturing province and not an agricultural one. The inelasticity of land revenue in Bengal has given elasticity to the stamp duty, income-tax, customs duty. An interference with the purchasing power of the people will be an interference with the taxable capacity of the country. The land revenue demand and agricultural rent demand being low, the purchasing power of the people has increased; if the Government do not gain directly thereby, indirect returns are not inadequate. Moreover, the certainty of collection of land revenue without any risk and possibility of suspension or remission even in emergent crises and involving a saving of expenditure of vexatious periodical settlements is no small gain to Government.

It will be most unfortunate and a narrow view of public finance if a measure is attempted to be judged by its direct return to the treasury. Its possibilities and ramifications towards the growth of indirect sources of revenue should not be neglected.<sup>1</sup> The best asset of the State is the people; the best credit of the State is the purchasing power of the people. Revenue receipts are not necessarily the best index of the country's prosperity.

*Land Revenue certain, while other receipts shrink during depression.*

In this connection, it may also be noted that even in the worst period of economic depression, when receipts under other heads showed a shrinkage, the land revenue demand from the permanently settled estates gave unvarying returns. That was a great gain to the provincial Administration which was ordinarily saddled with inadequate revenues. In 1929-30 the Budget estimate of Bengal showed revenue of Rs. 2 crores 25 lakhs under Excise, Rs. 4 crores and 22 lakhs under Stamps. But the Budget receipts of Bengal for 1935-36, when the peak year of depression is over, show Rs. 1 crore 33 lakhs under Excise and Rs. 2 crores and 95 lakhs under Stamps. The deterioration of the receipts under heads, other than land revenue in times of depression, emphasises the importance of the unalterable nature of land revenue receipt in the system of provincial public finance.

*Payment of land revenue and other kinds of cesses.*

Our Committee cannot, therefore, subscribe to the contention that the Permanent Settlement has financially crippled the resources of

---

<sup>1</sup>"No doubt the provincial Government would have been able, had there been no Permanent Settlement to deprive a larger revenue from the land; but in that case it would have been impossible under conditions prevailing to-day (that is, in a period of agricultural depression) to collect the full amount of the tax on Jute."—(His Excellency Sir John Anderson, Governor of Bengal, at St. Andrews' Day Dinner on November 30, 1932.)



the country. Indirect returns apart, direct returns are pouring forth from the people dependent on income from land in the form of cesses, in addition to land revenue. And in fact, public works and road cesses have been in operation for more than half a century and the rural primary education cess is in operation in many districts (although suspended in certain districts for the last floods). In the face of these direct and indirect returns, our Committee is unable to agree with the implications involved in the contention that the Permanent Settlement is a measure which has "permanently crippled the financial resources of the country."

**Q. 6.** It is true that by virtue of the Settlement of 1793, the Governor-General in Council trusted that "the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefit conferred upon them by the public assessment being fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry, and that no demand will ever be made upon them on their heirs or successors by the present or any future Government for an augmentation of the public assessment in consequence of the improvement of their estates."

*Languid commerce and poor farming at the time of the Settlement.*

We have shown in our answer to question 3 that the country when the Permanent Settlement was concluded, lay exhausted. There were more lands, less tillers. Trade and industry were in a languid state; roads were neglected, irrigation in an unsatisfactory condition.<sup>1</sup> At that period there was "an ignorant husbandry which exhausts the land, and neglects the obvious means of maintaining its fertility and of reaping immediate profit from the operations which might restore it;" there were rude implements, "inadequate to the purpose for which they are formed, and requiring much superfluous labour, and this again ill-divided<sup>2</sup> and employed disadvantageously." In Bengal there was,

---

<sup>1</sup>"The want of accommodation, in travelling by land or water, is doubtless the consequence of limited intercourse, and becomes, in its turn, a cause of discouragement to frequent communication. If duly weighed, it will appear no unimportant circumstance, whether considered as indicating general poverty or the decay of commerce and agriculture. A brisk trade requires much intercourse, and this again promotes traffic, by early information on the wants or abundance of different provinces. A languid commerce, which merely fetches, in an established course, the produce of provinces usually cheap to dispose of it in districts usually dear, cannot note the smaller variations of markets, and consequently, the prices of different districts find their level slowly, and vibrate between wide limits. The effects which great variations in the price of land produce have upon husbandry are obvious."—Colebrooke in 1794.

<sup>2</sup>Every mechanic, every manufacturer followed his regular occupation as called to it by the wants of his neighbours, and in the interval he returned to the labours of the field and became a husbandman.

then, great value of money<sup>1</sup> and cheapness of labour.<sup>2</sup> Agriculture was suffering from want of capital. "In agriculture particularly, which is the basis of the prosperity of a country, the want of pecuniary funds is a bar to all improvement."

*Energy and capital of zamindars released for improvement of land.*

We have also seen that the Settlement diverted the energy and capital of zamindars to the economic development of the country. Lord Cornwallis estimated no less than a third of the Company's territory to be a jungle; Mr. Colebrooke estimated that one-third of the territory only was fit for cultivation. The Fifth Report was aware of the different kinds of estimates.<sup>3</sup> In the circumstances, the extension of cultivation cannot take place without the employment of capital sunk in clearing jungles and courting cultivators to stick to the work of cultivation. The sense of security released by the Settlement brought out the wealth of zamindars, and cultivators were accordingly nursed. When this peaceful and secured state continued for some time, the curve of population which was in its decline in 1793 began to rise, and in fact, by 1825, agricultural prosperity set in indicating the extension of cultivation and the increase of population.

*The extension of cultivation through zamindars' efforts.*

The waste lands<sup>4</sup> included in the zamindari settlement belonged to the respective landholders, and it was in the extension of cultivation that the security of landlords lay. In the evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1831-32, many of the close critics of the zamindar had to admit that a great extension of cultivation had taken place since the Settlement of 1793. Mr. J. Mill, a great radical

<sup>1</sup>The prices of the main articles at the time of the Settlement were as follows. Pulse of all kinds—10 annas per maund; rice, wheat, barely—12 annas per maund; Gajree, Joar and maize—8 annas per maund. In a cheap district rice in the husk sold, one season, as low as eight maunds for one rupee. (Vide Colebrooke's Notes on the Husbandry of Bengal).

<sup>2</sup>The wages of agricultural labourer at the time of the Settlement did not exceed Re. 1 per month and in a cheap district it was as low as eight annas. (Vide Colebrooke).

<sup>3</sup>"In the extensive plains of India, a large portion, estimated in the Company's provinces at one-third by Lord Cornwallis, at one-half by others, and by some two-thirds, of land capable of cultivation, lies waste and probably was never otherwise"—Fifth Report, 1812.

<sup>4</sup>"It is necessary to apprise you that all waste lands form a part of the estate of the different landholders, and the boundaries of the portions of these lands that belong to each individual are as well defined as the limits of the cultivated parts of their property, and that they are tenacious of their right of possession in the former as the latter.....It is the expectation of bringing them (waste lands) into cultivation, and reaping the profit of them, that has induced them to agree to the decennial jama which has been assessed upon these lands. It is this additional resource alone which can place the landholders in a state of affluence and enable them to guard against inundation or drought, the two calamities to which this country must ever be liable."—Letter from Governor-General to the Court of Directors, 6th March, 1793.

thinker of England, who was very bitter against the zamindars of Bengal, stated in his evidence that "many of the zamindaris that were settled in 1793 contain a considerable portion of waste land which the zamindars have been permitted to cultivate without any further assessment. The consequence has been that the value of those estates where waste land susceptible of cultivation has been cultivated has increased, which is to a great degree the reason of the very great diversity in what appears to be the value of the estates, the number of years' purchase that one estate sells for beyond another."

*Relevant extracts from the evidence of Mr. Mill show what the zamindars did for the extension of cultivation.*

Our Committee takes the liberty of making relevant extracts from the evidence of Mr. Mill (*vide* Third Report, Select Committee, 1831) wherein it will be found that Mr. Mill, although very much reluctant, and necessarily guarded, to shower any praise on the zamindars in the matter of extension of cultivation, could not avoid acknowledging certain facts in the interest of historical accuracy. The extracts are as follows, and the reply is that of Mr. Mill:—

Q. 3347—Is it not the fact that cultivation has extended in those provinces where the zamindari system prevails? I believe that is the fact.

Q. 3348—To what do you ascribe that? There can be no doubt that this extension of cultivation implies an increase both of population and of capital. In order to enable the country to extend its cultivation further, capital must have been applied to it, unless old land at the same time had gone out of cultivation. I have no doubt that there has been in Bengal considerable increase of capital and extension of cultivation.

Q. 3351—Do you think the raiyats have accumulated capital? The raiyats cannot have done this without an extension of capital equal to those effects.

Q. 3352—If the raiyats have in any degree accumulated capital, is not that a proof that their situation has somewhat improved? Of some of them no doubt it has.

Q. 3353—Then you would not say that the effect of the zamindari Settlement has been unmixed injury to the raiyats? Where the raiyats have had an opportunity of obtaining fresh lands under certain advantages, they have been able, under the zamindari system, to extend cultivation.

Q. 3361—I rather think, unless I misrecollect, that Lord Cornwallis' statement was that there was only one-third of Bengal under cultivation; he did not, however, mean to say that there were two-thirds

absolutely waste, for a large portion of that which is not under cultivation is still considered as pasture land? It is in one sense waste, but it is not absolutely useless. Lord Cornwallis may have also declared that there was a full third of Bengal that was jungle, and absolutely useless. But within a few years the declaration has been repeated, by people upon the spot, that not above one-third of Bengal is under cultivation.

Q. 3362—Then, according to that statement, there would be one-third under cultivation, one-third in a state of jungle, and one-third in an intermediate state? That is probably something of an approximation to the fact.

Q. 3363—Do you think that those proportions have been much changed since the time of Lord Cornwallis? The proportion, I should say, cannot be very considerably changed, because the amount of land is so great, that the increase of cultivation bears a very small proportion to it, although absolutely it is considerable.

*Raja Ram Mohan Roy's evidence.*

There were other critics who bore testimony to the extension of cultivation. Messrs. Holt Mackenzie<sup>1</sup> and R. D. Mangles<sup>2</sup> admitted the increase of cultivation, although the language used was extremely reserved. Raja Ram Mohan Roy, perhaps the greatest free thinker of modern Bengal, was in his evidence in 1831, very pertinent in his observation: "If it (the Permanent Settlement) had not been formed, the landholders would always have taken care to prevent the revenues from increasing by not bringing waste lands into cultivation and by collusive arrangements to elude further demands; while the state of the cultivators would not have been at all better than it is now."

*Deserted Bengal turned into a rich plain by landlords.*

The area under cultivation in 1793 in Bengal and Behar was 31,000,000 acres according to Colebrooke, whereas in 1884 it was 70,000,000 acres. There is now hardly a rod of land which is not under cultivation. The extent of extension was considerable and

<sup>1</sup>Holt Mackenzie's reply in his evidence on the 18th April 1832—

Q. 2627—Is the cultivation of the land supposed to have improved since the Permanent Settlement? I should say rather extended than improved; it has very greatly extended. I am not aware of any essential improvement, but I believe in some cases there has been improvement.

<sup>2</sup>R. D. Mangles' reply—

Q. 3560—In Bengal has there not been a large increase of cultivation, and great improvements in agriculture since the Permanent Settlement? Yes; a vast increase of cultivation, but I am afraid, not much improvement in the mode of agriculture.

Q. 3633—Still, you admit that the extension of cultivation, and the growth of many articles has been greater in Bengal than in other provinces? The extension of cultivation has been greater.

impressive. There are observers who maintain that it is the cultivators who have brought the country into cultivation. Raiyats clear and cultivate lands; they dig wells and make roads. It was undoubtedly that their labour was and had to be called for, but unless landlords advanced seed or money to their raiyats, built and maintained embankments, expended money in the construction of roads and water-courses, helped raiyats by suspending or remitting rents and distributing food in the years of scarcity, it was impossible for raiyats to make any profitable cultivation. Those who maintained that zamindars had done nothing also complained that raiyats had no "reserve capital" and were encumbered with a family; but they did not care either to ascertain or to admit the source wherefrom the capital and initiative had come which had transformed the exhausted, deserted, and uncultivated Bengal into rich, populated, and cultivated plains within half a century. This miracle was the work of landlords under the boon of the Permanent Settlement. All this has been discussed in greater details in the answer to question 3. It is clear that the expectation on this account has been amply fulfilled.

*Zamindars have shared with raiyats in agricultural prosperity.*

Our Committee has already noted that the extension of cultivation has been made under the certainty, as assured by Regulation I of 1793, that the zamindars will "enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry." In fact, zamindars have got their returns in the form of rents, but the rise in the value of money and in the value of produce, has gone to raiyats, if not wholly, at least considerably. Zamindars have only shared with raiyats in the enjoyment of the fruits of their "good management and industry." The rents have never proportionately risen with the growth of agricultural prices, brought about by the extension of cultivation, and to that extent raiyats have gained more than landlords. The increased incomes of zamindars from land through the extension of cultivation have, on the other hand, suffered diminution through the imposition of various cesses and rates.

*Bengal of 1793, left to her natural growth, could not be repeopled and cultivated so easily.*

There can thus be no doubt that the extension of cultivation has resulted from the initiative of, and laying out of capital by landlords, the increase in the number of cultivators, and the enterprise of tenants. But to indicate the extent played by each of the above factors, separately, in the extension of cultivation is almost a baffling task. It is said that the reclamation of jungles and extended cultivation are due to the increase of population which has taken place in Bengal.

It is true that the increase of population leads to extension of cultivation, especially when agriculture is the main industry of Bengal. But the Bengal of 1793 could not be re-peopled, if she were left to her natural growth. The significant historical role of the zamindar's capital in rescuing the country from being converted into jungles should receive recognition. It is to be remembered that land lying fallow for three years or more tends to be turned into waste land, needing reclamation at a great outlay of capital. Land neglected grows its own weeds. Moreover, "there is not a shadow of evidence in support of the statement that inferior lands have been occupied and cultivated as population increased. The increase of population has not preceded but followed this occupation and cultivation. It is not the pressure of population on the means of subsistence which has led men to cultivate inferior soil, but the fact that these soils were cultivated in another way, or taken into cultivation, made an increased population possible. How could an increased population have stimulated greater labour in agriculture, when agriculture must have supplied the means on which that increased population could have existed? To make increased population the cause of improved agriculture is to commit the absurd blunder of confounding cause and effect."

*Population increased under the shelter of Permanent Settlement.*

Our Committee does not pretend to be dogmatic on this point, but we are satisfied, and desire to impress the Commission, that Bengal, as she was situated in 1793, received the incentive to multiplication of the population under the shelter of security provided for by the Permanent Settlement in the matter of extension of cultivation. But the population, when it increased, again in its turn gave a stimulus to raiyats to increase their incomes by attempting to cultivate the waste lands. In this wise, after a certain stage, both the factors go on complementing each other. The increase of population in the cultivating classes of Bengal bears testimony to the wide margin left by landlords in the matter of fixing the amount of rent. Had cultivators been rack-rented, the growth of population and subinfeudation among raiyats would have received a severe setback.

*Permanent Settlement assessment.*

**Q. 7.** The amount of land revenue assessed from Bengal, Behar and Orissa for the year 1790-91, it is said, was Rs. 2,68,00,989. According to Baden-Powell, the Permanent Settlement revenue was

\* Thorold Rogers's Political Economy, P. 153. Quoted by Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee in his paper, "The Annals of British Land Revenue Administration in Bengal, (1698-1793)."

about Rs. 2,85,87,722.<sup>1</sup> The figure of Rs. 2·85 crores is accepted by Mr. O'Kinealy who was a close critic of landlords (*vide* Report of the Rent Law Commission, Vol. II). The zamindars were to get one-eleventh of the rental.<sup>2</sup> If the sum of Rs. 2·68 crores were assessed as land revenue, the raiyati rental was about 3 crores of rupees; if the land revenue were Rs. 2·85 crores, the raiyati rental was above Rs. 3 crores. According to Colebrooke, the gross rental of raiyats was Rs. 4 crores but the raiyati rental was likely to be less, as there were irregular tillers and agricultural labourers.

*Bengal of 1793 includes Behar and old Orissa.*

It may be mentioned in this connection that the Decennial Settlement, made permanent in 1793, extended to Bengal, Behar and Orissa (the Orissa of those days being the tract between the Rupnarain and Subarnarekha rivers, now in the Midnapore district). Bengal, Behar and (old) Orissa, granted in 1765, went to Fort William and they together formed the Presidency of Bengal. At present Behar including Chota Nagpur is a separate province. And in comparing the Bengal of 1793 with the Bengal of to-day, this transformation is to be taken into account, although in the questionnaire there is no such evident recognition.

*The raiyati rental of Rs. 12 crores analysed.*

It is said that Rs. 12 crores represent the raiyati rental. Our Committee understands that this is the sum paid to the landlords, zamindars or tenureholders as the case may be, by the raiyats. Our Committee may assume that the figure of Rs. 12 crores comes from raiyats of the permanently settled estates, temporarily settled estates and khas mahal estates. Roughly 61 thousand square miles are at present permanently settled in Bengal; 5 thousand square miles are

---

<sup>1</sup>Mr. Shore conclusively proves that the figures of Moghul assessment from 1756 were unrealisable as they were excessive. In 1762 the revenue was 80 lakhs of rupees in arrears. It will be seen that the Permanent Settlement assessment was excessive beyond any historical record as will be seen from the following:—

1762-63—Kasim Ali Khan—Rs. 2,41,00,000 assessed—Rs. 65,00,000 collected.

1763-64—Nanda Kumar—Rs. 1,77,00,000 assessed—Rs. 77,00,000 collected.

1765-66—Muhammad Reza Khan—Rs. 1,60,00,000 assessed—Rs. 1,47,00,000 collected.

<sup>2</sup>There were many writers who referred to nine-tenths of rental as land revenue under the Settlement of 1793. Baden-Powell observed: "the Settlement, thus made with the zamindars for one consolidated lump sum of revenue, was supposed, in theory, to represent nine-tenths of what they received directly in rent from the raiyats, the remaining tenth being allowed to them for their trouble and responsibility. In reality the zamindar, when made landlord, got all the increase of rents (as the raising of rents gradually came to be understood), and in any case he got the benefit of all extension of cultivation, as well as all the "sayer" items from fisheries, fruit, grazing, etc., and the benefit of all invalid grants (under 100 bighas) which he chose to resume" (p. 432-33, Vol I, Land Systems of British India).

settled direct by Government; and 5 thousand square miles are temporarily settled. Out of a little over Rs. 3 crores of land revenue, a sum of Rs. 2 crores and 15 lakhs comes from permanently settled estates, Rs. 71 lakhs from khas mahal estates and Rs. 26 lakhs from temporarily settled estates. That is the position of Bengal to-day where the raiyati rental is Rs. 12 crores. It is not true to say that the raiyati rental of Rs. 3 crores in the Bengal of 1793 has increased to Rs. 12 crores in Bengal to-day. To arrive at a true assessment of the ratio of increase, the raiyati rental of the Bengal districts, including the district of Midnapore in 1793, should have been found out.

*The increase in raiyati rental is due to (1) change in the value of money, (2) increase of area of cultivation.*

Our Committee, however, begs to state that the vast increase in the raiyati rental is primarily due to the following factors:—

- (1) The change in the value of money.
- (2) The increase of the area under cultivation.

The rupee to-day is not worth one-third of its exchange value at the time of the Permanent Settlement. If rice were sold at 8 annas to 12 annas per maund, it is now sold at more than Re. 1-8 to Rs. 2-4 per maund. When in Bengal proper money rents prevailed in 1793, a mere change in the value of money brings the rental of Rs. 3 crores to Rs. 9 crores preserving the rentals at the same pressure.<sup>1</sup> If one-third of Bengal were cultivated, two-thirds awaiting cultivation, the area of tillage at present extended nearly three times. If the area under cultivation is modestly taken as being doubled, the raiyati rental increases to Rs. 6 crores. The area of tillage has, in fact, been trebled. If the rupee, as is shown, is worth one-third of its former exchange value we get the rental of Rs. 18 crores to maintain the old pressure of rental. Over and above, the exports which enrich a country have increased at a very rapid pace, and to a very flattering amount.

#### *Measurement of the bigha.*

According to Grant, the rental of Bengal was one-fourth of the gross produce. In his opinion, the gross produce of one bigha of land was Rs. 6, and as such the rate of rent amounted to Re. 1-8 per bigha. This bigha measurement has inherent difficulties. The measurement was generally made by a bigha in 1793 which contained twenty biswahs. This was the statement of Mr. Colebrooke. We find that the same measurement of bigha is given in the "Ain-i-Akbari" (that

---

<sup>1</sup>Ten maunds of rice was a large produce from one bigha in 1793. If a maund was valued at 12 annas, the return in money came to Rs. 7-8. As an average Grant estimated at Rs. 6. The same 10 maunds gives to-day more than Rs. 20 to Rs. 25 per bigha. Thus if the rental of a bigha is increased from Re. 1-8 to Rs. 5, the same pressure is maintained.



is, 20 biswahs make one bigha). It consists of three thousand six hundred square guz, one guz consisting of forty-one fingers (it was named the ilahee guz). It will be found on calculation that the acre was roughly equal to one and one-third bigha.<sup>1</sup> If this were so, the raiyati rental, as given by Grant, comes to nearly Rs. 2 per acre. If the old measurement is neglected, and bigha be taken as roughly one-third of an acre, (as accepted by section 92 of the Bengal Tenancy Act) the raiyati rental comes to Rs. 4-8 per acre which exceeds the average of to-day. There are many writers who have calculated bigha as one-third of an acre, but the raiyati rental, as shown from abstracts of raiyats' accounts (given in Harington's Analysis), was evidently based on the old measurement of bigha.

*According to Shore's estimate rent per bigha was to be nearly Rs. 3 at the Settlement.*

Unless the measurement of bigha is appreciated, the pressure of rental cannot be understood. In the minute of the 28th June, 1789, Mr. Shore mentions from an abstract of raiyat's account, taken nearly eight years ago (that is about 1781-82), that the rent of seven bighas, twelve cottahs and seven chattaks of land was more than Rs. 14 excluding other forms of cesses, imposing an extra burden of Rs. 8 which were included in the assul jama at the time of the Permanent Settlement. This is only mentioned to indicate that if the rental per bigha at Re. 1-8, as estimated by Grant, be taken as prevailing at the Settlement of 1793, it will rather be an under-estimate. It is undoubtedly true that there were places where the rental was lower still. The very fact that the rents of land were regulated by known rates, called "nirkh", gave rise to multiplicity of rates. About the "nirkh" we shall have occasion to mention in greater details in the subsequent answers.

*Significant statement of Mr. R. Knight, Editor of the "Calcutta Statesman".*

Our Committee has only tried to show that the increase of the quantum of raiyati rental was due to the change in the value of money

---

<sup>1</sup>According to this measurement it will be found that in the Permanent Settlement the assessment was much too high. The area under cultivation was 18 thousand square miles, according to Grant whose figures generally erred on the side of exaggeration. Thus the area was 115·20 lakhs of acres. Taking Akbar's measurement we find roughly one and one-third bigha is equal to one acre. Accordingly the Permanent Settlement assessment ought not to be more than Rs. 230 lakhs taking the rental per bigha as given by Grant. At the initial stage landlords were thus burdened with an extra assessment for a good sum, whether we accept 2·68 crores or 2·85 crores as Permanent Settlement assessment. Akbar's bigha contains 3,600 sq. illahi guz; the bigha which Colebrooke in his estimate of the profits of cultivation took, contains 1,800 sq. yards. That 3,600 illahi guz is equal to 3,025 square yards. The former one bigha is roughly equal to modern 2 bighas.

and to the extension of the area of cultivation, and also that the rate of raiyati rental has not increased appreciably throughout the province, as will be evident from Shore's figures, although there are localities where rents have been enhanced in response to the rise in the value of the produce. When we know that the raiyati rental of to-day is Rs. 3 per acre, it can easily be proved that the general enhancement in the average rate of rent has been practically nothing. The rents and other various kinds of cesses were consolidated into a specific sum, and accordingly, the raiyati rental in developed districts was not appreciably lower than the average of to-day. Particular districts may be found out where enhancement has responded, although feebly, to the rise in the value of produce. Mr. R. Knight, Editor of the *Calcutta Statesman*, in his prefatory note to Mr. Colebrooke's "Husbandry of Bengal" (reprinted in 1884) commented: "With this essay of Mr. Colebrooke's in our hand, the fact becomes as clear as the noon day sun, that the zamindar has so apathetically and carelessly, or else so timidly, asserted his rights, that he has allowed his rent to fall almost to nothing. A rental of four crores in 1793 would represent twenty-four crores to-day, from the mere increase of area under cultivation, and the change in the value of money."

*The increase of the quantum of rent has been due to a multiplicity of factors.*

Zamindar's role in the economic development of the country, which has been dealt with in the answer to question 3, has undoubtedly added to the increase of the value of produce, although other numerous factors, such as the increase of population, greater intercourse facilitated by steamers and railways, security provided for by the Administration, etc., are not, of course, to be whittled down. Accordingly, the increase of the quantum of rent has been more due to the other factors, already mentioned, than to the enhancement of rent, a pet argument not infrequently advanced without taking into consideration the economic development of Bengal in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the increase of rent, necessitated by the increase of the value of produce, is not strictly "enhancement of rents", because landlords were asked by the Regulations of 1793 to grant leases at the "pargana rates"

<sup>1</sup>Mr. Knight's calculation on the basis of Mr. Colebrooke's figures runs as follows:—

1793	Extended tillage	Change in Money	1884.
Rs. 4,00,000 ×	2	× 3 =	24,00,00,000
(as gross rental of raiyats).			

This can be had without any enhancement at all. The zamindar has asserted his rights in enhancing rents so timidly that "it is doubtful if the rental represents even one-twenty-fifth" in 1884, whereas at the time of the Settlement of 1793 the proportion of rents to harvests was one-eighth. In Mr. Knight's opinion, the zamindar is ignorantly denounced as rack-renting the soil, because the value of produce entitles him to higher rental.

which had reference to the capabilities of soil. This aspect of the question will have to be discussed later on in details. But it is enough to state here that the expression, enhancement of rent, involves, ordinarily, taking away the profits of cultivators to the extent the rent is enhanced, but in our country, due primarily to the fact that agriculture was in its lowest ebb, the enhancement of rent did not in any way contribute to the increase of the old pressure on the rental. Hence, there has been no effective enhancement of rent. There was room for increase; there were directions for increase; rather the wide margin left for enhancement was not fully taken advantage of, as was pointed out pertinently by Mr. R. Knight. The expression, enhancement of rent, should, accordingly, be understood in that light.

**Q. 8.** In our answer to question 3, it has been specifically stated what duties have been assigned by Permanent Settlement Regulations of 1793, and how far landlords have discharged their functions, and to what extent the handicaps imposed by the tenancy legislations are putting strain on them. They need not be recited here, but they will undoubtedly indicate if the zamindars have conducted themselves with moderation towards their tenants.

*Severity of the measures so far as landlords were concerned.*

The question under discussion raises another interesting historical point, whether landlords received equitable and generous treatment from Government. It is an open historical fact that the Settlement of 1793 was thrust on zamindars under extreme heavy responsibilities. The responsibilities were: (a) ten-elevenths of the rental would go out as Government revenue; (b) there would be no concession shown in the matter of punctual payment of the specific sum; (c) the estates will be sold in discharge of the arrears of revenue. The extreme severity will be evident from the following facts; (1) in the pre-Settlement days the collections had hardly reached the assessments; (2) estates were never sold in discharge of arrears; (3) the increase of land revenue had always resulted in the increase of rental, but the pattas which landlords were asked to execute would specify the amount of rent which shall not be liable to enhancement during the currency of the lease. The laxity in the Moghul administration could be set off against the severity of the measures adopted. The Company meant to observe the Regulations and Lord Cornwallis set up Courts to see the laws obeyed and observed. The Sale Law of the Permanent Settlement led to the following state of things, which is put by Mr. J. McNeile in a Memorandum on the Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces of Bengal: "In 1796-97 lands bearing a total revenue of sicca<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Speaking roughly, three company's rupees equalled two siccas. The sicca contained 176·13 grains Troy, and the rupee afterwards introduced in 1835, 165 grains of pure silver—vide Baden-Powell, Vol. I, p. 440, Footnote.

Rs. 14,18,756, were sold for arrears, and in 1797-98 the jama' of land so sold amounted to sicca Rs. 22,74,076. By the end of the century, the greater portions of the estates of the Nadia, Rajshahi, Bishnupur, and Dinajpur Rajas, had been alienated. The Burdwan estate was seriously crippled and the Birbhum zamindari completely ruined. A host of smaller zamindars shared the same fate. In fact, it is hardly too much to say that, within ten years that immediately followed the Permanent Settlement, a complete revolution took place in the constitution and ownership of the estates which formed the subject of that Settlement."<sup>1</sup>

*Landlords' lenience shown at every stage.*

If zamindars had returned the same "generous" treatment towards raiyats in the matter of realisation of rents, the results would have been devastating. Zamindars were not asked by the Regulations to extend "the same equity and generous treatment received from Government" to raiyats.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, zamindars allowed tenants to default; they only resorted to law courts as the last resource and avoided them, whenever they could; they even went into borrowing to satisfy land revenue without rack-renting raiyats. Landlords have often been rebuked for realising their legitimate dues; their "oppression" has extended only to that extent. Since 1793, landlords have been wanting an effective machinery for realisation of rents, but in the nineteenth century they were restricted by two comprehensive Rent Acts, the one in 1859 and the other in 1885, but nowhere has the effective machinery been provided for. It was only through the lenience of landlords that a defaulting tenantry has enjoyed all the rights open to them, but at the Settlement there was no provision for permitting the tenants in arrears in full possession of lands. The rights of khudkasht raiyats were contingent on punctual payment of rent.

*Attempts to limit landlords' rights.*

Our Committee does not find that Government has shown any specific concession to landlords as a body. They (landlords) were required by Government at every stage; and their co-operation was appreciated from time to time. Landlords had to find out their rights

---

<sup>1</sup>One effect of the Sale Law was to reduce very greatly the size of the zamindaris, for up to 1845 they were sold piecemeal. Taking the figures for 1882-83, out of a total number of 110,456 estates borne on the roll of 38 districts of Bengal proper and Bihar, 457, or 0.41 per cent. only are great properties with an area of 20,000 acres or upwards; 12,304 or 11.1 per cent. range from 500 to 20,000 acres; while the number of estates which fall short of 500 acres is 97,695 or 88.4 per cent. of the whole—vide Baden-Powell, "Land Systems of British India," Vol. 1.

<sup>2</sup>It would be interesting to note that in all such matters of conducting fairly and equitably, it was a language of "trust and hope"; there were no definite directions forming the basis of the given rights.

from interpretation of statutes in law courts. Their rights were undoubtedly strengthened by the Judiciary, but the strong Executive was always alert to limit the rights of landlords. We shall discuss this in our subsequent answers. It is true that cordial relationship has generally existed between Government and the landholding community, and there were strong evidences that Government was in the nineteenth century alive to the useful services rendered by landlords. And naturally Government showed sympathetic consideration now and then.<sup>1</sup> If zamindars would not have acted as patrons of raiyats, the improvement of agriculture, which we witnessed in Bengal, would have remained a dream. Even fertile lands require tilling, and in the task of tilling, cultivators require assistance and guidance. Government was unequal to render assistance; if landlords were not encouraged by the Permanent Settlement, they would not, and perhaps could not, have functioned as useful agencies. Raiyats themselves had no reserve capital. In the face of these historical facts, the flinging of rebuke and calumny at the landlords as a body has hardly any basis.

**Q. 9.** The major part of the question has already been answered. Our Committee has shown that zamindars have admirably performed the functions imposed by the Permanent Settlement, and that they have not stopped at that. The handicaps thrown by various factors, legislative, historical and social, have also been explained. The only aspect that has not been dealt with refers to "absenteeism."

*What "absenteeism" means in Bengal.*

It is a very pet charge against landlords that they live away from the estates, and that for all the evils of absenteeism landlords themselves are responsible. With a view to understanding "absenteeism" the following factors should be recognised:—

- (1) One landlord has generally estates spread over many districts.
- (2) Through a system of subinfeudation both among landlords and raiyats and through the grant of positive rights to occupancy raiyats by tenancy legislations, the position of landlords and raiyats should be more clearly grasped. If a tenureholder intervenes, a superior zamindar is not the real "landlord" of the occupancy raiyat under the tenureholder. If there is an under-raiyat, the tenureholder is not the real "landlord" of the under-raiyat; it is the occupancy raiyat who is the "landlord." If the superior zamindar in the former case lives away from the occupancy raiyat, he is not an "absentee landlord," as is understood by the expression. Because, even if he lived close to the occupancy raiyat, he had no access to the latter, nor could the rent of the occupancy raiyat be realised by him. In the latter case, if the

---

<sup>1</sup>The Court of Wards' Estates Act came, at a very late stage in the nineteenth century.

tenureholder lives away from the under-raiyat, he is not an absentee "landlord," as the landlord of the under-raiyat is the occupancy raiyat. If this system is appreciated, it will be found that there is hardly any absenteeism in Bengal. The zamindar or the tenureholder, who has direct connection with the raiyat, generally lives in his principal mahal; at least one of the family members who is charged with the zamindari work resides there. If the under-raiyats of Bengal have absentee landlords, the responsibility goes to occupancy raiyats who are *de facto* "landlords" in any social science, although they are advertised as "rai-yats" under the shelter of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It must be a very bold, rather rash, assertion, that "absenteeism" to any considerable extent prevails in Bengal if the scheme of subinfeudation, especially among tenants, which is encouraged by the Bengal Tenancy Act, is appreciated.

*The fiction of "absenteeism" dies away if the last grade of tenureholder resides near the raiyat.*

Moreover, landlords whose estates are scattered throughout the province and even beyond the province are bound to be "absentees." Those who have direct connection with raiyats generally reside in villages, even if they are absent, they have their family representatives. The fiction of "absenteeism" dies away if the last grade of tenureholder resides near about the principal "cutcherry." Under-raiyats and bargadars who have been settled by the higher grade of raiyats can get no relief, through the operation of the Tenancy Act, even if landlords (that is, zamindars and tenureholders of the said holdings) are not absentees; when they get relief in the form of water facilities, better roads, and other beneficent works, that is pure charity on behalf of landlords, the advantages, if any, being reaped by occupancy raiyats.

*Landlords as torch bearers of culture and education.*

\* In Bengal, landlords have become the torch bearers of education and culture. Their city establishments have been necessitated by the fact that they are to receive new ideas and to get their sons trained with the best kind of education. Moreover, the health of the majority of Bengal villages is, at present, far from satisfactory. Malaria and other preventible diseases are working havoc. The task of reforming rural Bengal is now left to Government, and the "success" of Government efforts can be measured by the extent of rural depopulation and exodus. It has not, therefore, been possible for landlords to be always confined to the rural surroundings, and for all this Bengal has gained more than she has lost. The middle classes, who form the pride of Bengal, have sprung from the tenureholding classes, and the urban training and influence on them have added to the richness of

Bengalee culture. Landlords have been patrons of such learning. To achieve this, some amount of absenteeism was inevitable.

With these observation our Committee urges on the Commission to consider the question of absenteeism in its proper bearing.

*Permanent Settlement for the benefit of the nation.*

**Q. 10.** In our previous replies, especially in answer to questions 3 and 5, we have maintained that the Permanent Settlement has contributed to the economic development of the country, and that it has not also financially crippled the resources of the Province. Because of the Permanent Settlement we have got stronger and prosperous middle classes and contented tenantry paying a very low rate of rent.<sup>1</sup> Bengal has witnessed agricultural prosperity earlier than the other provinces in the nineteenth century; Bengal could enjoy the blessings of British rule because of her land system. In assessing the comparative effects of the Bengal Settlement of 1793 and Pitt's Permanent Settlement of land tax in England, Mr. R. C. Dutt in the "Economic History of British India" summed up the position in the following epigrammatic way: "In England the Settlement benefited the landed classes only, in Bengal the Settlement has benefited the whole agricultural community, the entire peasant population shares the benefit and is more prosperous and resourceful on account of this measure. In England the Settlement limited the tax on one out of the many sources of national income, in Bengal it has afforded a protection to agriculture which is virtually the only means of the nation's subsistence. In England, it precluded the State from drawing a large land

---

<sup>1</sup>The benefits of the Permanent Settlement of land revenue were summed up by William Muir, Senior Member of the Board of Revenue of the North-Western Provinces, in a Minute, dated 1861: (a) saving of the expenditure of periodical settlements, (b) deliverance of the people from the vexations of resettlements, (c) freedom from depreciation of estates at the close of each temporary settlement, (d) prosperity arising from increased incentive to improvement and expenditure of capital, (e) greatly increased value of landed property, (f) contentment and satisfaction among the people. Samuel Lang, Finance Member to the Government of Lord Canning advocated the Permanent Settlement on higher moral considerations: "We do not exist as a Government merely to get the largest revenue we can out of the country, or even to keep the mass of the people in a state of uniform dead level, though it should be tolerably a happy and contented one, as a peasant tenantry under a paternal Government. If we give a Permanent Settlement, we lay the foundation for a state of society, not perhaps so easily managed, but far more varied and richer in elements of civilisation and progress. We shall have gradations of society, from the native noblemen of large territorial possessions down through the country gentlemen of landed estate to the independent yeoman, the small peasant proprietor, the large tenant with skill and capital on a long lease, the small tenant on a lease, the tenant-at-will, and the day labourer."

Because of the Permanent Settlement, the Sepoy Mutiny could not catch conflagration in Bengal. "The village system of the North-West Provinces collapsed at once on the withdrawal of British authority: the anarchy threatened by sepoys in Dacca, Chittagong and even Behar, dwindled away before the impassive, not to say the loyal, behaviour of several of the great zamindars" (Saturday Review, October 22, 1881, quoted with approval by Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee).

tax to be spent in the country for the benefit of the nation; in Bengal it has precluded from increasing the annual economic drain of wealth out of the country. In England, it saved the landlord class from added taxation, in Bengal it has saved the nation from fatal and disastrous famines." In the foregoing answers our Committee has tried to prove that the claim of Mr. R. C. Dutt finds corroboration from historical facts.

*The doctrine, "greatest good of the largest number", is vague; it has no relevancy in judging an economic system.*

The expression, "the greatest good of the largest number," is extremely vague in political science and has no relevancy in judging an economic system. Utilitarianism was formulated into a theory by Jeremy Bentham who used it as a standard for criticising the legal system of his day, for Bentham was a legal reformer before he became a political thinker. According to the school of Bentham, utility is that which promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Happiness is hard to be defined. Moreover, this happiness being subjective cannot serve as a foundation for objective rights. Those who are aware of the recent tendencies in jurisprudence know that individualism is abandoned, and that social solidarity is the law of future readjustment.<sup>1</sup> This objective understanding, which may be called a sociological approach, bids adieu to the doctrine of "the greatest good of the greatest number."<sup>2</sup>

Whenever an economic system is introduced, it is favoured as being best "adapted to improve the use of the available resources of production, both by advancing the efficiency of production itself and by affording an outlet for the distribution of the largest possible amount of real wealth or material welfare."<sup>3</sup> An economic system is never judged by its appeal to the ethical doctrine—"the greatest good of the greatest number."

*The Settlement of 1793 has fulfilled its purpose.*

Landlordism under the shelter of the Permanent Settlement was the best agency for the most advantageous exploitation of the resources

<sup>1</sup>Vide Political Theories (Recent times), by Merriam Barnes & others, p. 176.

<sup>2</sup>"Dethroned from the high seats of philosophy, it (utilitarianism) lives on as a powerful principle in the sphere both of personal conduct and of social effort."—Prof. G. D. H. Cole's "Some Relations Between Political and Economic Theory," p. 45. Utilitarianism rests on the notion that each man must be regarded as the best judge of his own happiness. This view implies that happiness is to be found in purely individual satisfaction.—p. 55.

<sup>3</sup>"All economic systems are ways of applying the power of human labour by hand and brain, to the available instruments and materials of production. The economic problem for any society is that of establishing the right relations between men and the things upon which they are to labour, so as to make the most advantageous use of the available resources of production, including both men and things."—Prof. G. D. H. Cole's "What Marx really Means", p. 76.



of production. The East India Company tried many other ways, but they failed before the inexorable law of economic forces. It was only through the help of landlordism that capital flowed in; labour, which was not then plenty, was exercised in the clearing of forests, the draining of swamps, the making of canals and roads, the development of agriculture, of cottage industries and internal trade. The fields were then "saturated with the effects of human labour," employed by capital. Thus, scarcity grew into abundance, agriculture improved, population increased. The Permanent Settlement as an economic measure can only be judged and justified by the standard referred to. "No economic system can develop its potentialities except with the aid of a legal system in harmony with its needs. It cannot function successfully unless individuals and classes who are its active agents are protected in, or compelled to, the rights and duties assigned to them under it. In other words, any economic system requires a legal system whose concepts and precepts correspond to the needs of the economic situation."<sup>1</sup> In our province, bad laws often hampered the play of the Permanent Settlement, and we shall explain this point of view in a subsequent answer.

*Factors to be noted in evaluating the revenue system introduced by Permanent Settlement.*

Our Committee, therefore, submits that the Permanent Settlement has led to a revenue system which is to the benefit of the province. In appreciating the excellence of the revenue system the following factors should be specifically taken into account:—

(1) Land acquired value, and the security for credit that it furnished appreciably mitigated the intensity of distress. The people are now in secure possession of land: their rights are on record. "The whole outlook of the rural community was influenced by the fact that it had rights which were rapidly becoming valuable."<sup>2</sup> In the pre-Settlement days, land of the raiyat was practically unsaleable; "it was of less value than the crop it yielded: in short, it was a burden involving liabilities for rent and not an object of desire which could be pledged for credit: when famines came, it was not the land which was sold; the cattle and household goods were disposed of, ornaments were

---

<sup>1</sup>"An analysis of any society will always reveal the close connection of its institutions and culture and the method of satisfying material appetites. Any given system of economic relationships will require political and social forms to develop all that is inherent in it"—Prof. Harold Laski in "The State," pp. 108-109. It is held that "the State is an organ of community; it commands only because it serves; it owns only because it owes; it creates rights as the agent of society for the creation of rights" (*vide* MacIver's "The Modern State", page 480), but "in sober realism the State never acts, it is acted by those who have become competent to determine its policies." Every movement is "fought in the name of the universal principles of right," but the purpose realised corresponds with the character of the State. It is, therefore, the function of the State to develop the system which it has brought into being.

<sup>2</sup>Vide Report of the Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, 1928.

pledged, and, when these resources were exhausted, the people deserted their villages and their fields and wandered in search of food." With rights defined, rent demand practically fixed, with protection established against arbitrary ejectment, cultivator has a clear assurance that the fruits of his labour will be left to him and, accordingly, the value of land has enormously risen.

(2) Borrowing by the cultivator is inevitable, because he lives on the margin of subsistence, and has "to wait for half a year before he receives the return of his labour, and in far too large an area when there is only one crop in a year, the interval between successive receipts may be full twelve months." The major part of borrowings is met by private moneylenders who have interests in land or who have the desire to be associated with land. Co-operative banks and Government sources provided by various Acts such as Land Improvement Loans Act, do not satisfy the needs in any substantial way and have proved failures. Banks and Government Acts look to the assets of cultivators; local landholders and moneylenders often look to the character of cultivators. There are cultivators who may not have the requisite assets to get a loan under stringent conditions of banks, but they are being hereditarily helped by landholders whose confidence in them and desire for help are encouraged by extra-commercial considerations. This personal touch was invaluable where Government do not and cannot have that affectionate bond. As village bankers landholders' services are inestimable and have been amply recognised by the Royal Agricultural Commission and Banking Committees, provincial and central.

(3) The Permanent Settlement has provided Government with an agency wherefrom the land revenue demand was assured and safeguarded against possible remissions or suspensions of rent in emergent crisis, a spectacle which was frequently witnessed in the provinces without the Permanent Settlement. Landlords also function as an agency for the collection of cesses; in Bengal they are more than that. Cesses (public works, road or education cesses) are realised by Government from landlords who are in their turn entitled to realise the quota payable by raiyats. Thus a system is introduced whereunder Government is assured of the full amount of demand under cesses without undergoing any expenditure and trouble, but landlords have to bear the expenses and troubles of collection of cesses and losses consequent on their delayed collections or non-realizations. Thus, Government gets the revenue peacefully whereas landlords become the butt of ridicule and calumny in the countryside for the realisation of dues, or even for demanding payment of dues. Landlords, in this manner, form a stable bulwark against the stress and strain of public agitation and economic crisis being directly experienced by Government.

*Ibid*, p. 9.

(4) For a century and more, the province entirely depended on the revenue system introduced by the Permanent Settlement. It is only in recent times that Government is introducing measures for improving the position of raiyats but with no visible results. The Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce of the Government of India, commenced to function in 1871. But it did not exercise "any" real influence on the problems of agricultural development." In 1880 the Report of the Famine Commission revived interest but most of its recommendations were neglected. The Commission's advice that "it should be the policy of Government to advance money freely and on easy terms on the security of the land whenever it can be done without serious risk of ultimate loss" led to the enactment of laws—the Land Improvement Loans Act of 1883 and the Agriculturists' Loan Act of 1884—which, in the opinion of competent observers, have failed to achieve the purpose. The report of the Famine Commission of 1901 was responsible for the Co-operative Credit Societies Act which was originally passed in 1904 and afterwards amended in 1912. The Usurious Loans Act was passed in 1918 which is now replaced by the Bengal Moneylenders' Act of 1933. A separate department of agriculture in Bengal was constituted in 1885 and it was not until 1904 that a Deputy Director of Agriculture was appointed. The Famine Code is of recent origin. All this is recited to show that until recent years, the improvement of the countryside was left to private initiative and enterprise, and that Government did not take up the improvement of agriculture seriously. Even the feeble effort, that Government has put forth in recent times, has not produced the desired results, as will be evident from the reports of the Royal Agricultural Commission and the Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee.

### *Criterion for judging the Settlement.*

Our Committee has shown that in assessing the Permanent Settlement as an economic measure, it will have to be found out if it has served the allotted functions, that is, the most advantageous use of the resources of production. To import sentiments expressed in the question, viz., if the Settlement is for the greatest good of the largest number and if it has resulted in the advantage of the landlords at the expense of the tenants, in the evaluation of the Permanent Settlement, is to confound the issue and to supply materials for wrong approach and imperfect understanding. A measure stands condemned in so far as its efficiency in production is impaired. We shall show later on how the Permanent Settlement has been largely discredited, not by its intrinsic defects, but by the unscientific tenancy legislations passed from time to time. To understand the Permanent Settlement we shall have to know to "separate the sheaf from the corn."

• Q. 11. The question under discussion raises some of the common-place charges against the Permanent Settlement indulged in by critics. Charges, repeated frequently, do not assume the character of truth. Let us examine the charges seriatim:

*The percentage of rental intercepted by private landlords is not high.*

(i) It is said that nearly 80 per cent. of the income from land goes to zamindar under the shelter of the Permanent Settlement. The gross rental of raiyats is about Rs. 17 crores (to be exact, 16 crores, 99 lakhs in 1936-37). This huge figure of gross rental, as shown from road cess returns is high, and it includes assessment on coal mines, tea plantations, and the rental intercepted by under-raiyats and bargadars and khas mahals, and accordingly in the above calculation allowances for these factors should be taken into consideration. It is well known that the rentals paid by under-raiyats and bargadars (settled by the higher raiyats) and by raiyats in khas mahal areas, do not go to the private landlords. Recognition of this comes from the fact that the raiyati rentals are estimated at about Rs. 12 crores. Our Committee is perhaps entitled to assume that something like 10 to 11 crores is intercepted by private landlords; definitely less if it is a matter for private landlords of permanently settled estates. We are making the assumption that the raiyati rental in khas mahal areas payable to Government as landlord is included in the raiyati rental of Rs. 12 crores. This sum of 11 crores, if we accept it as the sum intercepted by private landlords, is only something like 65 per cent. of the gross rental. Out of this 11 crores, the sum of nearly 3 crores of rupees goes out to Government as land revenue, and the percentage works out roughly at 27 per cent. According to the Taxation Enquiry Committee, land revenue should not exceed 25 per cent. of the rental. The balance (that is, the sum of Rs. 8 crores) is distributed among zamindars and a host of tenureholders<sup>1</sup>. And this 8 crores is less than fifty per cent. of the gross rental of Rs. 17 crores. Moreover, in judging a landlord-tenant system it is not very relevant to say that 80 per cent. of the income goes to zamindars, the points to be noted are that (1) if the pressure of rental is heavy, (2) if the share realised from landlords is negligible or not. Our Committee has, however, shown that the private landlords do not intercept 80 per cent. of the income from land. They intercept at the most 65 to 70 per cent. of the gross rental out of which more than 25 per cent. goes out as land revenue (being the ratio of Rs. 3 crores of land revenue to Rs. 11 crores as raiyati rental), 15 per cent. as collection charges and at least 15 per cent. as unrealisable assets. Thus the sum that remains

---

<sup>1</sup>The number of estates paying land revenue was 101,776 (in 1933-34). According to the Census Report, non-cultivating proprietors taking rent in money and kind number 783,755; the cultivating owners number 5,817,973; the tenant cultivators 873,094; and agricultural labourers 2,874,804.

for appropriation by landlords is distributed over a large body of persons, and that, in an undoubted manner, adds to the national wealth of the province by the increased purchasing power of the persons concerned. This does not involve "a tragedy of waste," as the concentration of capital in a few hands is not possible in Bengal through a system of subinfeudation among landlords, partitioning of estates into several shares, absence of primogeniture, and sale of estates in default of payment of revenue in the case of zamindars and rent in the case of tenureholders.

*"Subinfeudation of tenancy" explained.*

(ii) The expression, "subinfeudation of tenancy", carries two-fold meaning: subinfeudation among landlords and subinfeudation among raiyats. Both tenureholders and raiyats are tenants under the Bengal Tenancy Act, but the tenureholder belongs to the community of landlords. In so far as subinfeudation among landlords has taken place, it has been encouraged by the Permanent Settlement Regulations. Because, it was a settled policy behind the Regulations of 1793 to see powerful landed magnates, split up into different estates, falling into the hands of several landlords. There was an Imperial consideration in encouraging subinfeudation, because the prevalence of territorial magnates exercising sovereignty in their localities was a menace to the ruling power. This diffused ownership of land through a system of subinfeudation was historically necessary, and it has justification in broadening the basis of agrarian capitalism: the middle classes thus developed a direct stake in the system. But the system of subinfeudation among raiyats, which was discouraged by the Permanent Settlement, grew up under the shelter of the Tenancy Act. At the time of the Permanent Settlement, the concept of a non-cultivating raiyat was not existent; the practice of tenants underletting their lands to other peasants has "grown up by abuse," and that is highly detrimental. "Wherever the system of an intermediate tenantry subsists, the peasant is indigent, the husbandry ill-managed." The Permanent Settlement asked landlords to grant leases to cultivating raiyats. The Bengal Tenancy Act, in scorn of all lessons in land economics, gave legal sanction to the practice of subletting and encouraged the growth of under-raiyats. To apportion the blame to the Permanent Settlement, as is sought to be made in the question under discussion, is to misinterpret the Regulations. The real mischief in the matter of subinfeudation among raiyats is done by the Tenancy Act which permitted occupancy raiyats to sublet and to transfer, and gave freedom to occupancy raiyats to convert themselves into non-cultivating raiyats or to degenerate themselves into under-raiyats.

*The pressure of rental, far from being enhanced, has considerably come down.*

(iii) Out Committee has shown that there has been so-called enhancement of the raiyati rental principally because of the extension of cultivation and the fall in the value of money. In fact, there has been no effective enhancement of the rent. According to Colebrooke, the gross value of harvests in 1793 in the Presidency of Bengal was Rs. 32,00,00,000. In 1912 Bihar was separated from Bengal, and in 1928-29 (the year before the beginning of the continuing general economic depression) the gross value of the agricultural produce was Rs. 243,80,65,500. In 1793, the proportion of rents to harvests was one-eighth according to Colebrooke, and in 1928-39, the proportion was one-fourteenth.<sup>1</sup> Those who pay higher rents in Bengal are lower grades of raiyats who have less privileges and make their payments to raiyats and not to private landlords, as understood in our country. At the time of the Permanent Settlement and in the pre-Settlement period the lower grade of raiyats (that is paikashts) used to pay lower rates. The position has been reversed by the Bengal Tenancy Act, and those who are really suffering under the weight of rents are creations of the higher grade of raiyats who, in fact, are responsible for "rack-renting," if there is any, in Bengal. The average rate of raiyati rent is Rs. 3 per acre, and the complaint, that the raiyati rental is high, "provokes a smile." Our Committee has already shown that there has not been any appreciable enhancement in the rate of raiyati rental since the Settlement of 1793, although there has been a great fall in the value of money (at least by one-third.)

*Sufficient profit left to cultivators.*

The assessments of the Sircars in the Ain-i-Akbari were based on the assumption that the Sovereign was entitled to one-fourth of the produce of the soil. Buchanan Hamilton, 1808, gives figures to prove not only that a rent of one-fourth of the produce left sufficient profit to the farmer but was necessary "as it may be safely said that a gradual and moderate use of rent is the grand source of wealth and prosperity to every country and as the additional exertion required from the

<sup>1</sup>The general practice before the Settlement of 1793 was to take one-fourth to one-half of the gross produce. Grant said that the assessment was limited not to exceed a fourth part of the actual gross produce of the soil. Manu and other legislators in the Hindu period authorised the Sovereign to exact a sixth, an eighth, or a twelfth part of the grain according to circumstances. The Institutes of Akbar inform that former monarchs of Hindustan exacted the sixth part of the produce of lands. Under Akbar the revenue was settled at one-fourth of the produce of lands cultivated for every harvest.

The Fifth Report put the State proportion at three-fifths in full-settled land, leaving the cultivator two-fifths. Mr. Shore was in favour of one-third. Mr. Elphinstone says that one-third is a moderate assessment and that the full share is one-half. Hence, the present pressure of rental, viewed in that light, is extremely low.

tenant always has turned out more for his benefit than for that of his landlord.”<sup>1</sup> The rent of “poli” lands per bigha in 1800, as could be gathered from Buchanan Hamilton’s account of Dinajpur, varied from Re. 1 to Rs. 3 (*vide* Survey and Settlement Report of Bogra and Pabna by D. Macpherson, page 44). Mr. Macpherson, I.C.S., the Settlement Officer, in his Report on Pabna and Bogra (published in 1930) accordingly remarked that “taking the rents of 130 years ago and calculating according to the provisions of section 32 of the Tenancy Act, the raiyats would frequently have had to pay, not 1 rupee per bigha, but Rs. 7-8, a rent they often levied from their under-raiyats.” By making a comparison of rents of Pabna and Bogra, the Settlement Officer concluded as follows:—

“It will be seen that the increase on the rates has not been so very great; and has, certainly, not been in proportion to the rise in the price of foodstuffs; yet, where the increase has been greatest, i.e., in the eastern alluvion, there, owing to the variety of the crops and a fertile soil, the incidence of the rent is lowest.....The under-raiyats who have not the protection of occupancy rights do not escape so easily, and have to pay, to the full limit of competition rents of Rs. 10, Rs. 12 and Rs. 15 per bigha—rents which are not far from representing the value of a quarter of the gross produce, or the chouth on which the old pargana rates of rent were based.....The enhancement of rent being allowed on the ground of rise in the price of staple foodstuffs, the surplus from the cultivation of the commercial crops (such as jute, tobacco) is unaffected and the raiyat keeps the reward of his industry and enterprise.”

What “actual cultivators” means.

(iv) The expression, “actual cultivators”, is significant. In Bengal the majority of the actual cultivators are under-raiyats, agricultural labourers, bargadars, etc. They form the peasant population. The higher raiyats, if they happen to be non-cultivators, are raiyats by legal fiction. Amongst the higher raiyats, there are some who have sublet their holdings in entirety; there are others who have settled with bhagchasis and hired labourers; there are the rest who let out in part and cultivate some portion themselves or by their family labour. If overlordship over actual cultivators is exercised by any party, it is by the higher class of raiyats. They resemble Russian kulaks”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>According to Buchanan Hamilton we find 1 bigha is nearly equal to  $\frac{1}{4}$  acre or  $1\frac{1}{4}$  Calcutta bighas. A farm of 55 bighas of land contained about 79 $\frac{1}{4}$  Calcutta bighas or 26 $\frac{1}{4}$  acres. The actual size of bigha varied—*vide* Appendix 8 of Buchanan Hamilton’s account of Dinajpur.

<sup>2</sup>The first agrarian revolution in Russia in 1917-18 which saw to the liquidation of the landlord was the work of the peasants, principally of the kulaks. The second agrarian revolution which involved the liquidation of the kulaks was the work of the Bolshevik Government. At the end of 1933 the liquidation of the kulak was completed.

"who managed to enlarge their holdings by renting land, often adding with the farming, a little trading and a persistent moneylending; they developed their cultivation through the employment of low-paid wage labour."

*Tenancy Act created a system of overlordship by higher raiyats over actual cultivators.*

The Permanent Settlement was permeated with an admirable team-spirit: there was no question of overlordship over actual cultivators. It was decided that cultivators would hold on leases, and there were directions for better farming. The tenancy legislation handicapped the full play of the Permanent Settlement Regulations, and created a system of lordship over actual cultivators having less privileges by higher raiyats with greater rights. And it is an open truth that the "petite bourgeoisie" do not and cannot possess the liberal tradition, imagination and sympathy of the "grande bourgeoisie," and in history they have turned out as the worst oppressors.

**Q. 12.** The question is suggestive of the lack of seriousness with which the Permanent Settlement is approached. Even if the grounds suggested in question 11 were true, there was no case for the abolition of the Permanent Settlement. The Permanent Settlement has fashioned Bengal's rural economy, given shape to her social structure, and has added richness and variety to her culture. Its replacement is neither an easy task, nor should it be attempted for ills which could be remedied by legislations and other steps. "Growth is slow, when roots are deep." In Bengal, the roots are deep down in historical forces: the cumulative effects of legislation and custom have had effect on the psychology and habits of the people. The answers to questions 3, 5 and 10 have indicated the extent of the work and nobility of the mission of the Permanent Settlement.

*The unmaking of the Settlement requires greater forces in history.*

An economic system becomes ripe for supersession when it is found inefficient in exploiting the resources of production. If it is found that the Permanent Settlement cannot be made to serve its purpose, the case for its abolition becomes unanswerable. But the defects pointed out are mostly not the creations of the Permanent Settlement; they could easily be grappled by other ways. The Permanent Settlement is not an ordinary legislation: its making and unmaking require greater forces in history.

*The interests of land to be made predominant in a land system.*

Agriculture forms the main industry of the province. The Permanent Settlement was introduced primarily to extend cultivation and improve agriculture. In the business of agriculture, landlords and tenants are undoubtedly partners, but land, being the basis of production, is the most important factor. Question 11 seems to suggest that



if the concessions could be granted to raiyats, the object of the land system would be achieved, and that, as the Permanent Settlement has failed to achieve it, there is a *prima facie* case for its replacement. It indicates a short-sighted view in the matter of evaluating a land system. Land is the principal thing, and its interests should be made predominant. Land requires landlords; land requires tillers.\* If the interests of land suffer from an agency, the case for limitation of the powers of that agency gathers force. Land shall be nursed in the best way: land should not be allowed to exhaust in any manner.\* If the interests demand the curtailment or expansion of the powers of any of the partners, landlord or raiyat, that is to be accepted in the interest of agriculture (that is, in the collective interest of the nation.) We shall show later on how the Tenancy Act has neglected the interests of land. That is beside the issue at present. Our Committee is content with remarking here that the modification or alteration of the Permanent Settlement can become a live issue if it can be shown that the interests of land are deteriorating thereunder, and that there is no other way out of it. The struggle between landlords and raiyats for power is one thing; the improvement of agriculture is another. Our Committee holds that the land system devised by the Permanent Settlement was most efficient for the improvement of agriculture: if its efficiency is lost, it can be restored by well planned legislations. Hence, the question of abolition of the Permanent Settlement does not arise, far less does it arise on the specific grounds suggested in question 11. Our Committee notes that no ground has been put forward to the effect that the Permanent Settlement was inadequate to make for extended tillage, better agriculture, and brighter countryside. The tragedy is that in the wrangle for the shifting of powers from landlords to raiyats, the interests of land are not thrown in the forefront. Accordingly, we are confronted with "political" grounds, not "economic" grounds, for bolstering up a case for the abolition of the Permanent Settlement.

*The charges made do not establish the case for abolition of the Settlement.*

Our Committee, however, contends that on the specific grounds in question 11 there can be no case for the abolition of the Permanent Settlement, because, firstly, the charges made do not stand the test of close analysis, secondly, even if they were true, they do not warrant a revolutionary measure, such as the abolition of the Permanent Settlement, especially when those defects could be remedied within the existing framework. It has not even been suggested that as an economic measure it has outlived its usefulness, although our Committee maintains that it has still useful role to play, if it is allowed to function unhampered by bad legislations and aided by good feelings on the

part of both the partners. If these factors are absent, no land system, whether it be based on the Permanent Settlement or any other, can possibly function to the advantage of the nation.

**Q. 13.** We have shown that the financial loss to the State because of the Permanent Settlement is superficial. The raiyati rental which is estimated at Rs. 12 crores includes also the rental of temporarily settled estates and khas mahal estates. The expression, "rai-yati assets," is confusing.

Land Revenue from the permanently settled estates is Rs. 215 lakhs and odd; the revenues from the temporarily settled estates and khas mahal estates push the figure beyond the sum of Rs. 3 crores.

*Losses of the State from the Permanent Settlement superficial.*

We have noted that the collection charges may be taken at 15 per cent. Even with that expense, the arrears of collection (nearly 30 to 40 per cent) are being carried from year to year. Out of this income, landlords pay their public works and road cesses and, in certain districts, education cess. Even if there are arrears in the quota of cesses to be paid by raiyats, they are made up by landlords. After subtracting all these expenses and noting that the balance is spread over a large number of landlords in Bengal, it is a fanciful idea to dwell on the riches of landlords and the losses of the State. If there were no private landlords and all khas mahal areas, the collection charges will have to be borne by Government; there will be a fall in the amount of cesses and union rates; there will also be a distinct fall in the income under the provincial head, "Stamps", which forms a main source of provincial revenue. Judicial statistics in Bengal show that 60 per cent. of suits in Bengal are rent suits; there are many money suits and title suits because of the prevalence of the landlord-tenant system. The provincial revenue under Stamps is generally more than Rs. 3 crores out of the entire provincial revenue of Rs. 12 crores.

*Indirect losses to the State.*

Apart from these direct losses, indirect losses will be considerable. A large section of the people, being deprived of the income from land, will have their purchasing power depreciated, and naturally there will be a fall in the national dividend. Private landlords, even in their distress, continue many recurring grants for charitable and beneficent

---

<sup>1</sup>The land revenue from certain Sunderban lots which belong to the temporarily settled estates has been considerably enhanced at re-settlements. In reply to a question the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, Revenue Member, placed certain figures of enhancement in the Bengal Legislative Council on the 16th March 1933. The enhancement of 200 to 500 per cent., it is found, has been usual, although "a moderate increase" was only contemplated.

works: this sum which is not inconsiderable will be withdrawn. The Report on the working of the Wards, Attached and Trust Estates in Bengal in 1931-32 reveals that the total sum spent during the year on schools, dispensaries and works of improvement by the Wards estates amounted to Rs. 5,00,412. Critics who harp on the "theory of loss" have no idea that a very big amount will be taken away which is at present being pooled for the improvement of the country.

*Principles of Public Finance to be followed.*

A statistical table of the losses, direct and indirect, due to the disappearance of private landlords from Bengal, cannot possibly be constructed except by the active co-operation of Government. We are only indicating very roughly some of the sources of "loss" which shall have to be taken into consideration in appreciating the "loss" flowing from the Permanent Settlement. The "losses," our Committee submits, cannot so easily be ascertained: they can hardly be gauged by putting land revenue on the one side and the raiyati rental on the other side. The national dividend does not admit of so rough and ready a calculation; the Permanent Settlement was not so superficial a measure. The financial losses apart, the psychology, habits and characteristics of the nation will have to undergo complete transformation. Our Committee is, therefore, really surprised at the facile and easy calculation of the losses, made in the question under discussion. Government does not exist to get the highest amount of revenue: even if they desire it, it is a very contracted view of public finance to realise the highest amount under a single source by drying all other elastic sources which add to the riches of the country. Public Finance is not governed by the principles of family budget where invisible returns do not find any room, nor are all the sources of income inter-connected.

*Human society, an organic whole, not to be disturbed.*

From the foregoing observations it will be found that the loss of revenue can hardly be removed by the abolition of the zamindari system. This abolition should not be contemplated in a light hearted manner. It is accepted that "in changing the modes of production, mankind changes all its social relations." The economic life is ultimately bound up with the whole ethical and social life.<sup>1</sup> "Human Society is an organic whole, the parts of which are naturally inter-dependent in such a way that each part in fulfilling its distinctive

<sup>1</sup>"Human life depends upon the relation between the individual and his environment. The economic interpretation of history, in its proper formulation, does not exhaust the possibilities of life and progress; it does not explain all the niceties of human development; but it emphasises the forces which have hitherto been so largely instrumental in the rise and fall, in the prosperity and decadence, in the glory and failure, in the weal and woes of nations and peoples. It is a relative, rather than an absolute explanation."—Prof. Seligman's "Economic Interpretation of History", pp. 157-58.

function, conditions the fulfilment of function by the rest, and is in turn conditioned by the fulfilment of its function by the rest. In this sense the whole is present in each part, while each part is indispensable to the whole. Every society consists of groups working for the fulfilment of the wants of the society."<sup>1</sup>

The "organic unity, ordered complexity, and harmonised multiplicity" in society should not be disturbed without grave necessity. The landlord-tenant system is undoubtedly weakening. If it goes, it will go because the position of the present landlord has been made economically weak by various legislations and impositions. Messrs. C. S. Orwin and W. R. Peel<sup>2</sup> when they advocated land nationalisation definitely stated: "Let it be stated over and again that no advantage, on balance, is claimed for this system of land purchase (by the State) when contrasted with the system of private ownership which has prevailed so long; it is only put forward to provide an orderly way out of the difficulties which the breakdown of the old system is creating."

*Zamindari system not to be abolished.*

Our Committee is, therefore, not in favour of the abolition of the zamindari system, but at the same time the "untenable" position to which landlords have been reduced by imperfect legislations should be remedied so that the system may proceed on smoothly. If it is felt by the State that the difficulties created cannot be removed and that a revolutionary change in the habits of people and the mode of production is helpful under new conditions obtaining in the present hour of crisis, it is then only that the need for the abolition of the zamindari system with compensation comes to the arena of practical politics.

*Temporary settlement is no substitute for Permanent Settlement.*

• Our Committee does not believe that the zamindari system has created difficulties which cannot be surmounted except by the process of its abolition. In the circumstances, there will not be any visible

---

<sup>1</sup>Sir S. Radhakrishnan strengthens his case in the "Hindu View of Life" by observing: "Each man is said to have his own specific nature fitting him for his own specific function, and changes of function are not encouraged. A sudden change of function where the nature is against its proper fulfilment may simply destroy the individuality of the being. We may wish to change or modify our particular mode of being but we have not the power to effect it. Nature cannot be hurried by our desires" (p. 111).

<sup>2</sup>Vide "The Tenure of Agricultural Land", Cambridge University Press, 1926. Prof. Taussig in his "Principles of Economics" states practically the same thing: "All things considered, administrative difficulties and the imperfections of Government, as well as strictly economic factors, the balance of gain is probably in favour of the untrammelled right of private ownership in agricultural land, and of such legislative changes only as facilitate its free transfer and its easy acquisition by those who will use it best." The spur of ownership was historically indispensable for the advance of agriculture.

improvement in the situation, if it is substituted for by one of temporary settlement. That will be only modifying the existing zamindari system without minimising, rather adding to, the difficulties inherent in the present situation. Government may, in a system of temporary settlement, enhance land revenue at every revisional period, but the stability of the whole system will be shaken. All the permanent leases will be made temporary; the enhancement of revenue will naturally lead to enhancement of rent; the spur of ownership will be absent; a state of insecurity will prevail. The losses involved will not, therefore, be commensurate with the gain contemplated in enhanced land revenue.<sup>1</sup> If the breakdown of the landlord-tenant system, under a scheme of temporary settlement, can be averted by scientific legislations and other governmental efforts it should rather be attempted within the given framework of the Permanent Settlement, and the fancied loss of land revenue can easily be recouped by indirect returns. "In raising a revenue to answer the public exigencies, we ought to be careful to interfere as little as possible in those sources from which the wealth of the subject is derived."

*Various factors should be considered in imposing agricultural income-tax.*

The tax on agricultural income should not be considered separately. The pressure of revenue and rent on landlords shall have to be found out; the cesses, and other rates shall have to be weighed; the costly method of realising arrear rents and cesses shall have to be taken into consideration; the amount of unrealised and unrealisable arrears shall be taken note of. Then the question of income-tax on agricultural incomes should be judged by the principles of taxation. In Bengal there is another aspect which cannot be neglected: that is, if direct agricultural income-tax on agricultural incomes should, in all fairness, be imposed on permanently settled estates. It is an "idle war of words," as Baden-Powell put it, to discuss at this stage if land revenue is a rent or tax; land revenue was taken by all distinguished authorities as a tax.<sup>2</sup>

The Permanent Settlement Regulation I of 1793 is very definite on the question of the limitation of public demand upon the land which is supported by the following expressions:—

*Jama fixed in perpetuity.*

"The limitation of public demand upon the land" (section 1); "the jama assessed upon their lands under the Regulations would be continued after the expiration of ten years and remain unalterable for ever"

---

<sup>1</sup>"A moderate jama, regularly collected, unites the Company's interest with the happiness of the natives more effectually than any forced imperfect system of an exaggerated jama"—Mr. Shore's Minute of June, 1789.

<sup>2</sup>Lord Cornwallis. Shore and others treated land revenue as a tax and it formed the staple source of revenue. The Taxation Enquiry Committee (1924-25) has looked upon land revenue as a tax for all practical purposes.

(section II, Art. I): "to declare the jama which has been of may be assessed upon their lands under the Regulations above mentioned, fixed for ever" (section III, Art. II); "at the expiration of the term of the Settlement no alteration will be made in the assessment, which they have respectively engaged to pay but that they and their heirs and lawful successors will be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever" (section IV, Art. III); "they and their heirs and lawful successors shall be allowed to hold their respective estates at such assessment for ever" (section V, Art. IV); "such individuals and their heirs and lawful successors shall be permitted to hold the lands at the assessment at which they may be transferred for ever" (section VI, Art. V); "from the earliest times the public assessment upon the lands has never been fixed," and "the zamindars, independent talukdars or other actual proprietors of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, are to consider these orders fixing the amount of the assessment as irrecoverable and not liable to alteration by any persons whom the Court of Directors may hereafter appoint to the administration of their affairs in this country" (section VI, Art. VI); "from the limitation of the public demand upon the lands the net income and consequently the value (independently of any increase of rent obtainable by improvement) of any landed property.....will always be ascertained by a comparison of the amount of the fixed jama assessed upon it" (section X, Art. IX).

In the face of these commitments, the imposition of income-tax on agricultural income can naturally be interpreted as a move towards confiscation'. Lord Cornwallis pointed out that the improvement of agricultural world gives rise to returns from other sources. "By reserving the collection of the internal duties on commerce Government may at all times appropriate to itself a share of the accumulating wealth of its subjects, without their being sensible of it. The burden will also be more equally distributed; at present, the whole weight rests upon the landlords and cultivators of the soil" (*cide* Cornwallis' Minute, 3rd February, 1790).

#### *Peculiarities of agricultural income.*

Secondly, whether the margins left to landlords do permit further taxation. There are 1 lakh of revenue paying estates, 31,000 revenue

---

<sup>1</sup>"New taxes, under any pretence whatever, were prohibited." Fifth Report, 1812. Judges Tucker, Barlow and Hawking judicially declared; "It is a narrow and contracted view to suppose that the Permanent Settlement consists in nothing more than the obligation on the part of the zamindar to pay a certain amount of revenue annually to the Government. The settlement is a compact by which the zamindar engages on his part to pay a fixed amount of revenue to the State; and the State on its part guarantees to the zamindar by means of its judicial and fiscal administration the integrity of the assets from which the revenue is derived and which in fact constitute the Government's own security for the realisation of its revenue." The "integrity of the assets" is affected by making any new demand on the income from land.

free estates, 18,000 rent free estates and 2 million tenures, and many zamindaris are encumbered with co-sharers. If the limit of taxation is recognised, many of the landlords will then be found to have no sufficient margin to be taxed. This point of view should not be neglected in any scheme of further taxation. In this matter, the equality of taxation on all interests should be borne in mind. Non-agricultural incomes pay income-tax; agricultural income pays revenue or rent and cesses. The incidence of charges on agricultural income is high, considering the fact that it pays its quota in rent and cess irrespective of the fact whether the income is accrued or not. Non-agricultural income, when accrued, pays income-tax. In calculating the incidence this difference should not be neglected. Moreover the incidence, as shown, often looks comparatively small as the collection charges are not taken into account in computing the effective income from land.

The charges on land income are land revenue or rent and cesses. The charges on non-agricultural incomes are income-tax, and super-tax thereunder. The incidence of land revenue and cesses on land income in Bengal would range between 25 per cent. to 40 per cent., that is 4 annas to 6 annas in the rupee. This incidence will vary from district to district. The following deterrent factors should also be noted: (1) the charge on land income has no reference to actual cash receipts or realisations, and is at a flat rate on every landlord's income; (2) the task of collection of cesses (including the education cess)<sup>1</sup> falls on landlords who have to bear the collection charges and also the losses consequent on non-realizations. In the case of incomes of persons other than landowners, the rate scales up from 6 pies to 26 pies and a surcharge of 1/12 p<sup>1</sup> plus super-tax beyond Rs. 30,000. The following illustrations<sup>1</sup> will make out the disparity:—

- (1) Income Rs. 8,000; landholder pays Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,200.  
Income Rs. 8,000; others pay, say, Rs. 400.
- (2) Income Rs. 20,000; landholder pays Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 8,000.  
Income Rs. 20,000; others pay, say, Rs. 2,200.
- (3) Income Rs. 1,00,000; landholder pays Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 40,000.  
Income Rs. 1,00,000; others pay, say, Rs. 20,000.

#### *Land income subjected to greater charge.*

"It is clear that in the cases of smaller incomes the disparity between the two impositions is indeed very large, but as the incomes move upwards, the disparity is narrowed down until in the cases of incomes over a lakh, the income-tax payable and the land revenue and cesses payable are close to each other. Taking the cases of incomes below one lakh, it can therefore be safely held that land income is

<sup>1</sup>Taken from Prof. B. N. Das Gupta's "A Treatise on Indian Income-tax Law and Accounts", page 22, published in 1938.

subjected to much greater charge by way of land revenue and cess than the charge upon other incomes by way of income-tax and super-tax."

*Income-tax on agricultural incomes confiscatory and unjust*

• Our Committee therefore holds, that the imposition of income-tax on agricultural income will (1) affect the integrity of the assets of the Permanent Settlement, (2) burden the land income with discriminating and excessive charges, and (3) deteriorate the indirect sources of revenue by making land tax inordinately heavy. On the other hand, the burden on land income is recommended by all economists to be moderate, so that agricultural prosperity may set in. The landlord-tenant system in Bengal, rendered economically weak, cannot bear the strain of further taxation. That would be discriminating, confiscatory and unjust.

*Permanent Settlement to be preserved in letter and in spirit.*

**Q. 14.** Our Committee does not favour the abolition of the zamindari system. We have shown that the Permanent Settlement as an economic measure has done immense service to the country. It has excellent provisions which could not be fully taken advantage of because of the unscientific tenancy legislations. We are definitely of opinion that the Permanent Settlement should not be modified, but that the land system based thereon cannot function to the benefit of the nation if it is preserved only in its outer form, the inner essentials being defeated by other measures. We, therefore, urge on the Commission that the Permanent Settlement should not only remain in form but also be allowed to function smoothly and usefully. The part set out by the Regulations of 1793 for landlords should be played without serious obstacles being put in the way; raiyats should discharge their allotted functions and enjoy all the privileges granted under the shelter of the Permanent Settlement; the revenue system, as envisaged, will be worked in a way as to make the most advantageous use of the resources of production. In this way, the Permanent Settlement of 1793 should be allowed to play its useful role without disadvantage to any of the partners in the business of agriculture, but with full awareness of the needs of agriculture. Our Committee has always taken this view of things and desires to make its position clear by restating it here.

*Effective safeguards to be provided for.*

Our Committee finds that there is an insistent movement against the Permanent Settlement. Government is making inroads on the Settlement, making the position of landlords delicate and untenable. Government and the people seem to be determined to make an assault on the fundamentals of the Permanent Settlement without disturbing the outer framework. That is all to the prejudice of landlords, and the situation looks desperate for us. Our Committee is in favour of preserving the Settlement of 1793, so that it may, or may be allowed to,



function. The impediments to its working should, therefore, be removed. In the circumstances, it is essential that there should be statutory protection extended to safeguard the Permanent Settlement and to nulkfy reckless legislative efforts for impairing the given basis of land-system. The kind of protection, sought to be extended by the existing Instruments of Instructions to the Governor and Governor-General with regard to the Permanent Settlement, is indeed illusory. The safeguards must be real and effective and should be provided for in the Constitution itself. Our Committee, therefore, urges on the Commission to take this view of the matter into serious consideration and to recommend real safeguards, if it considers the maintenance and functioning of the Permanent Settlement essential for the interest of the country. With these observations, our Committee returns to answer the question under discussion.

*"Confiscation is the evolution of ill-will"—Prof. Laski.*

Our Committee believes that property is the return made to the individual for effort. The institution of private property in land is a question of expediency in history, not morals. Through historical forces and social necessities private property in land has grown; it has received the protection of the State. If in the evolution of historical process, a stage is reached when property in land shall have to be abandoned in the interest of the country, an eventuality which should not be considered in any light-hearted manner, our Committee is definitely of opinion that none shall be deprived of his lawful property without compensation. We do not advocate the abolition of the zamindari system: we want the forging of factors helpful for the functioning of the system. Should the existing Government, however, be seized with any ideology of riding the country of private property or creating impediments to the functioning of the zamindari system, our Committee will then advocate the abolition of the institution of landlordism with fair compensation.<sup>1</sup> Confiscation, we admit, makes "a dramatic appeal to those who are impatient of the system." They do not pretend to recognise that property has been the basis of our civilisation; nor do they appreciate the fact that "the progressive societies are built upon the regime of private property." Confiscation is not a remedy for peaceful times, it was possible in revolutionary Russia. According to Prof. Laski,<sup>2</sup> the result of so drastic a step as confiscation is the

---

<sup>1</sup>The Government of India Act, 1935, be it noted, is not in favour of expropriation of property in land without compensation. *Vide* section 299 of the Act.

<sup>2</sup>"Extinction of rights by the payment of compensation seems to leave in full vigour a class of functionless owners. That is true; and in strict logic it is unjustifiable. But the life of a community must be adjusted to its experience and not to strict logic. The sudden extinction of these legal rights would, if unaccompanied by compensation, probably result in an assault upon the government making the attempt. Men will sooner, as Machiavelli said, forgive the death of their relatives than the confiscation of their property. Nothing is so likely to poison the spirit of the body politic than the sudden disappointment of financial expectation"—Prof. Laski's "Grammar of Politics", p. 209.

evolution of ill will. That ill will should be avoided, and "it is always wise for statesmen to avoid the disappointment of established expectations so long as they can be abridged to reasonable dimensions. The community may pay a higher price in money; but the gain in the good will that accrues is always more than compensation for that price." Mr. Mill, who was very radical in his thinking, also agrees that landlords have indefeasible claim to compensation. "It is due to landowners, and to owners of any property whatever, recognised as such by the State, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its full pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to what they derived from it." Moreover, landlordism was accepted in Bengal because it was rooted in the traditions of the country; it is enjoying the protection of the State for so long a period.

Property rights are the child of law. Now, the question whether land ought to have been allowed to come into private hand, is meaningless. In fact, land has come to private hands, and "the present owners have brought or inherited them in exactly the same way as other people have bought or inherited other sorts of property." To appropriate them without compensation has no justification, and no Government can launch on any plan of confiscation in normal times. According to Prof. Pigou the argument for compensation derives its main force from the circumstances that land is a marketable commodity.

#### *Purchase of zamindaris after fair compensation.*

Compensation brings about gradual transformation; it takes note of the laws and conditions of reality. The misguided idealist is exasperated by the slow progress, and advocates confiscation as short cut to the millennium. He forgets that ideals have to be realised "through the common clay of human nature," and that by "protesting against the checks and controls he leaves society open to the assaults of anarchy." Our Committee, therefore, strongly argues in favour of compensation in the case of the extinguishment of the rights of landowners.

#### *Difficulties of valuation.*

Compensation is to be fair, and that offers certain difficulties: true valuation of the landed property is practically an impossible task. The market value is not the final indication: it is dependent on many seasonal factors. Land generally has two values, one a definite, ascertainable, agricultural value; the other an indefinite, speculative value. The second is compounded of "monopoly value, amenity value, prestige value and potential site value." Equity asserts that "similar persons should be treated similarly." But land always carries special value due to sentiment and other factors which cannot be valued and reckoned in compensation money. Accordingly, Prof. Pigou in his "Public

Finance" remarks: "We must content ourselves with such rough justice as is afforded by the payment of something, say 10 per cent. in excess of market value as compensation for disturbance."

*Principles advocated in Land Acquisition Act may be followed.*

Our Committee suggests that the principles advocated in the Indian Land Acquisition Act in the matter of valuation may be adopted. The agricultural value of land should be taken note of. Three commissioners, of which one shall be a person of legal knowledge and judicial experience, the second representing the landlord's interest and the third on behalf of tenants, may be appointed in every district to settle the compensation money. This plan was advocated by the Liberal Party of England in its report of the Land Committee, 1923-25 (p. 336). There can be no common standard for the calculation of the value of land. The values will differ according to districts, even according to estates. Lands in different parts of Bengal may yield different kinds of value, and compensation money is bound to vary in all cases. Moreover, the principle of statutory compensation, say 15 per cent. more than the purchase money by way of compensation for enforced disturbance of rights, should be accepted as advocated by Prof. Pigou and others and followed in the Indian Land Acquisition Act. All this cannot be neglected in determining a fair purchase money of the zamindaris. Our Committee strongly advocates that strict valuation should be made by taking all the relevant factors into consideration.

*Different schemes of payment to landlords.*

It is contended by economists that landlords should be paid out by annuity, because "the urgent need of agriculture is a sufficiency of capital; the capital improvement of its lands is the soundest investment the State can make, and the State's credit resources should, therefore, be used to assist the cultivator rather than to pay a lump sum for the purchase of the freehold." In England there are various schemes pushed by the different political parties. The Liberal Party is in favour of compensating landlords by an annuity which will be perpetual, but the State may make such arrangements as are equitable by sinking fund, drawings, or other means, to redeem the annuities in any way, equitable to all parties. The Labour Party is in favour of giving Land Bonds to the owner which would be redeemable by a sinking fund provided from the economic rent of the land. The official Conservative Party does not contemplate public ownership beyond the extension of small holdings. The small holdings movement is this: County Councils purchase lands and settle tenants on holdings, divided into economic units. In Scotland, compensation claims are determined by the Land Court. Messrs. Orwin and Peel who are distinguished authorities in England advocated that the National Land Stock should be issued to the landlord to the value of the property passing. The

stock will bear interest at a rate comparable with the yield of other long-dated British Government Stock at the time of issue. The stock will be redeemable through the creation of a sinking fund.

On a survey of the various schemes it becomes clear that the transference of land from private landlords may be effected in the following way:—

(1) A policy of purchase, as is found in the small holdings movement in England and Scotland, by the County Council. This is a very cautious and gradual policy of municipalisation of agricultural land.

(2) A policy of purchase by the State by issuing Land Bonds bearing fair interest with option of redemption through the creation of a sinking fund provided from the economic rent of the land.

(3) The initiation of a policy of accepting land in satisfaction of public dues payable by landlords. In England the Marquess of Lothian and the Duke of Montrose broached the proposal of paying death duties by surrendering a portion of the estate. We are told that this received substantial support in the Conservative circles.<sup>1</sup>

*In case of Land Stock, it will carry 5 per cent. as interest on principal.*

Our Committee has no desire to be dogmatic on any particular scheme: its chief concern is that the compensation shall be real and fair; that the land stock, whatever it is, should bear a rate of interest not less than 5 per cent.; and that it should be free from any kind of encumbrance and tax. Whether a particular measure will be good for the country or not, that depends on the technique of administration contemplated. "Nationalisation is not an end, but a means to an end, and when the question of ownership has been settled, the question of administration remains for solution."<sup>2</sup>

*\*Expenses to be involved in State purchase of zamindaris.*

The total sum required will undoubtedly be large, but the policy of purchase, if adopted, is bound to be gradual. The raiyati rent is estimated to be Rs. 12 crores; the compensation money may roughly be taken at Rs. 240 crores on the basis of twenty times the rental. The annual interest at 5 per cent. will be Rs. 12 crores; if another 6 crores be paid by way of 2½ per cent. as sinking fund, it will take 40 years to redeem the Land Bond. If sinking fund be at 1½ per cent., it will take nearly 66 years. In fact, the calculation is

<sup>1</sup>In fact the Finance Act of 1909 in England provided that the Inland Revenue Commissioners might accept land in lieu of death duties, but a Treasury Minute later ruled that land should only be accepted if it could be utilised for some public purpose, which in practice has nullified this provision. Vide "The Planning of Agriculture" by Viscount Astor and Keith A. H. Murray, published by Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup>Vide R. H. Tawney's "The Acquisitive Society."

not so easy. If the sinking fund that is created for amortisation is handed over to the landlord concerned, the interest will fall off annually to the extent the principal is paid off. Even if the sinking fund which will be annually created be kept separately and handed over to the landlord after a definite period, it will earn its own interest so long as it does not travel to the hands of private landlords. In this way, it will be found that every year the quantum of payment will decrease if the percentage of payment is maintained. If the amount of payment in the first year is continued, the period of 40 years contemplated will be considerably reduced. Moreover, all the districts should not be taken up at a time. Accordingly our Committee thinks that, given will and energy, the State can within a brief space of 25 to 50 years (the period depending on the extent and manner of payment) nationalise the entire province. Whether the nationalisation of lands is called for, or it will be all to the good of the country,—all these questions deserve separate treatment.

It would be better if an "estate" is purchased, and not an individual holding. It was the experience of Ireland that the sales of individual holdings, with the Land Commission acting as intermediary between the parties, were generally costly, slow and unsuitable to a huge purchase operation. Under Wyndham Act the landlord was obliged to sell an "estate."

#### *Peasant proprietorship or State landlordism.*

The raiyati rental in Bengal is very low (Rs. 3 in permanently settled estates), and it can be enhanced to Rs. 4-8 without making the pressure of rental heavy. That may mean lesser sub-lettings, consolidation of holdings and other economic measures. If the raiyati rental is enhanced, the policy of nationalisation resulting in peasant proprietorship may be completed within a very reasonable period. If the State proposes to act as landlord, it can do so and get back the money invested by pushing the rental to a very limited extent and by adopting other scientific measures. Whether there will be State landlordism or peasant proprietorship, is a matter of policy.

#### *Policy of purchase to be pushed gradually.*

Even this entire huge sum of Rs. 6 crores, earmarked for the sinking fund, will not be required at the initial stage; the rate of

It is generally accepted by the authorities on land economics that the involved in the task of nationalisation should ultimately come from the economic rent of raiyats. The nationalisation of lands would throw greater responsibilities on Government and would involve a draw on the State's resources for the improvement of agriculture. Unless the extra burden is met out of the enhanced rental, the resources of Government will be inadequate to meet the growing necessities of raiyats, and if Government fails there it will have devastating effects on the country.

interest will be met out of the existing raiyati rental. In Ireland the policy of purchasing landlords' rights was initiated in 1871, and it continued up to 1922, when it is claimed that she has been converted into a country of peasant proprietors. In England the Small Holdings Act was passed in 1908 and only 13,122 small holdings were established within a period of ten years (that is upto 1918). It is always a wise policy to take recourse to gradual transformation: the transference of agricultural land from the control of private persons into the hands of the State, country, or cultivators, should not be sudden, as the nation should be given time to adjust itself to the new mode of production. If a scheme spread over 50 or 60 years is planned, the extinguishment of the landlords' rights can peacefully be brought about. Our Committee is not at this stage offering a complete scheme of nationalisation: it is only giving an outline wherewith the details can be worked out, if the policy of purchase is accepted by the State. We are sure that the need for detailed statistical calculation will then arise.

**Q. 15.** We urge, and beg to repeat it here, that our Committee is definitely in favour of preserving the Permanent Settlement and of introducing suitable measures so that the system, based on the Regulations of 1793, may usefully and smoothly function. We have, however, indicated roughly the outline of our scheme of nationalisation if compensation is paid in bonds carrying interest. We have also shown how through the creation of a sinking fund, land can clearly become the property of the State or peasants, whichever is pursued. The period of redemption will depend on the percentage earmarked for the amortisation fund. Whether the sinking fund will be created or not, is also a matter of policy for the State. The rate of interest should be 5 per cent. exclusive of the sinking fund.

*Principles of the Wyndham Act regarding cash bonus may be followed.*

Even if the compensation be paid in bonds, our Committee desires to impress that at the initial stage one-fourth or one-sixth of the purchase money should be paid in cash, since "the estates burdened with encumbrances could be redeemed only in cash." The Wyndham Act of 1903 in Ireland introduced the principle of cash bonus. Wyndham desired that the cash bonus should be graduated inversely with the purchase price, that is 15 per cent. on an estate worth £5,000, 10 per cent. on one worth £20,000, and 5 per cent. on one worth £40,000, etc. This scheme of graduation was opposed, and the bonus was changed to one of 12 per cent. upon the sale price. In Ireland where the landlord made an agreement of sale with his tenants, subject to the limitation of the Act, the transaction was

known direct sale. The Act also provided for indirect sale, whereby the Estates Commissioners purchased an estate from the landlord and resold to the tenants. In either case, the Commissioners were empowered to rid the estate of uneconomic holdings, by adding to the existing holdings untenanted strips of land, or by interchanging strips of land so as to consolidate the occupier's farm land. The principles of cash bonus and other procedure of sale adopted in the Wyndham Act may be profitably followed.

**Q. 16.** We have indicated already that the abolition of the zamindari system will involve a revolution in the social life of the people. In rural Bengal there are gradations of people, and their interests are more or less inter-connected, so much so that in religious festivities and social ceremonies every section of the community has its proper place. The joint family system, the concept of social life, the interdependence among all classes which prevents the disintegration of society through class conflict—all this has derived vigour and nourishment from the existing land system.

*Collapse of rural society from the disappearance of landlord.*

In India, especially in Bengal, the absence of various avenues of employment has naturally transferred the attention of the people to land. A landlord has around him a large body of dependants; they render some sort of service and look up to his patronage. He has a large staff to maintain; he feels it an obligation to help the dependants of his raiyats in some way or other. Everybody and everything will be thrown out of gear. "As regards rural society generally, the disappearance of the landowner deprives it of its natural focus. With the dispersal of his property nothing remains to tie the squire to the locality in which he has exercised for so long, in greater or less degree, functions of leadership and wise-control. Many people do not realise the extent of the collapse in rural society, which is the first result of their abandonment, bringing discomfort and even misery to many of their more humble neighbours. Indeed, there are some who think that it is not for the good of rural society that the landlord element should be eliminated from it by the uncontrolled operation of economic pressure. The greatest single cause of social unrest is the disintegration of classes. Where everything is understood everything is forgiven, and people can only understand each other when they have opportunities of mixing freely one with another. On the estate and the farm, at work and at play, all classes on the land are in almost daily contact."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Vide Messrs. Orwin and Peel's "The Tenure of Agricultural Land."

*Hindu view of society will be sacrificed.*

• The rural society in Bengal is a mould into which "many different potters have poured their clay." The upper classes and the middle classes will, in the event of the abolition of the zamindari system, be withdrawn from land; there will be disintegration of the existing social classes; raiyats will be disciplined into a separate and independent economic interest. The law of social life will then be cold and cruel competition. Society will be a theatre of conflict, as the work of readjustment will be sacrificed to building a "brighter future" on the quicksands of class antagonism. There is such a thing as social environment; there is such a thing as fidelity to the past; all this will be ruthlessly rooted out in the scheme of the abolition of the zamindari system—a system which is not created by any legislation but has grown out of the soil of the country. According to the Hindu view of life,<sup>2</sup> each clan is centred in itself but works alongside another in co-operation. This mutuality, this synthesis is abandoned if landlords are made to go out of rural Bengal. The spirit of accommodation, which is the historical characteristic of the Hindu society, will then be extinct.

It will be a grave social disaster when the institutions maintained by the recurring grants of distinguished houses will collapse. Those welfare institutions—schools, libraries, dispensaries and others which are now maintained by landlords and will be extinct along with the abolition of the zamindari system—are the assets of the country. There are also religious endowments; we have not discussed how will they be dealt with, because our Committee is definitely of opinion that they should not be touched by the State in its eagerness to have more revenues. The rural society in its varied aspects has a dependence on landlords, and the collapse that the disappearance of the landlord element in society will involve, will be considerable and far-reaching in its effects.

---

<sup>1</sup>Bengal has received from time to time accessions of new blood and fresh traditions, contributing not a little to the variability and catholicity of culture. The prevalence of Buddhism encouraged such inter-mixture. The cults of Sahajiya, Aul and Baul, the liberal anti-caste outlook of Vaishnavism, the appeal of the Tantric discipline, the ideal of man-God in many popular cults, the folk literature influenced by the liberal traditions of religion—all testify to the wide-minded culture of the masses of Bengal.

<sup>2</sup>"Hinduism repudiates the belief resulting from a dualistic attitude that the plants in my garden are of God, while those in my neighbour's are weeds planted by the Devi which we should destroy at any cost. The cure for error is not the stake or the cudgel, not force or persecution, but the quiet diffusion of light. The interests of humanity require that every type should be assisted and educated to its adequate expression and development. Every historical group is unique and specific and has an ultimate value, and the highest morality requires that we should respect its individuality."—Prof. S. Radhakrishnan.



*Term "landlord" includes all classes of tenureholders.*

**Q. 17.** Our Committee desires to make its position clear. When we have talked of the abolition of the zamindari system or of the nationalisation of land, we have always included all the grades of tenureholders within the category of zamindars, as forming the landowning community. The technical meaning of the zamindar as paying "revenue" and not "rent," without including tenureholders in its fold, is not taken simply because of the fact that the community of landlords in Bengal cannot be understood without reference to tenureholders. We further feel that if the case for the abolition of the zamindari system has arisen, it is applicable to both "zamindars" and "tenureholders." If zamindars go out and tenureholders remain, the position practically remains the same, with this little difference that one grade of landlords is reduced. For all this, no State becomes ready to pay compensation, nor does the cry for the nationalisation of lands get any logical interpretation. However, our Committee thinks that zamindars and tenureholders are tied by the same bond, and in any scheme of reforming the land system, they should not be dealt with separately.<sup>1</sup>

*All grades of landlords to get compensation.*

We beg to repeat again that we are in favour of preserving the Permanent Settlement, and that legislations should be so devised as to help the functioning of the land system. But if the abolition of the zamindari system, or nationalisation as it is commonly put, is considered very essential by the State, our Committee holds that all grades of landlords should be given a fair compensation. The outline of the scheme of nationalisation, that we have given in the previous answers, is based on the presumption that in any such scheme interests upto the first grade of raiyats will be purchased.

*The anticipated effects of the proposed change in the land tenure system on agriculture.*

We have also indicated what radical changes will be brought about by the revolutionary scheme of nationalisation. But whether the nationalisation of land will lead to advantage or not will undoubtedly depend on the nature of agricultural policy that will be pursued by the State. Nationalisation means public ownership. If

---

<sup>1</sup>There are authorities who think that the abolition of tenureholders with compensation may facilitate the growth of a simple landlord-tenant system (that is, zamindar and raiyat) which may function better and more advantageously if a simplified, scientific legislation is given to the country. But no student of land economics has ever suggested that zamindars alone, excepting the tenureholders, should be paid off, because that will be keeping the landlord system *in toto*, with the superior grade being out of the picture. In estates where there are no tenureholders, that is altogether a different matter.

private landlords are extinguished, the question remains—who will own land, the State or peasant? Even if the question of ownership is settled, it does not necessarily promise better farming, better agriculture. We have already remarked that in the business of agriculture, the interests of land should be predominant. Whether the State will follow a forward agricultural policy in the matter of tenancy legislation, that is a matter to be watched. If nationalisation is advocated merely with a view to decrease the profit rates of property owners, and to provide the State with augmented land revenue for facilitating its operations, it does not ensure that better agriculture will follow therefrom. To achieve that something more than nationalisation is necessary, and that requires administering and nursing agricultural land in the interest of the country. The administration and management of agricultural land being matters of primary concern, the question of ownership recedes in the background, and accordingly our Committee has held that there has been an undue emphasis on the question of ownership in the revenue policy of the Government of Bengal, and consequently an inadequate and unsatisfactory approach to the agricultural problems of the country. In improving the land system, land has always, unfortunately, been neglected.

*Conditions on which the scheme of nationalisation of land is to be adopted, if at all.*

Hence, the question, that nationalisation of land will lead to any advantage, can only be dealt with if we can know that Government will pursue a scientific agricultural policy without stopping at the realisation of the augmented land revenue which will also, in the first three decades, be swallowed up in payment of compensation money to landlords.

*What would be the effect if the management is (a) carried on by the State, or (b) left to producers.*

**Q. 12.** The question of nationalisation amounts to an empty phrase, unless the allied questions of control and management are clearly brought out in the picture. It is an important but a delicate matter to decide on the question of administration and management. If by the process of nationalisation it is definitely aimed that the State will own and administer the instruments of production, that is likely to lead to the worst form of bureaucratic control. The State does not act; it acts through a body of people, called Government. These agents will believe that what is good according to them is good for society. "Power has the habit of corrupting even the noblest of those who exercise it; and it follows that to leave to the State the final control of all other wills in the community is, in fact, to leave

to a small number of men an authority it is difficult not to abuse."<sup>1</sup> It is suspected that if Government controls as many undertakings<sup>2</sup> as possible, it would be too powerful as against the people and the popular assembly—such an augmentation of governmental power would be dangerous to democracy. At the same time, the Government would be a bad administrator of the nationalised industry; no body manages industrial undertakings worse than the State.<sup>3</sup> If on the other hand, the instruments of production are left to be controlled by producers only, there is the danger that producers will look to their interest at the cost of efficiency and service to the community; they may raise their profit, diminish the quantity of production, increase the prices of products, etc. Producers must know that the instruments of production do not exist solely for their benefit. We have noted below the trends of modern thinking in the line of control and management of nationalised undertaking of agricultural land, only to emphasise the facts that the problem does not end at nationalisation, and that the questions of control and management are of greater importance. Accordingly, it is found that those who have advocated nationalisation have devoted special attention to laying down policies and agencies for control and management.

#### *Schemes of administration current in England.*

The Small Holdings and Allotments Act of 1908, to which the Conservative Party of England is committed, empowered County Council to take all the land which any individual owned in England and Wales in excess of 50 acres and to sell or lease it to a farmer or labourer. County Councils will have committees to attend to all matters relating to small holdings, and to promote the formation of Co-operative Associations among the occupiers of the holdings for banking, insurance and all agricultural purposes. The Labour Party's scheme of administration is roughly as follows: there will be County Agricultural Committees, consisting of an equal number of representatives of farmers and farm workers, chosen by their respective organisations, and members appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture from a list, including experienced persons, suggested by the County Council and other appropriate bodies. The Committee will enforce good husbandry, improve the existing method of cultivation and deal with other questions relating to administration. The Liberal Party's scheme of administration runs as follows: the administrative body will be popularly elected under the widest possible

<sup>1</sup>Prof. Harold Laski.

<sup>2</sup>Vide Otto Bauer, leader of the social democracy of Austria in his "Weg Zum Sozialismus (1919) quoted in "A History of Socialist thought" by H. W. Laidler.

franchise. Each administrative area should have its own representative body. Each county should be autonomous to the largest degree compatible with safeguarding the interest of the nation as a whole. Half of the members will be nominated and half provided by rural districts and by those urban districts which contain a minimum of 500 agriculturists each. Of the nominated members, two-thirds are to be nominated by the County Council, and one-third by the Ministry of Agriculture after consultation with the recognised agricultural organisations in the country.

The scheme of administration advocated by Messrs. Orwin and Peel is this. Each administrative county will be under the control of a qualified County Land Agent responsible to the Chief Administrator of Lands. The County will be divided into administrative districts, each of them under the charge of a District Land Agent responsible to the County Land Agent. The Chief Administrator of Lands will be appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture.

We have surveyed some of the schemes of administration current in England to find out a common measure of agreement. They agree on the following lines:—

- (1) that there should be a separate department or agency for the purpose,
- (2) that the administration will be decentralised, and there will be an amount of regional autonomy,
- (3) that an elective element should be associated with the work of administration. (This is absent in the scheme of Messrs. Orwin and Peel).

*Improvements suggested to meet the situation in Bengal.*

Our country has yet to witness the adult franchise in the scheme of political Government. The training received from the exercise of franchise has not yet been adequate, as an extended political franchise is also of recent origin. Moreover, there are other peculiar conditions which do not warrant an elective body administering raiyats engaged in the sacred work of agriculture. The scheme of Messrs. Orwin and Peel is administratively practical, although it is criticised as being subject to all the objections against management by Government officials.<sup>1</sup> That criticism can be met if advisory committees,<sup>2</sup> partly elected and partly nominated, are associated with County Land Agents and District Land Agents. Our Committee does

<sup>1</sup>Vide Dampier's "Politics and the Land."

<sup>2</sup>An analogy may be found in the advisory committee associated with the administration of Court of Wards' Estates in the United Provinces.

not, at this stage, desire to commit itself to any scheme of administration, as its full picture can only be given if we can know the extent and manner of nationalisation.

*The criterion which should weigh with Government in devising the land system.*

**Q. 19.** The question sidetracks the fundamental principle of land economics, but lays stress on the wrong key. What raiyats will and do prefer in Bengal, that is a matter for the raiyats concerned; what raiyats should prefer, that is a matter for the State. The responsibilities of the State are grave: they should settle what raiyats ought to prefer. From a survey of the progressive land legislations in Europe,<sup>1</sup> it is abundantly clear that "peasant proprietorship" is more or less a courtesy expression; and that raiyats are disciplined and drilled into an approved line of conduct in the interest of agriculture. In the circumstances, it is no concern for the State to know what raiyats do prefer; it is a matter of supreme importance to know how can agriculture be best improved, and it is the sacred duty of the State to subordinate the rights of farmers to the interests of farms.

*Raiyats under Government will show little improvement.*

We have already observed that mere nationalisation indicates no solution of the land problem; it is the agricultural policy, launched by the State, which will determine the extent of success. Therefore, if the raiyats of Bengal come under Government and pay rent to it direct and Government is satisfied with realising rent as landlord, no improvement in the situation can be expected. Our Committee has, accordingly, no faith that a millennium will set in from the inauguration of peasant proprietorship or State landlordism; much depends on how Government proposes to regulate the parties interested in land in the furtherance of "better farming, better agriculture and brighter countryside." The revenue policy of the Government of Bengal, so far pursued, is not encouraging; our Committee hopes that the new agrarian policy will be based on broader and more imaginative outlook.

*Condition of khas mahal tenants.*

Our Committee trusts that khas mahal raiyats are not better placed than their compatriots in the estates of private landlords for, amongst others, the following reasons:—

(1) The raiyati incidence of rent per acre is Rs. 3 in the permanently settled estates, Rs. 4-6 in the temporarily settled estates and Rs. 4-11 in the khas mahal areas.

<sup>1</sup>Vide "The Tenure of Agricultural Land" by Sachin Sen, wherein a survey of modern land legislations in Europe is made—pages 14 to 60, published in 1937.

(2) The realisation of rent in the khas mahal areas is made under the Public Demands Recovery Act and, accordingly, rents are realised more effectively and swiftly. Raiyats cannot fall in arrears, and it is undoubtedly to the ultimate good of raiyats. Private landlords show leniency which is not obtainable from Government; they wait up till the last moment and generally go to Civil Courts when the period of limitation is about to expire. Even in Courts, rent suits are dragged on, and it is a common experience that the rent suit begins in the fourth year and landlord gets a rent decree in the fifth or sixth year; during all these intervening years raiyats occupy the holdings without any payment of subsequest dues, not covered by the suit. This state of thing is only possible under private landlords. To ensure prompt realisation of arrear rents in khas mahal estates, the help of the police and the executive is also resorted to.

(3) In estates under private landlords the touch between landlords and raiyats is human, and necessarily sympathetic. There is understanding; much disobedience is forgotten, much wrong is forgiven. Whenever raiyats pray for mercy, they often get it. Unless certain raiyats are known to be deliberately refractory, landlords generally extend concessions as to the mode of payment of arrear rents, and they also remit interests thereon. In khas mahal areas there is no human touch; the mechanical administrative machinery goes on, and perhaps the efficiency of Government officers depends on the extent of realisations. Even if concessions (such as in emergent crisis of drought and inundation) are granted, they are generally done so out of a broader policy of the State; they thereby fail to establish personal human touch with individual raiyats.

(4) With Government officers in khas mahals the collection of rents is their routine work; with landlords the realisation of rents is a sacred obligation. Landlords have duties issuing out of rights; Government officers have rights, and their duties, if any, are catalogued and regulated by the authorities from above. In the circumstances, State-landlordism does not and cannot win over raiyats unless the State machinery, from the highest to the lowest, is informed by a spirit of service and sacrifice which cannot normally be expected from a bureaucratic organisation.

#### *The Permanent Settlement provided for subinfeudation.*

**Q. 20.** It was a settled policy behind the Permanent Settlement to encourage the creation of permanent tenures by zamindars. Section 9, Article VIII of Regulation I of 1793, clearly provided that the zamindars were privileged to transfer to whomsoever they might think proper by sale, gift or otherwise their proprietary rights

in the whole or any portion of their respective estates without applying to Government for its sanction to the transfer.

*The historical necessities of subinfeudation.*

The dismemberment of estates was further helped by the sunset law whereunder the deficiency in the payments of the zamindars was to be made good by selling a portion of their estates equal to the liquidation of it. The assessment at the Permanent Settlement was fixed high; it was expected, as Shore observed in his Minute of June 1789, that "several of the zamindars will incur penalties for the non-performance of their engagements, and it may be said that they (zamindars) will be sufferers, and not the Government, who will have a security in the land." In fact, the sunset law brought about quick changes in the ownership of many zamindaris, as many principal zamindars defaulted. Many zamindars saved themselves by the creation of patni and other permanent tenures which brought forth many prudent and vigilant landlords into existence as they, by employing their capital and abilities, rescued many zamindars and zamindaris. "It is certainly also for the interest of Government and good of the country," observed Shore, "that the great zamindaris should be dismembered; and the number of petty proprietors be increased. The raiyats or inferior renters, who suffer from the irregularity or inequality of the assessment, will obtain relief from being transferred to a more prudent, economical, or equitable management."

*The dismemberment of principal zamindaris was saved to a great extent by subinfeudation.*

At the time of the Permanent Settlement there were many territorial magnates, and it was the desire of the Ruling Power to see them dismembered. The creation of permanent tenures, through a policy of subinfeudation, saved many principal zamindars who could not, left to themselves, find their way to meet the revenue demand. This helped the growth of many inferior landlords within the principal zamindaris whose energy, prudence, and capital were extremely essential. They however minimised the influence and control of the superior zamindars. The following history of tenures is taken from Sir George Campbell's Administration Report for 1872-73:—

*The history of tenures.*

"At the Permanent Settlement, Government, by abdicating its position as exclusive possessor of the soil, and contenting itself with a permanent rent charge on the land, escaped thenceforward all the labour and risks attendant upon detailed mofussil management. The zamindars of Bengal proper were not slow to follow the example set before them, and immediately began to dispose of their zamindaris in a similar manner. Permanent undertenures known as patni tenures,

were created in large numbers and extensive tracts were leased out on long terms. By the year 1819 permanent alienation of the kind described had been so extensively effected, that they were formally legalised by Regulation VIII of that year, and means afforded to the zamindar of recovering arrears of rent from his patnidars, almost identical with those by which the demands of Government were enforced against himself.....It is a system by which, in its adoption by the zamindars, their posterity suffers, because it is clear that, if the bonus were not exacted, a higher rental could be permanently obtained from the land. This consideration has not, however, had much practical weight with the landholders. And if a gradual accession to the wealth and influence of the sub-proprietors be a desirable thing in the interest of the community, the selfishness of the landholding class is not, in this instance of it, a subject for regret.

The process of subinfeudation, described above, has not terminated with the patnidars and ijaradars however; gradations of sub-tenures under them, called dur-patnis and dur-ijaras and even further subordinate tenures, have been created in great numbers. And not infrequently, especially where particular lands are required for the growth of special crops, such as indigo, superior holders have taken undertenures from their own tenants.....All the undertenures in Bengal have not, however, been created since the Permanent Settlement in the manner above described. Dependant taluks, ganties, howlas and other similar fixed and transferable undertenures existed before the Settlement. "Their permanent character was practically recognised at the time of the Settlement, and has, at any rate, since then confirmed by lapse of time."

*The effect of subinfeudation on the agricultural economy of Bengal.*

The creation of permanent tenures has thus brought out prudent investors in the field and associated a greater number of persons in the land system, but it has also widened the gap between superior landlords and raiyats. It has not, as is held, led to the increase of raiyati rental, because the margin left over to zamindars was distributed among the grades of landlords. It may be urged that in the absence of grades of landlords there would have been room for greater concessions to raiyats by zamindars in times of necessity, because of the large margin enjoyed in normal times. But it was found in the process of historical evolution that without the creation of permanent tenures many houses could not have been maintained at all. In strict logic, the creation of permanent tenures, in and between zamindars and raiyats and the consequential decimation of the margin of profit of zamindars, is not helpful for the growth of a simple landlord-tenant system. A particular estate providing living for various grades of landlords and raiyats becomes subject to pressure and strain and is likely to respond to deterioration at the first touch of an economic



blizzard. To that extent the land system becomes involved and complicated. There are gains on the other side: the country, having no varied avenues of employment, shifts its capital and ability to land; this has accelerated the pace of extension of cultivation and improvement of agriculture; the shortage of capital in the matter of satisfaction of farmer's needs has never been felt, although Government have always been chary in meeting the financial needs of cultivators; there have been gradations of classes in rural society which have added to its variety and richness; the village side has thus been quick with life and has withstood the tendency to urbanisation which was helped by the diffusion of western light and learning in the country.

The growth of Bengal's middle classes has been the result of the creation of permanent tenures by zamindars. Raiyats have practically got all the classes of people in the rural society interested in them and in their welfare. The greater number of people have thus developed a stake in the existing land system. In this wise, raiyats have gained the adherence and guidance of many people. It is equally true that so many people, being dependant on land for "livings" have transmitted a heavy pressure on land which is not wholly to the advantage of raiyats. And the absence of other wide avenues of employment is perhaps traceable to this. This has its gains; this has its defects too, which can only be lessened by a progressive agrarian policy.

To know how far raiyats have been affected socially and economically, it is relevant to know both sides of the case for the permanent tenures in Bengal. It is true that raiyats have to occupy socially a lower position, because the permanent tenures have brought in different grades of people above them, but economically their position was strengthened in so far as their needs were met by them collectively. Through slow but steady process of synthesis, the evils of social backwardness have been greatly mitigated. The Hindu society believes in accommodation and specific performance of duties by specific classes; and accordingly, class consciousness has not been able to gather sufficient momentum to generate class conflict and rivalry.

**Q. 21.** We have already indicated that the State purchase of all tenures will tend to revolutionary changes in the modes of production with which the social, political and ethical life of the people are bound up.

*State purchase and middle classes—the political change in the country.*

Politically, the predominance of the middle classes in the legislature will be extinguished. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, rural areas have received greater share of representation, and Bengal's middle classes, who form the tenure holding community, are most advanced politically; and naturally their importance in Bengal's

political life is inevitable. They are leading political movements, responsible for the growth of new political ideology, and are representing the country in the legislature as being trustworthy and tried political fighters. Those who are holding the political field and even leading extreme political movements are not raiyats, far less actual tillers. It is well known that the Bengal landlords having decent incomes so as to place them in the category of the upper ten are very few in number;<sup>1</sup> but the landholding community of Bengal forms her middle classes. The extinction of this community will throw the higher grade of raiyats into the political forefront, and the middle classes being uprooted from the countryside will flock to the towns in greater numbers; and it may, therefore, be said that the nationalisation of land will help the movement of urbanisation and the emergence of "petite bourgeoisie" in the political field. If it is true that Bengal will live in villages and her political work will have to be carried on for the improvement of the countryside; the existing middle classes, torn away from land, will cease to be important in the political field. Our Committee does not intend making any prophecy here that such a contingency will be all to the good or evil of the country; but this revolutionary change in the political field shall have to be taken note of, in considering the effects of nationalisation of land.

*Legal profession—how affected by nationalisation.*

Legal profession, like "a bewitching mistress," attracts our middle classes most, and in fact the maffasil pleaders deal with cases arising mostly out of the Bengal Tenancy Act, money suits connected with moneylending operations, and title suits related to partitions of estates and other rights connected with land. Land being nationalised, there will be State landlordism or peasant proprietorship. The State will realise rents through summary procedure; Government will have to

---

<sup>1</sup>The electors of landholders' constituencies of the Bengal Legislative Assembly do not reach even one thousand in number. Their franchise qualifications are as follows:—

• A person shall be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for a landholders' constituency if during the previous year he either—

- (a) within the Burdwan and Presidency Divisions held in his own right as a permanent tenureholder one or more estates or shares of estates, or one or more permanent tenures or shares of such tenures held direct from a proprietor, and paid in respect thereof land revenue or rent or both amounting to not less than three thousand rupees, or road and public works cesses amounting to not less than seven hundred rupees; or
- (b) within the Dacca, Rajshahi and Chittagong Divisions held in his own right as a proprietor or as a permanent tenureholder one or more estates or shares of estates, or one or more permanent tenures or shares of such tenures held direct from a proprietor, and paid in respect thereof land revenue or rent or both amounting to not less than two thousand rupees, or road and public works cesses amounting to not less than five hundred rupees:

Provided that a person shall not be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for more than one landholders' constituency, and a person who would but for this provision be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for more than one such constituency shall be included in the roll for that constituency in which he made the greatest payment of land revenue, rent or cesses, as the case may be.

satisfy the financial needs of farmers, and it will have special powers in realising their interests and other dues. Legal profession shall have to look to other sources, and before the country advances industrially and commercially, this profession will be in its languid state, and even when industrialised, the number of people absorbed in the legal profession shall have to be thrown out for provision elsewhere. We have taken legal profession as an illustration; but in Bengal many of the professions derive their competence, so to say, from incomes provided by land. If the direct filtration of the land income is checked by tearing away all the landlords from land, it will take years to adjust and fit in.

*Nationalisation changing class relations.*

Our Committee is not suggesting that no country can prosper in a scheme of State landlordism or peasant proprietorship. If agriculture improves prosperity will set in, and the question of ownership has importance only when it is considered in its relation to the improvement of agriculture. But it submits that a sudden change in the land system will lead to a change in the constitution of her social classes, political forces, economic structure, and cultural background.

*Economic transformation under State landlordism.*

With the disappearance of the landlord would go one of the farmer's principal creditors. For every bit of rural welfare work, the resources of Government shall have to be drawn upon. Even today, the recurring grants to schools, colleges, hospitals, and other beneficent works, involve a great amount of money, and the whole amount will be withdrawn. The liquid capital in the hands of money-lenders shall not possibly be thrown open for raiyats, as it is likely that there will be rigid restrictions on land alienation in a scheme of peasant proprietorship or State landlordism. If there is no such restriction, private landlordism will again rear up its head. Accordingly, land once nationalised, shall be nursed by financial assistance from Government. Even in a form of peasant proprietorship, it is the Government which has to act as landlord by giving financial assistance and other directions. Hence, peasant proprietorship is a form of land tenure in name, and is preferred for psychological satisfaction of the peasant; it is the State on which the entire responsibility rests. The entire economic structure shall thus undergo transformation.

*Joint family system disintegrated under nationalisation.*

The joint family system in the middle classes will suffer a change. It has thrived on rural atmosphere and rural civilisation. It will be a misfit in urban environments, and in an atmosphere of urban civilisation, the constitution of society becomes individualistic, a system which is foreign to indigenous culture and traditions. This change in

outlook will involve not an inconsiderable strain on our people. The religious festivities and the social amenities of the countryside, which embrace all classes of rural people, are still provided for by the wealthy people of the locality, and along with the extinction of the landlord there would go many such festivities and amenities. Those who do not know Bengal's villages cannot recognise the importance of landlords in the countryside. The spirit of exclusiveness which has never pervaded our rural society will destroy old ties, old customs and old traditions.

**Q. 22.** If the zamindars and tenureholders are purchased naturally their attraction to live in the countryside will be reduced. Wealthy people may have country houses in villages after their likings. But, landlords will have little temptation in keeping their old homesteads, unless sentiments play a great part. They would naturally like to be away from the place where they had once power, position, prestige and influence.

- *Landlords may keep khas lands.*

But it will be a wise policy to give option to landlords to keep their khas lands in perpetuity and with full rights of ownership. In our country the sources of employment are very limited. It is quite natural that a large number of landlords will prefer to take to farming, and in that event khas lands should be placed under their disposal. Those who will not prefer it may have the liberty of getting the khas lands purchased along with the tenanted lands. When land will be nationalised as a matter of State policy, this option should in fairness be given to them. Those who will keep khas lands will naturally like to see their homesteads preserved.

Khas lands should broadly include those lands which are not tenanted and which are worked by hired agricultural labourers. Section 120 of the Bengal Tenancy Act lays down rules for determination of the proprietor's private land.

*Occupancy raiyat—a creation of British legislation.*

**Q. 23.** Our Committee contends that the occupancy raiyat, as we find to-day, is a creation of British legislation; he first appeared in the scene under cover of the Rent Act of 1859, and his rights have been broadened by subsequent tenancy legislations. The concept of occupancy right, as put forward by the Rent Act and encouraged by subsequent Acts, differs fundamentally from the one which was prevalent in the Hindu period, Muhammadan times, and at the time of the Permanent Settlement. Our Committee will accept the best authorities, friendly to raiyats in the matter, and try to impress the Commission that the incidents of "occupancy right" as created by British legislation were altogether different from those which we found

in the "earlier period." It may also be noted that the expression "occupancy raiyats" was also for the first time used in the Rent Act of 1859; and before that, the raiyats having a right of occupancy were known under the appellation of "khudkashts." With this terminological change there had been a large change in the contents of occupancy rights, and the change, it will be seen, was a change for the worse.

### *Khudkashts in the Hindu period.*

During the Hindu period, there were three classes of cultivators having interest in the soil: first, the original settlers and their descendants; second, the immigrants who had permanently settled in the village; third, the mere sojourners in the village. The first two classes formed the class of khudkasht (own cultivating) raiyats, and "they had an hereditary right to cultivate the lands of the village in which they resided." They were also called *chupperbund* (house-tied), *mauroosi* (hereditary) and *thani* (stationary). They could not be ousted while they continued to cultivate their holdings and pay the customary revenue; but on the other hand, they could not originally transfer their holdings without the consent of the community. They paid a higher rate of revenue than other cultivators, such as paikashts. (*Vide* Phillips' Tagore law lectures, 1874-75.)

### *Khudkashts in Muhammadan period.*

The rights of khudkashts were little disturbed in the Muhammadan period. "In the persistent force both of the cultivator's right to the land and of his obligation to cultivate it and pay the tax, we find a strong resemblance to the position of the khudkashts as they have come down to us from Hindu times. How far this element in the observed phenomena is due to the influence of Muhammadan theory, it is impossible to say: so far as we can judge, these rights of the Hindu khudkashts appear to have been analogous to, but not derived from, Muhammadan practice; and it is very probable that such analogies led the Muhammadans to disturb what they found existing so little as they seem to have done." (*Vide* Phillips' Land Tenures of Lower Bengal, pages 50-51.)

### *The status and rights of khudkashts in pre-Settlement period examined.*

There are many distinguished authorities who have made significant observations as to the status and rights of khudkasht raiyats at the period previous to the Permanent Settlement. Some of them are quoted here to find out the incidence of the raiyati right—

(A) "Pattas to the khudkasht raiyats or those who cultivate the land of the village where they reside, are generally given without any limitation of period, and express that they are to hold the lands paying the rents from year to year. Hence the right of occupancy originates;

and it is equally understood as a prescriptive law that the raiyats who hold by this tenure cannot relinquish any part of the lands in their possession, or change the species of cultivation, without a forfeiture of the right of occupancy, which is rarely insisted upon; and the zamindars demand and exact the difference. I understood also that this right of occupancy is admitted to extend even to the heirs of those who enjoy it. But though his title is hereditary, yet the raiyat cannot sell or mortgage his land." (Mr. Shore's Minute of June, 1789.)

(B) Cultivators possessed "a fixed hereditary right of occupancy in the fields cultivated by them or at their risk and charge; their tenure being independent of any known contract, originating probably in the mere act of settlement and tillage, and the engagements between them and the zamindar or (in the absence of a middleman) the Government officer serving, when any formal engagements are interchanged, not to create the holding but to define the amount to be paid on account of it. They cannot justly be ousted so long as they pay the amount or value demandable from them; which is determined according to local usage, sometimes by fixed money rates varying with the quality of the land or the nature of the crop grown; sometimes by the actual delivery of a fixed share of the grain produce; sometimes by an estimate and valuation of the same; sometimes by other rules." (Mr. Holt Mackenzie in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 18th April 1832.)

(C) Khudkasht raiyats are "resident raiyats cultivating lands in the villages in which they reside. They hold by prescription and cannot legally be turned out as long as they pay rent." (Mr. Welby Jackson, 27th August, 1852.)

"I do not think that the right of occupancy was formerly confined to those who had acquired such a right by prescription. It extended to all who had given unequivocal proof that they intend to remain at the place of their settlement and who had been recognised as fixed residents of the locality, although their holding may have been of recent date." (Mr. Justice Norman in the Great Rent Case: *Thakooranee Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee* and others, 1865.)

"To be a khudkasht raiyat at all implies that the raiyat must not only be a cultivator of lands belonging to the village in which he resides but he must be a hereditary husbandman. A khudkasht right is not acquired in a day but is transmitted, and it has never, so far as my knowledge extends, been laid down what exact length of holding gives a title to a tenant to consider himself a khudkasht raiyat." (Mr. Justice Steer in the Great Rent Case, 1865.)

(D) According to justice Field, two elements were necessary to constitute a khudkasht raiyat: residence in the village and occupation of land forming part of the village. The definition of "khudkasht"

in Wilson's Glossary is "a cultivator of his own hereditary lands." The word "khud" means self or own, and "kasht" means "to sow."

"A raiyat has nevertheless a title of occupancy, in right of which he may retain his land, so long as he continues to pay the rent in conformity with the custom of the country, or with his own particular engagement." Colebrooke in 1794.)

"Distinction from these claims are the rights and privileges of the cultivating raiyats, who, though they have no positive property in the soil, have a right of occupancy so long as they cultivate to the extent of their usual means, and give to the sircar or proprietor, whether in money or in kind, the accustomed portion of the produce." (Indian Government, October 1790.)

(E) "In the general opinion of the agricultural population, the right of the raiyat is considered as the greatest right in the country; but it is an untranserable right. The raiyat may, if harassed by our assessment, leave his lands, quit the neighbourhood, and return when he chooses and reclaim the lands, and raiyats holding them will always resign them to him. The right never seems to die." (The Third Report, Select Committee, 1831.) Be it noted that the right also never revives unless the raiyat comes back for residence and cultivation.

(F) "The khudkasht raiyats pay the highest rents." (Mr. Shore's Minute, June 1789.) "There is a peculiarity worthy of remarks in the cases in which the casual and perpetual occupants hold under the Government, that the perpetual occupant pays the larger rent of the two, his lands are more highly assessed." Mr. J. Mill, 4th August, 1831.) The vagrant raiyats take land at an under-rent (Phillip Francis, 1776). The settled raiyats, the ancient inhabitants attached to the soil by the bonds of affection, habit and property were made to pay heavier rates than the mere temporary sojourners (Sir George Campbell).

*The incidents of khudkasht right summed up.*

From the above quotations the following incidents of the khudkasht right can generally be inferred:—

(1) Residence, hereditary, and cultivation are the factors that go to constitute a khudkasht raiyat.

(2) The khudkasht right is an untransferable right. Sir George Campbell, Mr. Shore, Mr. Harington and others agree with this.

(3) The practice of subletting was not legal; it grew up through custom. Moreover, there was "not enough profit derived from them to lead to systematic underletting." The position is explained very clearly by Sir George Campbell in his Cobden Club essay: "Under native rule the rights in the land, whatever they may be, are not bought and sold in the market. As regards the occupancy of the

peasants, the rent which gives the real value going to the Government and the claim of the peasant being rather a privilege, deriving its value from sentiment, affection and habit, than a property capable of being estimated in money, there was little room for mercantile dealings. Nor was there any margin of profit which admitted of systematic subletting. Transfer from one hand to another did occur, but the communities claimed a right of veto, and would not permit the entrance by purchase of a stranger disagreeable to them. The general feeling prevented a man from alienating his land for ever. Hence, if the occupant was unable to cultivate his land or to pay the revenue, when he did not simply run away, the ordinary form of alienation was, not by selling or letting, but by mortgaging, if the term can properly be applied to the transaction. The mortgagee or depositary, undertook to discharge what was due upon the land and obtained the use of it, while the original owner retained an almost indefinite right of reclaiming it on repaying the mortgagee.....The seizure and sale of land for private debt was wholly and utterly unknown."

(4) The rate of rent payable by resident raiyats is determined according to local usage and is thus variable with the quality of land or nature of the crop.

(5) A raiyat can enjoy his right of occupancy so long as he cultivates and pays his stipulated rent.

(6) A resident raiyat paid the highest rent.

#### *Two classes of khudkasht raiyats.*

There was a distinction between raiyats settled as permanent inhabitants and cultivators in a village "who had given pledges by building and clearing and establishing themselves, and had accepted a share of common obligations," and those other raiyats who were avowedly mere temporary sojourners. According to Mr. Justice Trevor in the Great Rent Case, 1865, the khudkasht raiyats were at the time of the Settlement divided into two classes, the khudkasht kudeemee (those who had been in possession of the land for more than 12 years before the Settlement) and the simple khudkasht (those whose possession did not run back so long). Whatever be it, the incidents of the khudkasht right mentioned above are more or less accepted by all, and they thus involve a great departure from the incidents of occupancy right created by British legislation.

#### *Occupancy right as framed by Act X of 1859.*

By Act X of 1859, a new species of right, called an occupancy right, was conferred upon cultivators who had occupied their holdings for twelve years or upwards. Act X of 1859, section 6, re-enacted by Act VIII of 1869, section 6, provides that "every raiyat who shall



have cultivated or held land for a period of twelve years<sup>1</sup> shall have a right of occupancy in the land so cultivated or held by him, whether it be held under patta or not, so long as he pays the rent payable on account of the same; but this rule does not apply to khamar, nij-jote or sir<sup>2</sup> land belonging to the proprietor of the estate or tenure and let by him on lease for a term, or year by year, nor (as respects the actual cultivator) to lands sublet for a term, or year by year, by a raiyat having a right of occupancy. The holding of the father or other person from whom a raiyat inherits shall be deemed to be the holding of the raiyat within the meaning of this section."

Section 21, Act X of 1859, provides that no raiyat having a right of occupancy shall be ejected otherwise than in execution of a decree or order under the Act. The grounds of enhancement of rent are rigidly laid down in the Act, and they are: (1) the rate of rent paid by such raiyat is below the prevailing rate, (2) the value of produce or productive powers of the land have been increased otherwise than by the agency or at the expense of the raiyat, (3) the quantity of land held by the raiyat is proved by measurement to be greater than the quantity for which rent has been previously paid by him.

*Position of occupancy raiyat in the Act of 1859.*

Under the provisions of the Act of 1859, the position was this—

(1) A raiyat, be the khudkasht kudeemee or simple khudkasht or paikash, cultivating or holding land for 12 years, is entitled to an occupancy right. The Act divided raiyats into three classes: raiyats at fixed rates since the Permanent Settlement or whose rents had not been changed for twenty years, occupancy raiyats, and non-occupancy raiyats. This was a new classification, and khudkasht raiyats were obliterated.

(2) The "raiayat" is not defined; he may continue to be an occupancy raiyat even after subletting.

(3) The raiyat in order to acquire a right of occupancy need not himself actually cultivate; it is enough if he derives his profits directly from the produce.

(4) Ejectment for arrears of rent cannot take place except through the execution of a decree or order under the Act of 1859. Crops could be distrained for the arrears of one year only.

(5) Enhancement of rent cannot take place except on the grounds specifically mentioned.

---

<sup>1</sup>The period of prescription in the case of land was twelve years in India, and this had probably some influence in determining the period chosen. *Vide* Field and Phillips.

<sup>2</sup>All these expressions mean proprietor's private lands which are known at different places under different names.

(6) The Act being retrospective as to the commencement of the holding, the occupancy right may be acquired by a holding partly before and partly after the passing of Act X of 1859. (*Vide Phillips.*)

*•Difference between khudkasht right and the new occupancy right.*

Before Act X of 1859, raiyats were generally divided into two classes and the fundamental division was based on residence. The concept of a non-cultivating raiyat was absent. Act X made the division by reference to the period of occupation (not even cultivation). It thus "gave to the paikashat raiyat with twelve years' occupancy the same privileges which khudkasht raiyats generally possessed and deprived the khudkasht raiyats without twelve years' occupancy of holdings and they were placed in the same position as the paikashat raiyats without occupancy were." Thus the occupancy raiyats are not the successors of the khudkasht raiyats. The direct effect of the legislation, it was found, was that a large number of tenants, who before the Act were mere tenants-at-will, at once acquired a protected tenure. It was at the same time observed that the selection of twelve years, as the necessary period of prescription of occupancy, inflicted serious injury on the resident raiyats by placing them in the position of tenants-at-will in respect of all lands, of which they could not prove twelve years' continuous occupancy. Many new raiyats who were settled on waste lands acquired occupancy right through continuous holding for twelve years. Residence was rejected; we shall see even cultivation was not insisted upon; possession for a definite period was the foundation of the occupancy right. A raiyat subletting his holding did not cease to be a raiyat; a tenant-at-will through sheer force of 12 years became a protected tenure. It was clear that all these formed "a new species of right."

The incidents of occupancy right, as given by Act X of 1859, are enumerated above only to convince the Commission that the legislature did not revive old rights; it rather created new rights to the prejudice of the old ones.

*Incidents of occupancy right extended by later legislations.*

Since the Act of 1859 the incidents of occupancy right have been extended by various tenancy legislations, and the present position may be briefly described as follows:—

(1) "Raiyat" is defined in a way which admits a non-cultivator in its fold.

(2) The occupancy right is now a transferable right and all restrictions are taken away.

(3) To be an occupancy raiyat, one need not be either resident or hereditary or cultivator. The old idea of deprecating strangers acquiring raiyati rights in a village is abandoned.

(4) Because of the commercialisation of occupancy right, it is practically in the hands of a class of non-cultivating land speculators, whose protection was never contemplated by the framers of the Permanent Settlement or by the earlier jurists.

(5) An occupancy raiyat pays the lowest rent; hence the old position is thoroughly reversed.

(6) Even by defaulting in payment of rent an occupancy raiyat does not forfeit his rights and privileges; he cannot be ejected unless his holding is sold under a decree of the Court. There can be no distraint on his crops—a practice which was in existence from a very early period. Even in the matter of successive rent suits, some period (at present 9 months) will intervene, and thus the defaulting tenantry is encouraged.

(7) At present, even the restricted provisions for enhancement of rent are suspended.

*Occupancy raiyats are not the successors of khudkasht raiyats.*

All the above incidents, it will be found, are the creations of "British legislation." They were not in existence up to the time of the Permanent Settlement. The old position may be said to continue till 1859 when the occupancy right was given a new interpretation which led to the present position. It is, at this stage, idle to maintain that the Tenancy Acts have only restored the raiyats to their former rights; to be accurate, they have created definite new rights. "Khudkasht raiyats" have no affinity to the "occupancy raiyats" of to-day, and to establish a chain between the two classes is to misinterpret the basic foundation of the rights of raiyats, then and now. The question, with which we are dealing, however seems to suggest that there is such a link. It is not true. We shall discuss elsewhere that these new incidents of occupancy right have been created and the old incident neglected in disregard of the fundamental principles of land economics.

### *Family as the unit in India.*

**Q. 24.** In Hindu India, the village community was strong. The village community was an aggregation of families. The family consisted primarily of those who belonged to it by consanguinity; secondly, of those who had been engrafted on it by adoption; and thirdly, of those who were joined to it by common subjection to its head (who were called slaves). In a community so situated, law and custom reach the heads of families, and "to every individual the rule of conduct is the law of his home." The movement of progressive societies has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligations in its place. In India, the family is still considered as the unit.

*"Rights" have a vague meaning in India.*

In our country we speak of rights in a vague way; rights may mean legal rights exercised or not; moral rights; the right of might; and customary rights. To find out a distinction between express law and custom is very difficult in India; as custom, to quote Sir George Campbell, is the only "ever surviving law of the East." The distinction between law and moral precepts was not marked, as we find in Manu "mere moral precepts mixed up with what we should consider definite law."

The Hindu system hardly contemplates "exclusive individual rights at all." "All property in ordinary cases was the property of several and not one alone. The movable property as well as the land of the family belonged to the family jointly." It probably was the joint property of the village community. At this stage no family, much less any individual, could dispose of any land. "When the family, and later the individual, could not transfer land without the consent of the village, not only had the recognition of individual rights not been reached, but transfer of land can scarcely have been contemplated."

*The meaning of ownership. Right in land extended only to the right of cultivation.*

It is true that Manu and other Hindu law givers referred to the cultivators as the "owner" of land and rendering a share to the King as such. There is also mention of the sale of land and metals.<sup>1</sup> At the time of Manu the theory of joint family property was not abandoned.<sup>2</sup> Even if the stage of individual property was reached, it was relevant to know what the "right in land" meant. The rights, in fact, do not "appear to contemplate any ordinary use of the land except for the purpose of cultivation." This was very forcibly expressed by Mr. Arthur Phillips, a distinguished commentator on land tenures, in his Tagore Law Lectures<sup>3</sup> in the following manner:—"When we find that the occupant was bound by custom as well as by law to cultivate, and to cultivate in the customary manner, we are forced to conclude that the only purpose for which the soil could have been considered of value was for the purpose of cultivation. Whatever further capacity the soil may have had was not sufficiently brought home to the minds of the parties interested in it to induce any one to claim it; much less to give rise to that continuous and deliberate assertion of a claim which would have sufficed to constitute a customary

<sup>1</sup>"Sages who know former times consider this earth as the wife of King Prithu and thus pronounce cultivated land to be the property of him who cut away the wood, or who cleared and tilled it, and the antelope of the first hunter who mortally wounded it" (Manu). "The right so acquired might be sold, given, bequeathed, or otherwise alienated at the discretion of the individual." (Halhed.)

<sup>2</sup>One of the principles of the Hindu Law of inheritance is that all male heirs possess a joint interest in patrimonial property which is absolutely inseparable without the consent of all the co-parceners.

<sup>3</sup>In 1874-75. Vide Phillips' "Land Tenures of Lower Bengal," p. 222.

right to the soil itself. And we do not find that the question was ever raised, or that any deliberate or continuous claim to the ownership of the soil itself was ever put forward in Hindu times."

Thus the cultivator as an original settler, or the descendant of an original settler, had a right to occupation for the purpose of cultivation; the King claimed and received his share of the produce as prescribed by law. There was thus "a sort of joint proprietary right to the produce in the King and the raiyat. But beyond the produce no value in the land, and consequently no rights in the land, appear to have been contemplated in Hindu times."

Possession denotes not simply "physical detention" but also the intention to hold the thing detained as one's own. It is contended that time and undisturbed enjoyment had ripened the holding into a species of ownership by virtue of "prescription". Here, possession was definitely for the purpose of cultivation. A tenant forfeits his land if he fails to provide a crop.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, there is a distinction between the right to possess which is a consequence of ownership and the right of possession which is independent of ownership.

*The commercial value of land not grasped in early times.*

The commercial value of land was not grasped, as is pointed out by Phillips, Sir George Campbell and others. That was due to the difficulties of transfer, conservative habits of the people, and want of a market. That was a stage when the country was sparsely inhabited; much of it was waste, and land could be "had for the asking." The competition was not for lands but for tenants. Hence, "land had little marketable value and there was no market for it. The right which was bequeathed, sold or alienated related to the right of cultivation. The sale of land was hardly thought of; land was bequeathed and inherited for the purpose of cultivation and the enjoyment of this right depended on the payment of the share of crops, as occasionally fixed."

*Hindu system persisted even in Muhammadan period.*

The Hindus seem to have borrowed little from their Muhammadan conquerors either in the way of ideas or institutions. It is true that

---

<sup>1</sup>There is no trace in express Hindu Law of a right in any one to take the land out of cultivation, and to turn it into a pleasure ground for instance, or to exhaust all the minerals under it. The owner of the field is advised by Manu not to let it fallow by sheer negligence and to keep up sufficient hedge.

"For damage caused to his field by negligent herdsman in charge of cattle, the owner is entitled to compensation, and fines are payable to the King—" Manu.

"If a lessee of land does not exert himself and the land bears no crop in consequence, he is bound to pay the value of the crops that ought to have been grown on the land leased"—Apastamba.

"When a field was abandoned by the owner and the same was cultivated by another without opposition, the cultivator was entitled to the whole of the produce, and the owner would not get back the land without paying the cost of clearance and cultivation"—Narada.

Similar observations are found in abundance, and they inform us that the "owner" had not anything more than a right to cultivate and appropriate the produce after paying his share to the King.

the Muhammadan was much more familiar with individual property. The Muhammadan had no joint family system; he had a centralised system of Government, and was averse to anything hereditary. Thus the Muhammadan ideas run counter to the accepted maxims of Hindu jurisprudence. But the Hindu ideas persisted; either from motives of policy or convenience, the Hindu system in all matters relating to land was "substantially untouched by the Muhammadans." The right to occupy, cultivate and retain a share of the produce, which was asserted in Hindu times, was respected by the Muhammadan conquerors. The historians have accepted this standpoint.

*The history of the growth of zamindars.*

Along with the organisation of the village there ran a machinery for the collection of revenue, land revenue being the main source of income. Though the principle of equal division of property extends to every part of the Hindu institutions, yet, whatever public office or political power develops at the decease of the last incumbent, "the succession is nearly universally according to the rules of primogeniture." All offices in Hindu India were hereditary. The fiscal machinery consisted of the village headman who remitted the payment to the "chowdhury" in charge of a pargana, who, in his turn, transmitted the revenue to the treasury. The State's revenue officers were the village "gopas" whose duties were to prepare various registers; above the "gopa" stood the "sthanika" (Circle-Officer) who was responsible for a large area. At the top of all stood the "samaharta" (Collector-General). All these offices were hereditary and they were often paid by assignment of lands. The beginning of the institution of landlordism could be found in the fiscal machinery and in the mode and manner of payment. In course of time, the King lost connection with individual raiyats; the village headmen were responsible for the stipulated quota; every subordinate officer was responsible to the superior officer for fulfilling the amount of revenue. The same fiscal machinery, with changes in names, was continued in the Muhammadan times. Thus, we learn that by Akbar's time, the zamindars in Bengal were "numerous, rich and powerful." The payments to be made by raiyats were settled by zamindars; the arrangement of the State was with zemindars. In this way, the institution of landlordism grew. Sir George Campbell, in his Cobden Club essay, confessed that he was labouring under a wrong impression that the zamindars, with whom the Settlement of 1793 was made, were mere tax collectors but his connection with Bengal had convinced him that the position of zamindars, who were recognised proprietors, was not overestimated.

We have indicated to what extent actual cultivators were "owners." The right only extended to cultivation and appropriation of the "remaining" produce. The rents paid by them were not a form of tax to the State, as it has been shown that the State along with others had

a right to the produce. The share of the produce accordingly varied in respect of different kinds and different modes of cultivation. Moreover, hereditary Government officers being assigned responsibilities for filling up the quota of land revenue, cultivators were removed from direct connection with the State, and left with a subordinate position. The zamindars appeared in the scene, and before them "all rights sank."

*Incidents of occupancy right depart from principles of land economics.*

**Q. 25.** We have roughly indicated in our reply to question 23 that the incidents of occupancy right, as they exist today, involve a departure from the fundamental principles of land economics. Our Committee submits that if the Bengal Tenancy Act would not have strayed from the accepted principles of agricultural economics, the deterioration of landlordism, and necessarily of agriculture, could have been greatly checked. We premise that the landlord's position in agriculture is not of privilege but of utility. It is equally true that "the tenant's occupancy of agricultural land is a form of national service, and so rests his right to occupy on his proper use of land." These principles were recognised by the Permanent Settlement Regulations; they were abandoned by the Bengal Tenancy Act. We have repeated again and again, that this shifting of attention from land to landlords and tenants, as evidenced in the tenancy legislations, has been responsible for the breakdown of landlordism and decline of agriculture. It is freely suggested by critics that landlords do not perform their functions; but they do not care to inquire into the restraints provided for by the tenancy legislations. Those critics, however, show undue enthusiasm in turning a class of raiyats under cover of the tenancy legislation, into the position of rent-receiving functionless tenants. The incidents of occupancy right have been broadened in a way which do not ensure performance of raiyati obligations, nor are they conceived in the interest of agriculture. An occupancy raiyat smoothly converts himself into a rent-receiving landlord, by subletting to an under-raiyat, or can degenerate himself into an under-raiyat by transferring his occupancy right to his moneylender. He can enjoy all his rights and privileges without specific performance of his duties and proper use of land—the purpose for which his tenancy was created by the landlord. In the face of all this, it is difficult for our Committee to find out what principles of land economics were imported into the creation of this kind of occupancy right which is sought to be extended to "more than one grade of tenant."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>The expression "tenant", as used in the question, is a bit confusing. It is, perhaps, intended to convey the meaning of "more than one grade of raiyat." Under the Bengal Tenancy Act both tenureholders and raiyats are "tenants," and as such "under-raiyats" and other raiyats do not form a gradation of "tenants" but of "rai-yats."

*A policy of "cultivating tenure" favoured.*

The incidents of the khudkasht tenure, as we have already observed, were more scientific and suited to the improvement of agriculture. The principles of khudkasht tenure are, more or less, followed in the Rural Report of the Liberal Land Committee, England, 1923-25, where a policy of "cultivating tenure" was advocated. On account of the fundamental position of agriculture in our national life, it will be the right and duty of the State to see that the Tenancy Act is framed in a way which will—

(a) create conditions of "cultivating tenure" so as to give actual workers in the soil the utmost freedom, encouragement, and security for helping efficient production and for the disposal of the produce;

(b) preserve full opportunities of access to land for those who are best qualified to use it;

(c) protect agricultural land from misuse and exhaustion either due to bad farming and fragmentation of holdings or to other factors;

(d) bring into agricultural use any land capable of cultivation, and not at present cultivated;

(e) give agriculture the full benefit of its national credit sources and rescue land from the plight of under-capitalisation;

(f) root out the impediments to the performance of the functions of landlords and raiyats.

(g) raise to the maximum the population which the land can support at a proper level of subsistence. In short, the holding of any portion of agricultural land by raiyat must be conditional on full use being made of it for the national service which it can best render, and in a scheme of "cultivating tenure" those who are best qualified to use it should be given all these privileges.

*The case for reforming occupancy rights in the interest of good husbandry.*

Our Committee has shown that an occupancy raiyat of to-day, as created by the Tenancy Act, can afford to be negligent in cultivation, dilatory in payment of his dues, non-cultivating land, speculator, absentee rent-receiving sinecurist, and on the other hand can hamper well-meaning interference by landlords in the improvement of holdings, stop any access of landlords to the holdings, hinder landlords from launching on or initiating any good scheme, and depress the agricultural value of holding by indiscriminate subdivision, subletting and other forms of transfer. All this is being pointed out, because the



question under discussion takes for granted that the principle of occupancy rights, as applied, has been a salutary one, and that we are to find out what grade or grades of raiyats will be protected by the "occupancy right". Our Committee desires to fashion occupancy right, bearing in mind the principles of land tenure enumerated above, and it will be found that the cultivators should have "occupancy right", the incidents of which should not be framed in a way as to defeat the very purpose for which raiyats are tenanted or settled.

Our Committee is, therefore, in favour of reforming the "incidents of the occupancy right" and of extending the right, as modified, to the raiyat following the rules of good husbandry in the task of cultivation. Accordingly, the last grade of raiyat, who is an actual cultivator, should enjoy the occupancy right properly framed, but special arrangements are to be made so that women, children, old men and invalids, who cannot undertake cultivation, will be entitled to continue in the enjoyment of the occupancy right, even if their lands are sublet to other tenants for the purpose of cultivation.

*The concept of "raiya" in Tenancy Act—an unscientific arbitrary rule of definition.*

**Q. 26.** Our Committee desires to impress the Commission that "landlord" should be, and is defined as the person for the time being entitled to the rents and profits of any land. This concept of "landlord" is accepted in agricultural economics. Accordingly, raiyats subletting their lands to under-raiyats are *de facto* landlords although under the Bengal Tenancy Act they are not so under an arbitrary rule of definition. In the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923, which regulates the relations of landlords and tenants in England and Wales, "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive the rents and profits of any land and "tenant" means the holder of land under a contract of tenancy (*vide* section 57). This concept is followed in the Punjab Tenancy Act whereunder an owner of an estate, who cultivates himself or by hired labour and has no tenant, is a proprietor but not a landlord, while a raiyat who collects rent from an under-raiyat is a landlord. Landlord thus includes an occupancy tenant subletting his land.

*Legislation for the "occupancy raiyats" of Bengal Tenancy Act is not for the protection and welfare of actual raiyats.*

In this view of things, it will be very hard to maintain that we shall be doing good to raiyats by protecting those who have sublet their entire holdings. In respect of the portions of lands sublet, a raiyat, or under whatever nomenclature he is advertised, is essentially a landlord, and has or should have no right to enjoy privileges incidental to the right of cultivation. In the whole questionnaire we have

not come across any question seeking to find out how will and can the zamindars and tenureholders be helped and safeguarded in their rights and privileges essential for playing their role. But the Commission seeks to devote some hard thinking to find out ways of protecting raiyats who have, by their own actions, turned themselves into tenureholders, that is, landlords. If the Tenancy Act perseveres in calling them raiyats, they do not remain so in fact, and by protecting them, we cannot have the consolation of legislating "for the protection and welfare of raiyats."

*Cultivating raiyats should have restricted rights of alienation.*

Our Committee, accordingly, suggests that those who will take lands for the specific purpose of cultivation and as raiyats, should have very restricted right of alienation of their own lands; ordinarily, they should cultivate by their family or in conjunction with hired labour. In special circumstances, they may sublet for a fixed number of years. Restrictions on transfer and subletting are found in the Agra Tenancy Act, the Punjab Tenancy Act, Madras Estates Land Act and other tenancy legislation.

*Difference between non-agricultural and agricultural lands.*

**Q. 27.** The primary objective of the Permanent Settlement was improvement of agriculture, and it was expected that the improvement of industry and commerce would flow therefrom. Non-agricultural tenants naturally fall outside the orbit of the Permanent Settlement. Agriculture is the fundamental industry of Bengal, and naturally cultivators are given special protection in the interest of agriculture which forms the wealth of the country. Cultivators, by pooling their labours and energies for the improvement of agriculture, are entitled to special consideration. They are secured in their rights to accelerate the pace of agricultural progress. With non-agricultural tenants, these considerations do not weigh. Non-agricultural tenants are private individuals, and the safeguarding of their interests to the prejudice of other individuals, that is private owners of non-agricultural lands, has little meaning, less justification, as the special treatment of non-agricultural tenants does not add to the wealth of the country in any direct manner. With agricultural tenants the case is otherwise. The whole community is interested in their security, as their operations will nurse land, improve agriculture, and enrich the country. In the case of non-agricultural tenants, it is a matter between this individual and that individual. So long as the principle of private property is accepted and the acquisitive order of society recognised, it is only fair and equitable that the relations between landlords of non-agricultural lands and non-agricultural tenants should be governed by the law of contract. The play of private capital and competitive basis should not be undermined in any arbitrary manner. The State can, and does, only interfere if its

interference is justified in the interest of the general community at large. By giving specific concessions to non-agricultural tenants, Government does not advance the cause of society in general; the State merely helps certain private individuals by prejudicing the rights of other individuals. The case of Government interference in the interest of non-agricultural tenants does not thus gather any force; it has no incentive of service to society or to the people. Our Committee urges on the Commission to take note of the vital difference between non-agricultural and agricultural lands. The principles, adopted with regard to agricultural land, cannot therefore be applied to other forms of private property. That will be misjudging the special character of agricultural raiyats.

Our Committee, in the circumstances, strongly opposes the granting of occupancy rights to non-agricultural tenants.

*Non-agricultural lands subjected to Indian Income-tax.*

**Q. 28.** In our answer to question 27 we have indicated the vast difference between the tenants of agricultural and non-agricultural lands; we have maintained that agricultural tenants call for separate treatment. Accordingly, the agricultural holdings, when converted into non-agricultural lands, do not deserve special treatment, and the rights of agricultural tenants cannot, in all fairness, and should not, persist. The logic of special concessions to tenants is lost.

The incomes from non-agricultural lands are subjected to tax under the Indian Income-Tax Act. It is not, therefore, clear what is meant by the State levying "an additional tax" on the converted holdings when, in fact, they are being so subjected. Our Committee, therefore, opposes the levy of any additional tax on such converted lands.

*Metayage system very useful to agriculture.*

**Q. 29.** Our Committee thinks that the number of produce-sharing tenants in Bengal is on the increase. In West Bengal, where the crops are relatively uncertain on account of flood or uncertain rainfall, the "metayage" tenancy is natural. In the East Bengal districts, where harvests are practically assured, cash rent is the natural system, although bargadars have appeared in the scene. We shall discuss later that a healthy system of metayage, which is very popular in Italy, France and America, is very useful to agriculture.

*The reasons for the prevalence of "bhagchas".*

The system of barga or bhag is an arrangement under which a person cultivates land, gives a share of the crops raised to the owner of land, and keeps the remainder as his remuneration. "Adhi" is a similar arrangement in which the produce is divided half and half. The

reasons for the spread of the produce-rent system are generally stated to be the following:—

(1) The costs of agriculture have increased but the returns thereof have diminished. The higher castes with a view to distribute the risks prefer "bhag bili" which is to the natural advantage of both parties. In some parts of the Burdwan division landlords are to induce the aboriginal castes to take to cultivation by attractive terms on the produce-rent basis.

(2) In many instances smaller families, broken down by malaria and consequential low vitality, sublet on the produce-sharing basis.

(3) The moneylender who purchases a holding generally creates a new tenancy by changing cash rent into produce rent.

(4) Higher castes because of their natural inclinations, social status and shastric injunctions do not cultivate themselves; they sublet either on cash-rent or on produce-rent basis. The inherent advantages of the bhag system in certain local areas are leading to the increase of share-tenancy.

(5) The lower middle classes and even the higher grades among raiyats, influenced by western education in the school and urban allurements, leave the task of cultivation to "bhagchasis".

(6) The occupancy right being transferable, non-cultivating classes can and do take hold of the raiyati right and sublet the holdings thus acquired on a new basis, some on cash rent and others on produce rent. The opportunities for the increase of "bhag-bili" are thereby widened.

The reasons are not peculiar to West Bengal; they prevail, more or less, in all the districts of Bengal where small landlords and tenants of all grades including the raiyats let out lands in "bhag" or "thika". The system, perhaps, originated in the fact that people of the lower middle classes with small incomes wanted to have a ready means of livelihood; if bigger landlords let out in "bhag", they often do it for considerations to the "chasis" whose risks are less in such a system. The produce-paying cultivators, both in western and eastern Bengal, who pay a proportion of the produce that varies from locality to locality and according to agricultural circumstances, can be differentiated from the "dhankararidars" who enter into a contract for paying a fixed amount of produce and necessarily take all seasonal and cyclical risks.

---

<sup>1</sup>Raiyats and under-raiyats at produce rents should not be mixed up with bargadars and bhagchasis who are generally not regarded as tenants. Provision of section 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (inserted in 1928) states that "a person who under the system generally known as "adhi", "barga" or "bhag" cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce to that person, is not a tenant, unless (1) such person has been expressly admitted to be a tenant by his landlord in any document executed by him, or (2) he has been or is held by a Civil Court to be a tenant."

The extent of the increase of produce-paying cultivators can, however, be gathered only from the Settlement Reports of the different districts.

*In a bhag system the risks are distributed.*

**Q. 30.** We have shown some of the causes of the increase of produce-sharing cultivators. Bargadars may not have statutory rights, but the customary practices are not inimical to them. The "bhagchasi" is ordinarily allowed to cultivate the same holding for years and even for generations, to build his house on it, and settle down as though he were sure of permanent occupancy. There are bargadars who execute kabuliyats for short terms. In process of time, some of them acquire the status of raiyats and under-raiyats. In Rangpur, "some of the adhiars have acquired the status of settled raiyats, some are non-occupancy raiyats, while others are under-raiyats." (Provincial Gazetteer, Rangpur District.) He is a sort of metayer tenant who cultivates land under jotedars or their derivatives, and pays rent in kind. Lands are often let out in "barga," as the system is found to be of mutual advantage to both the parties. In a "bhag system" the risks are distributed, and it is quite likely that people with small incomes prefer the bhag system as the land may not be burdened with a "protected interest" which often results in inefficient farming through lack of knowledge and resources of cultivators. Our Committee agrees that the transfer of occupancy rights to non-agriculturists is likely to help the spread of "bhagbili." If the purchasers of raiyati holdings let out in barga, it is to be accepted that "barga system" has inherent advantages.

*Spread of barga depends on various factors.*

The spread of the barga system generally depends on local factors; the factors which lead to the increase in one part of Bengal may bring about different results in another part. It is difficult to dogmatise. The law of supply and demand of agricultural labour, the remunerative nature of agriculture, the energy and enterprise of the landlord, all are contributory factors in their own way.

**Q. 31.** The area held by the bargadar varies according to the condition of each bargadar and to the circumstances of each case.

It is true that many cultivators, besides possessing lands which they hold in their own raiyati and under-raiyati right, cultivate "bhag" lands. There are persons who take to "barga" only because they have not enough land of their own. Therefore, it may be said that, broadly speaking, bargadars do hold lands in raiyati and under-raiyati right.

*"Occupancy right" of the Bengal Tenancy Act should not be extended to bargadars.*

**Q. 32.** We have already observed that the "occupancy right," as interpreted by the Bengal Tenancy Act, is extremely harmful for agriculture and also for agriculturists. The real occupancy right in agricultural land should mean that so long as the raiyat cultivates land by his best exertions and pays his dues, he should be protected from eviction. The other occupancy rights relating to alienation of holdings, the manner of ejection by sale of the raiyati holdings defaulting payment of rent, etc. are all contributing to the decline of both cultivation and cultivators. The concept of relief or protection to cultivators should be more scientific than the one evidenced in the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Accordingly, our Committee does not, and cannot, favour the extension of "the occupancy right," as we find in the Bengal Tenancy Act, to bargadars. But it is at the same time true that the cultivators who are being given the right of cultivation on a share basis should not be disturbed at the indiscreet whims of any party. So long as bargadars agree to have the lands on the share basis, as determined by law or custom as the case may be, and show their responsibilities by proper cultivation and payment of the definite share allotted to the landlord under the form of supervision and direction, as given out in any written lease or unwritten customs, they should not be evicted only for the sake of bringing in new cultivators. In fact, it is not in the interest of landlords to take recourse to reckless evictions, nor do they do so.

*Steps necessary for the protection of bargadars.*

To ensure protection, (1) the division of share to each party may have legislative definition, (2) the terms whereunder the barga system is resorted to may be mentioned in written leases, (3) the exactions of landlords in any other form may be prohibited, (4) the specific performance of duties by the bargadar will be insisted upon, and on that will rest his rights, consistent with good agriculture. In a share-tenancy system, the shares will vary according as landlords agree to undertake greater or less responsibilities in the matter of supervision and direction of farms and assistance to farmers. This principle is accepted even in progressive Europe, and the incidents of occupancy right, as we find under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, do not exist in any post-war tenancy legislation of any part of Europe. Until modern times metayers in Europe had rarely written agreements. "A written title is the material for lawyers." In our country, as in Europe, the form of share-tenancy, though running from year to year, is little disturbed, and many share-tenants have been holding lands for generations, unless they have willingly travelled to industrial centres

or adopted other forms of occupation. Tenants know that "a written agreement can be far more easily thrown out than a purely customary title." A share tenant is "attached not only to his land but to the things which grow on it." But if bargadars demand a written lease, renewable from year to year, on specific performance of the terms stipulated therein, they may be satisfied "to ensure improved husbandry from their side."

*The advantages of the barga system.*

**Q. 33.** The barga system, or to put it in the language of agricultural economics, share-tenancy, has manifold economic advantages, some of which may be briefly mentioned—

(1) Share-tenancy is definitely useful to cultivators in so far as their risk is less than in cash-tenancy. "The thought of paying a fixed rent, whether the crop is large or small and whether the prices are high or low, is not attractive to the farmer."

(2) In a country where most of the cultivators have little wealth, a share of the product is of great help to them in case of crop failure.

(3) In a share-tenancy, payment of rent is more assured. The collection of rent becomes easier. The raiyats will give the landlord his share of the farm products much more cheerfully than pay him cash.

(4) Share-tenancy brings both landlords and raiyats into working partnership. The landlord is willing to exert and direct, help and take risk, because in that case there will be larger products which mean larger profits.

(5) The share rent adjusts itself to changes in the value of the products without any change in the contract. In a cash rent a tenant may be paying a usurious rate of rent; he may have miscalculation in fixing the amount of rent; and his payment will be dependant on better prices realised for the produce.

*Share rent versus cash rent.*

But it is true that in a cash-tenancy the cultivator gets the advantage of an extra large crop; he exerts himself in a cash-tenancy more because he knows that after payment of the fixed rent, he will enjoy the rest. In our country, where agriculture is dependant on precarious rainfall, and the raiyat lives on the margin of subsistence and has little reserve capital, share-tenancy offers better economic advantages, especially when under this system the participation of the interest of landlord in the work of cultivation and farm management shall have to be living and more direct and intimate. This is a matter of supreme importance in adhering to the share system, especially in a

scheme of private landlordism. It is only where raiyats are men of considerable wealth, can stand losses from time to time, are capable farmers and do not require the direction and supervision of landlord, that it is better for them to pay fixed rents.

Share-tenancy is more common than cash-tenancy in the United States. In South and West France, metayage system is popular. Mazzadria is a popular type of share-tenancy in Italy which covers more than one-third of agricultural land in the country. Share-tenancy is getting popular everywhere and is peculiarly suitable to our country. When a holding is tenanted on payment of a fixed rent, the landlord, in process of time, tends to lose interest in land except in rents thereof; that is very harmful for agriculture. In a share-tenancy, landlord is a joint manager with the tenant. There is less risk for the cultivator; the collection of rent becomes an easier matter. All these advantages cannot and should not be whittled down under the plea of clothing raiyats with more positive rights. In determining the form of tenure, it is to be found out which form would be suitable to agriculture. The mere fact that a cash paying raiyat will have greater rights should not drive out all other relevant considerations. If it is granted, as is generally complained of, that in a share-tenancy the landlord will have the advantage of asking for more, it may equally be said that the cultivator has greater opportunities of evading and avoiding payment of the adequate and stipulated share. Exaction on the one side can be met by cunningness and deceit on the other, and all this creates very unfavourable atmosphere for the growth of an ideal tenure. Mutual trust is the basis of an ideal land tenure. It may be necessary that the limit of the share of produce for each party under different forms of contract may be statutorily determined and a common standard of measurement recommended. The rights of bargadars necessary for the observance of the rules of good husbandry should be safeguarded.

Our Committee is, therefore, not in favour of preventing the extension of the barga system in the ultimate interest of agriculture and agriculturists.

**Q. 34.** The occupancy right, as sought to be extended to bargadars, needs definition. If it is proposed to clothe bargadars with all the incidents of occupancy right, as found in the Bengal Tenancy Act, it will throw Bengal's agriculture into "a pit of abysmal depth" wherefrom the rescue of agriculture will be out of the question. A bargadar, converted into a "protected tenant," may continue subletting and transferring his holding, and at the same time he will have no "risk of eviction" without his holding being brought to sale under a Civil Court decree; that will make an impossible situation for any system



to function. We do not know if all this is interpreted by any well-wisher of the tenant as affording the desired and necessary protection to the bargadar.

*Barga system, clothed with occupancy right, will complicate land system.*

It is quite likely that in the event of such an attempt the barga system will be substituted for by a system of cultivation by hired agricultural labourers. But this can only be done by capitalist landlords; tenants with small incomes may find the system of cultivation by hired labourers not practicable within their means. The barga system, if protected by all the incidents of occupancy right, will also neutralise the rights of the superior tenants and help the complication of the already complicated land system to an incredible extent. If bargadars are clothed with occupancy rights, it is not unlikely that landlords will prefer cultivation by hired labourers. They may keep more lands in their direct possession, but there is hardly any chance of increased unemployment of bargadars; the result will be that more bargadars will be turned into agricultural labourers. This will act as a check to the spread of the barga system which will not be salutary under the existing state of things.

*Various kinds of bhag jote in Bengal.*

**Q. 35.** To find out a fair proportion payable by bargadars is a difficult and delicate task. In Bengal, there are various kinds of bhag jote, such as—

- (1) Ardua-bhag jote—when produce is equally divided.
- (2) Thika or Dhan Thika—when the sub-tenant contracts to supply a fixed amount of produce taking all risks and bearing all expenses of cultivation.
- (3) Hal-krishi-krishani—in which the cultivator is a mere labourer who does the work, receives one-third of the outturn, the tenant supplying seed.
- (4) Atharabaisa jote—in which the under-tenant gets eighteen-forti-eighths of the produce but does all the work of cultivation and supplies seed, etc.
- (5) Panch-ardha jote—in which the under-tenant gets three-fifths of the produce doing all the work and supplying seed.

There are also other forms of bhag jote. In the Bankura district, no less than 11 per cent. of the total area of settled raiyats is held on "sanja," the rent consisting of a fixed amount of the produce irrespective of yield. "Sanja" is generally equivalent to one-third of the

crop in a normal year, and it has to be paid in good and bad years alike.

Our Committee is recounting all this to show that different proportions prevail in Bengal, and they are partly determined by the kind of services offered and received, and partly by customs in different districts. The methods of letting land on shares are bound to be varied, and even if scientific principles in disregard of customs are attempted to be introduced, the variation of shares cannot be avoided. Share-tenancies, under scientific principles, should vary with respect to (1) the equipment and supplies furnished by each party, (2) the degree of control exercised and the forms of work rendered by each party. Accordingly, the proportion of the product received by each party varies.<sup>1</sup> The different proportions are, therefore, to be determined with reference to the kind of control and service and there can be no such hard and fast fixation of the proportion, although half-and-half system is generally popular, and accepted in ordinary cases as representing the fair proportion. The maximum limit may be two-thirds (that is, landlord leaving one-third to the tenant).

*Wages vary from district to district.*

**Q. 36.** The wages<sup>2</sup> of agricultural labourers vary from district to district. The Bengal Census Report gives the following, indicating the average rate of daily wages of agricultural labourers in annas in 1925: Burdwan division 9·48 (although in Burdwan it is 11, and in Howrah and Hooghly 12). Presidency division 9·75 (although in Jessore it is 12 and in Khulna 13); Rajshahi division 10·89 (although in Rajshahi it is 15, in Pabna 13 and in Jalpaiguri 12); Dacca division it is 12·51; and Chittagong division it is 10·69 (although in Chittagong it is 13 and in Chittagong Hill districts 16).

---

<sup>1</sup>In the United States there is the one-fourth system (that is, when one-fourth of the product is the landlord's share) where the tenant usually furnishes all the equipment and seeds; the one-third system whereunder the landlord usually controls in detail the kind of crops to be grown on each field; the two-fifths system, the one-third system and the half-and-half system. For details, vide Henry C. Taylor's "Outlines of Agricultural Economics", pages 344-357. In Italy there are "terzieria" (landlord taking two-thirds of the crops), "tirare avanti" (where the owner gets into partnership with a "contadino", and after receiving 25 per cent. of the produce to himself as rent, he halves the remainder with the partner and becomes responsible for the provision of machinery, drainage and loan of money without interest needed for the year's working), over and above "mazzadria" (sharing with the matayer equally or in some other proportion).

<sup>2</sup>Economists draw a distinction between nominal and real wages. By "nominal" or money wages is meant the actual cash which a man earns for a period of time; by "real" wages is meant the quantity of goods which a man can buy with his money wages. In making comparisons, "real" wages should be taken. The nominal wages of agricultural labour rose from 105 in 1895 to 189 in 1912; and real wages from 103 to 138 during the same period. (Vide Second Wages Census of Bengal, April, 1911). These wages figures make no allowance for the fact that agricultural labour cannot be employed continuously throughout the year. The rise of "nominal" wages has not been so great as the rise in prices. Hence, "real" wages has fallen.

*No comparison on uncertain data.*

It is difficult to compare the economic position of an agricultural labourer with that of a bargadar and an under-raiyat unless other things, which are unknown in the present case, can be had. We do not know how many days will be taken as working days for an agricultural labourer, and if his subsidiary income will be taken. A bargadar and an under-raiyat will have variable income due to the nature of crop raised, the extent of holdings cultivated, and the productivity of the land concerned. If an agricultural labourer does not starve for work and a bargadar and an under-raiyat are fastened with uneconomic holdings which are not double-cropped and do not yield such crop as jute and tobacco, the agricultural labourer will certainly be better placed. The economic position of the two parties, when so many factors are unknown, can hardly be compared. But our general impression is that an agricultural labourer may have more freedom, and need not stick to his holding however uneconomic, like a limpet, but a bargadar and an under-raiyat, given an economic holding in an average fertile district, are far more better placed. But generally, our peasants are bound up with small and uneconomic holdings, and compared to their desperate position, an agricultural labourer has a better living. Our Committee, however, does not pretend to come to any definite conclusion on uncertain data.

**Q. 37.** The unrestricted right of transfer of holdings by an occupancy raiyat is at variance with the ideals of good land tenure. It is condemned by the best authorities on land economics; it is restricted by the progressive tenancy legislations in modern Europe. In any experiment of the land system, the economic holding cannot be sublet, nor can it be subdivided; it can be sold to one who intends to settle on the land for the manifest purpose of cultivation. The restrictions on mortgage and sale are conceived with an eye to agriculture. The ideal has found ready acceptance in the latest land experiments of the West.

*The harmful effect of unrestricted right of transfer.*

“A true peasant is he who wants to remain a peasant.” It is not helping a peasant when opportunities for ceasing to be a peasant are thrown open to him. Our Committee has noticed that the granting of unrestricted right of transfer has been claimed, and in fact it has been conceded to raiyats endowed with occupancy rights by Government, as a measure for the protection and welfare of raiyats. This new concept of relief to raiyats has never been appreciated by our Committee. It is genuine relief when concessions are granted by Government to raiyats for better performance of their rights and obligations. We do not know how “rai-yats” are benefited if they are helped to

convert themselves into non-cultivators or to degenerate themselves into an inferior position. That is what the unrestricted right of transfer seeks to bring about. It may be a relief to the outgoing raiyat but not to the raiyat who wants to carry on the task of cultivation without degenerating his status. The "fatal gift of transferable rights" does only bring in outsiders to step into the shoes of occupancy raiyats, or to degenerate the existing raiyats into under-raiyats, or to help the existing occupancy raiyats to play the role of petty landlords. To achieve all this in the name of doing good to raiyats in disregard of agricultural interests has confounded our Committee to a considerable extent. The doctrine of "free sale," which was warmly put forward in the nineteenth century, is now abandoned everywhere, primarily in the interest of agriculture, and accordingly, "the magic of property" and other similar arguments in favour of peasant proprietorship do not dominate modern thinking.

*The views of Florence Nightingale and Field.*

Miss Florence Nightingale,<sup>1</sup> a great friend of Bengal peasants, vehemently criticised the ideal of granting the right of transfer to raiyats and pertinently remarked: "To give the power of free sale to a people unaccustomed to such rights seems to be giving them the power of killing the goose which laid the golden eggs." In her opinion, the right of occupancy should be attached, not to the raiyat, but to the land. There should be, therefore, raiyati land. It would be interesting to recall the wise words of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Field (*vide* his "Landholding"):

"It must not be supposed that legislation which merely adjusts the relations between the zamindars and the raiyats will be a final solution of the difficulties which exist in these provinces. The Bengali or Behari raiyat is a very different individual from the enfranchised serf of modern Europe. He is inclined to sloth, wanting in thrift and self-reliance, careful only of the present and regardless of the future. Let no one indulge in the delusion that an Act, even of the Legislative Council of India, will convert him into a French or Prussian, or Belgian peasant, industrious, frugal and provident. Even when the raiyat is protected from oppression, there is the danger that he will convert himself into a petty landlord and an oppressor of the worst kind."

The Famine Commission (1880) approached the question from another standpoint and observed that the gift of transferable rights by increasing the credit of the raiyats would encourage beyond measure the habit of borrowing and more improvident modes of living;

---

<sup>1</sup>A paper, "The Dumb Shall Speak and the Deaf Shall Hear," read by Miss Florence Nightingale on 1st June, 1883, under the presidency of the Right Hon'ble Sir Bartle Frere, Bart., at the East India Association, London.

in fact, tenants with occupancy rights are more indebted than tenants-at-will. Debt follows credit, and raiyats with greater rights invite more easy money and get ensnared in debts.

*Free right of transfer criticised.*

Our Committee is definitely of opinion that the right of transfer, at first allowed by custom, then followed by law in a restricted form, and recently sanctioned by legislation without any kind of restriction whatsoever, has led (1) to the transfer of raiyati lands to non-agriculturists, and (2) to the prejudice of the interests of agriculturists and agriculture. Our Committee is in favour of restricting the rights of occupancy raiyats to resident and cultivating raiyats, a position which we have explained elsewhere in this memorandum, and accordingly, it is only those who are and intend to be cultivators should have access to the raiyati land. This restriction of alienation is being favoured by agronomists and followed in all progressive legislations, and we do not know what is exactly meant by the question, "Is this practicable"? Even if practical difficulties are experienced, they do not extinguish the need of reforming tenancy legislations on approved lines within the framework of the prevailing land system.

*Difficulties of determining the size of an economic holding.*

**Q. 38.** To determine the size of an economic holding presents many difficulties, as it is dependent on so many factors. The minimum size of a holding shall have to be ascertained with reference to a given stage of industrial and agricultural progress. Land forms the basis of agricultural production. Land varies greatly in economic capacity; it varies in its economic efficiency. Capacity and efficiency<sup>1</sup> are the two "dimensions of production." Efficiency is measured in terms of output per unit of "input," whereas capacity is measured in terms of input per acre of land. "If one would compare the productivity of two pieces of land it is not enough to know how much corn or other crop it will yield per acre; it is necessary to know the expense of the operation (the input) and the product per unit of expense. A piece of land might yield a large product per acre and yet class as relatively poor land because of the great expense of production." Moreover, the variation in economic productivity of land, or in its value-producing power, is due not only to the differences in topography, soil and climate but to the differences in the character of the people cultivating the land and to the differences in the distances from the markets at which the products of land are sold.

---

<sup>1</sup>"The capacity of a given area of land is measured in terms of the number of units of labour and capital which can be associated with it with optimum results at a given stage of industrial progress. The economic efficiency of land is measured in terms of the value of the product per unit of labour and capital expended upon it."—Henry C. Taylor in his "Outlines of Agricultural Economics," pp. 96-97.

However, in determining an economic holding,<sup>1</sup> we propose to distinguish it from a subsistence holding. The size of an economic unit will depend on bringing into maximum play the factors of production. A pair of bullocks (unimproved) and a plough (unimproved) can, with the requisite depth of tillage, have full play in a given area of four bighas having double crops. The cultivating family consisting of five members will have at least two or three working male members. If the given area of four bighas of land is situated in a dry condition and not assured of a regular supply of water, it will be found that in case of a well being set up for watering purposes, one or two hired agricultural labourers may be required till the period of harvesting.

*Factors determining the size of an economic holding.*

In finding out the size of an economic holding we shall have to see that the labours of the human and cattle units do not run to waste for any determinate period of the year. Land shall have to bear two crops a year. If crop varieties in different plots may be found suitable, the economic unit will expand into 8 to 10 bighas, the same as the unit of the subsistence holding. In Bengal, paddy and jute cover 24 million acres out of 28 million cultivated acres. Jute-growing land may have potato as an economic crop during the period from November to March. Jute is a very exhausting crop, and it will be in the interest of soil if it can be arranged that jute and "aus" paddy will be grown in alternate years. There are three main varieties of rice: (1) Aus is planted in April or May and reaped in July and September. It is a shallow water rice which must be reaped before the flood where this exceeds 2 feet. (2) Aman rice is sown in May and reaped in November and December. It is a deep water rice and when transplanted, it must be established before the flood. (3) Boro rice is sown after the flood in October and reaped in April and May and is usually transplanted (*vide* "Encyclopedia of Scientific Agriculture," edited by H. Hunter).

In an "aus" land, different crops such as potato, tobacco and others may be got. That will require liberal additions of manures to the soil. The difficulty is with "aman" lands, which cover the major portion of rice lands in Bengal. From experiments it shall have to be

<sup>1</sup>If an economic holding is defined as a holding which allows a cultivator a chance of producing sufficient to support himself and his family in reasonable comfort after paying his necessary expenses, the borderline between economic holding and subsistence holding vanishes. Situated as we are, there are advantages in emphasising the distinction between economic unit and subsistence unit. If an attempt is made to utilise the economic unit to give the optimum results by introducing a number of successive crops, diversification of crops and other economic ways, the size of the economic unit will increase. The economic unit may then be 8 or 10 bighas. Economic unit is to be determined, at the given stage of progress, by the play of the factors of production, and subsistence unit will be ascertained after taking into consideration many monetary and non-monetary factors.

found out if the quick growth of wheat, linseed, gram, etc., could be had within the period of mid-December to April after artificial manuring.

Our Committee is concentrating its attention on all this because in determining an economic unit we shall have to see that the factors of production, applied thereto, do not stay idle for any length of time. Hence, attention to manuring and making lands double-cropped is essential. It is only 9·8 per cent. of the cultivated area of Bengal which is cropped more than once. The consequential result is wastage of human and cattle units. Mr. J. C. Jack in his study of the economic life of the district of Faridpur says: "The time-table of the cultivator, when his land is unfit for jute, shows three months' hard work and nine months' idleness; if he grows jute as well as rice, he will have an additional six weeks' work in July and August. These are not conditions of which he can reasonably complain."<sup>1</sup> What is, therefore, really to be desired is a larger product per man. Where the product per man is large, there is a high standard of living and high state of well-being for the average man. Where nearly all the cultivable land is under cultivation, large product per man can only be secured by increasing the product per acre. There are generally two methods of increasing the productivity of each acre of land in use: (1) the growing of more productive crops, (2) the more intensive cultivation<sup>2</sup> of each crop.

### *Productivity of land to be increased.*

Our country is peculiarly situated, our population is likely to increase rapidly for a good many years to come, but our supply of land is limited. It is obvious that the present average rate of production per head cannot be increased or even maintained at the present level except by increasing the average productivity of land. In doing so, two obstacles are to be overcome: (1) tendency of the soil to decline in fertility as large and larger supplies of food are extracted from it, (2) the law of diminishing return.

Our Committee is, therefore, in favour of rigidly fixing the size of an economic unit which should not be disturbed under any plea. To get the best use of the economic unit requires rotation of crops, diversification of crops, and increasing the fertility or checking the

---

<sup>1</sup>The cultivator's time-table is discussed in full by Mr. Jack in Chapter 1 of the book referred to.

<sup>2</sup>Intensive farming, in strict sense, may mean any or all of the following methods: the application of more labour in the preparation of the soil and the handling of the crop; the use of more capital in connection with a given area of land and a given quantity of labour, thus enabling the same labour to prepare the soil more thoroughly and care for the crops more efficiently; the application of more scientific methods to improvement and maintenance of the fertility of the soil.

exhaustion of land. The major portion of the area of Bengal has been under plough for centuries. The inundated area of Bengal receives no doubt annually a deposit of silt which adds to the fertility of future years, but in those areas where silts are not annually deposited, the basic minimum of production has been reached. The primary question is, therefore, one of raising the fertility of the soil. The questions of improved plough, deeper cultivation, rotation of crops are all related to this.

Accordingly, under given conditions of production, the economic holding may be taken roughly at four bighas. It may be increased. A family should possess two to four economic units (that is, roughly 3 to 5 acres) for his subsistence. The minimum subsistence holding is generally accepted by Jack and others at 3 acres. The number of units required for the subsistence of a cultivating family at a reasonable standard can only be determined by reference to price mechanism, the amount of production, the condition of supply and other monetary and non-monetary factors.

*The evils of fragmented holdings.*

**Q. 39.** It is true that the size of many raiyati holdings is uneconomic. The law of average in these matters is very deceptive. Those who have more than subsistence holdings are in comfort; those who have not are a menace to agriculture. The average may lead us on to the wrong track. The Settlement Reports, the majority of them relating to the first quarter of the present century, give sufficient indications as to the subdivision of holdings, and since then, many holdings have undergone further fragmentation. Accordingly, we should not go by the law of averages or by the records of old Settlement Reports. The size of an average raiyati holding on the basis of Settlement Report figures comes to nearly 2 acres, but many of them have undoubtedly less than the average, and there the evil works out its mischief and brings about the decline of agriculture.

*Raiyats do not have economic holdings.*

If three acres form the subsistence holding, and four bighas the economic unit beyond which it should not be fragmented, it will be found that many of the raiyats have not the requisite units. One may possess more than 3 acres, subdivided into uneconomic plots. That worsens the situation. Many of them have less than 3 acres fragmented into uneconomic plots, that seals the doom of agriculture

---

<sup>1</sup>"In a village in Murshidabad district I found the average size of holdings to be 10 cottahs, i.e., .20 acre; but these are widely scattered, sometimes separated by a distance of 2 to 3 miles. The size of the smallest plot is 2 cottahs, i.e., .04 acre." Dr. Radha Kamal Mukherjee in his "Rural Economy of India", published in 1926, pp. 51-52



and agriculturists. In Bengal, such a menacing situation is growing with devastating effects on agriculture.<sup>1</sup>

*The reasons of fragmentation of holdings.*

It is undoubtedly true that the inheritance laws, the statutory right of transfer by the occupancy raiyat, and the increase of population tend to fragmentation of holdings. The break up of the joint family and the importation of individualistic notions of property are no less responsible for division of holdings beyond economic units. But the chief blame must be shared by the imperfectly conceived Tenancy Act which at present allows subdivision of holdings to a unit carrying rent of one rupee (section 88 as amended in 1938). That is tantamount to permitting subdivision of holding to one bigha: It illustrates that either Government is insensible of the evils of fragmentation beyond economic limits, or that Government considers the one bigha holding as a desirable unit. If the Tenancy Act would have stopped the subdivision beyond four or five bighas, all the forces tending to fragmentation would not have received full play, and the decline of agriculture would not have been so assured. The laws of inheritance subdivide only the shares of holding; the Tenancy Act could have preserved the economic unit without disturbing the laws of inheritance.

*The case for consolidation of holdings.*

**Q. 40.** Consolidation of uneconomic holdings into economic units is necessary and desirable. Our Committee is not in favour of consolidating large areas into a compact holding. The holdings being dispersed have a great advantage in our country, because the deficiency or an irregular distribution of rainfall may destroy one crop, while there may be favourable returns from other fields. If we are not going in for mechanical cultivation, the dispersion of fields (without being uneconomic) with diversification of crops<sup>2</sup> will be suitable to our country.

In the matter of consolidation of uneconomic holdings, two things are to be noted: (1) the future deterioration of holdings beyond economic level, (2) the tackling of the existing uneconomic units. The future deterioration can be stopped by a provision in the Tenancy Act that the subdivision of holdings beyond a specified size, which will be

---

<sup>1</sup>Uneconomic holdings involve wastage of all the factors of production, destroy enterprise, involve loss of land owing to boundaries; they lower the standard of living, bring about chronic unemployment, breed inefficient labour.

<sup>2</sup>The diversification of crops has the following advantages: (1) Every crop has its enemies and these tend to multiply if the land is continually planted with the same crop. By changing the crop, the special enemies of each crop is held in check, even if they are not starved out altogether. (2) Different crops extract the different elements of plant from the soil in different proportion. A wise diversification of crop tends to exhaust the soil less rapidly. (3) Different crops require labour and attention at different times of the year. *Vide* T. N. Carver's "Principles of Rural Economics."

ascertained as an economic unit, should not be allowed. This will invite one complexity, that is, numerous persons may have claims on a particular holding. This multiplicity of claims may discourage the play of the human factor of production. Such a contingency arising, it is generally found that the surplus members having shares will be diverted elsewhere, either to the industrial centres or to some other occupation. It is no solution if a cultivator is provided with an uneconomic holding; in that case, he turns out to be a contributory cause of social unrest and disaster. "The very rights which the cultivator has in his land and which have been secured for him by special tenancy legislation make the cultivator stick like a limpet to his petty holding and prevent him from going in search of work in industrial centres except in the last extremity." In Europe, the practice of preferred heir system is being encouraged. The custom is being advocated to leave the property to a single heir who gradually pays off the charge paid on it by the father for the benefit of the other heirs. If he finds the property unprofitable, he sells it undivided; thus the size of the holding does not diminish.<sup>1</sup>

*Economic holdings brought about by voluntary effort or legislative enactment.*

Secondly, uneconomic units may be consolidated into economic levels by voluntary effort or by legislative enactment. In the Punjab, co-operative consolidation by consent has been effected. The first society was started in 1921, and in 1931 we find 500 societies with 48,000 members and during the period 336,000 acres have been consolidated at a cost of Rs. 2-5 per acre, the whole cost being borne by Government.<sup>2</sup> In 1929-30 the acreage consolidated amounted to 50,105 and the average size in block of the 7,651 owners was increased

<sup>1</sup>In Germany the practice among the peasants of succession to undivided properties by the creation of a preferred heir is encouraged by law. In Prussia, only one heir is to succeed to the family holding under a new law in 1924. In Denmark, the reconstituted small holdings can be sold but not subdivided, and the owner is to determine which child shall succeed and the other children are to be compensated. The Russian Agrarian Code, 1922, removes land from the sphere of buying and selling and forbids sale or gift or mortgage of the land. In small holdings movement and in peasant proprietorship brought about by compensation, it is arranged that the small holdings should not be subdivided; they can be sold. In France where the division of property is among all sons, "the population has not grown in order that the holdings might not be subdivided." The higher standard of living discourages population.

<sup>2</sup>"Societies generally cease to function as soon as the consolidation is completed. The fundamental weakness of the system, from the viewpoint of co-operative principles, is that the whole cost of consolidation, of which surveying is responsible for a considerable part, has been borne by the Government, the Registrar for the Punjab remarking that people nowhere seem sufficiently keen for consolidation to pay for it. Unanimous consent to the decision by all participants in the scheme is always required to avoid possible future disputes, although a Punjab bye-law, never invoked, would permit the majority to compel the minority by their votes to accept the lots offered them by the surveyor. A similar optional provision appears in the Consolidation of Holdings Act in the Central Provinces, which, however, applies to one division only"—Eleanor M. Hough in "The Co-operative Movement in India," published in 1932, p. 185.

from 0.51 to 2.9 acres. As a result of consolidation, no less than 993 new wells were sunk in the Punjab in that year, 5,206 acres brought under cultivation and 3,193 acres irrigated for the first time. Section 58A of the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887, as amended in 1927, provides as follows: "(1) Any tenant with a right of occupancy may, with the consent of his landlord, transfer his land to all the members of a Co-operative Society for the consolidation of holdings of which both he and his landlord are members and obtain from them any other land in exchange. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other enactment in force any land obtained in exchange in pursuance of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be subject to the same right of occupancy as the land given in exchange."<sup>1</sup>

*"Restripping" in foreign countries.*

There are legislative enactments for "restripping" of land. In Japan law permits a certain majority of owners in a village to apply for forcible allotment and restripping of the land, each man receiving a consolidated block in one or two places, approximately equivalent in area and value to the fields surrendered by him. The law provides also for the construction of roads and canals. In Europe there are legislations which compel villagers to accept restripment when a majority desires it.

*Consolidation by voluntary effort in Bengal.*

In Bengal, the task is to be undertaken within the framework of the zamindari system. It can only be introduced by voluntary efforts without disturbing in any way the rights of landlords. A particular area under a particular landlord can have the advantages of consolidation if the rights of landlords are duly protected. The methods adopted in the Punjab with suitable variations, incidental to the zamindari system, may be tried with the utmost caution in Bengal on strictly co-operative lines. Accordingly, the details of the Punjab scheme of consolidation are put down to fashion our line of reform. Legislative enforcement is unsuitable for a permanently settled province like Bengal. It is true that consolidation of holdings may reveal that

---

<sup>1</sup>The actual procedure of a co-operative consolidation of holdings society is that all persons who have a right in lands in the area affected agree to throw all their holdings into one joint holding, embracing them all and then to re-divide it according to their previous rights allotting to each other suitable blocks of land without the former evil of dispersal. There are thus two mutations effected in the revenue papers, though in practice both of them are entered, signed and approved at a single moment on the conclusion of the proceedings, when every member of the society has accepted the new holding which is being allotted to him by the society. The occupancy tenant thereby ceases to be a tenant under his original landlord, and becomes a tenant under the entire proprietary body. He then takes a new plot equal in area but different in locality from his former plot under his original landlord. Legally he has made two exchanges and clause 2 of section 58A protects him from any loss of right in consequence of this transfer. (Taken from: Om Prakash Agarwala's annotated edition of the Punjab Tenancy Act.)

there is a great surplus of agricultural labour, a portion of which may be employed in the land by improved methods of cultivation with successive number of crops which will necessitate more men for minute and patient attention, and the rest to be absorbed either in the village occupation and small scale industries or factories and mills started anew in the neighbouring towns to give a fillip to, and to keep pace with, agricultural prosperity set in by better farming. New economic forces are expected to bring in new conditions for adjustment: the fear of surplus agricultural labour should not extinguish our efforts for improving the ways and methods of agriculture in the country.

*Consolidation requires a new record-of-rights.*

**Q. 41.** We have discussed the difficulties of consolidation of holdings, the more so when the province is permanently settled and the landlord made proprietor. In a particular area under a particular landlord the work of consolidation may be carried on with the consent of the landlord on co-operative lines without prejudice to his interests. Subject to the rights of landlords, facilities should be provided for the work of consolidation; whether they will take the form of exchange, or purchase, or any other method, depends on the plan to be pursued. But consolidation will necessitate a new record-of-rights. The existing record-of-rights, prepared at an enormous cost paid by landlords and tenants, will thus be rendered useless. In the Punjab, the surveying work and other costs are borne by Government; it involves a departure from the co-operative principles, because raiyats should, in strict theory, bear their portion of expenses collectively. However, the expenses of new survey and settlement, incidental to consolidation, cannot and should not be imposed on landlords; it will be a matter for the State to decide if they will be met by Government or by raiyats. All this emphasises the difficulties of the work of consolidation and stresses the urgency of adopting measures to guard against the degeneration of holding beyond the economic level. The objects of the work of consolidation, if carried under the handicap of the difficulties pointed out, will be frustrated unless the complementary measures for prevention of the future fragmentation of holdings beyond economic level are adopted.

*The permissive Act in Baroda.*

The provisions of a permissive Act in Baroda for the consolidation of agricultural holdings, passed in 1920, are worthy of study in this connection:<sup>1</sup> (1) It cannot be made applicable to a village excepting when two-thirds of its total "khatedars," who are the holders of not less than half of its total land, desire to have it applied to their

---

<sup>1</sup>Vide Radha Kamal Mukherjee's "Land Problems of India," p. 63.

village.\* (2) After readjustment, the reconstituted holding, which will be the economic holding, should be regarded as indivisible. The right of pre-emption should be made applicable to the economic cultivating unit. (3) The economic holding will be held by the head of the family as family property and regarded as impartible and exempt from seizure for debt. (4) On his death, a preferred heir should succeed to the undivided economic cultivation unit and compensate the other heirs according to the agricultural profitableness of the farm and not its price in the land market. The German practice of the preferred heir system is followed.

*The undesirability of having large areas under a raiyat.*

**Q. 42.** The accumulation of large areas in an individual raiyat is always undesirable; that inevitably tends to lead to subletting and rack-renting. The lessons of agricultural economics dictate that a raiyat should not hold more than he can cultivate by his labour (including that of his family members). It should also be seen that the holdings, occupied by him, can give him maintenance and other little necessities on the average standard of life prevailing at that period in the given region. A raiyat who has generally no reserve capital for investment and scientific farming should not occupy more than 5 acres; if he does, he shall have to sublet, and that is likely to lead to rack-renting of the inferior raiyat. Moreover, the combination of two-fold functions in one man, cultivator in respect of a certain portion and landlord in respect of the rest, is very harmful for agriculture and complicates the land system itself. Legislative discouragement is the only way to prevent large areas from falling into the hands of one raiyat.

*The reasons why capitalist farmers should have large areas.*

If there are capitalist farmers or capitalists who intend to take to scientific farming, they should be allowed to get possession of large areas of land. They will invest money for better farming; cultivation by the aid of machines and artificial manures may give startling results which will tempt more capital in land; that is all to the good of the province. The economics of small holding may be suited for the country, but it will be an evil day if no room is thrown open for the investment of large capital in land for better farming which will effectively add to the riches of the country. Such capitalist farmers should rather be encouraged, and the landlords, who intend doing so, should be welcome as national assets. The Royal Commission of Agriculture in its report recommended that legal obstacles in the way of bigger landlords acquiring large areas "for the inauguration of improvements beyond the financial capacity of their tenants or

small holders," and for "the establishment of home farms and their management on modern scientific lines" or "the cultivation of special areas as seed farms for supplying the needs of their tenantry and the breeding and maintaining of pure line herds of stock" and for other welfare and business purposes, should be removed and replaced, where necessary, by "legislative encouragement." (*vide* para. 358). This has been recognised in the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926, under the provisions of which a landlord may apply to the Collector to acquire for him land held by an ex-proprietary or occupancy tenant for the purpose of farming on improved lines. The Bengal Tenancy Act is, however, travelling towards the opposite direction.

*Coparcenary detrimental to cultivation.*

**Q. 43.** It is true that coparcenary is detrimental to cultivation, the more so when many co-sharers have only small holdings to make their means of livelihood. The tendency of equal division among all sons is towards fragmentation of holdings beyond economic level. It is detrimental to cultivation, as the fragmented holdings involve wastage of both human and cattle units; they bring about a lower standard of living and inefficient agriculture. Moreover, too many co-sharers sticking to the holdings, which are not profitable, engender a sense of frustration in them, and thus the forces of discontent and disruption find nourishment from an extremely unscientific state of things.

*How the evils can be minimised.*

Without interfering with the laws of inheritance, the evil can be minimised by (1) creating economic units which can be sold but not divided, (2) introducing the practice of "preferred heir system" with compensation to the other co-sharers in the form of a sum of money or mortgage. Moreover, if it is found that the economic units cannot be disturbed by subdivision, it will be in the interest of a cultivator's family to settle mutually which child will succeed; and the other co-heirs will seek employment elsewhere or in other forms of work in the same village. In Bengal there is a demand for Bengalee labour in many spheres in the towns, and it is not likely that other avenues will be glutted within a very short time. The new economic forces, let loose by the new arrangement recommended, are likely to create new avenues for their absorption—an eventuality which is to be encouraged for the welfare of the province as a whole.

**Q. 44.** The evil effects of coparcenary and fragmentation in estates and tenures are not so pronounced. It is true that under our laws of inheritance estates are split up, and in the course of three generations, even big estates are partitioned into various small portions providing

livings for a good number of co-parcenars. This matter has no direct damaging economic effects on agriculture; it is, more or less, a social question: whether large estates will be maintained intact for providing a big common fund, to be distributed in accordance with the laws of inheritance. It is only in this connection that the question of primogeniture is raised, and that will amount to disturbing the laws of inheritance which our Committee does not approve.

*Appointment of a common manager.*

The appointment of a common manager is suggested as a way to avoid the injury to private rights arising from disputes among the proprietors of joint undivided estates. Regulation V of 1812 provided for the appointment of a common manager "to collect the rents and discharge the public revenue, and provide for the cultivation and future improvement of the estates." The history of the legislation on the subject of the appointment of a common manager is given in the Report of the Rent Law Commission. It may be true that the estates and tenures without being partitioned and under a common manager will give better returns for all the coparcenars. That is, however, a matter for mutual adjustment. The difficulties of availing of the device of appointing a common manager are dealt with in the reply to question 45.

*The harmful effects of common agent under legislative compulsion.*

**Q. 45.** It is a salutary canon that legislative interference should be made compulsory only when the welfare of the country as a whole calls for it. When it is a matter for particular individuals to decide which way their own interests will be served, any compulsion by legislation is unnecessary, and often disturbing. Moreover, any such compulsion may lead to mismanagement, as the officer, appointed by the co-sharer landlords under the threat of a legislation to arrange for the collection of rents, may take advantage of the disputes among co-parcenars with a view to become the real master of the situation. In the absence of legislative compulsion, the matter would be adjusted on mutual understanding which is far more valuable. If the coparceners do not agree and go on causing injury to private rights and public convenience, the existing provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, regarding the appointment of a common manager, are sufficient for the purpose. If a common agent is forced upon the coparceners under the coercion of a legislative provision in the Tenancy Act, it will not be beneficial for raiyats for whom he will have little affection, and in whose welfare he will have less interest (perhaps except in realisation), nor will he be very valuable for the co-sharer landlords themselves, as his role will be that of a Receiver of the property without any real

interest in it. Our Committee is, therefore, not in favour of legislative compulsion in such matters.

**Q. 48.** We have shown that according to some authorities the assessment of the Permanent Settlement was Rs. 2·68 crores (exclusive of sayes) and according to others 2·85 crores. The figure 257 lakhs naturally seems puzzling, although it is not our intention here to test the accuracy of the sum specified. The first part of the question forms the hypothesis, and it is indeed true to say that the excessive assessment was expected to become moderate in process of time.

*Permanent Settlement permitted enhancement of rents.*

Our Committee is definitely of opinion that the Permanent Settlement Regulations did not shut out the zamindars from enhancing the rents of raiyats; it was, however, true that the zamindars were forbidden to enhance the rate of rent, if it is considered as equivalent to the pargana rate. The maximum rate was the pargana rate which was also variable, but it was the standard to be appealed to. The specified amount of rent calculated in money which prevailed at the time of the Settlement could be enhanced under the provisions of the Permanent Settlement Regulations.

Our Committee will gladly discuss the question of enhancement at some length in order to establish the point beyond any manner of doubt that the zamindar's right to enhance the rents of raiyats was inherent, and even explicit, in the Regulations of 1793 and in the explanatory legislations that followed. To explain the underlying principles of the pargana rate, our Committee will have to discuss how they have been worked out in the period anterior to the Permanent Settlement. It is a pet theory with some critics that the zamindar's right to enhance rents is not warrantable under the Regulations of 1793, and questions 47 to 50 have evidently been framed to establish that theory. The opinions expressed in the questions have no scientific basis.<sup>1</sup>

*Measurement and revision of rates contemplated.*

Clause 2, section 60 of Regulation VIII of 1793 provides: "No actual proprietor of land, or farmer or person acting under their authority shall cancel the pattas of the khudkasht raiyat except upon proof that they have been obtained by collusion; or that the rents paid by them within the last three years have been reduced below the rate of the nirikbandi of the pargana; or that they have obtained collusive deductions; or upon a general measurement of the pargana for the purpose of equalising and correcting the assessment."

---

<sup>1</sup>"Scientific method sweeps aside our wishes and endeavours to arrive at opinions in which wishes play no part"—Bertrand Russel in "The Scientific Outlook."



The above section definitely argues in favour of a measurement and revision of rent rates, as would bring those rates into accord with the value, for the time being, of the samindar's share of the produce. The maintenance of patwaris which was imposed on proprietors by Regulation VIII of 1793 was evidently for the manifest purpose of keeping accounts relating to the lands, produce, collections and charges. Field in his "Landholding" (p. 551) observes that where rent was payable in money (as was in Bengal proper), there was no use in keeping an account of the "produce" for the assessment of the revenue; and the natural conclusion is that it was kept for the purpose of assessing the rent. This view is supported by section 62 of Regulation VIII of 1793 which expressly states that the rules prescribed regarding patwaris were framed also to "facilitate the decision of suits in the Courts of Judicature between proprietors and farmers of lands and persons paying rent or revenue to them." The duties of Kanungo were framed on similar lines.

*What the "pargana rate" means.*

The next matter that is referred to by section 60 of Regulation VIII of 1793 is the pargana rate. The Permanent Settlement Regulations clearly provide that raiyats are liable to pay rent at the established rate. This established rate is the pargana rate. The expression "pargana rate" shows that the rate of rent is variable in different districts, and that its variability is traceable to its relation to gross produce. It is the rate and not the rent referred to. The difficulty of determining the pargana rate is undoubtedly great. The pargana rate, by its very nature, is bound to become uncertain; and in fact section 5 of Regulation V of 1812 declared "that the pargana rates are in many instances become very uncertain." Section 7 of that Regulation explained the point further by stating that "the collections shall be made according to the rate for land of a similar description in places adjacent."

In June, 1789, Mr. Shore wrote that the qualities of the soil and the nature of the produce suggested the different rates of rent and endorsed the observation of the Collector of Rajshahi that "the infinite varieties of soil, and the further variations of value from local circumstances are absolutely beyond the investigation or almost comprehension not merely of a Collector but of any man who has not made it the business of his life.....The regulation of the rents

---

<sup>1</sup>The words, "actual produce", were defined by section 8 of Regulation I of 1801 to mean the net annual rent (i.e., where rent was payable in money) or other net produce (i.e., where rent was payable in kind) receivable by the proprietor after deducting from the gross rent or other gross produce the expenses of collection and management.

of the raiyats is properly a transaction between the samindar or landlord and his tenants, and not of the Government, and the detail attending it is so minute as to baffle the skill of any man not well versed in it."

It is well known that the rule of taking from the cultivator a share of the produce in kind and of making this share the ultimate standard for adjustment of a money rent, was an essential feature of the fiscal system of the Hindus. The Muhammadans, finding it akin to their system, allowed the Hindu method to remain. In the Ayeen-i-Akbari we find: "Some soils produce crops almost spontaneously, whilst the others require the greatest exertions of labour and skill. Much depends upon the vicinity or distance of water, and the neighbourhood of towns ought also to be a matter of consideration. So that it behoveth the officers of Government in their respective districts to attend to every one of those circumstances that the demands of the State may be fixed accordingly." Thus, the wisdom of variability of rates is recognised and accordingly the pargana rate, which was established, has all the elements of enhancement along with the increment of the value of produce, due to economic or non-economic reasons.

*Pargana rate varies according to capabilities of land.*

The principle of pargana rate is a recognition of the principle that "assessment should be fixed according to the value and capabilities of the land, and not according to produce." If the rent becomes a fixed portion of the produce, the different rates subsisting in different villages do not, and cannot, possibly arise. The pargana rate must take note of the various factors connected with the value and capabilities of land, such as, fertility of land, the denseness or otherwise of the population, the salubrity or inclemency of the climate, the abundance or scarcity of good culturable soil in the vicinity, the neighbourhood of market, the situational advantage, the benefits of good communications and so on. All this creates grades of difference in the value of land giving rise to different pargana rates. Accordingly, the ascertainment and determination of pargana rate requires minute and complicated examination, and in the fiscal machinery determining the pargana rate, the zamindars occupied the most distinguished place. Though the Ayeen-i-Akbari complimented the principle of fixing the rate of rent to the value of land, the difficulties of establishing different rates, in different districts after careful examination manifested themselves, and the Ayeen-i-Akbari admits the difficulties: "It was found very difficult to procure the current prices of grain from all parts of kingdom: and the delays that this occasioned in making the settlements were productive of many inconveniences. In order to remedy these evils His Majesty directed that a Settlement should be concluded

for ten years. For the above purpose, having found an aggregate of the rates of collection from the commencement of the fifteenth year of his reign to the twenty-fourth inclusive, they took a tenth part of that total as the annual rate for the ensuing ten years." Thus, individual village settlements were abandoned. The significance of such a step is pointed out by the Lieutenant Colonel Briggs in his work on "The Land Tax in India": "Thus it appears that at a very early period the scheme of Akbar to assess the field was discovered in practice to be full of embarrassment, and, before his measurement even was completed, he was reduced to the necessity of assessing whole villages, and leaving it to the people themselves to distribute the portion payable to individuals. This is one of the most instructive lessons we could have of the extreme difficulty of assessing land in any proportion which approaches to the full profit of the landlord."

Mr. Shore in his Minute of the 18th June 1789, speaks with special reference to Bengal: "In every district throughout Bengal where the license of exaction has not superseded all rules, the rents of the land are regulated by known rates called "nirik," and in some districts each village has its own. These rates are formed with respect to the produce of the land per bigha. Some soil produces two crops in a year of different species, some three. The more profitable articles such as the mulberry plant, betel leaf, tobacco, sugarcane and others render the value of the land proportionately great, these rates must have been fixed up on a measurement of the land, and the settlement of Toran (Todar) Mal may have formed the basis of them."

It is clear that individual assessments were made by landlords and those assessments formed the "nirik" which is variable and liable to enhancement. There was another difficulty of determining the pargana rate because the land of every village was divided into great many classes, according to its qualities fetching different rates of rent. To obviate this, the rate of rent paid by the greater number of raiyats goes to establish the pargana rate.

*Lord Cornwallis on pargana rate and the deduction therefrom.*

Whether the pargana rate prevailing in Bengal was equitable or whether the principle of pargana rate is itself scientific, these are questions which cannot be discussed at this stage. But it can be said that the pargana rate was in most places "fully equal to what the cultivator could afford to pay." Lord Cornwallis in his minute of February, 1790, clearly says: "whoever cultivates the land, the zamindars can receive no more than the established rent, which in most places is fully equal to what the cultivator can afford to pay. The rents of an estate can only be raised by inducing the raiyats to

cultivate the more valuable articles of produce and to clear the extensive tracts of waste land which are to be found in almost every *zamindari* in Bengal."

• From the above statement we get the following information:—

- (a) the established rent is what the cultivator can afford to pay;
- (b) the rents can be raised if more valuable articles of produce are cultivated;
- (c) the rents can be raised if waste lands are cultivated.

We have seen that the established rent rises along with the rise of the value of produce and, therefore, it is fully equal to what the cultivators can afford to pay. Mr. Justice Field explains the point when he says in reply to Mr. Mackenzie's note, dated 6th January, 1880 (in connection with the Rent Law Commission): "Under the former Government of the country the amount of revenue to be collected was settled by a periodical measurement and assessment—that the *pargana* rate originated in this measurement and assessment—that inasmuch as the assessment was based upon an average of prices for a period of years, it contained within itself an element of increase of rent as prices rose—that the early Regulations found this system in the country and did not interfere with it."

• *The view of Raja Rammohan Roy.*

Raja Rammohan Roy, in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1831, pointed out that "the different fields or plots of ground on an estate are classed into 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quality, and certain rates per bigha are affixed to them respectively, agreeable to established rates in the district. These rates are considered as a standard in settling the rent to be paid by the cultivator." This significant statement is in accord with the principles of Akbar's assessment, and shows that the increase of rent is inherent in the above principles.

The term, "*pargana* rate", occurs in the Regulations of 1793, 1794 and 1799 in connection with *khudkasht* *rai*yats. It is held by one school of critics that (a) the *pargana* rate never meant anything, (b) it was a mere myth, (c) it was only another term for the *zamindar's* discretion or moderation, (d) even if the *pargana* rates existed in 1793, they had become wellnigh obsolete in 1812.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>By section 6 of Regulation V of 1812 it was enacted that established *pargana* rates, where such existed, would determine the amount to be collected by Government officers and purchasers at sales for arrears of revenue but by section 7 it was enacted that in case in which no established rates of the *pargana* or local division of the country might be known, *pattas* would be granted and the collections made according to the rate payable for land of a similar description in the places adjacent.

Mr. Justice Trevor in the Great Rent Case, 1865, criticises the above view in the following manner:—"I cannot assent to the doctrine that the legislature in 1793 and the following years used terms without meaning, and directed the Court to settle disputes according to a rate which then had no existence. I must rather conclude that the terms which the legislature used to denote the rate which was to form the limit of the zamindar's demand represented something real and distinct at that period; and although in the shape of a pargana rate, the limit on the zamindar's demand had become by 1812, in some places, indistinct, still the limit existed in the shape of the rate which was payable for lands of a similar description in the places adjacent—a rate which is, in fact, the same thing with the pargana rate, under a different form—the customary rent deduced from the similar rate paid in places adjacent rather than from a rate current in the pargana."

**Q. 47.** In our previous answer our Committee has tried to show that revision of the rent-rates on the expiry of a lease was contemplated under the provisions of the Permanent Settlement Regulations. It is useless to attempt to trace the right principle during the last years of Moghul rule in Bengal. The only principle of action traceable throughout is a determination on the part of the Ruling Power to exact by means of arbitrary impost as much rent as possible from the zamindars or farmers of revenue as might be. Sir John Shore (Minute of June, 1789) remarked: "The mode of imposition was fundamentally ruinous both to the raiyats and zamindars; and its direct tendency was to force the latter into extortion, and all into fraud, concealment and distress."

Section 49 of Regulation VIII of 1793 provides for "mokararidars" and "istemrardars" who had (1) held at fixed rent for more than twelve years, or (2) contracted for payment at a fixed rent with the zamindar or actual proprietor. These two classes are not liable to be assessed with any increase.

*Enhancement of rent in respect of simple khudkashts and paikashts.*

The existing leases of khudkasht raiyats at the time of the Permanent Settlement who had no prescriptive rights were, with certain exceptions, specified in section 60 of Regulation VIII of 1793 to remain in force until the period of their expiry; and those raiyats were entitled to renewal of their leases at pargana rates; and on a sale for arrears of revenue such raiyats were entitled to a new Settlement at the pargana rates, and could be evicted only after declining to enter into agreement with the purchaser at the same rates. Should the rate in the engagement, cancelled by the sale, have been below that figure, they can only be evicted on refusing to renew at the pargana rates. It was also enacted by section 6 of Regulation IV of 1794 that "if a dispute arises between the raiyats and the persons from whom they may be entitled

to demand pattas regarding the rates of pattas, it should be determined in the Dewani Adawlut of the zillah in which the lands were situated according to the rates established in the pargana for lands of the same description and quality as those respecting which the dispute arose." As to paikasht raiyats they are nowhere expressly mentioned in the laws referring to Bengal.<sup>1</sup> If they held under pattas at the time of the Settlement, they were entitled to hold them till the expiry of the lease "under the comprehensive terms of clause 1, section 60, Regulation VIII of 1793, which included even them."

### *Period of leases.*

The period for which leases to tenants could be granted by zamindars was restricted to ten years, renewable in the last year for another period of ten years (*vide* section 2, Regulation XLIV of 1793). This law remained in force till 1812 when by Regulation V of that year, section 2, the above restriction was taken away, and zamindars were declared competent to grant leases for any period which they might deem most convenient to themselves and tenants, and most convenient to the improvement of their estates. Some doubts arose on the construction of section 2 of the above Regulation and they were set at rest by Regulation XVIII of 1812 which explained that the true intent of section 2 of Regulation V of 1812 was to declare proprietors of land competent to grant leases for any period, even for perpetuity and at any rent, which they might deem conducive to their interests. By section 2 of Regulation VIII of 1819, it was declared that all leases and engagements for the fixing of the rent now in existence, that may have been granted or concluded for a term of years or in perpetuity, by a proprietor under engagement with Government, or other persons competent to grant the same, shall be deemed good and valid tenure, notwithstanding that the same may have been executed before the passing of Regulation V of 1812, and while the rule of section 2 of Regulation XLIV of 1793, above alluded to, was in full force and effect.

Thus the position came to this—

(1) The khudkashts were entitled to pattas at the pargana rates by the laws of 1793.

(2) Under section 6 of Regulation IV of 1794 the Courts were, in cases of disputes, to determine the rates of the pattas according to the pargana rates.

---

<sup>1</sup>In section 10, Regulation II of 1795, which referred to Benares, they (paikasht raiyats) are expressly mentioned and declared to be equally entitled with khudkasht raiyats to have their pattas renewed at the established rates, provided the proprietor or farmer chooses to permit them to cultivate the land held by them, which they have the option to do, or not to do, as they think proper, on the expiry of all paikasht leases. In Bengal the paikashts have always been considered to have no rights independent of the particular engagements under which they hold; and those being cancelled, they are liable to immediate eviction. •

(3) Under the operation of the laws of 1812 and 1819, raiyats might, if they pleased, bind themselves by specific engagements, irrespective of pargana rates and having done so voluntarily, they would be held strictly to the terms of their engagement. (This interpretation was given by Mr. Justice Trevor in the Rent Case, 1865.)

*Subsequent laws to explain the position.*

In Regulation XI of 1822, the expression, khudkasht kudeemee raiyat (resident and hereditary raiyat with a prescriptive right of occupancy), was used in section 32 to designate the cultivator who would not be liable to eviction on a sale for arrears of revenue. It crystallised the doctrine that simple khudkasht raiyats who had their origin subsequent to the Settlement were liable to eviction; though if not evicted, they under section 33, could be called upon to pay rents determined according to the law and usage of the country. By Act XII of 1841 and Act 1 of 1845 (which repealed the former), a purchaser acquired his estate free of all encumbrances which had been imposed on it after the time of the Settlement, and he is entitled, after notice given under section 10 of Regulation V of 1812, to enhance at discretion, anything in the Regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the rents of all under-tenures in the said estate and to eject all under-tenants with certain exceptions, amongst which are khudkasht kudeemee, but not simple khudkasht raiyats.<sup>1</sup> All these laws were enacted to explain the points which were not considered explicit in the Regulations of 1793.

*Justice Trevor and other authorities on variability of rent inherent in pargana rate.*

"Since the Decennial Settlement, the rates of rent have adjusted themselves to the varying prices irrespective of any extraneous demand; and the terms used in Regulation V of 1812 have regard to the varying rates in the different localities which have resulted solely under the increased activity and industry caused by the comparative security obtained under the Permanent Settlement. To suppose that a pargana or local rate of rent could be permanently fixed in amount when the circumstances of the country were improving, is to suppose an impossible state of things. The proportion of the produce calculated in money payable to the zamindar, represented by the pargana or local rate, remains the same; but it will be represented, under the circumstances supposed, by an increased quantity of precious metals." This statement comes from Justice Trevor, fully concurred in by Justices Loch,

---

<sup>1</sup>"It follows that these laws distinctly gave the purchaser the power to eject a khudkasht raiyat whose tenure was created after the Permanent Settlement, and if not ejected, they are liable to be assessed at the discretion of the landlord. It is, in short, introducing into this country competition in the place of customary rents."—Judgment in the Great Rent Case 1865.

Bayley, Jackson and Glover. Mr. Justice Macpherson observes in a similar strain: "The rent payable by some of those raiyats was fixed and unalterable. The rent payable by others was subject to increase under certain conditions. Rents prior to the Settlement were fixed according to the produce of the land, so much of each bigha going to the Government as land revenue and so much to the raiyat. The same principle prevailed after the Settlement, save that the position of the zamindar, as landholder between the Government and the actual cultivator, was distinctly recognised. The rents were from time to time adjusted, and there was a pargana rate or customary rate of the neighbourhood (based on the original rule as to dividing the produce proportionately and from time to time readjusted) to refer to in case of dispute, and according to these rates the disputes were settled."

The rents of raiyats with occupancy right could not be enhanced above the pargana rates. "As regards new lands and persons not having a right of occupancy, the zamindars could make what arrangements they pleased." Mr. Justice Campbell concluded: "Looking to the expressions regarding the expiry and renewal of pattas, and the advantage to be derived from valuable articles of produce, I imagine that the framers of the early Regulations very probably contemplated periodical readjustment of rates between zamindars and raiyats with reference to the value of produce in the same way as was originally contemplated in Akbar's settlements, the plan of which was that the money rates were to be fixed every ten years on the average rates of the preceding ten, that is, the grain rates remaining the same, the money rates were to be adjusted in proportion to the average price of grain."

Mr. Holt Mackenzie, in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1832, pointed out that the rent rates "varied with the quality of the land or the nature of crop grown."

*The meaning of "fixed rates of rent" given by Sir Barnes Peacock.*

The Hon'ble Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of Bengal, pitched the case of Bengal landlords on a higher key when he observed: "By the term 'fixed rates of rent,' I understand not merely fixed and definite sums payable as rent, but also rates regulated by certain fixed principles, such, for instance, as a certain proportion of the gross or the net produce of every bigha, or such a sum of money as would be equal to such a proportion of the produce, or such a sum as would give to the raiyat any fixed rate of profit after payment of all expenses of cultivation." (Great Rent Case Judgment.)

*Principle of enhancement inherent in pargana rate.*

• It is admitted that "on a correct construction of the Regulations and Acts before Act X (of 1859) no landlord was legally entitled to



raise the rents of any village raiyats above the pargana or customary nirikh or rate." But Mr. Field says that the principle of enhancement is inherent in the principle of the pargana rate. "At a time when there was much waste land and cultivation was extending, the importance of periodical measurements must have been considerable. The assessment was merely the mode of making a pargana nirikh. While the nirikh thus established was in force (i.e., during the period intervening before a new nirikh was made), rent could not according to the custom of the country be raised above the rates of the nirikh."

The question gathers complication from the fact that the Permanent Settlement, although it settled and defined the mutual rights of the State and zamindars, did not settle, define, or ascertain the mutual rights of zamindars and raiyats. The Hon'ble Mr. Libert, who was not a friend of the zamindar, declared that the Permanent Settlement "transferred to the zamindars those indefinite proprietary rights in the soil which had formerly been claimed by the State. But it did not settle or define the rights of raiyats or occupying cultivators. The legislation of 1793 left those outstanding and undefined."

*Mr. Mackenzie's criticisms met.*

Critics hold that under the Regulations of the Permanent Settlement landlords had no right to enhance rent. They argue that the Permanent Settlement was devised for permanent fixation not only of revenue but of rent. Mr. Mackenzie, a member of the Rent Law Commission, 1880, and the then Revenue Secretary, Government of Bengal, who insisted on this view of the case, enunciated the following constitutional theory of raiyats' rent in Bengal: "My own view is that under the law and custom of Bengal no zamindar is entitled to rack-rent any cultivator admitted to settlement on the village lands. On his demesne lands (like khamar, nij-jote or sir lands) he can ask what rates he likes, but on the village lands the rates should be uniform, customary and fair, and such as to divide equitably between the zamindar and the cultivator in accordance with the custom that may have established itself in the village the net profits of cultivation after defraying all outgoings and the actual cultivators' wage." Even if this theory, put forward by one of the bitterest critics of landlords, is accepted, the enhancement of rent is possible,

- (a) if a raiyat is paying rent at a less rate than the village nirikh,
- (b) if a raiyat holds land for which he is not paying rent at all,
- (c) if profits leap up through a general rise in the value of produce, as equitable division of the net profits is emphasised.

*Fixity of rent not admitted by the Rent Law Commission, 1880.*

The Rent Law Commission, 1880, which zealously tried to guard raiyats' rights, pertinently remarked that "whatever differences of

opinion there may be as to the other rights which belonged to the raiyats in 1793, we think there can be no doubt as to one right, the right, that is, to have the proportion of the produce payable by the raiyat determined by Government. Such had been the practice of the Hindu and Muhammadan sovereigns, and the Government of 1793, though it created zamindars 'proprietors,' using a term which seemed to convey the absolute disposing power of an English landlord, never intended to destroy this right or to abdicate the function cast upon it by the ancient law of the country."

The above quotation is significant as the Rent Law Commission has made admission therein that (a) the rights of raiyats were uncertain, (b) the proportion of produce payable by raiyat is variable at the hands of Government, (c) zamindars were given in 1793 absolute disposing power. The claim that the Government of 1793 fixed rents in perpetuity is not admitted by the Rent Law Commission. The rent being liable to enhancement, could it be varied by Government or by landlords? Rent can be settled by custom, competition and law. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 left the matter to custom: the principle of competition was not introduced, and, in fact, in 1793 there was no competition among tenants for lands; it was the tenants who were to be courted; the Government forbore to determine the rents and left them to be settled by the parties, subject to the prevailing rate. It is not true to say that Government retained the rights and, in fact, it did not exercise any such right till 1885. Even in Act X of 1859 Government had no intention to disturb the customary rate.

*Formula in Hills v. Iswar Ghose.*

Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of Bengal, in the case of *Hills v. Iswar Ghose*, 1862, laid down the doctrine that the absolute increase in the value of the produce and also the portion of it due to the tenant's expenditure of capital or labour being ascertained, the landlord was entitled to the rest as economic rent. He took his stand on the Malthusian definition of rent which states that "rent is that portion of the value of the whole produce which remains to the owner of the land after all the outgoings belonging to its cultivators, of whatever kind, have been paid, including the profits of the capital employed, estimated, according to the usual and ordinary rate of agricultural capital at the time being." This decision was, however, overruled in the *Great Rent Case*, 1865, where the majority of Judges repudiated the theory of economic rent, and advocated that the rent should be fair and equitable which meant that the portion of the gross produce calculated in money, to which the zamindar was entitled under the custom of the country, would vary according to the rise of the value of produce.

The rent, fixed by the law and the usage of the country, is nothing but the pargana rate or the rate paid for similar lands in adjacent places.

*Formula in the Great Rent Case.*

The formula by which the increase should be determined seems to be the following: the value of the gross produce before the alleged alteration in the same is to the rent which the land then bore, as the altered value of the produce is to the rent which should be assessed on it, or, in another form, the old rent must bear to the new rent the same proportion as the former value of the produce bears to its present value. The value of the produce which each would receive, the one as rent, the other as raiyat's profit, would remain in the same proportion to each other, though the figures representing that proportion will be altered. This rule of proportion was accepted in the Great Rent Case, 1865. The Hon'ble Chief Justice, however, was in favour of granting something more to the Bengal landlords.

*Some authorities who disclaim the intention of the Permanent Settlement to fix rents in perpetuity.*

We give below more authorities who held that the rent was not fixed in perpetuity by the Permanent Settlement Regulations—

(1) Mr. Harington in his Analysis considered the question whether the rents of the permanent raiyats should be fixed. After giving arguments for and against the question, he finally summed up: "On the whole, considering the Act of Parliament ordaining the general preservation of rights, the orders of the Court of Directors for a settlement of ten years and the foregoing arguments for and against the raiyats, zamindars and Government respectively, I am of opinion, no perpetual right of possession, on condition of paying a fixed rent, should, at present, be conferred on those raiyats who have not already a declared or prescriptive title to such." Mr. Harington reproduced these views of 1789 six and twenty years after, in 1815, when he published his Analysis, and "the context shows that he would not have done so, if they had not been accepted."

(2) Mr. A. D. Campbell observed in 1832: "The Permanent Settlement, whilst it shut the public treasury against any increased receipt from the land by commuting the zamindars' variable payment, as the hereditary contractor for the land revenue, into a fixed jama determined irrevocably, entirely neglected to fix the amount payable by the cultivator to this hereditary contractor." Mr. Campbell was a great critic of zamindars' rights.

(3) "In point of law and fact, the raiyat can claim under the provisions of Lord Cornwallis' Code no rights at all. For the few privileges he may enjoy, he is indebted entirely to the forbearance or to the fears of his task master, zamindar."—(Land Tenure By a Civilian.)

(4) "I make this conclusion upon the supposition that they are, to be at liberty to raise their rents, like landlords in other countries; for

if they are restricted from raising the assessment fixed by Government, and are at the same time liable for all losses, they have not the free management of their estates and hardly deserve the name of owners"—Colonel Munro's observation in or about 1806 (*vide* Appendix to the Fifth Report).

(5) "True it is that an arrangement, under which Government would reserve to itself a claim upon a share of the value of the increased produce of the land, or rather the right of augmenting the land tax in proportion to the increased power of the land to pay it, does imply a departure from the principle of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal which has secured to the proprietors of estates the whole advantage of a rise in their rental"—Letter to Government of Bengal by the Directors in 1812.

Similar observations are found in abundance in various distinguished works.

*Privy Council on the zamindar's right to enhance rent.*

The provisions of the Permanent Settlement Regulations, the legislations passed thereafter to confirm the rights granted by the Regulations of 1793, the express assent of the Government of Bengal and the Court of Directors, and last, but not the least, the judicial decisions go to establish the zamindar's right to enhance rents. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council affirmed the right in no uncertain language when their Lordships observed in *Radhika Chaudhrani v. Bama Sundari Dasi* (*vide* 13 Moore's Indian Appeals, p. 248): "A suit to enhance proceeds on the presumption, that a zamindar, holding under the Perpetual Settlement, has the right from time to time to raise the rents of all the rent-paying lands within his zamindari according to the pargana or current rates, unless either he be precluded from the exercise of that right by a contract binding on him, or the lands in question can be brought within one of the exemptions recognised by Regulation VIII of 1793." And again:—"The right of the zamindar to enhance rent is presumable until the contrary is shown." (*Forbes v. Mir Mahammed Hossain*, 12 Bengal Law Reports, p. 215.)

Our Committee cannot, therefore, agree that the permanency of rent was contemplated, far less provided for, by the Permanent Settlement Regulations of 1793.

**Q. 48.** Our Committee has shown that the zamindar's right to enhance rents receives corroboration from (a) the terms of the Permanent Settlement Regulations, (b) other legislations passed after 1793 to confirm and explain the rights granted by the Permanent Settlement, and (c) declarations of contemporary and distinguished authorities. Section 50(1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act was necessary to respect the rights of "mukararidars" and "istemrardars" who are

not liable to be assessed with any increase under section 49 of Regulation VIII of 1793. The doctrine that a raiyat paying the same rate of rent for 20 years be presumed to have held at that rate from the time of the Permanent Settlement and, therefore, must have the right to fixity of rent is a premium on the zamindars' timid assertion of the right to enhance rents. There were raiyats who were not assessed with any increase at all, and they acquired permanent rights through the indulgence of zamindars. All this does not create new rights for all raiyats; it merely points to "the lapse of right through non-use."

*Fixation of revenue has no relation to fixation of rent.*

There cannot be a "general ground," unless specifically mentioned in the Regulations, that the permanent fixation of revenue is tantamount to permanent fixation of rent. If there was any such intention, it could have been easily provided for. On the other hand, they provided for fixity of rent in respect of raiyats with hereditary and prescriptive rights but wanted the matter of "assessment of increase" in respect of simple khudkashts and paiykashts to be determined in accordance with the principles of the pargana rate, a standard which was to be appealed to and which would put the limit of assessment. Moreover, "by the terms of the Permanent Settlement, Government pledged themselves to the zamindars that they were to have the full benefit of the assessments having been made permanent." "The Governor-General in Council trusts," to quote the very language of Regulation I of 1793, "that the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefits conferred upon them by the public assessment being fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands, under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry."

*Sir Barnes Peacock's point of view.*

Accordingly, the Hon'ble Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of Bengal, held: "To hold that the landowners are not fairly and equitably entitled to receive from the raiyats since the Permanent Settlement as much as they would have done if the assessment had not been permanent and the land had been reassessed is, in my opinion, to put such a construction upon Act X of 1859 as to render it a violation of the pledge made by Government to the zamindars at the time of the

---

<sup>1</sup>It is well-known that landlords have increased their incomes as well as resources of the country. Firstly, they did it by the extension of cultivation. Secondly, the Charter Act of 1813 took away the monopoly of the East India Company and "it has been asserted and perhaps justly that much of the increased wealth of Bengal in late years is to be ascribed to the opening of the trade in 1814 thereby occasioning a greatly increased demand for the produce of land. In so far, however, as this cause may have operated to the increase of wealth, it is confined to landlords and dealers in commodities" (Raja Rammohan Roy's observation in 1831). Hence, landlords are entitled to "the fruits of their own good management and industry."

**Permanent Settlement**; for there is no doubt in my mind that, to give the landholder the full benefit of that engagement, they ought to be allowed to collect as much from the land, and to enjoy as large a portion of the net produce without an increase of the assessment, as they would have done if the settlement had not been made permanent, and the landholders had been reassessed."

*Right to enhance rents has got the sanction of Courts.*

**Q. 49.** It is an equitable principle of Jurisprudence that legislation, should not ordinarily have retrospective effect; if it seeks to disturb rights legally accrued and peacefully enjoyed and to make things move backward, the case for compensation gathers force. Mr. A. Mackenzie, Revenue Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 1880, who is a close critic of the zamindar's right, admitted that landlords had enhanced the rents of raiyats, and that their action "had had the seal and sanction of the law courts." Accordingly, he observed: "I am not prepared to say that we can now in 1880 ignore all the changes that have taken place in the last 90 years in the relative positions of landlord and tenant throughout Bengal, or that we can confiscate all the rights to which landlords may perhaps be said to have acquired a prescriptive title. One of these rights is certainly that of enhancing the rent of each individual tenant." (Note submitted in connection with the Rent Law Commission.)

*Present landlords and raiyats have little connection with those at the Settlement.*

Moreover, the old lines between zamindars and raiyats have become disfigured. "While the present landlords against whom we propose to rehabilitate these rights are in nine cases out of ten tenureholders who are either the original khudkashts and their successors who, as the value of produce has increased, have converted themselves into middlemen by subletting or are persons who have bought their tenures with reference to the rent roll at the date of their purchase" (Mr. Harrison's Note, 1880, in connection with the Rent Law Commission). In the interval between 1793 and 1880 the process of disintegration of estates and raiyats' holdings has been so rapid that the present cultivators who are successors, or in any true sense representatives of raiyats in 1793, must be very few indeed. There is another aspect of the question. A distinction must be made between the ancient tenures which subsisted before the Permanent Settlement and such as those created by the landholders or their representatives with whom that settlement was made. At the time of the Settlement, two-thirds lay waste. "If waste lands have been brought into cultivation on specific conditions voluntarily accepted by the tenant or any other tenures have been acquired from the landholders since the formation of the Permanent Settlement

and such conditions and such tenures are legal and unexceptionable under the Regulations in force; they must, I think, be maintained.' (Harington's observations quoted by Mr. Harrison.)

*Difficulties of returning to the old rents.*

On the basis of the prevailing rates of rent, subinfeudation among landlords has taken place, and if there is a return to the old rentals at the Settlement of 1793, middle tenures, which have grown up, will collapse. But these tenures were created lawfully; the tenureholders invested money and considered them as business propositions. If the margin of increment since the Settlement is taken away, it will mean the extinguishment of those tenures which have come into being on the strength of the above margin. Without fair compensation, those middle tenures cannot, and should not, be prejudiced.

*Impossibility of ascertaining rents at the time of Settlement.*

There have been new landlords, new raiyats. Act X of 1859 by virtue of section 6 endowed raiyats, holding or cultivating lands for continuous 12 years, with occupancy rights, and thereby the Act created new raiyats with occupancy rights to the prejudice of the old khudkasht raiyats. In this way, violent changes have taken place in the constitution and status of raiyats. Moreover, after the record-of-rights being prepared after Survey and Settlement in conformity with Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, the maintenance of old records in all estates, compiled by patwaris and kanungos, has been absolutely redundant. It will, therefore, be an impossible task to determine the old rents in respect of different plots at the time of the Settlement. The majority of the tenancies in Bengal have been created after the Settlement. The successors of the raiyats of 1793 cannot possibly be found out as many of them have turned themselves into tenureholders. Those who can be traced by the help of section 50 (1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act need no protection. All these difficulties will overwhelm any one enquiring into the matters set forth in the question.

We are not told here what are the grievances of tenants but are at the same time asked to suggest "practical proposals" for removing their grievances. If there is any claim put forward by tenants for going back to the quantum of rent (paid so much per bigha) prevailing at the Settlement of 1793, and not to the rate of rent (meaning the ratio of rent to produce) subsisting in 1793, and if this claim is supposed to have started from "a sense of grievance," our Committee is at a loss to suggest any "practical proposal," although there may be good many theoretical proposals, such as removal of the grievance, so placed, after payment of adequate compensation to the interests affected by the transaction. We propose to discuss the question afterwards if an exceedingly low rent, which is sought to be put forward as an ideal

by the series of questions tabulated herein, is good for farming or farmers. This aspect of the question seems to be entirely lost in the mass of proposals calculated to remove the "grievances" of tenants without reference to the improvement of agriculture.

*The right of landlords to enhance rents was affected by Act X of 1859.*

**Q. 50.** Our Committee has held that there was no intention in the framers of the Permanent Settlement that the rents of the simple khudkashts and paikashts should remain unalterable and we have already discussed the matter, in some detail, in answers to questions 46 and 47. Accordingly, the grounds of enhancement adopted for the first time in Act of 1859 and followed in a modified form in the subsequent tenancy legislations did not contravene the rights of tenants; rather they affected the rights of landlords, because (1) the conditions of enhancement were limited to the specified grounds, and (2) the rise of prices of other crops except the staple food crops<sup>1</sup> could not be shared by landlords. The "rise of prices" was inserted as a ground of enhancement in consonance with the connotation of the expression, "fair and equitable rate," introduced in Act X of 1859. The terms, "fair and equitable", when applied to tenants with a right of occupancy, are to be considered as equivalent to the varying expressions, "pargana rates," "rates paid for similar lands in the adjacent places" and "rates fixed by the law and usage of the country." This interpretation was accepted in the Great Rent Case, 1865. All these expressions permitted enhancement on the ground of rise of prices of agricultural crops. Accordingly, "the rise of the prices of staple food crops" was inserted as one of the grounds of enhancement to lend conformity to the interpretation of the "fair and equitable rates."

*Waste lands cultivated by zamindars.*

**Q. 51.** Many of the zamindaris that were settled in 1793 contained a considerable proportion of waste land which zamindars had been permitted to cultivate without any further assessment. The extension of cultivation was the principal thing insisted upon by the framers of the Permanent Settlement, and it was assumed that the excessive assessment at the time of 1793 would become moderate through extension of cultivation and other ways.

*Waste lands to be settled at pargana rate.*

We have already shown that the Permanent Settlement has definitely provided that new tenancies will be created at the pargana rates. We have explained what the pargana rate means; it signifies the rate (that

---

<sup>1</sup>It was perhaps limited to staple food crops as it was found that paddy formed the chief agricultural produce of Bengal.



is, 'ratio of rent to produce) prevailing in 1793. We cannot, therefore, exactly follow the last part of the question, viz., "what action should be taken to give effect to that intention." We have noted that the zamindars under the Permanent Settlement Regulations had full freedom to grant lands to tenants at any rent, the limit being the pargana rate. During the currency of the lease, the rate could not be enhanced; the rent could only be enhanced at the renewal of lease but the village rents should not exceed the pargana rate.<sup>1</sup> If the rate imposed was below the pargana rate, zamindars were then undoubtedly acting within their legitimate bounds; if the rate imposed was above the pargana rate, it was for the Courts to interfere. Moreover, Government has laid down principles in the Tenancy Act for the regulation of the rate of rents and raiyats paying more than "the prevailing rate of rent" can obtain relief under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Moreover, the raiyati rental in our country is low; it is illustrated by the fact that a vast subinfeudation has taken place among the raiyats, and it is held by many distinguished authorities that the rate of rent paid by the lowest grade of under-raiyat is, in fact, equivalent of the "pargana rate"; the raiyati rental judged by the principle of the pargana rate is rather a favoured one. Hence, "favoured rate" is the creation of landlords; "the unfavoured rate" payable by the lowest grade of raiyats is the creation of the higher grade of raiyats. In the circumstances, it is difficult to follow what is exactly meant by taking "action to give effect to the intention of settling waste lands at the pargana rates."

*Economic rent defined and explained.*

**Q. 52.** All that is produced is divided into rent, profit and wages. Rent<sup>2</sup> may therefore be defined, for the purpose of clearness, as "that payment for the use of land which the owner can obtain by free competition for lending out the use of it to others." If the element of competition is taken away, the payment made loses the character of rent. When the payment which a raiyat makes over to a superior tenureholder is "simply the handing over to the other partner in the firm of that share of receipts of the firm which under the deed of

---

<sup>1</sup>"Reading the law up to 1859, the only class of raiyats recognised as entitled to hold at privileged rates (i.e., at lower rates than neighbours) were those raiyats whose rates were fixed for ever. The rents of other raiyates might be raised up to the pargana or customary rate by an auction-purchaser or by any other landlord not bound by special contract to accept a lower rate. On a correct construction of the Regulations and Acts before Act X of 1859, no landlord was legally entitled to raise the rents of any village raiyats above the pargana (customary) *nirikh* (rate)"—Mr. A. Mackenzie, the great critic of the zamindar's rights, observed in 1880. Our Committee accepts the position. The "pargana rate" has been explained in our previous answer, and on a correct understanding of the pargana rate depends the appreciation of the question of so-called enhancement of rent.

<sup>2</sup>"The income derived from the ownership of land is commonly called rent, and the term is stretched so as to include that derived from letting houses and even such things as boats, pianos and sewing machines"—Prof. Marshall. Economists zealously reserved the term "rent" to the income derived from "land."

partnership belongs to him," it is no rent at all. The theory of rent has but little direct application in such places where custom and law tend to make rent fixed and unalterable, as we find in our country. But in places, where the cultivator makes payment which can be revised on the basis of the probable surplus produce of the land after deducting the cultivator's necessities and his little luxuries, according to the customary standard of the place, and on the supposition that he cultivates with energy and skill that are normal in that place, this kind of charge is of the nature of economic rent. That was the view taken by Prof. Marshall.<sup>1</sup> Economic rent may be defined, to quote Prof. Seligman, as the rent which an intelligent tenant who enjoys complete mobility of labour, who has an alternative investment for his capital and who is thoroughly acquainted with the conditions of the market, could afford to pay.<sup>2</sup> The implications of economic rent, sought to be conveyed in the question under reply, are admittedly confusing.

*Producer's surplus product of many factors.*

It is held that "the producer's surplus which is excess of the gross income from the improved land over what is required to remunerate him for the fresh doses of capital and labour he annually applies is the rent."<sup>3</sup> The surplus depends on the richness of land, the relative values of those things which he has to sell and of those things which he needs to buy. The fertility of land cannot be measured absolutely, for it varies with the nature of the crops raised, and with the methods and intensity of cultivation. The prices at which the various requisites of the farm can be bought and its various products sold depend on the industrial environment. The efficiency of the cultivator is a factor to be counted. A rise in the value of agricultural produce increases the producer's surplus and its real value.

*Rent, the result of economic forces, varies from land to land.*

The rent of land is thus its economic product, that is, the contribution of land over and above that of the labour and the capital employed on the land. In agriculture the unit is the individual farm. Every farm has special characteristics; every farmer has his own efficiency; all this exercises mighty influence on the cost of production, the amount of produce and the prices it will fetch and the profit which.

<sup>1</sup>Taxes are supposed to be apportioned to the net income which actually is earned, and rents to that which would be earned by an individual of normal ability. A successful trader will pay on ten times as large an actual income ten times as large a tax as his neighbour who lives in equally advantageous premises and pays equal rents.

<sup>2</sup>Where there is ignorance, lack of opportunity or lack of mobility on the part of tenant, actual rent may be higher than economic rent.

<sup>3</sup>The Ricardian theory of rent (according to which the rent of any given grade of land is measured by the difference in the value of the produce resulting from a given outlay of labour and capital on that land and on the no-rent land) ignores the variation in the efficiency of the factors other than land.

will be realised. So does rent vary from land to land. Political Economy cannot determine the definite and ascertainable quantity to be demanded as rent; it can only analyse the conditions and enumerate the forces tending to the determination of rent. It is competition which determines the right amount of rent. If rent be insufficient, the landlord refuses; if rent be higher, the tenant refuses. "It is a matter of common observation that competition tends to distribute the farmers on the different grades of land in accordance with their efficiency. But it is not the individual farmers alone who are benefited as the result of the working out of this tendency. The combination of the productive forces that puts the most useful agents of production into the hands of the most efficient farmers results in the largest total production of economic goods for the country as a whole."

*Competition regulates the rate of rent.*

It must be recognised that with the passing of time, "the relative abundance of the factors of production changes, market conditions change, and the degree of skill and knowledge changes, resulting in changes in the amount of rent paid for a given piece of land." Whether land rents will increase or decrease depends on the relation of population to improvements. Growth of population or an elevation of the standard of life means an increased demand; improvements in production or transportation mean increased supply. When the population keeps ahead of the improvements, rents will rise. When the improvements keep ahead of the population, rents will fall. The important economic questions regarding rent relate to the causes which "determine the amount of rent paid at a given time for a given farm; the difference in the amounts of rent paid for different farms at the same time, and the changes in the amounts of rent on a given farm during a period of years." In a progressive society the principle of competition is allowed to regulate the rate of rent, and "it is only," observes Mr. Mill, "through the principle of competition that Political Economy has any pretension to the character of a science."

*Market value of land regulated by competition.*

The contention that the market value of land should be taken into consideration is not far removed from the operation of the principle of competition. The market value of land is governed by the laws of supply and demand which are very complex, and the difficult problems in distribution arise when costs and prices do not correspond.

*Money rent should have reference to productivity of land.*

If rent forms a definite share of the produce and is paid in cash at its prevailing money value, the principle does not tend to be unfair as the ratio of rent to produce is being maintained in all circumstances.

That is the principle of the pargana rate, and this principle is practically followed in the Punjab.<sup>1</sup> But, on the other hand, if rent, as a definite share of the produce, is converted into its money equivalent, and that specified sum of money is retained as rent without any reference to the variable productivity of land, it undoubtedly brings about the most unscientific state of things, as we find in Bengal, viz., the poorer land paying higher rent in proportion.

• *The Punjab method of revenue assessment on a sliding scale.*

In the matter of determination of fair rent, the new Punjab experiment of revenue assessment on a sliding scale may be profitably studied. The central idea of the scheme is that the land value demand will be adjusted to the price-level. The main features of the system are: (1) The commutation prices proposed to be introduced by Government are worked out on the basis of the average prices of the previous twenty years. The standard grain share of the State is then commuted in terms of these average prices, and thus a set of average assessment rates are arrived at, these differing with the class of land and other factors. (2) These revenue rates will represent the maxima that Government can take during the currency of the Settlement. If in any year the general price-level is lower, a remission in the revenue rates will be given in the following year proportionate to the fall. (3) The percentage of remission due for a particular year is calculated on the basis of index numbers of the aggregative type. By multiplying the percentage of the total matured area under each important crop, the average yield per acre of each of those crops and the commutation price assumed for each of those crops, Government will obtain an index figure. A corresponding index figure will then be calculated for the year previous to that for which remissions are to be given. The difference of the two

---

<sup>1</sup>In the vast majority of cases rent is paid in kind. In suits for arrears of rent, the problem remains of determining what amount should be decreed. The average outturn per acre of each crop is ascertained as accurately as possible and the produce is obtained by multiplying the acreage under each crop by its assumed yield. A table showing the Settlement Officer's estimate of the outturn per acre of the principal crop in each assessment is available. For the purposes of a rent suit his figures may usually be accepted as they stand, if the land of the tenant's holding seems to be of ordinary quality, and the harvest was an average one. They may be raised or lowered to any extent that appears proper, if the land is specially good or bad, or the harvest is shown to have been much above or below the normal. In order to convert the grain rent into money one must find out what the harvest prices were. These are recorded for each assessment circle in its revenue register, to which the Tahsildar or Naib-Tahsildar (who generally hears rent cases) can easily refer. In the judgment of the Revenue Court the process by which it arrived at the rent decreed ought to be briefly explained and Appellate Courts should insist on this being done. The revenue should theoretically absorb one-fourth of the rental of the land. The rent found to be due should always be compared with the revenue of the tenant's holding. Unless the former is at least four times the latter, it can hardly, provided the harvest was a normal one, be fair to the landlord, and some flaw in the calculation may be suspected. It may be a good deal more without being necessarily unfair to the tenant. (The Punjab Land Administration Manual.)

index figures will represent the remission to be granted.<sup>1</sup> Each year a new index figure will be calculated and the amount of remission will depend on the level of prices during the previous year.

The Punjab experiment embodies the principle of regulating the assessment according to the ability of the assessee as measured by his money income from land. There are obvious difficulties in introducing this system in its entirety in Bengal but the main principles, akin to those of the pargana rate, can be adopted without greatly disturbing the existing arrangement. The customary rate, which is not adjusted to the price-level, is bound to become unscientific in course of time, and in fixing the cash rent, this time element cannot be ignored.

**Q. 53.** Our Committee holds that the existing rents paid by cultivators are settled by an arbitrary rule of law and custom, sanctioned by the Tenancy Act; the scientific principles discussed in answer to question 53 have found no room. Under the Permanent Settlement Regulations, we have shown, the pargana rates were to be the standard beyond which village rents should not exceed. The ratio of rent to produce being recognised in the principle of the pargana rate,<sup>2</sup> the rent demand was adjusted to the price-level. Act X of 1859 provided that raiyats having right of occupancy and not holding at fixed rates were entitled to receive pattas at "fair and equitable rates." In case of dispute, the rate previously paid by the raiyats shall be deemed to be fair and equitable, unless the contrary be shown in a suit by either party under the provisions of the Act (section 5). The Act thus does not define "fair and equitable rates" and leaves the task of interpretation to courts. The "fair and equitable rates" have, accordingly, been considered to be the equivalent of pargana rates, rates which similar lands bear in places adjacent, or rates fixed by the law and usage of the country, and are to be explained and interpreted by these customary rates. Justice Trevor observed in the Great Rent Case: "It appears to me that it was the intention of the Legislature to place the raiyat

---

<sup>1</sup>The percentage of remission will depend upon the scheduled commutation prices and the market price of products ruling in the previous year as deduced below—

$$R = \frac{(KP - KP_1) 100}{KP} = \frac{100 (P - P_1)}{P}$$

Where  $R$  represents the percentage of remission to be given for the year,  $K$  the product of the percentages of the total matured area under the crop and the average yield per acre of the crop, which is assumed as a constant for ordinary years,  $P$  represents the level of prices taken for the maxima revenue rates and  $P_1$  represents the prevailing average prices at the villages in the previous year. (Vide Prof. P. J. Thomas' paper on "Reforms of Land Revenue Assessment" read at the nineteenth session of the Indian Economic Conference, 1930.)

<sup>2</sup>This ideal of the pargana rate was in existence even in the Hindu theory of land system when Manu detailed the ratio of the share as being of grain an eighth part, a sixth or a twelfth part according to the nature of the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it. This ideal was followed in the principle of Akbar's assessment and it practically continued. It is a grand canon in the determination of an equitable land rent. The differential scale of rates, intended to apply to different classes of soils or crops, involves a more equitable principle of assessment than the rule of a uniform rent.

whose rights were created by Act X in exactly the same position as all other tenants with a right of occupancy held under the old Regulations ..... The terms, fair and equitable, seem to me to have relation to the customary rate of the country representing a share of the gross produce, calculated in money under whatever form of expression it be designated, and as the law directs that in case of disputes the rate of rent which a raiyat with a right of occupancy has paid shall be considered fair and equitable until the contrary be shown, it is a fair presumption that the rent now paid represents the customary rent in the absence of any proof to the contrary.

*What the "prevailing rate" means*

Act X of 1859 also used the expression, "the prevailing rate," but gave no definition thereto. Accordingly, it should be interpreted by the Courts in accord with the expression, "fair and equitable." On the strength of judicial decisions, the words "prevailing rate" came to mean the rate actually paid and current in the village and not the average rate. Where it is found that there is no one prevailing rate and that raiyats holding land in the village of similar description and with similar advantages pay rent at varying rates, the lowest rate may be taken, and the rent may be enhanced upto that limit. In ascertaining the prevailing rate regard must be had to the rent paid by occupancy raiyats holding similar lands in the whole village, or in neighbouring village and not to the rent paid by some of them only.

*"Prevailing rate" in the Bengal Tenancy Act.*

Section 31A of the Bengal Tenancy Act gives a statutory definition of "the prevailing rate," viz., the highest of such rates at which and at rates higher than which the larger portion of land of a similar description and with similar advantages are held within any village or villages.<sup>1</sup> Section 31A was inserted by the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1938. The definition adopted involves a departure from the principle laid down in the judicial decisions that the prevailing rate should be that paid by the majority of raiyats in the village. To guard against all the rates being levelled up to the maximum rate by manipulation of the new prevailing rates from time to time, it was provided

<sup>1</sup>The illustration as given in the Tenancy Act to find out the prevailing rate is given below—

Bighas.		Rs. A. P.
100	at	1— 0—0
200	at	1— 8—0
150	at	1—12—0
100	at	2— 0—0
150	at	2— 4—0

Then Rs. 2-4 is not the prevailing rate, because only 150 bighas, or less than half, are held at that rate. Rs. 2 is not the prevailing rate, because 250 bighas, or less than half, are held at that or a higher rate. Re. 1-12 is the prevailing rate, because 400 bighas, or more than half, are held either at this or a higher rate, and this is the highest rate at which, and at the rates higher than which, more than half the land is held.

in section 31B that a prevailing rate once determined should not be liable to enhancement on the ground of rise in prices.

*"Prevailing rate" of Bengal Tenancy Act ignores the principles of pargana rate.*

The "prevailing rate," as defined by the Bengal Tenancy Act, ignores the principles of the pargana rate: the connection between the amount of rent and the productivity of land is lost; the principle of competition has hardly found any play in the matter of regulating rent-rates in Bengal; the customary rate is thus being maintained under cover of the Tenancy Act without any reference to the income of land. In this wise, the Bengal Tenancy Act has introduced complications in the rate of rent and involved a breach of the pargana rate principles, adopted by the framers of the Permanent Settlement. Thus, we get at present poorer lands paying higher rents and superior lands paying lower rents through the operation of "the prevailing rate."

*Prevailing rate—an unfortunate doctrine for agricultural economics.*

We have described the growth of the concept of rent in Bengal. It was an unfortunate decision of the Rent Law Commission, 1880, that Government had the right of regulating the rate of rent and, accordingly, the Government thought it proper on their part to introduce new principles in the concept of "the prevailing rate," principles which had no basis on economic doctrines. The principles of agricultural economics were not recognised in the attempt to give a statutory definition to the expression, "prevailing rate," which was to be availed of in regulating the rate of agricultural rent in Bengal where agriculture forms the main industry. Custom was rigidly adhered to, and through the play of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, bad customary rates were created and those rates were followed. In a country sunk in illiteracy, where there is hardly any alternative means of livelihood and a great pressure of population on land, the principle of competition was always discouraged so that raiyats might not be mulcted. But the consideration of the productivity of land was entirely forgotten with damaging effects on agriculture.

*The low raiyati rental leading to rack-renting of under-raiyats.*

It is true that in the regulation of the raiyati rental, the principle of competition was kept at bay, but it was taken advantage of by raiyats in sub-settling their lands to under-raiyats. The result has been the high rental of under-raiyats. The raiyati rental remaining low, the scope for subletting to under-raiyats at a fairly remunerative rent was widened. Thus, the Bengal Tenancy Act kept the raiyati rental at a level without any connection with productivity of land and broadened

the opportunities for the rack-renting of under-raiyats by occupancy raiyats. The raiyati rents may be customary rates but they are not adjusted according to the change in the prices of staple products<sup>1</sup> or to the variable fertility of land. We are thus confronted now with a very unscientific state of rent-rates in Bengal.

**Q. 54.** It is not within the experience of our Committee that a tenant is forced to pay higher rents as he is weak and poor. It is true that various rates prevail in the locality, and that generally has relation to the bargaining strength of the party concerned, to the productivity of land, and to the liking, sentimental or otherwise, that a tenant may have in respect of a particular land. In the United Provinces, we have found that caste has something to do with rent-rates, Brahmins being favoured. There are, and may be, a host of considerations for favouring a particular tenant, but landlords do not exploit the weakness of tenants in rack-renting them.

In our answer to question 53 we have indicated how the Tenancy Act has brought forward considerations, which are not scientific nor sanctioned by the Permanent Settlement Regulations, in regulating the agricultural rents in Bengal to the detriment of actual cultivators.

*The rate and not the quantum of rent should be fixed.*

**Q. 55.** We have already discussed the principles of fixing rent. The uniform quantum of cash rent per bigha is not desirable, but a uniform basis or rate is essential. One-sixth of the produce as rent was generally the basis in the Hindu period; one-third was generally adopted during the Muhammadan period; one-fourth is generally adopted in modern days. It is difficult to trace a uniform basis throughout all the stages of history in India. Whatever be the basis, it may be regulated that the money-equivalent of rent should have relation to one-fourth or one-sixth of the gross produce. That was the principle of the pargana rate. If the matter is entirely left to the play of competition, the uniform basis cannot be achieved, as various economic forces will regulate the keenness of competition. If the limit of rent is regulated by law, a sort of uniform basis is desirable.

*Grades among raiyats to find no room.*

Relying on the modern principles of taxation, we should recommend one-fourth of the gross produce as the uniform basis of rent. Fertile

---

<sup>1</sup>The Rent Act and the Bengal Tenancy Act have always forbidden, enhancement of rent on account of the rise in the prices of non-food crops, such as jute, tobacco, crops which are commercially important and economically essential for the material wealth of the province. Thus, for instance, the profits arising out of the enhanced price of jute can never be directly shared in by the landlords under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The entire surplus due to rise in prices (which may be called unearned increment) goes to raiyats.



lands will pay more in money-equivalent and infertile will pay less. This uniform basis has meaning, if there are no grades among raiyats. If a lower grade pays a higher rate and the upper grade naturally lower, and the attempt extends only to establishing the rent of the higher grade of raiyats on uniform basis leaving the lower grades to be mulcted and rack-rented by the superior grades, there is hardly any improvement on the given land system, except that the grades of landlords are out of the picture. All the troubles and expenses are undertaken by the State to have access to the land, to improve the tenure in the interest of agriculture. If all the grades of raiyats are kept intact, the State does not obtain an access to land, it can only touch the higher grades of raiyats. All efforts will thus run to waste. When the State and raiyats are contemplated to be brought close together, as is suggested in the question under reply, our Committee envisages the position that under the altered condition the State will act as landlord and raiyat as cultivator. Otherwise, the whole scheme is meaningless from the nation's point of view.

*Rent-rates may be revised with reference to the capability of the soil, etc.*

In the United Provinces we find that in the matter of revising rent-rates soil classification is made, and there shall be different cash-rates for each class of soil in each circle. We have shown in our previous answers that a new experiment on a sliding scale of revenue assessment is made in the Punjab. After the ultimate analysis of all the modern methods of fixing rents, it is evident that rents shall have relation to the capabilities of land, nature of crops, methods of cultivation, provisions for checking the exhaustion of the soil and the expectation of profits to be realised. Hence, different rent-rates are bound to occur, but that does not warrant the laying down of different principles in the matter of the basis of rent. To make the position of raiyats more secure and rent-rates more scientific, rent-rates may be revised in normal conditions every three years by reference to the capabilities of soil and the average prices of products and other relevant factors connected therewith. In a scheme of State-landlordism, similar plans are quite practicable.

#### *The question of record-of-rights.*

Record-of-rights is prepared for different purposes, and it may be undertaken at longer intervals. The basis of rent can be formulated without reference to the record-of-rights; the quantum of rent for the specified area can be had from the record-of-rights, and that rate will vary in accordance with the principles adopted. In the Collectorate all such records will be preserved, and raiyats will get receipts every year. All these records and receipts will be necessary

in preparing the next record-of-rights which may be prepared every twenty or twenty-five years.

**Q. 56.** The question stands answered in our previous replies. A definite share of the produce, preferably one-fourth, may be fixed, but it should be alterable according to the money-value of the produce. Accordingly, enhancement of rent is to be provided for. If such a scheme is attempted to be introduced within the framework of the Permanent Settlement, it shall have to be recognised that inroads on landlords' income derivable from the raiyati rental should not be made, otherwise the system cannot stand the strain of taxation when their right to enhance rents is circumscribed or extinguished.

**Q. 57.** The basis of rent may be fixed in perpetuity as our Committee strongly believes that the rent will, and should, vary according to the various economic factors tending to the determination of it on a scientific basis. If the money value of rent is fixed in perpetuity, it will lead to the most unscientific state of things in course of time. All these principles have already been discussed.

*"Needs of the nation" to guide taxation measures and loans.*

Our Committee cannot appreciate the alteration of rent according to the needs of the State. The concept of "the needs of the State" is a mediaeval one; they should be subordinated to "the needs of the nation." If the costs of administration and ventures of the State having no direct relation to the welfare of the citizens require more money, our Committee will, far from favouring an increase of the rent-rate, recommend retrenchment to live within the means. But if the needs of the nation, that is, the nation-building activities of the country, require more money, taxes have always been increased. But before launching on any such new taxes, three things should be taken into consideration: (1) the limit of the direct taxation of one's income should be fixed at a fair level, (2) avenues of screwing up better incomes from indirect sources shall have to be explored, (3) loans will be raised, should necessity arise. (In public finance, debts contracted for productive purposes are not liabilities.)

Rent is a form of direct taxation and affects the classes of people with whom the prosperity of the nation is bound up, and accordingly, we are not in favour of enhancing the rate of rent in normal conditions, and in ordinary circumstances. Moreover, "the needs of the State" is a dangerous plea, illusive to the public and even elusive to the servants of the State.

The quantum of rent payable may be revised every three or five years in normal times keeping the basis of rent intact.

**Q. 58.** In a scheme of zamindari system there are numerous difficulties in the substitution of an income-tax on profits from agriculture

in place of rent. If it is done, the income-tax to be paid by the inferior grade shall have to be paid to the superior grade, the State receiving tax from the superior grade only. The scheme of graduation applicable to the income-tax can hardly be made practicable. In that case it will be a change of name, revenue or rent being rolled into income-tax. Further, there can be no exemption limit in a zamindari system. In a system of state-landlordism, rents from cultivators can be realised as income-taxes, that is, the principles of income-tax regulating the rate of rent. If any exemption limit is provided for, a larger proportion of the land in Bengal, rendered small and uneconomic by the laws of inheritance and the opportunities thrown open by the Tenancy Act, would escape payment of any rent at all. Thus, many raiyats and tenureholders shall not be subject to any tax, and this arrangement is not adapted to the institution of private landlordism. It is true that the number of non-paying tenureholders and raiyats will increase in the process of time.

*The principles of fixing fair rents under the Bengal Tenancy Act defective.*

**Q. 59.** In our answer to question 53, we have discussed that the principles for fixing fair and equitable rent, as formulated by the Bengal Tenancy Act, are defective. The principles of enhancing rents are equally defective for, amongst others, the following reasons:—

- (1) The concept of "the prevailing rate of rent" is not helpful for a legitimate enhancement of rent,
- (2) the discretion of the Court in the matter of enhancement of rent is very great, and it is difficult to prove an "improvement" which is to be registered under the provisions of the Act,
- (3) the rise in the prices of the commercial crops is absolutely shared in by raiyats,
- (4) the limit of enhancement is fixed (section 29).

Mr. A. C. Guha,<sup>1</sup> sometime Personal Assistant to the Director of Land Records, Bengal, observes: "So far as my experience in Bengal Settlement goes, the rise of prices is practically the only ground on which decrees for enhancement can be obtained. The prevailing rate for land of similar description with similar advantages in the vicinity is difficult to prove, as also an increase in the productive powers of the land in respect of which enhancement is sought. In order to prove the latter, witnesses from the spot must be produced and elaborate inquiries instituted. The production of evidence essential to success

<sup>1</sup>Vide A. C. Guha's "Land Systems of Bengal and Behar," published in 1916, p. 162.

is a matter of great expense and the cost of victory in a single suit is out of all proportion to the advantage gained."

*Enhancement of rent discouraged by the Tenancy Act.*

• We have noted that the Tenancy Act provides for enhancement not on account of the rise in the prices of agricultural produce but in the prices of staple food crops. The increase must also be a steady and normal one and should be lasting. Section 32 of the Tenancy Act points out the difficulties of an enhancement on account of the rise in the prices of food crops. The ordinary economic principles of competition tending to the rise of rent, such as the increase of population, and the agricultural progress tending to anything which makes agriculture remunerative, and the accumulation of capital, are not applicable to Bengal. "The increase in the efficiency of men, which results in more produce from the same amount of land and labour, will, other things being the same, tend to reduce rents; for with the demand for produce remaining the same, increased supply will tend to lower the prices of produce. While this would be the first effect, lower prices would tend to stimulate population and in the long run increased efficiency will enable a growing population to encroach farther and farther down the scale to less and less productive land and bid higher and higher for the good land, driving rents higher than they could have been without the increased human efficiency."

• The Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1938, suspends all provisions relating to enhancement of rent. It is perhaps done on the supposition that provisions for an enhancement of rent do not find any room for devising an ideal land tenure. That this is not so has been explained in our previous replies.

*Enhancement due to fluvial action under the Bengal Tenancy Act.*

**Q. 60.** Enhancement as a result of fluvial action is permitted under the Bengal Tenancy Act because abatement of rent can be asked for in the matter of deterioration of land by a deposit of sand or other specific cause, sudden or gradual. The one is complementary to the other. A plea for reduction may be taken on the ground that the landlord has refused or neglected to carry out the arrangements in respect of the maintenance of embankments which were in force at the time when rent was settled, and the soil of the holding has thereby deteriorated. Silt deposits in the deltaic portion of the province and sand deposits in the moribund portion of the Bengal delta are common

---

<sup>1</sup>Dr. Taylor points out that differences exist among men as well as among the different grades of land which give basis for a special differential return in the form of profits to men and that competition may result in the decrease of one of these surpluses to the advantage of the other. If farmers and workmen and equipment increase more rapidly than land of the quality in use, competitive forces tend to increase rent at the expense of the return to the other factors.

occurrences. "Fluvial action", as understood in the Bengal Tenancy Act, includes a change in the course of the river rendering irrigation from the river practicable, when it was not previously practicable. Even when land deteriorates through a change in the course of river (such as we find in western and central Bengal), rent, in respect of the portion of land affected, may be reduced under the provisions of the Tenancy Act whereas landlords shall have to meet their stipulated dues without any possibility of abatement.

Accordingly, it has been provided that landlords will share with raiyats in better returns from lands as a result of "fluvial action." The concept of "landlord," as envisaged by the Permanent Settlement of 1793, is not that of a rent-collector; landlords have duties to perform, obligations to carry out and rights to enjoy. The general trend of the Tenancy Act is to reduce the landlord into the position of a rent-collector, an attempt bringing in harmful effects on the land system and on the improvement of agriculture. There is, however, a feeble recognition that a landlord is something more than a rent-collector when he is asked to maintain embankments, etc. (section 38), and that unless he does all this, reduction of rent will follow. It is the inherent right of landlords to share in the returns from fluvial action. Moreover, clause (d) of section 30 is complementary to section 39 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Section 30 cannot, therefore, be considered separately.

Our Committee regrets to note from the wording of the question under discussion that no attempt is made to differentiate "a landlord" from a "rent-receiver" or "rent-collector." That is most unfortunate, and forms the basis of a wrong approach in the matter of tenancy amendments. Our Committee is, therefore, strongly in favour of retaining clause (d) of section 30 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

*The legitimacy of enhancement of rent on account of rise in prices.*

**Q. 61.** In our previous replies we have discussed and advocated that (1) the theory of rent, as propounded by the Bengal Tenancy Act, is defective, (2) provisions for enhancement of rent are essential in the interest of agriculture, (3) the ratio of rent should be to the money value of crops. If "economic principles" are to be brought to bear on the theory of rent, the enhancement of rent on account of rise in prices of agricultural produce (not of staple food crops only) has been an accepted maxim. Our Committee does not desire to repeat the arguments here but it begs to place in no uncertain language that enhancements on account of rise in prices cannot be objected to "on principle," and should not be extinguished under any pretence whatever.

The theory of rent is discussed in our answers to questions 52 and 53; the questions of pargana rate and enhancement on principle are

also discussed in our answers to questions 46 and 47; the necessity of retaining and relaxing the provisions regarding enhancement of rent has been put forward under the authority of the Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, and the Land Committee of the English Liberal Party in the concluding portion of our answer to question 3. It will be noticed in our discussions that we have advocated an enhancement of rent, principally on account of the rise in prices of agricultural produce, in the interest of better functioning of the landlord-tenant system. For better working of the system it is essential; for better agriculture it is necessary; for broad-basing land tenures on a scientific basis, it has to be accepted. Cash rents, fixed in perpetuity without reference to the prevailing money value of the crops, are prejudicial both to agriculture and agriculturists: agriculture will suffer by shrinkage of capital; agriculturists will be fastened with unscientific rates in course of time. Moreover, low rents generally accompany low farming.

Our Committee is, therefore, in favour of permitting an enhancement of rent on account of rise in prices without increasing, of course, the weight of rental pressure. Enhancement of the quantity of cash rent does not, in such case, increase the rental pressure, and if this is remembered, most of the arguments against enhancement lose their validity.

**Q. 62.** Raiyats who require their whole crops for their own consumption and have no surplus to meet legitimate dues and other necessities have only uneconomic holdings for their occupation and cultivation. The holdings are thus uneconomic and inadequate to meet the dues. Such an unscientific state calls for immediate revision, as it will afford no genuine relief if the enhancement on account of the rise in prices is forbidden in respect of those tenants. These raiyats, fastened with uneconomic holdings, are the creation of the Bengal Tenancy Act; their degeneration could have been checked by legislative restrictions. In course of time, more raiyats will be coming within this category. Such a miserable state of things should be immediately removed. Our Committee, however, agrees that no landlord will enhance rent, under any plea, of those raiyats who require "their whole crops for their own consumption;" he is, and will be, naturally satisfied with existing rents in similar cases. Moreover, the Court has much discretion in the matter of enhancement of rents under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and given that discretion, there is no need for a separate treatment of such cases. But our Committee begs to stress that the continuance of such raiyats below subsistence limit is a clog on the improvement of agriculture and a danger to social stability and solidarity.

**Q. 63.** We have seen that the doctrine of "the prevailing rate" keeps the rents at a very unscientific level. Moreover, the presumption is that the existing rent is fair and equitable, although it is a rebuttable presumption. Naturally, our Committee will object to the deletion of the ground of enhancement (viz., the rent is below the prevailing rate) under all circumstances; that will be altering the very concept of rent, which, although defective, is being maintained by the tenancy legislations. If this ground of enhancement is removed, the question arises, what will be the limit of rent-rate in Bengal. We have discussed all these questions in our previous replies. If there are provisions in the law for reduction of rent on the ground of prevailing rate, it amounts to stating that the "prevailing rate" will exist only to bring about reduction, but in the matter of enhancement there will be no guide. The salami, if at all paid by raiyats, should not be a factor in keeping the rent low as it is the price for getting holdings from the grip of other bargainers. The gains from the improvements, effected long ago by raiyats, have been enjoyed by them, and even the improvements exhaust. Accordingly, those improvements made long ago, should not be put forward as a plea for extinguishing the legitimate grounds of enhancement of rent by landlords.

**Q. 64.** The prevailing rate of rent being accepted as the basis of the fixation of fair rent and the existing rate of rent being treated fair and equitable, the limit of rent is practically settled and, accordingly, a specific provision of law for reducing high contractual rents or for limiting rents for new settlements is not essential. If any statutory limit is to be fixed, the theory of rent ought to be scientific, and, under any scientific canon of taxation, the raiyati rental has nowhere exceeded the limit. In the settlement of rents under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the rent is fixed at a sum favourable to raiyats. There are, of course, under-raiyats in Bengal who may be said to be rack-rented. Clause 2 of section 48D of the Tenancy Act practically sets the limit of the rate of rent of an under-raiyat to one-third of the value of the average estimated produce of the land for the previous decennial period (in the case of money rent), and to one-half of produce in the case of produce rent. The limit of the rent of an occupancy raiyat is practically set by sections 36 and 37 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The provisions for the reduction of rent nullify the evil effects of high contractual rents. Our Committee is of opinion that unless the theory of rent is placed on a scientific basis, the limit of rents cannot be statutorily fixed. There is another difficulty: if there is a statutory limit, the tendency of new assessments will run towards achieving the limit, and the favourable rates of rents which the higher

grades of raiyats generally enjoy may ultimately be prejudicially affected.

**Q. 65.** Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act is hailed as the "Magna Charta" of the rights of raiyats. This chapter was introduced into the Bengal Tenancy Act to safeguard the rights of raiyats. When rents are settled under this Chapter, the decisions are generally in favour of tenants. We have already referred to the ratio of rent to produce worked out in the Great Rent Case. Rents are generally settled far below the calculated amount of increase. As for instance, if on calculation the increase comes to annas seven, the real increase effected is not more than two to two and half annas only. In previous replies our Committee has taken exception to the concept of "prevailing rate of rent," because it does not ensure fairness to landlords. We have criticised that on economic and scientific principles. Subject to that general criticism, our Committee is of opinion that Chapter X works out fairly well and in favour of raiyats. Chapter X is a matter of procedure law and, therein, there is practically no defect; the substantive provisions of the Tenancy Act are, and have been, criticised on different grounds which need not be raised here. That is the experience of the Committee with regard to permanently settled and temporarily settled estates.

**Q. 66.** It is not within the experience of our Committee that the settlement of fair rents in private estates under section 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act has resulted in unfair enhancement. On the other hand, the settlement has been more favourable to tenants. We have held that the prevailing rate of rent, which guides the Courts in settling rents, works out in favour of raiyats; landlords do not gain even their legitimate ratio of increase. The question of unfair enhancement cannot, and does not, therefore, arise.

*Land revenue increased in every revisional settlement in khas mahal and temporarily settled estates.*

**Q. 67.** The question primarily concerns the khas mahals and temporarily settled estates. The rent in khas mahals was very low at the time of the original settlement. It has, therefore, been gradually increased at every revisional settlement. It is no wonder if the tendency is yet the same, although the policy is abandoned in some cases due to political pressure. This is not true in temporarily settled estates. It is known that in the Sunderban area the rent was low in the original settlement, but it was low because the proprietors had to conquer vast difficulties, undertake reclamation works, and to accept great risks of inundation with consequential damage to the fertility of land. Government in dealing



with the Sunderbans thought primarily of reclamation of lands: their object was not to realise high revenue demand. The task of reclamation was at once difficult and costly. The grantees, assured by the Rules of 1830 and 1853, have fairly reclaimed the Sunderbans.

The difficulties of Sunderban proprietors are enhanced by the following factors: (a) the Sunderbans are surrounded by salt water rivers, having in most cases higher level than the agricultural lands inside the embankments, (b) cultivation has to depend on seasonal rains, (c) one crop is possible in the area, (d) it takes at least three years' washing with rain water to make lands fit for cultivation after they have once been flooded with salt water due to accidental break in the embankment; (e) every three years there is a failure of crop due to natural causes. The task of reclamation of Sunderbans was beyond the resources of Government, and naturally private capital had to be tempted for playing its part, a risky part no doubt. At the time of the revision of the assessment, proprietors were assured of "a moderate increase" only; but in practice it was found that Government had exploited the situation to the utmost in increasing land revenue to an inordinate extent.<sup>1</sup>

It may be mentioned here that Sunderban proprietors have definite covenants with their tenants that they can proportionately enhance their rents in case of their revenues being increased, although they do not exercise, or have not made use of their contractual rights. It has been established by judicial decisions that their covenant runs with the land, and is entitled to be respected and obeyed.<sup>2</sup>

Our Committee, however, does not agree that all revisional settlements are made with the primary object of enhancing revenue. There are, and may be cases, where a moderate enhancement is inevitable. But in respect of Sunderbans proprietors, the ratio of enhancement has been generally unfair.

---

<sup>1</sup>Vide "Studies in the Land Economics of Bengal" by Mr. Sachin Sen, published in 1935. The terms offered in the Grant Rule of 1830 and in the Rules of 1853 as modified in 1863, and the two sets of Rules of 1879, which on examination, will be found to stress the importance of reclamation in the Sunderbans, rather than of the improvement of revenue even at a future date, are discussed in pages 266 to 289 of the book referred to.

<sup>2</sup>Vide *Kumar Chandra Guin & another v. Kumar Narendra Nath Mitter and others*, 34 C.W.N. 121 (1929). In the said case the purchaser was liable to compensate the landlord as the agreement, which contracted for the deposit of one-fourth share of the proper value in the sherista of landlord in the event of a sale by the grantee, was a covenant running with the land, being a benefit reserved for the landlord with reference to the land demised. Accordingly, the other "benefits" in the agreement can also be availed of by landlords, if they desire to press it for observance.

**Q. 68.** Some Sunderban lots are mentioned below where the enhancements of revenue have been obviously unfair:—

Tonsi No.	Name of holder (Grants under the Rules of 1879).	Previous revenue.	Revised revenue.
		Ra. a. p.	Ra.
2807	Harmohan Ghosh and Others.	844 0 0	3,545
1392	Roy Satindra Nath Chowdhury	750 0 0	4,167
2741	Manindra Nath Mandal ..	935 0 0	4,236
1722	Haricharan Pal ..	938 0 0	6,275
2739	Roy Manmatha Nath Mitter Bahadur ..	938 0 0	4,715
2908	The Mahesh Chunder Land Reclamation and Agricultural Improvement Co., Ltd. .. (Grants under the Rules of 1853).	206 0 0	838
1493	Narendra Nath Mitra ..	1,459 0 0	9,657
1477	The Port Canning and Land Improvement Co., Ltd. ..	1,151 6 0	8,726
3195	Tarapada Ghosh ..	95 4 2	1,112
1442	Nirod Chandra Mallick and others. ..	1,138 13 10	6,565

The above figures are selected from the statement showing revenue of certain lots in 24-Parganas by the Hon'ble Sir P. C. Mitter, K.C.S.I., Revenue Member, Government of Bengal, in the Legislative Council on the 16th March, 1933, in reply to a question. The increase of 200 to 500 per cent. in revenue cannot be justified under the plea of "moderate increase."

**Q. 71.** In the permanently settled estates, Government can grant remissions under the special conditions mentioned in the question, but such remissions are hardly granted. This provision is a dead letter; zamindars do not ask for it, perhaps due to the stringency of the conditions. We are not aware of a single instance when such remission has been granted in any particular area and made applicable to all the zamindars. They go on satisfying their revenue demands even in the worst year when a calamitous state of things prevails. On the other hand, landlords suspend collections of rents and remit large amount of interests on arrear rents and costs of rent suits realisable from tenants. Such leniency is shown even in normal years; that is an act of charity and special concession following from the liberal spirit of zamindars. They can be borne out from the records of estates of landlords and Government. As for instance, the remissions made by the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan in rents and cesses from 1307 B.S. to 1344 B.S. total Rs. 32,69,802.

The rules can be, and should be, changed and improved by well-thought-out amendments to the existing provisions without encroaching on the basic principle of the Permanent Settlement, so that in times of famine conditions prevailing in any part of the country, zamindars may not be driven to a desperate situation so as to make good their revenue demands by encumbering their estates.

*Cost of production of jute, paddy and sugarcane.*

**Q. 72.** The Commission has circularised certain estimates of the cost of cultivation of jute, paddy and sugarcane from the Settlement Reports and other sources. The Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee calculates the average yield and cost of cultivation per acre of jute, paddy and sugarcane which are as follows:—

Name of crop.		Average cost of crop production.	Normal yield per acre in 1928-29.
		Rs.	Mds.
Rice (cleaned)	..	47	12·4
Jute	..	92	16·2
Sugarcane (gur)	..	276	37·2

The cost of production, as expressed in terms of money, will naturally vary after depression. The total cost of production per acre, as given in the report of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, is given below—

Birbhum—Rs. 162·3 to Rs. 257·9 in sugarcane, Rs. 25·2 to 34·7 in aman rice.

Rajshahi—Rs. 123·2 to 164·2 in sugarcane, Rs. 19·4 to 23·8 in aus paddy, and Rs. 172 to 20·7 in aman paddy.

Bogra—Rs. 30·2 to 34·2 in jute.

The average yield and cost of cultivation for the whole province do not truly indicate our agricultural position; there are regional variations which should be taken note of, because in any plan of increasing the yield and reducing the cost, those local deficiencies shall have to be grappled in the first instance.

*Water and its importance in agriculture.*

**Q. 73.** It is well-known that water operates as the chief limiting agent in agriculture and the growth of human numbers; soil through its effects on fertility governs the nature and rotation of crops; the subsoil water level determines the cropping and methods of irrigation and cultivation. "Man and the wider environment have evolved together through mutual influences." Land, river, tree and man

are not independent factors, and the advance of civilisation depends on the mutual co-operation of all these factors. The destruction of forest covering ultimately results in decreased humidity of the air and lessened fertility of the region; "the loss of the periodical movements of water from the interior low lands to the main channels and vice versa alters the regime of the khals and water courses and upsets the drainage; the reclamation of low lands coupled with the continuous exhaustion of subsoil water reservoirs by means of thousands of alluvial wells lowers the water level; the lowering of the water level depletes the pastures and certain crops are no longer grown; with the destruction of vegetation on the river banks, the forces of soil erosion under the heavy monsoon rainfall are given free play." The construction of embankments, roads and railways facilitate the silting up of river beds and the change of water course, leaving a legacy of soil exhaustion, water-logging and fever for the next generation.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Factors governing agricultural production.*

The factors governing the agricultural prosperity of the different areas of Bengal are: (1) the relative fertility of the soil, (2) adequate and seasonal rainfall, and (3) liability to enriching inundations with silt-bearing river water. In the Statistical Account of Bengal, we read that "lands adjacent to rivers, or watered by them, do not require manure, but other lands do," and "that low lands which are annually flooded do not require to lie fallow in order to preserve their fertility." The Imperial Gazetteer of India and the Census Reports show that eastern Bengal enjoys certain natural advantages. There, rainfall is abundant, is usually well distributed and is never known to fail. The land of the delta is enriched by yearly deposits of silt. The climate, the soil, and the river system are all alike favourable to cultivation. "The alluvial deposits which spill over its bank year by year afford the fields a top-dressing of inexhaustible fertility. The natural overflow of the periodic

---

<sup>1</sup>"Man's invasion of the river's domain upsets the whole drainage organisation. An obstruction or prevention of the tidal flow and water-logging not only bring about agricultural deterioration in the course of years but also enable the anopheles to breed and multiply, and malaria becomes endemic, destroying or debilitating the population. Cholera becomes a periodic scourge when the flood is low and there is no flush or drainage. Further, obstruction in the channels considerably raises the high tide levels in the estuaries as well as in the upper reaches of the larger rivers, and bores become a menace to the riverine people. Pressure of population has thus led to a premature utilisation of low-lying land and marsh by methods, which have interfered with nature's processes, and which ultimately redound to the ruin of the river system and the marsh-dweller alike. Man, if he wishes to control nature must to a great extent follow her, for she has her own wisdom. If he seriously disturbs the balance and rhythm in which nature delights, her vengeance often follows quickly and man has no escape"—Dr. Radha Kaml Mukherjee's "Changing Face of Bengal," published in 1938. This point of view was discussed and placed by Dr. Bentley (Director of Public Health, Bengal), in his report on "Malaria and Agriculture in Bengal," published in 1935.

inundation is sufficient to manure a soil which receives in addition a heavy rainfall, and this natural overflow is allowed to find its own lines of drainage. The plains of eastern Bengal, watered by the Brahmaputra, yield abundant crops of rice, jute and mustard, year after year, without undergoing any visible exhaustion."

The decline of western and central Bengal is eloquent. The Bengal Census Report of 1901 states—

"Central Bengal which is bounded on the west by the Bhagirathi, on the north by the Padma, and on the east by the Madhumati, was formerly the Ganges delta, but it has been gradually raised above flood level, and the great rivers which formerly flowed through it, depositing their fertilising silt, yielding an ample supply of wholesome drinking water and draining it, have shrunk to insignificance. Their mouths have been silted up and their beds are often higher than the surrounding country, which they are no longer able to drain. The country has become less healthy, and far less fertile than it was formerly."

The Report of the Census of India for 1911 states with reference to central Bengal—

"The Ganges, having strayed further east, has ceased to enrich the soil with its fertilising silt. The numerous distributaries down which it once found its way to the sea have degenerated into stagnant lagoons, and the health of the people has thus been seriously affected."

#### *Decline of Nadia.*

The Nadia Fever Commission, 1881, remarked:—

"There is a consensus of opinion among Europeans and Natives that, except in the lower lands used for the rice crop reaped in the cold weather, there is a distinct decrease in fertility of the soil of Nadia. Considering that no land except that used for sugarcane and tobacco is ever manured, and that the Ganges floods, which are so fertilising, are shut out by the embankments of the rivers, it is not to be wondered at that gradually the soil should become partially exhausted."

The following from the Nadia Gazetteer is illuminating—

"In earlier days before the rivers had completed their work of land making, the district was far more liable than now to considerable inundations which, although they might destroy the crop which was actually standing at the time of their visitation, brought with them a coating silt, which ensured an excellent outturn for the following crop. This enrichment of the soil, however, no longer takes place as frequently as it used to, and as the very light

manuring which is applied is insufficient to compensate for the loss occasioned to the soil by cropping, there can be little doubt that land is getting less and less capable of giving a good return."

"The Nadia district is a part of the old delta, but its rivers have gradually dried up and it no longer receives the annual deposits of silt which formerly renewed its fertility." (Bengal Census Report, 1901.) The Director of Agriculture reported in 1910-11 and 1912-13 that in Nadia the soil is deteriorating on account of the gradual silting up of the river channels.

### *Exhaustion of Murshidabad.*

Even in the beginning of the nineteenth century the district of Murshidabad used to receive the annual overflow of the river which gave richness to the district. But the unexpected change for the worse was directly associated with the cessation of the periodical inundations which used formerly to enrich the soil. The Bengal Census Report, 1901, states: "The district of Murshidabad is bisected from north to south by the Bhagirathi.....East of this river, the soil is low-lying and alluvial and forms a part of the old delta. It is fertile but liable to be flooded by the spill of the Bhagirathi and other rivers to prevent which numerous embankments have at various times been created. The most important is the line of embankments along the left bank of the Bhagirathi. The propriety of maintaining all these embankments has often been called in question. The land which would otherwise be flooded is thereby deprived of its supply of fertilising silt, and the river confined to its bed deposits its silt there and thus gradually raises itself above the level of the surrounding country."

### *Decline of agriculture in Jessore.*

Jessore was also a prosperous district and even in 1870 Westland, when describing a considerable portion of Jessore, says that "for some months in the year, the whole region may be said to be under water. The tract is not only liable to inundation but the inundation is calculated upon, and the crops do not prosper without it." Since 1870, matters have changed for the worse in Jessore. "The interior Jessore rivers, namely the Nabaganga, Chitra, Kabadak, Bhairab, Harihar and the Bhadra have within the last century ceased to be the true deltaic rivers. They no longer convey the waters of the great Ganges to the sea, and have degenerated into lines of drainage which carry the local surface water to the Bay of

‘Bengal’ (Statistical Account of Bengal). The natural form of fertilisation has now ceased, and “the area under aman rice is contracting owing to deficient floods.” The Director of Agriculture reported in 1908: “Large tracts in Magura, Narial and in the Sadar subdivision of Jessore are showing signs of permanent deterioration owing to want of facilities for the ingress and regress of rain and flood water.”

### *Decline of Burdwan.*

In 1760, Burdwan, which then included the present districts of Hooghly and Howrah, was described by the officers of the East India Company as the most productive; it was spoken of as “a garden in the midst of wilderness.” In 1815, Hamilton referred to Burdwan as being in a progressive state of improvement and said that there was no other portion of territory in Hindusthan that could compare with it for the productive agricultural value in proportion to its size. This prosperous state continued up to 1860. Then the great epidemic fever spread to Burdwan. Raja Digamber Mitter first pointed out that embankments were the cause of epidemic fever (*vide* Raja Digamber Mitter’s Minute published as an appendix to the Report of the Fever Epidemic Commission). In 1869 Dr. Thompson, Civil Surgeon of Hooghly, reporting on the epidemic fever in that district remarked: “What then are the causes which have caused an once flourishing district to be half populated, and which threaten to throw half the land out of cultivation. The portion of the Hooghly district which has suffered most from the ravages of this fever is that comprised between the Damodar and the Hooghly rivers. Intersecting this land from west to east run many khals or rivulets. They were the means where the floods of the Damodar found egress into the Hooghly. They were not only the safety valves to the Damodar, but they exercised a fertilising and sanitary influence on the whole surface of the district. But it was found (as often happens) that this process was not wholly beneficial. It had the inconvenience of inundating a large tract of country in seasons of great flood and thus crops suffered and the revenue also. A remedy was proposed and carried out, a bund was created on the left or eastern bank of the Damodar, cutting off the head waters of the khals; and these in consequence commenced silting up.”

*Embankments, railways, roads, all designed without due regard to the interest of agriculture.*

The disastrous effects of embankments on agriculture in Burdwan and Hooghly are now well recognised. Though the

people of Burdwan have enjoyed comparative safety from the frequent inundations of the river, yet their lands have lost in fertility owing to the loss of alluvial deposits which the flood water used to leave before. Embankments that prevent flooding may be a direct cause of malaria. The cessation of inundation causes a decline in agriculture and in sanitation. The epidemic malaria causes depopulation partly by increased mortality and reduced fecundity and partly by stimulating migration. Embankments, railways and roads were designed and executed without due regard to the fundamental needs of agriculture and to the physical peculiarities of deltaic areas. Thus the course of river has changed making flourishing districts into fertile regions. Central and western Bengal are portions of the Ganges delta which have now become inactive. Most parts of the delta "have been raised above the level of periodical inundation by the silt deposits of the Ganges and its tributaries which formerly distributed abundant red water derived from the main river." The rivers have deteriorated as the result of the Ganges having marched eastward; the fertility of the soil has thus declined owing to loss of inundation silt. Necessarily, agricultural yield has declined and many lands are lying fallow and reverting to jungles. For the greater part of the year, many rivers of central and western Bengal are merely chains of stagnant pools. The railway lines and embankments have shut out the flood waters of the Damodar, the Rupnarain, the Ajay and Mayrakshi and of other minor rivers which acted as spill channels for the distribution of the red water in west Bengal; they have also contributed to the decline of the Jamuna, the Jelanghi and the Mathabhanga and of other spill channels in central Bengal.

Three factors, viz., (1) the silted up rivers, channels and khals, (2) the high sub-soil water, and (3) the jungly and moist condition of the villages which increase the malaria rate,<sup>1</sup> contribute to the decline of agriculture. Decline in agriculture in the districts of the moribund delta (that is, in Burdwan and Presidency divisions) can be gauged from the decrease in acreage under cultivation, decrease in the amount of products and also from deterioration of the health of the people which tells on the efficiency of tillers. The following

---

<sup>1</sup>Seventeen out of 28 districts are now malarious in Bengal—this statement was made by the Hon'ble Sir B. P. Singh Roy as Minister of Local Self-Government in Bengal. In the dense shade of the jungle there are innumerable low-lying places, swamps, ponds and the like where anopheles thrive. The increase of jungle is symptomatic of the decline of agriculture and does also foster disease and rural exodus.

Taken from Dr. Radha Kamal Mukherjee's "Changing Face of Bengal", p. 90. The decrease of the cultivated area of the moribund districts is on the increase; the total cropped area (in 1933-34) is 711,200 acres in Burdwan, 858,400 acres in Nadia, 810,000 acres in Jessore. But in the districts in the active delta, more lands are being tilled.



Table giving a comparison of agriculture and health movement in the moribund and active delta will describe the story vividly:—

			Normal cropped area at the end of the last century (in acres).	Cropped area (1931-32) (in acres).	Incidence of Malaria, 1930 (fever index).
<i>Districts in the moribund delta.</i>					
Burdwan	..	..	1,248,300	742,100	53.4
Nadia	..	..	990,400	913,200	56.5
Murshidabad	..	..	1,106,600	946,500	41.7
Jessore	..	..	1,303,600	887,300	48.2
Hooghly	..	..	541,400	293,900	46.6
<i>Districts in the active delta.</i>					
Dacca	..	..	1,086,169	1,709,000	9.7
Mymensingh	..	..	3,076,800	3,674,500	11.0
Faridpur	..	..	1,295,800	1,470,300	26.6
Bakarganj	..	..	1,660,000	2,015,000	8.3
Tippera	..	..	1,315,900	1,472,800	7.2
Noakhali	..	..	429,087	1,192,600	10.5

*The losses of West Bengal and central Bengal.*

On account of the decline of fertility, jungle growth and prevalence of malaria, the amount of good cultural land left fallow is quite large in the decadent areas of Bengal. Depopulation and physical breakdown, due to malaria and decline of soil fertility, are leading to a serious setback of cultivation in central and western Bengal. "There is all round depression centered round the decrease of cultivation." The backbone of agriculture in the large parts of Burdwan and Hooghly is now the immigrant aboriginal. "It is obvious that Sonthal agriculture is a much less skilled and intensive farming," and thus even if fallow lands are taken up, agricultural decline can hardly be checked. The decrease of the area under cultivation is undoubtedly disconcerting. But the loss of yield due to "the red water famine" is incalculable. The figures of the crop returns worked out by the Chinsura Agricultural Farm are as follows:—

		Average yield of paddy. (maund per acre.)
Without irrigation	...	15
With irrigation	...	28
With silt irrigation	...	35

The loss of yield can be estimated from the following figures:

				Average yield. (maund per acre.)	
				Aman.	Aus.
Nadia	...	...	...	9.8	10.2
Jessore	...	...	...	14.0	10.6
24-Parganas	...	...	...	10.3	12.4

Thus on the basis of the Dacca figure where the rich red water is available for crop cultivation, the monetary losses through lower yields in western Bengal are indeed alarming. In addition to the loss of yield, crops irrigated with rich red water of the flood have a vigour and stamina enabling them to withstand the early failure of the monsoon, which the anaemic crops deprived of the red water cannot possess. Anaemic cereals and anaemic men and cattle go together, observes Sir W. W. Wilcocks.

To calculate the losses of west Bengal and central Bengal the following should be taken note of:—

(1) Districts in active delta enjoy an abundant rainfall, early and late, whereas West Bengal and central Bengal suffer from lack of sufficient rainfall.<sup>1</sup>

(2) The percentage of twice-cropped area to the cultivable area is very small in West Bengal and central Bengal, whereas in East Bengal it is high.

(3) The aus crop dominates in the western Bengal districts, as it grows on high lands with a sandy soil. When the monsoon rain is irregularly distributed, the aus crop declines. Naturally, the future of agriculture in the aus crop districts is uncertain. In eastern Bengal the aman crop dominates, and it implies less dependence upon rainfall and more upon the rise of the rivers. In the high lands of East Bengal, jute, which is Bengal's money crop, is grown because of better and assured rainfall. Thus, central Bengal and western Bengal have less aman crop (which yields the finest grain), less jute crop (with which the prosperity of Bengal is bound up) and greater aus crop (which yields the least outturn and worst grain). If the deltaic character of the landscape is disturbed and the river changes its course again, the agricultural future of some parts of East Bengal and North Bengal will be jeopardised. Jute is an exhausting crop on soils not replenished by the annual silt deposits by rivers; the aman crop can only thrive only where the periodic ingress and discharge of flood

<sup>1</sup>"The dominant climatological factor in Indian agriculture is the monsoon. Not only is the cropping and system of agriculture dominated by the character of the monsoon but the Indian budget has frequently been described as a gamble in rain."—Bryce C. Burt of Imperial Council of Agricultural Research in his paper on "Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in India," 1937.

are not interfered with, the boro rice which gives larger outturn than the aman crop can be grown successfully in the low lands and marshes and on the sand banks of the active rivers. Eastern Bengal flourishes principally on jute and aman crops; if the periodical flooding is once obstructed, the phenomenal agricultural prosperity and rural density of eastern Bengal will disappear.

*A planned economy for the decadent areas necessary.*

The story told in the foregoing paragraphs is dismal, and it is surprising that Government has yet to launch on any planned programme for the recovery of western and central Bengal. A few irrigation works, executed not on any planned basis, have not improved the situation to any appreciable extent, and even irrigation water cannot be supplied throughout the year, especially when it is needed. Lands are still falling out of tillage, the decay of rivers is proceeding on and malaria is continuing unabated. When the problems are so grave and menacing, they call for urgent and bold action. The distribution of manures and improved seeds that is undertaken by Government is extremely inadequate for the purpose. The extent of Government indifference, in the task of checking the decline of agriculture in western and central Bengal, is appalling.

*The various Acts of Government to improve rural Bengal are merely half-hearted attempts; they represent, more or less, the commercial instinct of Government.*

**Q. 74.** These Acts, viz., the Bengal Land Improvement Act, the Bengal Sanitary and Agricultural Improvement Act and the Bengal Rural Development Act, embody half-hearted attempts of Government to improve the economic situation and rural Bengal. They are enacted not in pursuance of a policy; they represent, more or less, the commercial instinct of Government. Whatever benefit Government proposes to distribute by its beneficent works, it tries to recover the cost and something more from the persons benefited. In an ordinary commercial transaction where individuals bargain with individuals, such a profiteering enterprise is legitimate with the given basis of class relations. But the above Acts indicate that Government is more keen on profitable returns from their expenses sunk than on helping and improving the purchasing power of the people which should have been the best reward of a progressive Government. It is a mediaeval conception of public finance to insist on direct returns from Government expenditure; in fact, such a procedure involves loss in the long run.

*The Bengal Land Improvement Act neutralised by restrictive provisions of the Tenancy Act.*

The Bengal Land Improvement Act provides for loans to landlords so as to enable them to improve the economic position of their

country. On the face of it, the Act seems well conceived and the failure of the Act may be interpreted as an indifference on the part of landlords to avail of such a beneficial Act in the interest of the tenantry. But it is well-known, and we have indicated in our previous replies, that the incentive of landlords in improving the position of the tenantry is asphyxiated by the Bengal Tenancy Act. The landlord's right to have increased returns from his increased investments on the soil is circumscribed. The restriction was first put forward in 1859, and it continued to be tightened at every stage of tenancy amendments till the provisions regarding enhancement of rent are suspended in 1938. The lessons of agricultural economics are thus lost sight of; the need for improvement of agriculture was not emphasised in the Tenancy Act. Every improvement, made by landlords, requires to be registered under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, if it is to be put forward as a condition for enhancement of rent; even the discretion of Court in the matter of decreeing enhancement is great. With all these handicaps, which do not exist in any progressive tenancy legislation, landlords cannot possibly take loans for sinking in the improvement of agriculture, especially when conditions for re-payment of the loan are extremely rigid. We do not know if Government were really serious that the provisions of the Land Improvement Act would be liberally taken advantage of under the stringent conditions of repayment of loans, even when it is known and found that the Tenancy Act is putting all restrictions on the landlords' rights. Accordingly, the Act can only function under a better tenancy legislation.

*The Bengal Sanitary and Agricultural Improvement Act stands discredited.*

The Bengal Sanitary and Agricultural Improvement Act has not been successful in this province. The drainage schemes executed under the Act have not been successful, but Government is very keen on realising the cess imposed by way of recovery of the cost. In the Act there was a clear hint that distribution of cost would be spread over in proportion to the benefit reaped by the parties concerned, but, in fact, our Committee finds that the realisation of the cost does not *pro tanto* diminish with the decline of the benefit; even when there is hardly any benefit, the cess is realised to the great disadvantage of the parties in the so-called "benefited area." The extensive application of the Act is dependent on two fundamental conditions, that is, the monetary value of the benefit, promised in the scheme executed thereunder, must be greater than the quantum of cess to be paid by way of meeting the cost, and the benefit which will accrue must continue in the same proportion so long as the cess is to be realised. Both these conditions are not assured; hence, local authorities or private persons have not shown any eagerness to the Collector for the application of the said Act. Even

the Government is not sure of satisfying the public whom it proposes to benefit, hence the Collector who had the necessary plenary authority in initiating drainage schemes under the Act has not made, and perhaps could not make a liberal application of the Act. Thus, the policy behind the Act stands discredited; it was a policy of promising relief, not effecting it.

*The Bengal Rural Development Act does not assure "benefit".*

The Bengal Rural Development Act is the latest attempt of Government in improving irrigation in Bengal. Our Committee is not aware if any new irrigation schemes are being contemplated to be executed under the Act. We find that the irrigation tax which was optional under the old Act (optional in the sense that those who will apply for the irrigation water have to pay the tax) is made compulsory in respect of the "benefited area." The Act is unpopular because the rate charged is high; the supply of water throughout the year, especially in seasons when cultivators need it in the absence of rains, is not assured; the entire locality declared to be within the orbit of the Act does not get supply of water, and in places, it is reported, the canal water is exhausted and sands appear. In the Burdwan division the silt water which is most suitable for enriching the soil, pours in the Damodar during the rains and unless arrangements are made for storing the silt water and distributing it throughout the year in response to the needs of cultivators, the realisation of a high rate is injudicious and unfair. In ordinary times, the water that is left in the Damodar does not possess the fertility of the rich red water. Moreover, the Burdwan division has a normal supply of rain water (although greater supply is necessary for good cultivation), and the demand for irrigation water becomes insistent when the rains fail. The distribution of rainfall (in inches) of some of the eastern and western Bengal districts is given below to indicate that even in West Bengal cultivators cannot purchase water at a high rate throughout the year, although jute and aman can thrive only in regions of higher humidity and higher rainfall:—

**Distribution of rainfall.**

					Early rainfall (from February to May).	Rainfall (from June to August).
Burdwan	..	..	..	..	9	33·3
Midnapore	..	..	..	..	9·6	35·4
Murshidabad	..	..	..	..	8·5	33
Dacca	..	..	..	..	18·7	39
Mymensingh	..	..	..	..	24	47
Tippera	..	..	..	..	20·7	45·8
Faridpur	..	..	..	..	17·6	37·8

• All this is given to illustrate that the West Bengal cultivators undoubtedly need the silt water and also more water during the rains; if a successive number of crops is to be planned, more water is necessary. Unless this liberal supply, especially at the period when they need most, is assured, no such irrigation rate can be popular. The promise of the liberal supply of irrigation water from June to August is not encouraging to raiyats. The Bengal Development Act does not promise the liberal supply of silt water, or even irrigation water, in times of need, but the realisation of the rate will not be lax on that account. Government does not seem to be active in meeting the needs of silt water for the cultivators of West Bengal.

Our Committee, therefore, finds that Acts, mentioned above, do not satisfy the needs wherefore they were introduced; Government also does not seem alive to remedy the defects found in their working; the people cannot go on paying cesses when the benefits received are of doubtful value.

#### *The need for nursing agriculture.*

**Q. 77.** In our country there is no forward agricultural policy. Our agriculturists work not for profit but for subsistence; they work unaided in their humble way on unimproved land with unimproved implements. When seasonal calamities come, they are ruined. It is hardly recognised that the interest of the whole nation demands the nursing of agriculture. "Agriculture is not merely a way of making money by raising crops; it is not merely an industry or a business; it is essentially a public function or service performed by private individuals for the care and use of the land in the national interest; and farmers in the course of their pursuit of a living and private profit are the custodians of the basis of national life." Agriculture is a matter of national concern calling for deliberate and farsighted national policies, "not only to conserve the natural and human resources involved in it, but to provide for national security, promote a well-rounded prosperity, and secure social and political stability."

#### *Agriculture and governmental apathy.*

Ours is an agricultural country; our riches are bound up with the prosperity of agriculture; the low purchasing power of agriculturists sets a limit to industrial expansion; inefficiency in farming, incapacities of farmers and defective equipments are national calamities. With all this, Government has not taken to any progressive agricultural policy; the whole matter is left to private initiative. In this sense, the responsibility of the Government for uneconomic condition of raiyats can be taken in a two-fold sense: (1) in its negative aspect, that is, the indifference of Government and the non-pursuit of any policy; (2) in

its positive aspect, that is, some of the measures adopted by Government tending to the deterioration of the economic condition of raiyats.

*No planned agricultural policy in the country.*

In our answer to question 73, we have shown how prosperous districts have been converted into infertile and marshy swamps, and healthy areas into insanitary regions through changes in the course of rivers, unscientific embankments and roads, and railway lines without sufficient culverts. Lands in Burdwan and Presidency divisions are falling out of tillage; their productiveness has greatly decreased; raiyats are broken down by malaria; inefficient farming, which is inevitable in the circumstances, is causing more damage to the soil. The flow of prosperity has definitely ebbed. Government has not been sufficiently alive to these dangers; even if it is alive, no planned irrigation projects have been launched, no comprehensive public health scheme pushed through.

The prices of agricultural produce are falling, even below the costs of production. In the maze of distribution costs, the values of the commodities are lost. Government can improve the situation by raising the prices through various devices, and this aspect of the question is discussed in our answer to question 80.

Through the operation of the Tenancy Act, the following disquieting features in our rural economy have crept in:—

*Unwholesome features of rural economy brought about by the Tenancy Act.*

(a) Through a system of subinfeudation among raiyats, the average under-raiyati rent per acre has reached Rs. 6-3, whereas raiyati rental per acre in permanently settled estates is Rs. 3. The under-raiyat of the last grade who often pays a very high rate of rent and has the least security of tenure is the actual cultivator, and this "cottier system" is the creation of occupancy raiyats through the help of the Tenancy Act. "If landlords neglect raiyats, the latter plunder under-raiyats." Low rent leads to low farming: the raiyati rental being low, the opportunities for negligent cultivation, sublettings and subdivisions are widened.

---

"It is difficult to conceive anything more calculated to destroy the energies of a tenant than the consciousness that no amount of skill, industry or economy can improve his position, while idleness and prodigality can hardly make it worse. This is the state of a tenant who holds land at a rent rather higher than he can afford to pay, and who finds that each year adds to the amount of arrears due to his landlord. As long as he owes more than he can pay, he is equally in his landlord's power." (The landlord of the under-raiyat is the superior raiyat.)—*Vide* an essay on "The Tenure of Land in Ireland"—by the Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Longfield (Cobden Club Paper).

(b) Through the grant of the right of transfer to occupancy raiyats, agricultural backwardness is promoted in the following way: an outsider may purchase an occupancy right and settle the old tenant with under-raiyati right and necessarily at an enhanced rate of rent. Agriculture does not improve, but the status of the real raiyats is depressed. A raiyat becomes an easy victim to moneylenders and is exposed to the dangers of cheap and easy credit. The Census Report of 1931 gives the following figures which indicate the effect of the right of transfer, as exercised by the occupancy raiyats: cultivating owners and tenant cultivators were not distinguished in 1921; together they number 6,041,495 compared with 9,724,924 in 1921, a decrease of about 35 per cent. Agricultural labourers have increased by 50 per cent., and now number 2,718,939 compared with 1,805,502 farm servants and field labourers in 1921. There has been a considerable increase in the numbers returned as non-cultivating proprietors (from 390,562 to 633,834). To make the position clear, be it noted that the expressions, "cultivating owners" and "tenant cultivators," include those who cultivate personally or by hired labour, and the expression, "non-cultivating proprietor," if he derives returns from rent.

(c) Through the unrestricted right of subletting and subdivision, the holdings become uneconomic very swiftly, and the plight of agriculture becomes appalling and grave. Section 88 of the Tenancy Act permits the creation of unreasonably small and necessarily uneconomic holdings.

(d) The Tenancy Act does not make it obligatory for a raiyat to conform to the rules of good husbandry. He can neglect his cultivation, the only restriction being that he cannot render the land unfit for the purposes of tenancy. There is no provision for punishing negligent farming or rewarding efficient farming; thus, the incentive to better farming in Bengal is lost.

(e) A very injurious custom is the permitting of an accumulation of arrears of rent to remain due by raiyats. Thus, an efficient farmer paying rents punctually is placed on the same footing with one who habitually defaults. There is another serious evil: defaulting raiyats ultimately lose in the event of rent decrees, as both interests on arrear rents and costs incidental to suits are borne by them. A defaulting tenantry can hardly be efficient farmers: once the arrears begin to accumulate, the incentive to payment is gone, and in the long run they are knocked down by the dead weight of arrear rents. This is exasperating to landlord too. It is a blot on any good land tenure. Arthur Young, a great advocate of Irish peasantry, recommended the enforcement of punctual payment of rent: "I would advise him (landlord) to distress without favour or affection at a certain period of deficiency.



"This will appear harsh only upon superficial consideration. The object is to establish the system."

(f) The Tenancy Act takes every matter between landlord and raiyat to Court; it thus increases litigation and gives better revenue under Stamps but exhausts the resources of both landlords and tenants. The Tenancy Act sows the seeds of disunion between landlords and raiyats and transfers the attention from land to the struggle of powers between the two partners. In the meantime, the soil goes on deteriorating.

(g) The Bengal Tenancy Act is an open recognition of the principle that the welfare of raiyats is the concern of the State. Landlords are circumscribed at every stage: they cannot enhance rents; they cannot choose their tenants; their incentive to making improvements is asphyxiated; they cannot introduce scientific farming by acquiring compact areas from occupancy raiyats; they cannot enforce rules of good husbandry; they have to realise arrear rents through Civil Courts and can only take possession of the holdings by obtaining and executing sale decrees; in a word, landlords are placed in the background. The Tenancy Act invites landlords not to be improvers of the soil. But Government has not, on that account, stepped in. Thus the under-capitalisation and exhaustion of land have worsened the condition of raiyats.

*Deterioration of economic condition of raiyats due to Tenancy Act.*

The other defects of the Tenancy Act have been, more or less, touched upon in the previous replies. In this way the imperfect policy, as embodied in the Tenancy Act, has directly led to the deterioration of the economic condition of raiyats. The landlord-tenant system has nothing to do with this. The defects pointed out could easily be checked by a better tenancy legislation within the framework of the given land system. For every acre of land, the landlord gets only Rs. 3. But the normal yield per acre in Bengal is, as pointed out by the Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 12·4 maunds of cleaned rice, 16·2 maunds of jute, 12·2 maunds of tobacco. If an under-raiyat is rack-rented, that is not the fault of "landlord," as understood in Bengal, but of the superior "raiyat." If the price of agricultural produce is low, that is within the jurisdiction of the State to remedy it. If an agriculturist fails to realise fair price, that shows defects in distribution. It is true that for every acre of holding the landlord gets less, the raiyat gets more; it is equally true that the raiyat is exploited more by people dealing with the distribution of agricultural produce than by landlords who charge a very low rate of rent. If raiyats suffer from diminished returns from lands, are burdened with uneconomic holdings, and are disorganised and ill-equipped to improve production and distribution, landlords cannot be saddled with any blame for all this.

*Factors necessary for a forward agricultural policy.* . . .

Our Committee has tried to show that the responsibilities for the uneconomic condition of raiyats are to be shouldered by Government, for their indifference in launching on a forward agricultural policy, and for enunciating an imperfect revenue policy complicating and stifling the free play of the prevailing land system. In suggesting modifications, our Committee begs strongly to point out that the defects of the Tenancy Act should be weeded out, and that a simple tenancy legislation with an eye to the interests of agriculture and to the free and smooth working of the prevailing landlord-tenant system should be codified. In the matter of enunciating a forward agricultural policy, the following points should be specifically dealt with:—

(1) Financing agriculturists at low rates of interest. Their real need is to buy finance cheap and sell produce dear.

(2) The fiscal organisation of the country and in particular assistance to agriculture by tariffs, quotas and subsidies.

(3) Better marketing of agricultural produce will widen the margin between costs and price.

(4) Under-capitalisation of lands and exhaustion of soil to be stopped; improved methods of agriculture with better sires, better seeds, better implements and more scientific rotation of crops and selection of money crops are essential for Bengal. An assured supply of water in places where rainfall is irregular is a matter of extreme importance.

(5) Schemes for the improvement of land, improvement in public health, and improvement of the human unit are vital for the country.

(6) The improvement of the transport system of the country, especially when the greater portion of it is of deltaic nature with its network of inland navigable rivers, streams and waterways, must be effected very carefully keeping in view the requirements of drainage, public health and agriculture.

(7) The price mechanism of the country is to be adjusted to equate supply and demand, to raise internal prices and to pave the way for greater purchasing power of agriculturists which is necessary for industrial expansion.

Our Committee does not propose to be exhaustive here; we are only indicating our plan in a rough outline. Modifications on the lines suggested may be fruitfully followed. In an agricultural country, it is prices, credit, and tenure that call for the foremost attention.

*Average annual income of a raiyat.*

**Q. 78.** The Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee has calculated Rs. 406 as the average annual income of an agricultural

family (consisting of five members). The average annual income from subsidiary occupations is estimated at Rs. 44. The total income amounts to Rs. 450 a year. The annual expenditure of the family is calculated by the Committee at Rs. 420 which includes all necessary expenses. There is thus a surplus of Rs. 30 per family. In the items of expenditure no interest on debts has been taken note of, although expenses on account of amusements and entertainment of relations have been shown. The holding taken for an estimate of income and expenditure was 5.2 acres which was manifestly an economic unit.

*Income of raiyat dependent on many factors.*

In the above case, the money incomes of the cultivating family were evidently calculated on the pre-depression prices of agricultural produce. If we calculate on the depression prices, naturally money incomes will show deterioration whereas expenses on many items of expenditure excepting rents, cesses and rates will also show a decrease. To get at the accurate estimate we shall have to ascertain if there is a corresponding decrease in income and expenditure. If the decreases correspond, the percentage of profits will be the same, although the quantum of money available as income and for disbursement will be less. But if the income suffers more than the expenditure, cultivators are at a disadvantage. It is said that "during the period of economic depression (that is, since 1929) the income of agriculturists has come down by 50 per cent. and expenditure has also decreased by 40 per cent." There is thus a deficiency of 10 per cent. only. On the basis of the statement, it may easily be held that a holding of 5 acres will easily provide a desirable subsistence holding on a reasonable standard of life. In fact, much greater income than the one estimated by the Banking Enquiry Committee on the pre-depression price lists, is possible from a five-acre holding, if it is double cropped, or is subject to deeper cultivation with money crops. We shall have to repeat again that there are regional differences, and the average income of a five-acre holding in East Bengal will have no relation to the income derivable from the holding of the same size in West Bengal. To arrive at the average income of the holding of a raiyat, we shall have, therefore, to reckon (1) the situation of the holding, (2) the price list of agricultural products, (3) the size of the holding, (4) the nature of crops grown, (5) the method of cultivation, (6) the rotation of crops or the successive number of crops, (7) the supply of water (from rains, or wells, or irrigation canals or from rivers through inundation), (8) the sinking of capital, and (9) the efficiency of labour. The income of a raiyat is dependent on many factors, and it will rise or fall according as all the necessary factors are exploited or unutilised.

We have already shown that a holding of 3 to 5 acres can be cultivated in a way as to provide for a living on the given standard of life

for a cultivating family. Those who have less can hardly maintain themselves. To find out the percentage of cultivating raiyats possessing more than 3 acres, one is to note the following factors: (a) the actual cultivators are generally under-raiyats and bargadars, (b) they may possess 3 acres split up into uneconomic units, and in that case they will not be able to live on 3 acres, (c) the subdivision is continuing unhampered by any social, economic or legislative force. Our Committee is, however, not in possession of the figures indicating the percentage of cultivating raiyats possessing 3 acres or more in compact economic plots. It is only possible for the Governmental or aided organisations to compile such statistics.

**Q. 79.** It is true that the record-of-rights, prepared at an enormous cost borne by landlords and tenants, does become defective if it is not corrected after a short interval of time. Some tenants die, mutations of holdings are not effected, and the perfection of the record is thereby impaired. But at the same time the preparations of records on an extensive scale should not be made frequently, as that will involve much expenditure.

Our Committee suggests that in the case of change of any tenant, the President of the Union Board and the local agent of the landlord may record a change jointly and send it to the Collector who, in his turn, may get the records corrected accordingly. The landlord will be entitled to a certified copy of such change effected in the record. That will minimise the trouble arising from the imperfection of records.

#### *Why cultivators have very low income.*

**Q. 80.** The increase in the income of cultivating raiyats does not yield to any specific measure, nor is there any short cut to achieve the purpose. The income of our cultivators is seriously curtailed, because (1) the costs of production and the prices received for agricultural produce are out of line, and (2) the holdings are getting uneconomic. When low prices appear to be at the root of trouble, it is generally considered that the price system is defective. It is the work of price to equate supply and demand, but this is not being done; production and consumption are not in line with each another.

#### *Agricultural prices depend on world conditions.*

Agriculture in Bengal cannot be divorced from world conditions, and the rescue of agriculture depends on a steady increase of demand for its products. Bengal's money crop is jute, and she produces rice mostly for her domestic consumption. In 1925, the income derived by the cultivators from jute amounted to more than Rs. 83 crores but in 1930, the first year of the last depression, it shrank to Rs. 24 crores.

She is not developing new commercial crops in the same way as the Punjab has found a new crop in cotton. Accordingly, it is suggested that Bengal should be divided into economic zones for developing suitable money crops with greater industrial utilisation of these crops instead of concentrating upon one crop. It is said that jute is fetching lower price because of its over-production. "Over-production of jute does not mean that its supply is excessive from an absolute point of view. It means that the supply is such that it cannot adjust itself to demand at a price which brings normal profit for the raiyat." Accordingly, the increase of the income of the cultivating raiyat has its relation to world conditions; it emphasises the need for the cultivation of more money crops.

*The reasons for fluctuations in price.*

The price-level, as is well-known, is "the outcome of interaction between monetary and non-monetary factors, and that the recent world-wide fall of prices is best described as a monetary phenomenon which has occurred as the result of the monetary system failing to solve successfully a problem of unprecedented difficulty and complexity set in by a conjunction of highly intractable non-monetary phenomena." (Macmillan Committee's Report.)

Price fluctuations exercise most pernicious influence on agriculture. The main causes of price fluctuations are variations in the value of money, variations in demand, variations in supply. Fluctuations in the value of money can only be stopped by Government; a cultivator can only, to an extremely limited extent, influence the demand. It is only the supply side which is within the control of the farmer. Even the supply side is limited by weather conditions, seasonal production, market conditions, farmer's finances, etc.

Our Committee does not intend discussing all the specific points in connection with the increase of the income of cultivators in details, but it is only pointing out that the question can only be dealt with by reference to all the factors governing the laws of market where products are to be bought and sold. The means suggested in the question under discussion are only illustrative; they do not, however, touch on the fundamental questions, such as the price system, fluctuations in the value of money, variations in demand and supply, and other matters connected therewith.

*Agricultural prices to be raised.*

Raising the level of agricultural prices is a delicate and difficult problem. The chief methods available are bounties, subsidies, or restriction of supplies by various methods. The restriction of supply can be divided into two parts: (a) imported, and (b) home-produced.

The measures for the restriction of imported supplies are prohibitions, tariffs, quotas, import monopolies and exchange depreciation. An exhaustive discussion of all these remedies is not possible here, but we beg to impress the Commission that the consideration of the question of increasing the income of cultivators is not a simple one, and that it involves a discussion on various points other than those given in the question. Our Committee is suggesting all these points so that a comprehensive view may be taken of this vital question.

• *Ways of ensuring better returns for cultivators.*

There are several ways in which better returns for cultivators could be achieved: (1) by more efficient methods of distribution, (2) by stronger bargaining power on the cultivator's side, (3) by getting better prices, (4) by increasing the consumption of produce, (5) by reducing costs of production, (6) by improving the quality and quantity of production. Along with the question of better returns is bound up the question of efficiency in farming which depends on the following factors: (1) the character of the land, (2) the character of the raw materials with which the cultivator works, (3) the capacity of the cultivator.

*The fundamental problem of credit.*

There is another important factor, and that is the scarcity of capital which results in under-capitalisation of lands. Agriculture is an industry of slow turnover. Means must, therefore, be found to finance "the interval between sowing and harvest," and the peasant, with his small resources, cannot normally provide for them. In all countries where cultivation is in the hands of tillers with no reserve capital, the fundamental problem is that of credit, although unfortunately it is not considered sufficiently important as to form "one of the means of increasing the income of cultivators." All the "means" that have been suggested can only be attempted, if the scarcity of capital is removed by any outside agency. The need of the peasant for intermediate and short term credit is always urgent. "Unless exceptionally fortunate, he requires it every year and, in a considerable number of cases, throughout the year. He gets it where he can, when he can, on what terms he can. His necessities are desperate." With these introductory observations, our Committee proceeds to discuss the points referred to in the question under reply.

• *Better farming is bound up with raiyats' economic condition.*

The task of the improvement of our agriculture is bound up with the question of improving the economic conditions of the raiyat. Primarily, it is a question of increasing the capacity of the land. The raiyat is a potential consumer of a larger portion of his own produce

than he is at present. The raising of the fertility of the soil is essential for our country. "Under the hot conditions prevailing, bacterial activity proceeds at a rate unknown in temperate climates, and the visible sign of that activity is loss of humus. Deficiency of organic matter is the outstanding feature of the soils of India."<sup>1</sup> It is a deficiency which it is difficult to make good, for cattle in our country return little to the land. They are not bedded down; straw is consumed as fodder, and the droppings made into cakes which are dried and burned.<sup>2</sup> These form the main fuel in a country where natural reserves are wholly inadequate. Unless we can provide for an alternative supply of fuel within the purchasing power of the raiyat, the agricultural problem in this matter remain unsolved.<sup>3</sup>

### *The essentials of good farming.*

Good farming in the West increasingly rests on chemistry, biology and mechanical invention. At this stage, it will be an idle talk to show the example of the West and force our cultivators to take to improved farming on similar lines. With large population the multiplication of dwarf holdings is, in the absence of a deliberate policy to counteract it, the inevitable consequence. It is said that the yield of rice per acre is 863 lb. in India, 2,350 lb. in Japan and 1,750 lb. in China. This indicates the low fertility of land. The prevalence of small sizes with a dense population requires systematic irrigation, deeper cultivation, better sires, improved seeds, double cropping (even sowing one crop between the rows of another as is done in China) and the minute attention and patient skill of the individual cultivator. Better tillage demands stronger cattle, and stronger cattle will only result when fodder supplies are not stored with the inefficient, and when the importance of the bull receives due recognition. An uneconomic holding places a check on fodder crops, and that handicap, in its turn, results in poor stock, and inability to support vigorous stock means absence of a market for well-bred cattle. All these difficulties are connected with the improved methods of cultivation.

In our agriculture, we do not dream of progress; we are satisfied with stability, and that stability cannot be achieved without bringing in increased return from land. In the West the primary concern is to secure the maximum return for the minimum effort. But in our

---

<sup>1</sup>Vide "Encyclopædia of Scientific Agriculture", edited by H. Hunter, Vol. I, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup>Fertility is conserved with great efficiency in China by the careful conservation of animal, vegetable and human refuse; and its restoration to the soil.

<sup>3</sup>"The agricultural solution of stall feeding or, as in Egypt, the tethering out of cattle, raises the equally difficult problem of the addition of specific fodder crops on holdings already too small. Green manuring raises problems similar to tethering, and is, moreover, subject to risks in a country with a precarious rainfall. Artificial, too, are practically unknown, and it is questionable whether a return commensurate with their cost would be obtained so long as the humus problem remains unsolved."—Encyclopædia of Scientific Agriculture, edited by H. Hunter.

country, land is under-capitalised and over-manned. A more intensive use of labour may be attempted, but the exhaustion of land is to be stopped. It may not be possible to bring in science for mechanical cultivation, but some kind of nursing of land by irrigation and manuring by animal, vegetable and human refuse, and better and deeper cultivation by stronger cattle, improved ploughs and better seeds shall have to be taken to. An increase in the yield cannot be possible without improved methods of cultivation. Since land is scarce, the last ounce of nutriment out of such land is to be squeezed and the exhaustion is to be stopped by suitable devices. Our Committee, however, has not shown any ambitious scheme for improving the methods of cultivation, although we know that an increase of the output per cultivator, and not merely per acre, determines the standard of life of the agricultural population. "Prosperity is a condition, not of acres, but of human beings." But situated as we are with dwarf holdings and dense population, the increase of the output per acre is more necessary in the beginning; the human waste at which the increase of the output per acre will be obtained may be thereafter calculated, and also removed, by a more comprehensive scheme. That is incapable of a spectacular solution by any short-cut method.

*Agricultural planning contemplates no wastage of man-power.*

In our scheme of improved methods of cultivation, we have shown that attempts should be made to raise crops in succession, and that will not give sufficient slack season as our cultivators ordinarily enjoy at the present time. If we are to plan out our agriculture at all, we should see that cultivators are as little diverted to other occupations as possible; they should be made to be specialists in cultivation, and there should not be any slack season at all. All this will require experiments and researches. For, the crops are to be raised in succession without injury to the soil. If this can be arranged, subsidiary occupations may be availed of by surplus labourers in the villages. The development and fostering of cottage industries can be done either by the State, or by Co-operative Associations, or by some statutory organisation which will find out the different zones suitable for different cottage industries. This is a different matter entitled to separate treatment in the matter of rural economy, and raiyats should not be encouraged to look up to cottage industries as subsidiary occupations to fill up their financial deficiencies. If women or other non-working members of the cultivating families divert their attention to subsidiary occupations and cottage industries, that is beside the point at issue. Our Committee is of opinion that if the State is really serious in the matter of planning agriculture, efforts should be put forth to make agricultural operations remunerative by themselves. In the villages there is a good deal of surplus labour which may be utilised in subsidiary occupations and cottage industries.



### *Possibilities of co-operative farming.*

Co-operative farming has undoubtedly many good features, but its practical operation in Bengal is to be studied very carefully. A cultivation society, based on co-operative principles, may be started. The society will take over the land, either on rent or on share-tenancy or by purchase. The land taken over may be farmed collectively; that may be taken as collective farming. The land may also be parcelled out to be cultivated individually by members. It may be said that a landlord would lease his estate more easily and more cheaply to a society than to "several small impecunious farmers." The society would provide for the members the advantages of collective purchase and marketing; it would obtain better credit facilities, and it would be the intermediary through which Government may give the subsidy necessary to support any scheme. In that case, the landlord will get his rents more regularly; Government can establish touch with the tenantry through the society. The landlord shall not have to deal with individual raiyats, and that is a burdensome task. Sir F. A. Nicholson, a distinguished authority on the problems of Indian rural economy, said: "It is impossible for a Government to influence individually millions of petty peasants; they are individually too isolated, too suspicious, too shy to accept new ideas or to undertake experiments in new methods; similarly, they are too poor, too powerless to produce the best products, to get the better of the middlemen and the best of the markets. There must be some organisation which enables Government to act upon a body of men at once and to serve as intermediary between the Government and the individual: an organisation which can be advised, educated, reasoned with and listened to, which will discuss together the suggestion of authority, and will through its better educated or bolder members provide intelligence to absorb new ideas, find courage and funds to attempt new methods and combine both for the improvement of products and better sale of the same." In this way, a co-operative cultivation society may function as a good medium of transmitting the services rendered by Government to individual raiyats and as an organisation to raise the bargaining power and the credit value of the members.

### *Obstacles to co-operative farming.*

But the obstacles should not be under-rated. In a landlord-tenant system, raiyats belonging to different landlords should not form themselves into a society, because that will create an impossible state of things. If there are grades of raiyat, a farming society on co-operative principles cannot be organised, because different members may have different proportions of land with different grades of rights, but they will all have to be placed on the same status. All members of a co-operative society should work; no one can sit idle and live on

unearned income. In Bengal, all the raiyats shall have to be cultivators and all grades shall be merged in one grade before a cultivation society is attempted to be started on collective or co-operative principles. If a member takes land from a co-operative society and gets it cultivated by an under-raiyat, the principle of a co-operative cultivation society will be defeated. Moreover, the rights and privileges will accrue to the Society, and the members will be protected by it.

### *Co-operative farming in Italy.*

Cultivation societies on co-operative lines are very much encouraged by Government in Fascist Italy. Our Committee examines below the organisation of a typical society<sup>1</sup> in Italy so that a complete picture may be obtained for fuller appreciation of the methods suggested. The objects of a co-operative society of agricultural labour and cultivation are: (1) to purchase, to rent or to obtain in any other manner lands to be cultivated collectively ("conduzione unita") or individually ("conduzione divisa"), but with unity of direction, (2) to undertake agricultural works of all kinds, such as reclamation, transformation, etc., (3) to obtain for the members the necessary credit for the development of their agricultural activities, (4) to aid members in the purchase of agricultural requirements and in the processing and sale of their products, (5) to promote the construction and the improvement of members' houses and farm buildings, (6) to improve the moral and the material conditions of members, (7) to give rural credit for the attainment of the society's aims. All workers who devote themselves to agriculture may be members, provided they are of good character. The funds consist of the following: (a) unlimited number of shares of 100 lire each, (b) entrance fees, (c) ordinary reserve funds, (d) extraordinary reserve funds, (e) special provident, mutuality or educational funds, (f) any donations to the society for social purposes. The surplus is allocated in the following way: (1) At least 20 per cent. to ordinary reserve fund, (2) 10 per cent. for aiding members in need, (3) interest on share capital at a rate not exceeding the legal rate, (4) any amount left over to the reserve fund. The control and administration are also democratic, and five in number are nominated even from among non-members by the assembly consisting of the members of the society. The reclamation of malaria-infested marshes outside Rome has been done mainly by those co-operative societies. In Italy the agricultural unions which usually go by the name of "consorzi agrari" have shown splendid results. They are open to all landowners and farmers of good character; agricultural co-operative societies and other bodies are also admissible to membership which is ordinarily restricted to a given

<sup>1</sup> Vide "Agricultural Co-operation in Fascist Italy", by F. Cotta, published in 1935.

area. The success of these organisations has been due to the fact that they have realised the fundamental requirements for the economic success of agriculture and they have supplied those requirements which are: (a) good and cheap seeds, manures, implements and good cattle; (b) scientific and up-to-date cultural processes; (c) easy and cheap credit; (d) orderly, organised and controlled marketing of the produce.

### *Collective farms of Soviet Russia.*

We meet with collective farms in Soviet Russia.<sup>1</sup> The "Kolhōz," as it is known, is a co-operative association, legally incorporated and with a constitution defining in detail its functions and purposes. It enjoys full powers of internal administration, the final authority being vested in the general meeting of members. The two types of "Kolhoz" of consequence are the commune and the artel. In the commune "all individual income-yielding property disappears, and all productive resources: land, implements, stocks and buildings, are held in common. In the commune the only personal possession a man has or may have are his immediate personal belongings, such as clothes and what savings he may have made out of his wages and out of the share profit that may at the end of the year be disbursed." Stalin and his followers disavowed any aim to draw the peasant into "a completely communised scheme." The artel is popular now where peasants pool their land, their work, stock, implements, their farm buildings and their accumulation of savings. But they may maintain their individual homes, and may keep a cow, hen, geese, ducks, pigs, sheep and goats, though in numbers which must bear a fair proportion to their personal needs. If they happen to have a surplus of produce they may dispose of it, preferably to the co-operative, or in the open market. All members receive wages which are mapped out tentatively at the beginning of the year; wages are scaled according to the type of work a member performs and the degree of skill with which he performs it, though in no event must the highest wage be more than double that of the lowest. The "Kolhoz" may not dispose of any of its produce to private parties; it must sell to the Government. The Governmental dues are now definitely fixed by regulation and agreement at the beginning of each year; so much for the agricultural tax; so much for the hire of the tractors; so much for any other agricultural machinery supplied; so much in payment for the seed, for fertilisers and for anything else provided by the authorities beyond advice, encouragement and special help in trouble. The Moscow National Kolhoz worked out a scheme (for the year 1930) for the division of income which will go to explain the ideology guiding the plan of collective farms; five per cent.

---

<sup>1</sup>Information about collective farms in Soviet Russia principally taken from "Soviet Communism" by Sydney and Beatrice Webb and "Red Bread" by Maurice Hindus.

the income is to be set aside as dividends on the properties that the individual members have turned into the "Kolhoz"; taxes, insurance, reserves for possible mishaps and for seed are figured out on the basis of the prevailing conditions and needs of the "Kolhoz" and provided for accordingly; ten per cent. of the remainder (that is, deducting the sums already mentioned) is appropriated for the indivisible fund; five per cent. for social needs; special appropriations for special needs; the balance is distributed as wages and profits among the members.

*In co-operative farming rights of individual raiyats to be subordinated to collective interests.*

In the scheme of co-operative or of collective farms which our Committee has discussed in greater details, it is true that the members, collectively, are the masters of the situation, but in their individual capacities they possess very little rights. In our country, undue emphasis on individual raiyati rights is the very antithesis of co-operative or collective farms. We have shown in our previous replies that such an undue emphasis is all to the prejudice of agricultural improvement. In all the latest experiments in land settlement, be they co-operative farming or collective farming or small holdings movement, or peasant proprietorship, individual raiyati rights are always subordinated to the interests of farms and farming. Moreover, in the acquisitive and competitive order of society which is based on the economics of capitalism, collective farms can hardly find a room. In the collective economy man is a social being and not a self-interested individual; labour as a consumer becomes a claimant to share, according to his need, in the social dividend which will come out of production. In a capitalist system, there are many owners, hence many standards; in a socialist economy there is the single owner, hence the single standard of social need. The co-operative farms do, of course, recognise the principles of capitalist economy but in a country of uneconomic holdings, dense population, individualistic laws of succession, non-cultivating and non-resident raiyats, and gradations of raiyats with different rates of rent, the engrafting of co-operative farms on the existing state of land tenure, rendered complicated and unscientific by an imperfect and harmful tenancy legislation, is not a simple task; the question of collective farms is unsuited to the fundamental basis of class relations. Co-operative or collective farms may also throw the question into the forefront that there is a surplus agricultural population above the agricultural needs. All this will invite new problems for solution. Our Committee thinks that the small holdings movement is more practical and more suited to the needs of our country, although there is no reference to it in the questionnaire. Our Committee is not, however, disputing that collectivisation or co-operation as a method of

farming will bring in better returns to the cultivators than the existing individualistic farming on dwarf holdings.

*The need for co-operative marketing in this country.*

The farmer in our country not only sows and reaps his crops, but has to see to the financing of his business and marketing the produce. In a country where the family farm is the prevalent type and where capital and reserves are small, credit, tenure and marketing are vital matters. Those who produce should not be brought out to market products, and some organisation should be planned out to do the work on behalf of producers in conjunction with the interest of consumers. Of the three main types of economic systems, co-operation is "a synthesis of the laissez-faire system of economy and of a planned economy." "Its natural range of application or latitude extends from a position in which private initiative and freedom of action are preserved in a large measure to one in which the member sacrifices some individualistic functions in co-ordinating his efforts with others to attain certain ends. Group interests are recognised as superior to individual interests. Theoretically, the form or organisation and the principles of co-operation preclude any individual from attaining these ends at the expense of a fellow member. Group action may result in progress, inertia, or regress, but the movement is always unified and each member shares in the fortunes of the association in proportion to his contributions. The general objective of associations is to improve the status of members in a manner superior to that attainable under other economic systems. The plane of living is to be elevated through collective action and collective responsibility rather through individual effort as laissez-faireism proposes."<sup>1</sup>

The immediate problems which co-operators seek to solve by association are, (1) to harmonise production and consumption, (2) to avoid duplication and waste of human resources, (3) to prevent men from exploiting one another by directing their activities in such a way that each mutually improves the status of the other, (4) to eliminate idleness and dissipation, (5) to assure the benefits which result from combined effort for the general welfare of society.

*Lessons from co-operative marketing in America.*

From a study of the systems of co-operative marketing in America the following lessons may be drawn:—

(a) Marketing must be on the commodity basis and must not be local in character. "Organisation to market by commodity rather than

---

<sup>1</sup>"Economics of Co-operative Marketing", by H. H. Bakken and M. A. Schaars, p. 142, published in 1937.

locally, organisation around the point of consumption rather than the point of production, organisation to control the movement of the product to market, organisation to merchandise the product, these are the cardinal points in the commodity plan."

(b) The organisation plan will be preferably on the federal basis. Growers will contract to deliver the particular products to the local associations of which they are members. The local association will have a warehouse. It is a non-stock and non-capital plan with a subsidiary stock organisation owning the warehouse where the products are pooled, graded, packed, loaded into cars and distributed. There will be a District Association with affiliated local associations. The packed and graded products of the local associations will be distributed under the advice of District Associations to favourable markets which will be guided by information received from the Central Association. The Central Association provides the selling machinery in the market and acts as distributor of market information.

(c) Co-operatives require capital for organisation, physical facilities, operations, and in some cases for financing production on farms. The capital needs are provided for in the following ways: (1) Direct methods: sale of shares of common stock; collection of membership fees; sale of preferred stock; sale of bonds; requiring members to execute promissory notes to the association; borrowing (from members and non-members, from central co-operative organisation, from existing marketing agencies, from local banks or large commercial banks, from Government agencies); (2) Indirect methods: deferring payments to patrons, deduction of definite amounts from members' returns; accumulation of surpluses, reserves and sinking funds; system of assessments (so much per cow, or so much per acre); use of sight drafts; use of trade acceptances; creating subsidiary companies and selling stock in the same; delaying payments of bills. Co-operative marketing associations obtain capital funds from members, non-member investors, credit agencies and business operations.

(d) A co-operative association has legal contract with producers to deliver products. If the member violates his contract, the association may obtain redress by obtaining liquidated damages, an injunction and a decree for specific performance.

(e) Co-operative associations are operated as semi public bodies. The Federal Reserve Banking system has been organised in a way which does not offer obstacles to accepting warehouse receipts as proper collateral for bankers' acceptance. Loans to co-operative associations on standard, liquid security are made easily obtainable. The Federal Reserve Board can make liberal provisions for financing of agriculture. The programme laid down in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929

in the United States, which encouraged farmer-controlled co-operatives, indicates the extent of Government assistance in the matter.

(f) The management is undertaken by experts and the organisation is of producers only.

### *Co-operative marketing in England.*

In England the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931 conferred powers upon a proved majority of growers to coerce the minority into a specified course of action. The Marketing Board is empowered to fix prices of the commodity selected, divert products to factory or other purposes, to deflect supplies into particular channels, to refuse recognition to certain qualities of goods and to select selling agencies. The Marketing Act of 1933 empowered the Board of Trade to restrict imports of any agricultural products subject to the provisions of the 1931 Act, the primary objective being the attainment of a remunerative level of prices. The policy has thus led to the establishment of monopolistic marketing organisations, subject to Government control, and naturally restricts the field of genuine co-operative enterprise.

### *Co-operative marketing in Italy.*

In Fascist Italy the Government controls directly the marketing of rice, tobacco, and beetroot. For the orderly marketing of other products, it depends largely on "Consorti agrari" and their Federation which stabilises prices and raises them when national production requires it. The Fascist Government is ready to subsidise any undertaking of public utility.

### *The need of Government help in co-operative marketing.*

Our Committee has made a detailed examination of the principles of co-operative marketing only to indicate that without Government subsidy, interference and patronage, co-operative marketing associations cannot possibly succeed, and without the legal rights and financial privileges they may be overpowered by private dealers who will lower prices, give higher commission to retailers and adopt other methods of defeating the co-operative associations. Moreover, our farmers are illiterate; they will not willingly sign contracts; they may be influenced by designing non-members; they will not understand their own interests clearly; there are few experts who are competent to run such organisations. Situated as we are, the marketing organisation on the lines, followed in the English Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933, is likely to be of more practical help to our farmers. But the success of all marketing schemes postulates the co-operation of all other provincial units and the active co-operation of the Government of India. British farmers are fortified by the Marketing Acts, quotas and tariff

regulations; the position of our farmers cannot also be improved merely by the efforts of the provincial Government. If, on the other hand, it is postulated that local co-operative societies dealing with various kinds of commodities will merely function as shoppers for the local area, and as *arats* to establish contact with the merchants, our Committee does not take such scattered societies seriously as to make agriculture remunerative in an effective manner. We have said all this to indicate the enormity of the task and to find out ways how can agricultural produce be efficiently marketed to earn better prices on a solid and stable basis.

### *Cattle insurance in Italy.*

It is true that the insurance needs of the farmer are always great. We may make our agriculture prosperous, but accidents may, and do, happen, and unless there are insurance facilities the farmer labours in vain. Epidemics appear and take away the cattle causing irreparable loss to the husbandmen. A cattle insurance society, based on the principle of mutuality and formed for an unlimited period, may be started to indemnify members within the limits fixed by rules for loss caused by the death of cattle belonging to them and to promote hygiene and prevention of infectious diseases and to undertake whatever else tends to the betterment and the preservation of the cattle insured. The guiding principles of an Italian Co-operative Cattle Insurance Society<sup>1</sup> are the following: (1) It must limit itself to a small area with a population not exceeding, say, 5,000 inhabitants. (2) It must fix annual premiums or contributions within the limits prescribed by the Minister of Agriculture. (3) It must observe the principle of free service in administration, the Secretary and the Cashier excepted. (4) It must give compensation for actual loss only. (5) The societies must form federations for re-insurance, for spreading and averaging risks.

### *Crop insurance more useful than cattle insurance.*

Our Committee is of opinion that cattle insurance will be useful to our farmers, but more useful will be the method of crop insurance. In America the form of crop insurance available to the farmer has been insurance against loss or damage by hail. In our country the form of crop insurance will be against loss or damage of crops by drought or flood which cause scarcity and famines. "True crop insurance must give protection against all hazards which are beyond the farmer's control." Regarding the determination of the amount of insurance

---

<sup>1</sup>For the details of management and constitution of such cattle insurance societies, vide F. Cotta's "Agricultural Co-operation in Fascist Italy", Chapter VIII, published in 1935.



per acre, Dr. H. C. Taylor observes: "Regardless of whether the insurance is written on the value-return basis or on that of yield, the guaranteed return will doubtless have to be well below that of the average expected return if the moral hazard is to be properly safeguarded against. The basis for determining the proper amount of insurance per acre is probably to be found in the past performance of the farm in question, considered in connection with the past record of the farmer, in case he has recently come into control of the farm he now occupies." Our Committee thinks that crop insurance against all hazards is more important than cattle insurance.

*Poverty of agriculturists not due to pressure of population.*

**Q. 81.** Our Committee is aware that the density of population in Bengal per square mile is very high, and that the pressure of population on land is unduly heavy, but we cannot, on that account, subscribe to the view that it is one of the main reasons of the poverty of agriculturists. If agricultural produce would have fetched better prices, holdings economic, methods of cultivation improved, financing of agriculture scientific, marketing arrangements more suited to the needs of cultivators, deterioration of land in the Burdwan and Presidency divisions checked, and the human and cattle units more efficient, Bengal's agricultural land would then have cheerfully accepted the present pressure of population. To trace agricultural ills to a dense population is to shift our attention to a comparatively less important thing, although our Committee believes that the improvement of the standard of living necessitates the curtailment of the rate of growth of population. We do consider that a large population is not a national asset; but if the growth of population is checked and the exhaustion of the fertility of soil continues through various ways due to human negligence and natural causes, we cannot expect to see a brighter countryside. This view of things should receive clear recognition and appreciation before our Committee proceeds on to discuss the density of population in relation to the poverty of agriculturists.

*Density of population in the districts of Bengal.*

The density of population is incredibly high in eastern Bengal. The world's highest records of rural density are observable in the Dacca district, and the density of persons per square mile in some of the thanas is given as illustration: Narayanganj 3,010; Tangibari 3,044; Lohajang 3,228; Munshiganj 2,329; Shirajdikhan 2,066. In the districts of Faridpur, Bakarganj, Tippera and Noakhali, the density is of more than 1,300 persons per square mile.<sup>1</sup> Burdwan,

<sup>1</sup>The density of population in the three regions in China (in northern, the Yangtze delta and the Canton delta) does not exceed 1,000 to the square mile. In the plain of Chengtu, which is intensively irrigated, the density does not rise beyond 1,700 to the square mile—Dr. Radha Kamal Mukherjee.

Nadia, and Jessore are the districts in the moribund delta and their density of population per square mile is 583 and 531 and 576 respectively. Hooghly, 24-Parganas, Khulna—they are the districts facing the sea and their density of population per square mile is 938, 516 and 595, respectively.

• • • *The relation of population to agriculture.*

The variation of the cropped area has relation with the variation of population. The following table will show the percentages of variations:—

Districts.	Percentage variation of cropped area (1901-31).	Percentage variation of population (1901-31).
<i>In the moribund delta.</i>		
1. Burdwan	—40	+3·7
2. Nadia	—7	—8·1
3. Jessore	—31	—7·2
4. Hooghly	—45	+6·2
<i>In the active delta.</i>		
5. Daoca .. ..	+57	+28·9
6. Mymensingh .. ..	+19	+28·5
7. Faridpur .. ..	+13	+21·8
8. Bakarganj .. ..	+21	+27·1

The remarkable decrease of the cultivated area in the moribund district of the delta, together with the deterioration of fertility of soil and the health of the people, go to show, as we have indicated in our previous replies, that agricultural depression and the poverty of agriculturists are not caused principally by the high density of population; there are other vital causes related thereto, and in a scheme of reconstruction, nation's attention should not be taken away from those factors. Our Committee, is, however, not minimising the evil effects that a large population has generally on the resources of the country; large numbers with high birth-rates which are accompanied by high death-rates often handicap the growth of agricultural prosperity, because agricultural labour in our country tends to be inefficient and of low vitality.

*The view of the Superintendent of Census Operations (1931)—why Bengal can maintain a larger population.*

Mr. A. E. Porter, Superintendent of Census Operations, Bengal, in 1931, has maintained that Bengal can support a larger population and he assigns the following reasons in support of his contention:—

(1) Bengal has undeveloped resources which are not exploited efficiently.

(2) The soil is probably unlikely to deteriorate further, and the general opinion about areas, such as Bengal, is that a dead level of yield was reached long ago and is conditioned by the rate at which plant food constituents are made available by weathering. The use of manures together with an improvement in the implement of agriculture would increase the output of the soil (at least 30 per cent).

(3) Of the total area cultivable, only 67 per cent. is actually under cultivation. (In the Burdwan division only 60·7 per cent. is under cultivation; in the Presidency division 55·7 per cent.; in the Rajshahi division 63·6 per cent.; in the Dacca division 89·3 per cent.; and in the Chittagong division 62·5 per cent. These figures are taken from the Census Report of 1931.)

(4) Inefficiency of labour, that is, lack of capacity on the part of the people to mobilise the physical, intellectual and moral forces of the country and to organise land and capital effectively for national production.

Mr. Porter is satisfied with quoting Raymond Pearl because he has pointed out that the increase of population need not necessarily increase the misery in the world since "the orderly evolution of human knowledge justifies us in assuming that science will keep pace in discovering means of expanding opportunities of human subsistence." Indirectly Mr. Porter has thus cast a severe indictment against Government in not diverting science to the improvement of the fertility of Bengal's soil and to the necessary increase of the means of subsistence. We have seen that lands in the Burdwan and Presidency divisions are falling out of tillage, and that the low yield of land, the unremunerative price of produce, the bad health of the people are leading to agricultural depression and rural exodus. If everything is done to ensure better returns from land, to improve public health, and to apply capital and science to providing for better farming, there is no doubt that Bengal can support a larger population even with an improved standard of living. But in the absence of a plan to bring about agricultural prosperity, the low level of subsistence and farming, accompanied by the growing rate of population, will make and are making the situation desperate.

*Population to be considered relatively to agricultural needs.*

To find out the percentage of surplus population in respect of the agricultural needs of the country we are first to know if the given methods of wastage and deterioration will remain unattended to. If they are not touched and improved, the present number of population is large; the rate of growth is alarming. The regional distribution of population is unsatisfactory, East Bengal having high density and West Bengal a comparatively low density, although this disparity is

conditioned by the differences in their deltaic nature. Taking as an average for Bengal and with the given standard of living, the cultivating families of 6 millions (each consisting of five members) do not show any surplus even in respect of the 28 millions of acres cultivated. In that event, every family can get more than four acres of holding which under improved methods of cultivation including better supply and control of water, better manures, seeds, sires, and implements, improved and more efficient labour, are adequate for the purpose of their subsistence on a reasonable standard. But this average is deceptive: the dispersion of holdings is unscientific, many of them being bound up with uneconomic holdings; the exhaustion of the soil and the deterioration of the cattle and human units are going on unhampered. In the circumstances, the question of population is looming large as it is bound to, and the rate of increase which is alarming is undoubtedly hampering the progress of agriculture by involving great wastages in human labour. The agricultural needs of the country are not showing a surplus; it is the agricultural state of the country which is showing a surplus, and that is all to the discredit of any progressive Government.

*Methods for relieving the pressure of population.*

**Q. 82.** In the matter of relieving the pressure of population on land, there are two ways of approaching the question: (1) the ways of checking the rate of increase of the population, and (2) the ways of the absorption of the agricultural population in the other avenues of employment.

*Measures to check the rate of increase.*

There are drastic ways of checking the rate of increase, possible in a planned scheme under a dictatorial regime. The Marxist school does not attach importance to the growth of population and even the Malthusian and neo-Malthusian doctrines are ridiculed as attempts of the "bourgeoisie" class to maintain and improve the standard of living. There may be political considerations when the growth of population may be desired. Our Committee is leaving aside all these considerations, practical and theoretical, and confining our remarks to the question of population in our province. The following measures which are not very radical may be adopted to check the rate of increase:—

(1) Early marriage is held responsible for a large population. The younger the couple, the larger the average family, because the most productive period for a woman is between 15 and 20 years. The Malthusian recommends abstinence from marriage for a great many who have not the means to support a family. The Eugenist will say that marriage should only be contracted by those who are

physically and mentally fit for the propagation of the race. All these prescriptions do not fit in with the ideological background of our society. It is always better if the principle of late marriage filters down to the agricultural population through the voluntary spread of liberal ideas, although our Committee is doubtful of the extent of success.

(2) The spread of education and culture is of great value in decreasing the rate of growth. "Organisms multiply in inverse ratio to the dignity and worth of individual life," observes Herbert Spencer. Fertility itself decreases in the higher classes with increasing wealth and culture. In European and American countries where most investigations have been carried out it has been found:<sup>1</sup>

(a) that the birth-rate is negatively correlated with wealth, and

(b) that the indirect psychological and social effects of relative poverty as contrasted with relative wealth express themselves definitely and clearly in the sexual activity of human beings and through sexual activity in birth-rates. That cerebral development lessens fecundity is corroborated from the theory that the professional and allied occupations (such as the legal, medical, and teaching professions, artists and men with literary and scientific pursuits) are occupations of low fertility, whereas the labouring classes of agricultural and fishing occupations, of mines and quarries, are of significantly high fertility.

(3) High birth-rate accompanies high death-rate. In our country infantile mortality is alarming. Fecundity affects longevity; hence, greater births lead to greater deaths. Conversely, in countries with a low birth-rate the expectation of life is higher. To bring about a decrease in the birth-rate offers difficulties: social legislation is beset with dangers; artificial restriction of birth-rate is not feasible amongst the agricultural population; the voluntary restraint in married life always remains an ideal; the Malthusian doctrine of natural checks and balances cannot be relied on. In the circumstances, an improved standard of life, accompanied by social reform movement, will check the growing tendency of the size of the family. Accordingly, Mr. Porter, significantly observes in his Census Report of Bengal for 1931: "It is, therefore, possible to expect that a reduction of the birth-rate by the adoption of improved measures of public health accompanied by an improvement in the standard of living, an increase in the spread of education and perhaps principally by a further emancipation of women and their introduction to spheres of usefulness and activity, will in due course result in a decrease in the birth-rate corresponding with the decrease in the death-rate which it is the object of public health measures to bring about."

---

<sup>1</sup>Raymond Pearl—"Biology of Population Growth," quoted in the Census Report of Bengal for 1931.

*Malthusian doctrine with reference to Bengal.*

The student of population starts with the theory that population has a tendency to grow in a geometrical progression, while the means of subsistence increase in an arithmetical progression owing to the operation of the law of diminishing returns. In Bengal, as we have seen elsewhere, the yield of land is decreasing in certain parts. It may be expected that the low return of land will diminish the rate of increase of the population, and in fact, it is lessening the rate, but the ratio of decrease in cropped areas and returns in the Burdwan and Presidency divisions is not corresponding with the ratio of variation in population; there has been comparatively greater decrease in cropped areas and returns. In the East Bengal districts, the position is different: in the Dacca district the increase of population is less than the increase of the cropped area but in other districts (such as Faridpur, Mymensingh, Bakarganj) the population has exceeded the increase of the cropped area. All this shows that the rate of increase in population shall have to be checked even if the means of subsistence could be multiplied, and that can be done by enhancing the mobility of our agricultural labour. Man, as Adam Smith has told us, is "of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported." In respect of our agricultural labour, this observation applies more significantly. The absorption of labour in village industries and other occupations and its emigration from villages to neighbouring towns, where labour is mostly supplied from the neighbouring provinces, are essential and will go a great way towards relieving the pressure on land.

*Redundancy of population and employment avenues.*

But it must be admitted, as pointed out by Dr. Chalmers, that it is not by drawing off the redundancy of the population after it is formed that we can uphold a well-conditioned state of society; but by preventing the formation of the redundancy. High birth-rates are, therefore, prejudicial to the country; the percentage of the rate of increase will remain undisturbed if the death-rates are lowered along with reduced birth-rates. The one will accompany the other. The redundancy of population is an evil: it can and should be met by lowered birth-rate and an increase of agricultural prosperity; it will remain an ineffective remedy if the redundancy is attempted to be tackled merely by diverting them to Government-aided factories. Undoubtedly, it is one of the many methods of relieving the pressure on land, but its effectiveness in the matter of absorbing the growing population of Bengal is extremely restricted. Government cannot start industries without a plan and in a haphazard manner. In the absence of agricultural prosperity the limit of industrial expansion is narrowed down; even with a reasonable measure of industrial expansion, the number of agricultural labourers required in factories will not be sufficiently large, at least not

adequate enough to relieve the pressure on land in a given state of agricultural progress rather of deterioration.

*Agricultural prosperity and the quality of human unit.*

It may be mentioned, in this connection, that agricultural prosperity, unless coupled with measures to improve the quality of the human unit and the standard of human existence, will "add little to the peasant's real wealth but greatly to his debt and alarmingly to his numbers." Mr. M. Darling in his study of rural Punjab has shown how the good effects of prosperity are neutralised by the rapid growth of population. Accordingly, Mr. Keatings observed in despair: "If every economic advantage gained is to be the signal for relaxation of effort, if improved methods of farming serve not only to increase the crop, but also to swell the ranks of non-workers, is any marked progress possible?" In a warm country, whenever prosperity dawns the people become slack and are satisfied with a low standard of living, provided it is based upon small exertion. In the task of relieving the pressure on land, this aspect of the question should not be lost sight of.

Our Committee has shown ways and means of relieving the pressure of population on land, but it has little faith that the starting of industries by Government, the scope whereof is limited, will appreciably lessen the pressure where it has exceeded the optimum<sup>1</sup> density of population.

*Borrowing inevitable in Bengal agriculture.*

**Q. 83.** The soil of Bengal, to use a commonplace phrase, is "raw gold;" it requires to be extracted. Ours is a country of small farms, where agriculture is hardly a business, not even a profession, but a means of livelihood. The cultivator lives on the margin of subsistence and he has "to wait for half a year before he receives the return of his labour, and in far too large an area where there is only one crop in a year, the interval between successive receipts may be full twelve months." There are unfortunate raiyats having small uneconomic holdings who have "to pawn their crops in summer, their farm implements in winter, and their household belongings throughout the whole twelve months." All this emphasises that borrowing is inevitable, because husbandmen who have no reserve capital require financial

---

<sup>1</sup>"At any given time, or which comes to the same thing, knowledge and circumstances remaining the same, there is what may be called a point of maximum return, when the amount of labour is such that both an increase and a decrease in it would diminish proportionate returns.....Just as there is a point of maximum return in each industry, so there must be in all industries taken together. If population is not large enough to bring all industry up to this point, returns will be less than they might be, and the remedy is increase of population; if, on the other hand, population is so great that the point has been passed, returns are again less than they might be, and the remedy is decrease of population." (E. Cannan's "Wealth", pp. 68-69). Over-population, therefore, means a departure from the optimum in the direction of an excess of population.

assistance between the period of sowing and reaping, and in agriculture there is too wide a space between the sowing of crops and the ripening of them.

#### *Agencies for rural credit.*

The agencies interested in rural credit are (1) village mahajans or indigenous moneylenders, (2) co-operative credit societies, (3) loan companies, (4) joint stock commercial banks generally through their branches.

Under the Land Improvement Act and the Agricultural Loans Act, Government grants takavi loans,<sup>1</sup> the former Act authorising outlay on improvements such as wells, bunds, embankments, terraces and the like, and the latter Act giving loans for purchase of seeds, implements and so on.

The total requirement for short term and intermediate loan was estimated by the Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee to be Rs. 96 crores, of which the co-operative societies were responsible for Rs. 4 crores and the loan offices for Rs. 2 crores. The takavi loans do not generally amount to a high figure. The rest of the loans are met by village moneylenders. Since then, the proportion of satisfaction of the needs of cultivators by different agencies has hardly been disturbed.

#### *Mahajan is the villager's mainstay.*

It is not an exaggeration to say that the mahajan is the villager's mainstay. Theorists may and do complain that the countryside lies "blighted by the shadow of the mahajan" but in times of drought and famine, and even in normal times, when the cultivators ask for money, they would have broken down beyond recovery without the mahajan's assistance. To remove such pressing needs and to satisfy such a huge amount required as loans by villagers, nearly all grades of people in the villages who have surplus liquid capital have taken to moneylending,<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>The takavi loans are generally unpopular, because they are recoverable by Revenue Officers who insist on punctual payment of interest and repayment of the loan. The hardship of rigid recovery is complained of both by the Famine Commission of 1901 and the Irrigation Commission of 1901-1903. Takavi is distinctly given for working purposes to those who have credit, so that the power of recovery is assured. Although the borrower's land is, when necessary, seizable as security, the loan is not given on mortgage lines. A running analysis of takavi loans is found in Henry W. Wolff's "Co-operation in India," Chapter I. In his opinion, an increased employment of takavi loans is an hindrance to the co-operative movement. "It is not the use of an air-bladder and safety-belts that teaches a man to swim."

<sup>2</sup>The ramifications of the system in our country bear analogy to money-lending in China where officials and gentry are one element in it; merchants, a second; professional moneylenders, who specialise in the business, a third; pawn shops, a fourth; certain types of bank, a fifth; farmers who have managed to lay by a little money and use it to make advances, for a consideration, to their poorer neighbours, a sixth." In China also, as in our country, neither borrower nor lender appears to make any clear distinction between loans needed to finance the business of farming, and loans sought to eke out the domestic budget. Every thing goes down in a common account with the result that there is no discrimination in the mind of either debtor or creditor between the borrowing and advancing of money for productive purposes and household expenses. *Vide* R. H. Tawney's "Land and Labour in China", first published in 1932, pages 60 and 62).



and in a private and unregulated business which thirsts for more and more profits, usurious rates of interest have come to stay. It is being tackled by the Moneylenders Act. The Bengal Act of 1933 has placed certain checks on usurious rates.

*Thrifty cultivators antidote to crafty mahajans.*

Our Committee finds that village mahajans, though rebuked as "rapacious jews," are satisfying the needs; the co-operative credit societies are touching only the fringe of the problem; the loan companies have generally, though in an imperfect way, tried to satisfy the requirements of long term credit which the Co-operative Societies Act does not provide for; the Joint Stock Banks have obvious limitations and they generally lend money "on the movement of produce" which can be, and are, hardly availed of by disorganised producers having no organised marketing arrangements. In any scheme of credit organisation on scientific lines, "the factor of production above all others to be strengthened and stimulated is," to quote Wolf, "the man himself, not his purse."

Our Committee submits that the organisation of credit brings forward the question that usury<sup>1</sup> and need are two enemies to be vanquished. The lines on which the poverty of agriculturists may be attempted to be grappled with, have been suggested in our previous replies, but this is to be mentioned here that any good credit organisation presupposes that agriculture is a profitable calling for cultivators whose credit needs are to be met in the interest of the nation. If agriculture is unremunerative to its tillers, the foundation of credit organisation on any sound basis will be shaken. Bearing this in mind we shall have to approach the problem of usury. Usury comes with poverty; thriftlessness is its parent; if we can banish improvident habits of cultivators and create thrift, usury goes, or at least, is controlled within reasonable limits. Accordingly, our Committee stresses that the creation of thrifty cultivators is the antidote to crafty mahajans. Legislation cannot control usury; "usury laughs at laws." "Education and the development of character are the sole specifics against both, the wiles

---

<sup>1</sup>Jeremy Bentham defines usury in the following way: "I know of two definitions that can possibly be given to usury; one is the taking of greater interest than the law allows—this may be styled the political or legal definition. The other is the taking of greater interest than it is usual for men to give and take—this may be styled the moral one, and this where the law has not interfered is plainly enough the only one." N. Barou in his "Co-operative Banking" explains the matter further by observing: "Moral usury does not, as a rule, occur in ordinary commercial and investment loans or in business connected with the ordinary money market of the country. Usury always finds its victims when an emergency makes borrowing a necessity. Against such emergencies social insurance is the best defence, and furthermore, it tends to reduce the occasions for such borrowing. It must be clearly understood that the best organised system of credit for small borrowers will prove ineffective if it has to meet the emergencies alone, without the aid of social insurance. In short, credit organisation can only be a supplement to social insurance and not a substitute for it" (pages 10-11). The unequal bargaining position of the cultivator and the mahajan is to be taken note of.

of the lender and the recklessness of the borrower. No legislation, however wise or sympathetic, can save from himself the cultivator, who through ignorance or improvidence, is determined to work his own ruin" (Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, 1928). There is nothing so costly as ignorance; there is nothing so valuable as character. Therefore, the first essentials are the training of cultivators in the habits of thrift and saving, and stoppage of wastages and leakages that take place through social and religious customs and unscientific and unproductive ways of living.

### *The case for registration of moneylenders.*

The registration of moneylenders fixing the maximum rate of interest, it seems, is getting popular amongst our countrymen. In fact, the Bihar Moneylenders Act, 1938, provides for registration of all moneylenders on pain of suits for loans being not maintainable at the instance of unregistered moneylenders. Registered moneylenders shall have to maintain accounts of loans advanced and to give receipts for all payments made to them. They will also be required to give a copy of account to the debtor at least once every year. It fixes a maximum rate of simple interest at 9 per cent. per annum in case of secured debts and 12 per cent. in case of unsecured debts. In no case shall the interests paid exceed the principal. Compound interest is totally abolished. Moneylenders are liable to criminal prosecution for not keeping books in order and are punishable with an imprisonment of one year and a fine of Rs. 500. The Moneylenders Registration Act has recently been passed in the Punjab. The Punjab had already one salutary Act in existence, and that was the Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act obligating all persons, moneylenders, or shopkeepers, who advanced loans in money or in kind at interest, to keep an account for each debtor and to send him every six months a signed statement of the account distinguishing between principal and interest and detailing all the loan transactions of the past six months. If a separate account is not maintained under the Act for a debtor, the creditor is liable to lose his interest and will in any case not be awarded cost.

### *The case for co-operative societies of moneylenders.*

The Central Banking Enquiry Committee favoured the idea to form co-operative societies of moneylenders which should lend to the primary societies and not to individuals. The adoption of any such scheme presents the initial difficulty: whether moneylenders will get frightened and refuse to be within the ring of registered moneylenders or the scheme of co-operative societies of moneylenders. Moneylenders in their loan transactions with individual cultivators must be assured of a rate of interest, higher than the bank rate, otherwise undue restrictions on them will contract the available credit money and divert it to the

local branches of the joint stock banks. The needs of cultivators are pressing and great; the resources of Government are inadequate. The liquid money of private persons shall have to be mobilised in a way as to satisfy the needs without usurious rate of interest, and also in a way as not to bring about shrinkage of capital to the prejudice of debtors. The problem thus becomes delicate, technical, and a matter of grave national importance. The indigenous moneylenders generally carry on personal business and advance credit, both long term and short term. Both classes of loans are advanced without caring to inquire about the purpose of the loan, whether productive or unproductive. In our country it is very difficult to draw a marked line of distinction between productive and unproductive expenses; a portion of the expenditure, although unproductive from an economist's standpoint, is enjoined by religious and social obligations, and hence necessary. The best dividing line may be between necessary and unnecessary expenses. Long term loan is generally secured and short term loan often unsecured. An agriculturist's capital is locked up in his land and stocks. Hence, credit is not necessarily objectionable, nor is borrowing necessarily a sign of weakness, as put by the Nicholson Report of 1895. But there are peasants who require loans beyond the mortgage values of their land and stocks, and to that end, the personal business of mahajans is extremely important; an organisation run on any banking principle is helpless there. Poverty being so general, income so poor and land and stocks inadequate, the problem of credit becomes all the more delicate; it thus tends to go beyond the pale of legislation and banking organisation. But those peasants of poor resources cannot be neglected; the need for the regeneration of agriculture requires their nursing in a suitable manner. A Chinese philosopher has been quoted by Darling as saying: "The well-being of a people is like a tree; agriculture is its root, manufacture and commerce are its branches and its life; if the root is injured, the leaves fall, the branches break away and the tree dies."

*Moneylender is a necessity.*

In the above analysis, our Committee has tried to show that the essential of agriculture is credit, and that the sphere of private moneylender is peculiar to his personal business which, in the given framework of rural economy, cannot be dispensed with. Thus, the moneylender takes undue risks and is entitled to a greater rate of interest. The objectionable ways of moneylenders are to be rooted out, but their useful role should not be ruled out. We want to control moneylenders for stopping usury; we do not, and should not, control them for restricting the natural flow of credit money. If it flies elsewhere, the doom of agriculture is sealed, and it must be taken note of that it is with our agricultural prosperity that our industrial expansion is bound up. \*Our Committee notices that there is not a clear recognition of the

differences between the task of checking usury and of restricting credit. Impatient reformers often confuse the one with the other; that is not only lamentable, but it acts as a clog on our wheel of economic progress.

*Better marketing, a problem of agricultural finance.*

Moreover, the question of credit cannot be considered alone. Our agriculturists are disorganised, agricultural produce is not standardised; there are no opportunities for the pooling of products of individual cultivators; the quality of produce is diverse and poor; the distribution of agricultural commodities is made in an erratic and bunglesome manner. All this affects the question of credit. Banking follows trade. If there is intelligent merchandising of agricultural products, the problem of agricultural finance can be satisfactorily solved. Banking credit can only expand if there is organised marketing. If products can be moved into an organised channel of production, the financing thereof "changes from agriculture finance to commercial credit." Better marketing is thus a problem of agricultural finance. The aid of commercial banks cannot be availed of in financing our agriculture, if the produce cannot be used as a security for provision of cheap credit.

*The limitations of the co-operative movement.*

The co-operative movement has a great part to play in the solution of the credit problem but the limitations of the movement, on which much reliance is placed by some thinkers, are to be recognised. The various handicaps and weaknesses of the movement are set out below—

(1) The co-operative credit society seeks to meet the current needs of agriculturists, but it does not relieve the crushing burden of indebtedness which they are carrying.

(2) The funds available to the movement are limited. Co-operation, as Sir Horace Plunkett has pointed out, will succeed only as an integral part of a comprehensive agricultural policy. In Bengal there has been an undue emphasis on credit societies, but unless the purchasing power of agriculturists is attempted to be improved by the co-operative solution, the credit societies are bound to come to grief in the process of time, as many of them have come to during the period of depression, when credit money could not be paid because of the lowering of their purchasing power.

(3) The movement justifies its existence not only to meet the credit needs of raiyats; it has a higher moral ideal of a collective community. That ideal has hardly been insisted upon in our country; there is no co-operative effort for riding the rural society of wastages involved in illiteracy, improvidence, unproductive ways of living, etc. There has been no joining of forces and the co-operative ideal has not been kept in the forefront.

(4) There is widespread illiteracy and lack of business experience; they undoubtedly act as handicaps.

(5) There is lack of spontaneity in our co-operative movement. "The habit of looking to the Government to do for us things which we can and ought to do better for ourselves" offers the greatest obstacle to the growth of the spirit of self-reliance. The societies are generally established by Government initiative, kept in order by Government audit, and financed by Government credit, and all this does not run in line with co-operative ideals. (The peculiarities of our country are to be noted where some amount of Government supervision is necessary, and even State control, to a limited extent, is desirable; all this is to be attempted without abandoning the principles of co-operation.)

(6) The MacLagan Committee emphasised that each member should have knowledge of the principles of co-operation, if co-operation is to be genuine. "While societies have been registered freely, there has been a lack of patient and persistent education of the members in the principles and meaning of co-operation by teachers competent to perform their task efficiently under adequate supervision" (Royal Commission on Agriculture).

(7) The co-operative movement attends to short term loans; the lack of provision for meeting long term credit is the obvious limitation of the movement. A credit system without cheap long term credit for such purposes as debt redemption and land improvement touches only the surface of our credit problem.

(8) The MacLagan Committee wrote in 1915 that "there is no defect more prominent or more dangerous in the management of co-operative societies in India than the exceeding laxity and unpunctuality in the repayment of loans.....unless loans are repaid punctually, co-operation is both financially and educationally an illusion." Arrears are also due to lack of supervision and slackness of managing committees, although low returns from agriculture, old indebtedness and innate habits of unpunctuality are primarily responsible.

(9) Agriculturists generally keep out of the ring of co-operative credit societies, because there are formalities inevitable in an organisation;—the purposes of the loans are looked into and loans for unproductive purposes are discouraged, the impersonal touch and the more rigid procedure for realisation of dues are not appreciated, the co-operative societies do look more to the assets and resources of the debtors and less to the character and personal elements and as such their ways do not get approbation from our raiyats used to personal touch, laxity, forgiveness and even personal exactions of the mahajan.

(10) Our economic malady is deep-seated and of long standing. Co-operation in the circumstances is not a panacea; it can mitigate some of the most painful symptoms. The removal of rural distress, the

liquidation of indebtedness to the mahajan, the raising of the prices of agricultural produce by monetary devices, a planned and extensive exploitation of the resources of production to suit consumers' preferences—all this can hardly be achieved by the principles of co-operation.

(11) It may be criticised that "co-operative credit is only a modernised sort of 'takavi,' in which membership is only an outward form and, the help rendered being taken to be Government help, no acute sense of responsibility has been awakened." Henry W. Wolff significantly observes: "Committee men have in some places, like carvers, thought mainly, if not exclusively, of themselves, allotting the loans to themselves, and gladly extending time for repayment to one another. And the 'panch' being held in reverent esteem, especially in the absence of supervising councils, control of the Managing Committee has remained a weak point. Rightly appreciating the value of combination among societies, which in India is an absolute necessity, by means of Central Banks, organisers have come to regard such Central Banks as the 'pivot' institutions of the movement, the authorities to direct local affairs as well as central, and act as overlords and suzerains to the local societies, which, in truth, it is their mission rather to serve than to domineer over. This is a mistake of course. For it is the local society which educates and brings home the responsibility, which co-operation imposes upon the individual" (Henry Wolff's "People's Banks.")

*Matters to be considered in reorganising credit organisation.*

Our Committee is analysing all these difficulties, seemingly insurmountable, but undoubtedly great and delicate, to indicate the nature of the task involved in the reorganisation of our credit organisation. There is no short cut. The Committee, therefore, urges on the Commission to take the following into consideration in the matter of reorganising our credit organisation:—

(1) The personal business of moneylenders which is peculiar and essential should not be discouraged.

(2) Efficient marketing is necessary for organising financing on commercial lines. Any bank, joint stock or co-operative, has obvious limitations, and the resources of a bank are, and can be, available in a more effective way to producers, if they are organised.

(3) There should be no "touting" for deposits, either in the co-operative banks or in the loan companies. The rate of interest should be assured, and the help of Government in guaranteeing the interest on debenture loans is felt very insistent and necessary. The floating of debenture loans by the central organisation, either of the co-operative banks or of loan companies, organised anew on banking principles, will minimise the necessity of drawing deposits on any preferential term.

(4) Government should not enter into the field in a spirit of competition with the joint stock banks or loan companies but rather assist the existing organisations so that they may function usefully. It is not a sound proposition to make Government a banker on profiteering lines (that is, paying interest on deposit money, and realising higher interest from debtors).

*Difficulties of agricultural credit.*

There are inherent difficulties in tackling the problem of agricultural credit. Those difficulties are: (1) Agriculture remains scattered, individualistic and small scale. The units of production are of one-man concern, and the credit available for the concern is limited to the credit of one man or one family. (2) In the very nature of things the agriculturist is isolated and remote from normal opportunities of obtaining credit. (3) In agricultural production and also particular crops, there is inelasticity of supply, and the comparative difficulty of adjusting the supply to fluctuation in demand. (4) The principal security in agricultural finance for a long term credit is land which is ordinarily unsuitable for commercial banking, for land is not readily a realisable asset and its price is liable to peculiar influences. (5) The liquid and easily realisable assets of the cultivator are his crops or livestock or dairy produce and they are precarious forms of security owing to the physical risks to which production is subjected. (6) The phenomenon of over-production affects agriculture most, because the agriculturists are disorganised. All these handicaps have been referred to by the Central Banking Enquiry Committee. Some of the difficulties shown can be overcome and some minimised. To ensure a scientific credit organisation for agriculture these handicaps should be examined, weighed and guarded against, as far as practicable.

*Private mahajans are national assets.*

**Q. 84.** Our Committee has shown in reply to question 83 that the credit needs of agriculturists are practically met by private money-lenders. If the total interest charged by them be worked out and found to consume 25 per cent. money equivalent of gross produce of Bengal, we can only be impressed with the extent of credit needs; it would be very wrong to describe it as an annual drain. If the interest charged is at an usurious rate, it is a drain to that extent; but when they satisfy the legitimate credit needs by charging lawful rates of interest, they are undoubtedly performing national services, and in this sense, private mahajans are national assets. The resources of Government are inadequate and are unable to meet the credit needs, and in the circumstances the services of mahajans should receive grateful recognition. In fact, without their services, the agriculturists of Bengal would have been shaken beyond any hope of recovery. To underrate the services of mahajans, is a very

wrong approach to the credit problem. If the interest charged by mahajans is seriously described as a drain, is it ever contemplated that the credit problem of Bengal is proposed to be satisfactorily solved by lending out money without any interest at all? The greater the amount of mahajans' lawful interest, the greater is the dependence of agriculture on mahajans' capital. That shows rather a different picture, that is, Government is dependant on the mobilisation of private capital through a private organisation for meeting the credit needs of agriculturists. The country has, therefore, every reason to be grateful to mahajans; Government has every reason to be ashamed of the absence of a credit policy.

*Usurious rate of interest deprecated.*

Our Committee, however, deprecates the charging of usurious rate of interest, but private moneylending, confined to legitimate bounds, is a national service especially when agriculturists can confidently look up to no other organisation for satisfaction of their pressing needs. The suggestions for improvement of the credit organisation of Bengal are detailed in the replies to questions 83, 85, 86 and 87.

*Co-operative credit touches only the fringe of the credit problem.*

**Q. 85.** 'Our Committee has shown in its reply to question 83 that the co-operative credit societies touch only the fringe of the credit problem. Their resources are inadequate; they are not also popular; they are often avoided by cultivators. The co-operative movement is "self-help made effective by organisation," as was put by Sir Horace Plunkett. In the co-operative movement of our country, the basic ideal is found wanting. "It is not a spontaneous growth but a Government policy." "The distinction between co-operation, imposed by the Government and necessarily supervised, regulated, restricted and controlled, on the one hand, and co-operation promoted by voluntary initiative and sustained by the co-operative spirit, which insures the loyalty of the members, on the other hand, cannot be over-emphasised" (Horace Plunkett).

The co-operative movement has obvious limitations; the disproportionate growth of credit societies has resulted in loans being locked up when the purchasing power of the cultivator shrank owing to economic depression. In fact, many societies have come to grief and become heavy with outstanding duties payable by debtors. The handicaps of the movement should be removed, at least as far as possible, and the weaknesses rectified. The movement to be effective must be free from the removable and curable defects.

The co-operative societies have not been able to enter into the real needs of agriculturists and, accordingly, only a small number of cultivators are benefited by the movement.



*Co-operative rate of interest to be below the mahajan rate.*

The aim of co-operative societies is to give members better service at a less rate of interest than the rate they would have to pay outside. The societies' rates must be below those of the mahajans. The MacLagan Committee pointed out that a society's profits depend mainly on the difference between its borrowing and lending rates, and held that until the reserve fund had reached a substantial figure it was a mistake to reduce unnecessarily the rate at which money is lent to members. Moreover, unusually low rate<sup>1</sup> may encourage reckless borrowing<sup>2</sup> and borrowing for re-lending by members. In Bengal, it is said that the central banks borrow at 6 per cent. and lend to the primary societies roughly at 10 per cent. Unusually low rates will encourage the members to discharge first their obligations to moneylenders, while the societies' overdues will pile up. The MacLagan Committee blamed too low or prematurely reduced rates of the primary societies, because in that case central banks will find difficulties in financing them. Hence, the rate of interest to be charged by a primary co-operative society from its members should vary with the bank rate, and the rate that can be lawfully charged by private moneylenders. Deposits may be attracted if the rate of interest thereon is a little over the bank rate given by the joint stock banks; the central banks will finance primary societies if they are sure of a margin, however small. Primary societies are to earn sufficient margins to pay the rate charged by the central banks, and to allow for their management expenses and bad debt insurance. But the rate of interest to be earned by primary societies from their members must be below the rate legally due to private moneylenders, who undertake greater risks in their personal business. Thus the rate may be varied from time to time, say, from 9 to 12 per cent.

*Measures to be adopted to reconstruct rural economy.*

**Q. 86.** We have shown that borrowing is inevitable in our country; the malaise is not in borrowing. The incapacity to repay loans is the fundamental question related to the problem of indebtedness. The reasons which lead to the borrowing are distinct from those which make cultivators impossible to satisfy their needs. This

---

<sup>1</sup>"In spite of all that has been said, however, against the dangers of too low interest rates, I am convinced that, given proper control of credit, they are less objectionable than too high ones. And the rates which co-operative society members have to pay in most parts of the country are too high"—Eleanor M. Hough in "The Co-operative Movement in India," page 80, published in 1932. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee observes: "One of the main requisites of agricultural credit is that it should not be too costly. Credit provided by the co-operative organisation is still much too dear for the cultivator in some provinces. We consider that if a rural society charges its members a rate higher than 12 per cent. per annum, it should form the subject of careful inquiry by the provincial Government and the provincial Bank concerned, and steps should be taken to reduce the rate of interest."

emphasises that borrowing for unproductive purposes is fatal. Therefore, to tackle the problem of indebtedness, we have to reconstruct our rural economy on vital fronts. The following measures are essential:—

(1) The holding must be economic. The occupier of the un-economic holding cannot be free from debts.

(2) Agriculture must be made remunerative; the production and distribution should run through organised and improved channels.

(3) The financing of agriculture must be at a low rate of interest, and the poor bargaining strength of the cultivator in the matter of getting loans should not be exploited by unscientific credit organisations.

(4) The mere rise in the prices of agricultural produce is rather harmful: the deficits of those who are insolvent will increase; it will be neutralised by larger population and greater debts. Accordingly, improvements in the standard of living and the character of cultivator (including removal of improvidence, thriftlessness, illiteracy, and other inefficiencies) are of great importance. The habit of saving and the art of regulating the spending of money after spreading over the period till the next harvest season are to be encouraged.

(5) The main causes of indebtedness (such as failure of crops from drought, poverty with irregularity of income, the ancestral debt, the increase of population without corresponding increase of produce, facilities for borrowing for unproductive purposes) must be looked into, and specific remedies must be suggested for the manifest purpose of removing the causes.

#### *Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, and agricultural finance.*

If it is accepted that the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935, was passed as a measure for tackling the problem of indebtedness, it must be clearly recognised that the approach was wrong and unscientific. The Act establishes Boards for scaling down debts and arranges for repayment of the "awarded debt" by long instalments. It is at best an attempt to scale down the existing debts; it does not provide for future debts and does not even conduce to conditions which may ensure repayment of the "awarded debts." It is a peculiar case of State interference without sharing in the responsibility. The causes of indebtedness remain untouched; there is no provision for the supply of credit money; the sanctity of debts is discounted and the mentality of non-payment of dues is encouraged; the decay of agriculture is left where it is; private creditors are hurt for no fault of their own, and they will perhaps be ruined by the indifference of Government. The Government of Bengal is setting up Boards; cultivators are thirsting for loans. The problem of indebtedness is not capable of any such easy solution.

The scaling down of accumulated debts is, in strict logic, not an unworthy measure as a preliminary to launching on a comprehensive scheme for attacking the problem of indebtedness. But the State, when it goes on to interfere with contracts validly made under the existing law, must be aware of its heavy responsibilities, and it can only be supported when such a measure is supplemented by organisations for better financing and better marketing, seeking to satisfy the needs of agriculturists and to maintain and improve their purchasing power. But a mere policy of scaling down, or liquidation of debts, unless coupled with the other supplementary measures of checking the wastages leading to indebtedness, is an evidence of the lack of appreciation of the gravity of the problem. It is unfortunate that debts are being wiped away with no ultimate plan in view; creditors are prejudicially affected but cultivators are not getting the full return of the sacrifices of creditors. The temporary respite of cultivators does not improve agriculture; it is only a good beginning. That is evidently the end of the economic policy of Government; the sacrifices of creditors are thus running to waste.

Agriculturists must borrow. This inevitability of borrowing which is emphasised by all the reports of the Committees set up to discuss the problem of agricultural debts, is frankly neglected in the Agricultural Debtors Act. It thus falls short of a measure "dealing with the problem of agricultural debts." The Act has, as usual, frightened private creditors. But our agriculture, if it is to live and prosper, must have cheap finance. If private creditors tighten their purses, as they are bound to do so under the prevailing circumstances, the rescue of agriculture, without a substitute credit organisation, assisted and encouraged by Government, becomes extremely difficult. It is no genuine relief if the old debts of cultivators are scaled down or even liquidated, and they find in the next date that there is no one to finance them in their agricultural operations. Those who are solvent farmers and are not absolutely dependant on loans will have all the advantages of the Act, although they do not require the protection of such legislative measures. But those farmers who live on the margin of subsistence and have to depend on loans for the financing of their operations, (and their numbers are growing), will have little constructive help from the Act; rather they will ultimately lose. In the countryside complaints are already audible, but they are being submerged in the noise of political agitation. The Act can never be defended in the interest of agriculture; it is of no constructive help in dealing with the "problems of agricultural debts." It is, at best, a measure for granting relief to the solvent raiyats, who may live on incomes from land but who are evidently not farmers themselves. They do not feel the pinch of loans for cultivation expenses, but they have all the slices of advantages under the Agricultural Debtors Act.

### *Defects of the Act.*

Our Committee has shown that the basic principles of the Act are defective. Some of the defects found in the working of the Act are given below—

(1) The expression "agriculturists," for whom the Act is evidently meant is not happily and clearly defined.

(2) The sanctity of arrear rents is not fully recognised by the Act; the payment of arrear rents by spreading it over long periods directly affects landlords with whom the zamindari property is a business investment. No business can function if its flow of income is thwarted by an outside organisation interfering with the Civil Court decrees, lawfully obtained.

(3) The rigid repayment of loans according to the "award" has prejudicial effect on the realisation of current rents by landlords.

(4) The proceedings before the Debt Settlement Boards are often protracted and they thereby stultify the normal operations of Civil Courts.

(5) The Act fosters a spirit among debtors to default payment of credit money. This is the importation of a serious disquieting feature in our rural economy.

### *The people have bankers but no bank.*

**Q. 87.** It is true that the want of a banking system for the people is standing in the way of our economic development. Sir Daniel Hamilton complained that "the people have many bankers but no bank." The solution of the credit problem involves the provision of improved banking facilities. The competition of would be borrowers for the limited funds of the mahajan was cited by the Bengal Banking Enquiry Committee as a contributory cause of usury. But it must be equally recognised that "no improvement in the existing credit system and banking facilities is likely to be effective unless it is accompanied by measures for raising the standard of living and economic condition of the mass of the population and for building up its productive strength. The progress of banking will depend on the spread of education and the promotion of agricultural improvement and on the encouragement of industrial effort. Economic progress and development of banking being interdependent, banking cannot make any advance in a community sunk in poverty, ignorance, and helplessness" (The report of the Bombay Banking Enquiry Committee).

*The role of Government should be one of guidance, not of banking itself.*

In our answer to question 83 our Committee has not appreciated the ideal of Government as a banker competing with the other

commercial and co-operative banks. The extension of commercial banks is essential and will be helped by better marketing arrangements; the extension of co-operative banks and loan offices on scientific principles is also necessary. But all the existing agencies may be improved and assisted by Government so that the financing of agriculture may be made more effective and useful. In America the Federal Reserve Banking system has been organised with an eye to the interests of agriculture; the Federal Reserve Board can make liberal provisions for financing agriculture. In England, the English Mortgage Corporation was set up by the Agriculture Credits Act of 1928, and the leading joint stock banks of England are the share-holding units in this Corporation. This is referred to and explained by the Central Banking Enquiry Committee. The Committee has also pointed out the need for commercial Land Mortgage Banks especially in the provinces where the Permanent Settlement prevails. In the absence of any such mortgage institution land is deprived of its proper credit value. But this is for long term loans. The short term loans for agriculturists are insistent, and they should be met by private moneylenders, co-operative banks, and joint stock banks through their branches. Loan companies, after they are re-organised, may find their room in the scheme. The extent of Government's help should extend to legislative and financial assistance in an approved manner. Our Committee is not in favour of State-owned and State-managed commercial banks in every union to finance agriculturists with short term loans. The privileges which the State, as sovereign power, owns may be spread over the existing agencies in a planned manner. That is more suited to the needs of the situation, unless, of course, the vision of a planned economy under an authoritarian State is envisaged for the country.

We have elsewhere discussed the difficulties of starting scientific credit organisations, and they will indicate that a mere establishment of banks, unless coupled with measures for improving the marketing arrangements by proper merchandising of produce, cannot solve the credit problem satisfactorily. The obvious limitations of such banks should not be underrated. All these connected problems cannot be brushed aside in a consideration of the question in the matter of Government banks in every union. Our Committee has more fully urged its point of view in the answer to question 83.

*The expensive and dilatory methods of realisation of rents through Civil Courts.*

**Q. 89.** In Bengal, landlords have to sue in Civil Courts for arrears in rent. The judicial statistics in Bengal show that the majority of the suits in Civil Courts are rent suits, and most of the money suits are for kistibandi (bonds executed by the tenants for arrears of their rents). The expensive and harassing methods of collecting rents

through Civil Courts tell on the resources of landlords and also of tenants. When the Settlement of 1793 was framed, such a miserable situation, brought about by the tenancy legislation, was not contemplated. The raiyats in 1793 enjoyed their rights on punctual payment of rents; their crops were liable to distraint and the frequent recourse to law courts in every conceivable matter between landlords and tenants was rather discouraged so that the institution of landlordism may grow to its full stature. In Act X of 1859 the transfer of original jurisdiction in suits between landlords and tenants from the Civil to the Revenue Courts was effected. The Chief Civil Court of the district retained a limited appellate jurisdiction. But Act VIII of 1869, which re-enacted Act X of 1859, so far as the substantive portions were concerned, retransferred the jurisdiction as to trial of cases between landlords and tenants from the Revenue Courts to the Civil Courts. The Rent Law Commission, which was practically appointed to devise, among other things, a speedy procedure for effective realisation of rents, came to the interesting conclusion that justice could not be abridged, although in simple rent suits rights are not attempted to be affected; and if they are, jurisdiction of Civil Courts may be justified. However, the Tenancy Act of 1885 empowered the local Government to order survey and preparation of record-of-rights. The period of limitation for suits in arrear rents is three years, and the time, from which period begins to run, is the last day of the agricultural year in which the arrear fell. The landlord ordinarily sues in the fourth year and obtains a Civil Court decree in the fifth or sixth year. After obtaining the Civil Court decree, the decree-holder may apply for the sale of the holding; and the obtaining of the sale decree, which is much complicated, involves much waste of time. If a landlord is to go through all this cumbrous procedure for every individual raiyat, it may be surmised that no institution can remain healthy; it tends to corrosion and corruption. Moreover, the provisions regarding distraint of crops which existed in a modified form up to 1928, have been deleted, and in 1938, section 158A, whereunder private landlords could get the facilities of certificate procedure at the instance of the local Government in the matter of realisation of arrear rents, has been repealed. The interest on arrear rents is reduced to six and a quarter per cent., and thereby the last incentive to payment of arrear rents is taken away. The position of landlord in the matter of realisation of arrear rents of raiyats is, therefore, this—

- (1) Landlords are to sue in Civil Courts;
- (2) The period of limitation in instituting suits for arrear rent is three years which encourages raiyats to be remiss in payment of rents;

- (3) the intervening period between two successive rent suits must be at least nine months;
- (4) there are no provisions for distraint of crops for realising arrear rents;
- (5) the interest on arrear rents is so low as not to encourage the habits of prompt payment;
- (6) whenever a holding is sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, and the sale is confirmed, the purchase shall take effect after the confirmation of the sale which again involves some wastage of time to the prejudice of the decree-holder;
- (7) section 158A of the Tenancy Act is repealed.

*Dilatory procedure illustrated by a few cases.*

Our Committee is not aware of any country where landlords have been asked to function usefully under the handicaps mentioned above. In addition to the legislative handicaps, the dilatory procedure of Civil Courts in our country is well-known. As illustrations of the dilatoriness and ineffectiveness of Civil Courts our Committee sets out below the disposal of certain rent suits—

The Port Canning Company *vs.* Elahi Bux Molla and others, Rent Suit No. 28 of 1927 filed at the 3rd Sub-Judge's Court at Alipore in April, 1927, for arrears of rent for 4 years from 1923 to 1926. The J. D.'s failing to pay the decretal dues settled in the High Court on 27th April 1933, the decree was put under execution in the month of November 1934 and the decree was fully satisfied on 29th April 1935 after long 8 years from the date of the institution of the suit.

Rent Suit No. 5 of 1931 (the Port Canning Company *vs.* Hrishikesh Dutta and another) involved 6 years from the date of institution to the date of the realisations of the dues.

Rent Suit No. 7 of 1931 tells the same tale.

Rent Suit No. 16 of 1934 (Kumar N. N. Mitter *vs.* Md. Ekramali Talukdar) in the 2nd Sub-Judge's Court, Barisal. Plaint filed on 16th April 1934; execution petition filed on 4th September 1934; sale confirmed on 10th June 1935; petition for setting aside sale on 24th June 1935. The case dragged on to 25th September 1937.

Rent Suit No. 17 of 1929 (Kumar N. N. Mitter *vs.* Santosh K. Das and others) in the 2nd Sub-Judge's Court, Barisal. Suit filed on 28th September 1929, judgment debtor files a case on 5th September 1934 to set aside sale, 17th November 1934 was fixed for deposit of the decretal amount.

Rent Suit No. 1 of 1934 was instituted against Fakir Chandra Roy by the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Bankura on 28th February 1934 for recovery of the arrear of rent. The sale was confirmed on 8th February 1937.

Rent case No. 2512 of 1934 instituted by the Nashipur Raj in the Court of Munsiff, Rampurhat, demanded Rs. 342. Instituted on 15th April 1934; disposed of 19th September 1934, Execution case No. 68 of 1936. On the party agreeing to pay amicably the case was withdrawn. But no payment was made, fresh execution case was filed in 1937, Case No. 1975. The party made part-payment.

Rent Suit No. 1/30 (Raja P. N. Tagore, Plaintiff vs. Eshak and others, defendants) in the Sub-Judge First Court, Barisal. Plaint filed on 27th March 1930. Even in 1934, execution pending. Whole amount not realised even by 1937.

The above cases are given as illustrations; our Committee has in its possession records of rent suits in the different districts of Bengal indicating the dilatoriness of Civil Courts in their final disposal. It is really interesting to note that cases are made to drag on even under colourless pretexts. Those who are familiar with the rent suits in Bengal know how the habit of playing at law, and the dilatoriness of Civil Courts, exercise prejudicial effects on the landlord-tenant system in Bengal. Our Committee is giving below a specimen case to indicate how rent suits are dragged on and executed in Bengal.

Rent Suit No. 3/32 in Sub-Judge 2nd Court, Barisal, Raja P. N. Tagore (Plaintiff) vs. Anes Mufti and others (defendants)—

Plaint filed on	...	...	15-4-32
Summons served. Defdt. 13 & 14 appeared and filed written statement	...	...	23-9-32
Written statement of Defdt. 1	...	...	10-11-32
Written statement of Defdt. 11 and 12	...	...	18-1-33
Defdt. 1 prayed for local enquiry on the ground of diluvion on	...	...	5-4-33 & 24-4-33
Defdt. 1 moved and pressed the petition of local enquiry on	...	...	15-5-33
Plaintiff opposed it on	...	...	16-5-33
Defdt. 1 prayed for postponement of the commission of local enquiry on the ground that the rent land is under water on	...	...	30-5-33
Defdt. 1 prayed for production of some documents from the plff.	...	...	8-3-34



Several petitions by defdt. & opposed by plff. for the production of document till	...	...	16-6-34
In the meantime defdt. 2 died and his heirs are substituted on	...	...	17-8-34
Commissioner filed report on the diluvion enquiry and plff. puts in objection against them on	...	...	12-9-34
Defdt. also puts in objection	...	...	14-9-34
Defdt. 1 prayed for time on the ground that his son is attacked with small-pox	...	...	20-5-35
Defdt. 1 prayed for time on the ground that defdt. 3 is dead and he himself is ill on	...	...	8-8-35
Plff. prays for substitution of the heirs of defdt. 3 on	...	...	31-8-35
At last after substitution and some adjournments the suit was decreed on	...	...	21-12-35
Then the decree was first executed on	...	...	20-3-36
Then on	...	...	21-12-36
Then on	...	...	22-12-37
Still whole of the decretal amount has not been realised	...	...	26-3-38

It is thus evident that the machinery available to landlords for realisation of rents is "costly and cumbrous" and undoubtedly 'expensive' to raiyats also.

Over and above all this, there are Debt Settlement Boards interfering with the payment of arrear rents; there is the deterioration of agricultural prices in the absence of a progressive policy initiated by Government; there is the countryside agitation contributing to non-payment of rent; a spirit of defiance of the established laws and class-relations is abroad, to the dangers of which Government does not seem to be fully alive. If the landowning community has not yet broken down under the forces marshalled against it by the legislative handicaps, unconstitutional activities of agitators, the general tide against the acquisitive order of society, and Governmental indifference, that bears eloquent testimony to its grip and grit. In fact, our Committee has been asking for a simple, effective procedure for realisation of rents for the maintenance of the institution of landlordism. It is not an extraordinary demand; it is conceded in every progressive country; it is appreciated even in other provinces.

*What "rules of good husbandry" mean in England.*

In England the landlord may claim compensation from the tenant if the value of the holding has deteriorated during the tenancy by the failure of the tenant to cultivate according to—

- (1) the rules of good husbandry, or
- (2) the terms of the contract of tenancy.

The expression, "rules of good husbandry," as defined by the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1923 (*vide* section 57), means—

(a) the maintenance of the land in clean and a good state of cultivation and fertility, and in good condition,

(b) the maintenance and clearing of drains, embankments and ditches,

(c) the maintenance and proper repair of fences,

(d) the execution of repairs to buildings (repairs which are necessary for proper cultivation of the land, on which they are to be executed). If a tenant is in arrear with his rent, the landlord may not only bring an action for its recovery, but he has also the right, without any previous legal process of any kind, and without even making a previous demand for the rent, of entering upon the premises in the occupation of the tenant, and there seizing different goods to satisfy the debt. This right is known as the right to levy distress.

Section 34 of the Act in England shortens the period for making a distress for rent to one year in agricultural tenancies. A landlord cannot distrain till the day after the rent becomes due; no distress can be made between sunset and sunrise. If rent is made payable quarterly "in advance if required," the landlord may distrain at any time during the quarter after demand. Section 35 provides for limitation of distress in respect of things to be distrained. Things absolutely privileged are perishable commodities (such as vegetables), fixtures, things in actual and personal use, wearing apparel, agricultural or other machinery which is the property of a person other than the tenant, livestock which is the property of a person other than the tenant, etc. Things conditionally privileged are beasts of the plough, tools, or implements of trade, etc.

*The position in the States of America in realisation of arrear rents.*

In many of the north central States of America laws have been passed declaring that the landlord shall have a lien for his rent upon all crops grown upon the premises leased. In others, a lien can be created by agreement of the parties. In some cases, the owner of the land required that all the produce shall remain his property until the rent is paid. There are various kinds of leases where the sanctity

rent is very much emphasised. The due payment of rent is considered an essential condition for the enjoyment of the rights of raiyats. That is the fundamental basis of the tenancy legislations of the West.

### *The position in Madras.*

In Madras, a landholder is entitled to recover any arrear of rent by a suit before the Collector, by distraint and sale of movable property or by sale of a raiyat's holding. (Section 77 of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908, as amended by Acts IV of 1909, VIII of 1934 and IV of 1936.) In a suit for arrears of rent, if the rate of rent is disputed by the tenant, the same can be determined by the Collector. No separate suit for determining the same is necessary. A suit for interest on arrears of rent is cognisable by Revenue Courts. When the landlord has resorted to Court and obtained a decree, he should not be allowed to distrain movable property in respect of the arrear for which he sued and obtained a decree. The articles exempted from distraint are: the necessary wearing apparel, cooking vessels, personal ornaments of a woman that cannot be parted with under religious injunctions, etc., and the ploughs and implements of husbandry, ploughing cattle and manure stocked by the raiyat, and such seed grain as may be necessary for the cultivation in the ensuing year. Section 112 of the Madras Estates Land Act marks the beginning of a series of sections under which the landholder is given the power in a summary way, without obtaining a decree for rent, to bring the holding of the defaulter to sale. The series of sections end with section 125 which says that when a sale is held all the title of other people are extinguished including encumbrances, and clear title is given to the purchaser. It is done on the analogy of land revenue sales, land being the first charge. The purchaser under rent-arrears is also given a similar title. Section 112 requires a notice to be given to the defaulter informing him that the amount is due, and that if he does not pay the amount or institute a suit within thirty days, the said holding will be sold.

### *The position in the Punjab.*

In the Punjab suits by a landlord for arrears of rent, or the money equivalent of rent, are tried by Revenue Courts. The limitation for rent suits is three years. When a tenant is under agreement to pay rent and there is no satisfactory evidence as to the rate of rent payable, the Revenue Court should decree rent at a rate deemed to be fair and equitable.

Under the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 the landholder is entitled to distrain any crops or other products of the earth standing or ungathered on the holding and any crops or other products of the earth which have been grown on the holding, and have been reaped or

gathered and are deposited on the holding or on a threshing floor or place for trading out grain, whether in the fields or in a homestead. But the landholder shall not be able to distrain any crop or other products more than thirty days before maturity, any crops or other products after they have been stored by the tenant, and any other property. The Agra Tenancy Amendment Act of 1931 provides that in case of any general refusal on the part of under-proprietors or tenants of any local area to pay arrears of rent, rates or cesses due by them to their landlords, the local Government may recover them as arrears of land revenue.

Our Committee has recited some of the provisions of the tenancy legislations in foreign countries and in other Indian provinces in the matter of realisation of rents to indicate, firstly, that the landlords of Bengal are badly situated; secondly, how the improvement of the machinery of collection of rents could be effected, and thirdly, how vital it is for a given land system to have an effective machinery for the purpose of rent realisation.

*Sir Richard Temple's move to devise an effective machinery.*

The British Indian Association has been agitating for an effective machinery for realisation of rent from the latter part of the nineteenth century. Sir Richard Temple, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, observed in 1875: "I apprehend that the speedy decision of suits between landlords and tenants is very important to the future tranquillity of Bengal and that land revenue authorities are much better fitted than the Civil Courts can be to decide suits to the advantage of both parties concerned." In lending support to the Agrarian Disputes Act of 1876 as a temporary measure, passed through the initiative of Sir Richard Temple, the British Indian Association in a letter, dated 12th June, 1875, observed: "Now-a-days, if a number of raiyats were disposed to combine and resist payment, they could keep the zamindar at bay, for any length of time, and thus ruin him ultimately. The rent suit under the existing law is a regular civil suit. It is dilatory, expensive and harassing." Since then, the situation has much worsened. Sir Richard Temple was insistent on having an effective and simple machinery for realising arrears of rent in undisputed cases by empowering the Court or Collector, on an application from the landlord, to issue a notice to the raiyat, requiring him either to pay or to appear and show cause to the contrary and in the event of the raiyat neither paying nor appearing, the Court is to order attachment and sale of the defaulter's property. Sir Richard's period expired before his proposals matured and before leaving Bengal he recorded a Minute proposing to go on with the procedure-sections of the draft Bill in order to

---

<sup>1</sup>The details of the draft Bill and the interesting turn that his (Sir Richard's) proposals took in the next few years culminating in the Tenancy Act of 1885 in the teeth of strong opposition from zamindars are discussed in Mr. Sachin Sen's "Studies in the Land Economics of Bengal," pages 228-258.

furnish zamindars with a simple mode of procedure for realising undisputed rents. But the turn of subsequent events was so peculiar that the proposals of Sir Richard Temple were left in the background.

After the preparation of record-of-rights, a simple and even a summary procedure for realisation of rents cannot be objectionable. Where rights are recorded and rates of rent fixed, the delays of rent suits can hardly be justified. Our Committee has broadly indicated how the machinery for the realisation of rent could be simplified; it does not want to burden the reply with detailed suggestions. But it strongly urges on the Commission that without any such effective machinery, the landowning community cannot for long keep its foothold on grounds made treacherous by restrictive tenancy and other legislations, and a hostile agrarian agitation.

*How certificate procedure functioned without hardship.*

**Q. 90.** Results of the operation of the certificate procedure on the strength of the statistics collected from Land Revenue Administration Report, are shown in Statement XII of the list of statistical abstracts, circularised by the Land Revenue Commission. The statement is given below—

	Average for 10 years up to 1936-37.
(A) Number of institutions	... 150,799
(B) Number disposed of	... 112,997
(C) Percentage of cases in which payment was made on issue of notice	... 23.3
(D) Percentage of cases in which payment was made on attachment	... 59.7
(E) Percentage of cases sold	... 13.1
(F) Percentage of cases in which body warrants were issued but realisation made without imprisonment	... 3.9

The above figures clearly indicate that raiyats make better payments under certificate procedure, which is neither harassing nor objectionable. Therein, they find the necessary incentives to payment. Our Committee may assume that the realisation of arrear rents is a sacred obligation and that the active co-operation of Government may legitimately be asked for by them. Body warrants and imprisonments may be objectionable, but the percentage of cases in which realisations were made by issuing body warrants without involving imprisonment was very meagre; payment came in at the issuing of notice and on attachment of property. If the attachment of the property of a defaulting tenantry to realise legitimate arrear rents be "harassing and objectionable," and if we are told so, it is certain that no land system in any

part of the globe can function. Well-wishers of tenantry, and authorities on land problems, have nowhere pleaded for showing "tenderness" to the defaulting tenantry; rather, they have devised ways and means so that they may not fall into the trap of defaulting payment of rent. Florence Nightingale<sup>1</sup> (known as the "Lady with the Lamp"), a great friend of the raiyats of Bengal, observed in connection with the Arrear of Rent Realisation Bill, 1878: "It may be admitted, even by the best friends of the raiyats, that there is need of an easier and less expensive process for realising undisputed rents in the interest of the tenants who have to pay costs." Arthur Young, a great friend of the Irish tenantry, seriously objected to showing "tenderness" to the defaulting tenantry.

*Number of landlords possessing certificate power is small.*

Our Committee gives below the following statistical information within its possession:

(A) Number of landlords enjoying the privilege of certificate power under Section 158A of the Bengal Tenancy Act	...	210
(B) Number of certificates under Section 158A pending from 1936-37	...	12,987
(C) Number of certificates under Section 158A field during 1937-38	...	31,011
	Total	43,998
(D) Number of certificates cancelled	...	2,619
		41,379
(E) Number fully discharged	...	26,981
(F) Number of certificates pending at the close of 1937-38	...	14,398

These figures show that the number of private landlords enjoying the privilege of certificate power under section 158A of the Tenancy Act is very small, and that there have been speedier and more effective and less costly realisations compared to the disposal of rent suits in Civil Courts. This small concession, available to a few private landlords, has been withdrawn in the last amendment of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

*The need and importance of speedy realisation of rents.*

Our Committee, however, urges that the basic principles and provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act of 1913 may be followed in the matter of devising a machinery for speedy realisation of rents. If the sanctity of rent is recognised, and the punctual payment thereof, appreciated both by Government and the tenantry, the framing of an

<sup>1</sup>Vide "Florence Nightingale's Indian Letters (1878-82)" edited by Prof. Priyaranjan Sen, published in 1937.

effective machinery does not tend to be a difficult problem. Our Committee is apprehensive because in the contours and shapes of the new demands of the tenantry which are receiving the sympathetic attention of Government, there is an eloquent absence of the recognition and appreciation of the sanctity of rent.

**Q. 91.** Our Committee admits that the revenue laws in the province are complicated. The zamindari system is based on the Regulations of 1793, and as such, they cannot, and should not, be touched if the institution of landlordism is preserved. The Bengal Tenancy Act does not purport to be a complete code in respect of the landlord and tenant; the preamble of the Act shows that it is intended to amend and consolidate only certain enactments relating to the law of landlord and tenant. The special procedure for the realisation of rents in estates under the management of the Court of Wards or of the revenue authorities, the special procedure for the realisation of rents in estates belonging to Government, the details of the law relating to the avoidance of tenancies by a sale for arrears of Government revenue, the effect of a partition of a revenue-paying estate upon tenancies therein and some other points have not been dealt with in the Tenancy Act. Our Committee does not object to codifying revenue laws in a simple form in conformity with the land system based on the Regulations of 1793, but such an attempt will presuppose the minute examination of the existing statutes and of the extent of their modification by judicial decisions. It is not possible for our Committee, at this stage, to describe its recommendations on the alteration or modification of any specific legislative enactment or provisions thereof. All this will require very close revision in the light of judicial decisions and practical difficulties.

**Q. 92.** Our Committee has made its detailed criticisms on the Bengal Tenancy Act. There are other Revenue Laws and Regulations which have given rise to practical difficulties in their working but it has not been possible for our Committee to examine them and detail its suggestions thereon to remove the hardships on both landlords and tenants. Revenue Laws or Regulations have far reaching effects, and on the strength of the provisions of the existing laws many new rights are created and confirmed; their amendments or repeal require very minute examination, which it has not been possible for our Committee to devote, nor can it be possibly given unless we can know the nature of the reforms to be adopted and the extent of the rights to be safeguarded.

*Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1938, hampers functioning of landlord-tenant system.*

**Q. 93.** The economic effects of the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938 have been damaging principally to landlords and also to actual cultivators. The Act has seriously hampered the functioning of the landlord-tenant system, and led to the increasing misery of actual

cultivators. The Permanent Settlement Regulation I of 1793, undoubtedly provided for future tenancy legislations for the protection and welfare of raiyats, but the reform of tenancy system was definitely meant to be attempted to guard raiyats against the exactions and oppressions of landlords; the enactment of provisions in disregard of the basic principles of the Permanent Settlement was unwarranted. But such an unwarranted legislation was first attempted in 1859; the attempt was continued in 1885 and it seemed to reach its culmination in 1928 and 1938.

*Some of the inequitable provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1938.*

Some of the prejudicial effects which are likely to follow from the new Act of 1938 are described below—

(1) The landlord's right of pre-emption has been done away with. It will have two results: (A) the landlord loses the last right of regulating the choice of tenants. Bad tenants, or tenants who are not to the liking of landlords, when thrust on landlords, are not helpful for the functioning of the landlord-tenant system. The value of landlord's right naturally shrinks to nothing. (B) The right of pre-emption, considered economically, keeps up the prices of lands. Any transaction defrauding the raiyat of the real value of holding could be stopped by the landlord exercising his pre-emptive right; the very fact that a third party exists, who can step in, reduces the chances of fraudulent transactions and maintains the prices of lands at a normal level. The abolition of the right of pre-emption has nothing to do with the improvement of farms or farmers. The Hon'ble Mr. Ilbert, who was a great friend of raiyats, in moving for leave to introduce the Bengal Tenancy Bill, 1883, made the following significant observations:

---

"The necessity of Government interposition for the protection of the raiyats was emphasised and provided for with a view to prevent landlords from imposing taxes and abwabs on raiyats. Lord Cornwallis in his Minute of the 3rd February 1790, enunciates the position very clearly: "I agree with Mr. Shore that some interference on the part of the Government is undoubtedly necessary for effecting an adjustment of the demands of the zamindars upon the raiyats, nor do I conceive that the former will take alarm at the reservation of this right of interference, when convinced that Government can have no interest in exercising it but for the purposes of public justice. Were the Government itself to be a party in the cause, they might have some grounds for apprehending the result of its decision.....I do not hesitate, therefore, to give it as my opinion that the zamindars neither now nor ever could possess a right to impose taxes or abwabs upon the raiyats; and if, from the confusion which prevailed towards the close of the Moghul Government or neglect or want of information since we had the possession of the country, new abwabs have been imposed by the zamindars or farmers, the Government has an undoubted right to abolish such as are oppressive and have not been confirmed by a competent authority, and to establish such regulations as may prevent the practice of like abuses in future." Those who will glance through the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act will find that on the plea of preventing "the like abuses in future," fundamental rights of landlords have been infringed upon, new conditions of tenancy created, contractual rights ignored and the whole land-system complicated to the prejudice of landlords and actual tillers—an eventuality which was and could be hardly contemplated by the framers of the Permanent Settlement.



"The landlord is concerned only to see that we do not allow an objectionable tenant to be forced on him against his will, and this we can readily guard against by giving him a right of pre-emption or something equivalent to a right of pre-emption in every case of transfer." What Mr. Ilbert apprehended in 1883 and wanted to guard against, was achieved in 1938 without the necessary safeguard.

Moreover, the pre-emptive right of landlords is considered a sound practice. Whoever be the landlord, the State or the private person, he should have the right to purchase to the exclusion of the right of strangers to come in. In Denmark where peasant proprietorship subsists, if the proprietor desires to transfer land to any person who is not his legitimate heir, the State has a right of pre-emption of the land and buildings, adding thereto the expenditure of the proprietor for the increase or improvement of the farm, as well as of the improvements arising from the labour and capital of the proprietor. It is an unsound legislation that landlord is deprived of the right of pre-emption and he is thereby handicapped to play his role. The Tenancy Act is thus evidently indifferent to the functions of landlordism. It is one thing that the landlord's right is prejudiced, which has been done by the abolition of the right of pre-emption; it is quite another thing that the functioning of the land system is handicapped, a point which our Committee is urging emphatically in this connection for the consideration of the Commission.

(2) Raiyats having occupancy rights are clothed with the unrestricted right of transfer of holdings. This question can be approached from two angles: firstly, the grant of the unrestricted right of transfer is harmful to agriculture. The tendency of modern tenancy legislations in Europe and other places is to restrict the right. In a scheme of peasant proprietorship or State landlordism or private landlordism, we do not meet with such right in Europe, so that (a) the economic unit of the holding may not be disturbed; (b) those who are best qualified for the purpose of cultivation may not be deprived of their access to the buildings; (c) land speculators may not appear in the scene and play the role of worst landlords under the garb of raiyats; (d) the increase of the credit power may not ensnare the raiyat in the coils of easy and cheap money. There are various considerations in the interest of agriculture which emphasise the restriction of the right of transfer of the raiyat. In fact, a raiyat cannot be rescued helped and brought under any plan of reorganisation, if he is given full freedom to deal with the land in a manner prejudicial to his status and to the productivity of land. In this wise, the new right of unrestricted transfer will be ultimately prejudicial to agriculture and agriculturists. Our Committee has all along advocated that the unrestricted right of transfer should not be given to raiyats; if at all conceded, the extent of land alienation should be restricted to agriculturists. In the matter of

restricting the right of alienation of lands our Committee does not, however, propose to follow the Land Alienation Act of 1901 in the Punjab and the later amendments thereto. There the Act has created a statutory class of agriculturists holding the highest positions in State service and carrying on trade, moneylending or any profession. The growth of such an agricultural class leading to the creation of an artificial socio-economic group at the cost of non-agricultural classes has little meaning, less justification, and is extremely unsuited to the needs of our agriculture in the province. Our Committee is always in favour of protecting resident, hereditary cultivators and of rescuing them from exploitation by outsiders, but the Tenancy Act of 1938 is the very antithesis of such a concept. The Hon'ble Sir Richard Garth, the Chief Justice of Bengal, observed: "I should have thought that the most effectual way of protecting such people (meaning the raiyats of Bengal) and preventing them from wasting their substance would be to secure them a permanent interest in their property by prohibiting the alienation of it in any shape or way. They might be allowed to underlet in the case of minors, lunatics or others labouring under disability; and some means might be taken for protecting (for a time at least) present interests which have been created by way of under-lease. But I should have said that with these exceptions, it would be more prudent to prevent underletting altogether." Similar observations in a similar strain come from distinguished authorities and find corroboration from the provisions of the latest land experiments in the West.

Secondly, the unrestricted right of transfer to raiyats with occupancy rights vitally affects the right of landlords in choosing their tenants, and it was a right which was inherent in them by virtue of the incidents of ownership and confirmed by the Regulations of 1793. The invasion of landlord's right is meaningless; an occupancy raiyat is allowed to get rid of occupancy right or transfer his interests. Through the unrestricted right of transfer a raiyat will come and go without the consent of the landlord, and the relation between landlord and raiyat becomes mechanical. This taking away of "consent" involves a fundamental assault on the right of ownership issuing out of the performance of obligations. The Tenancy Act takes away this right without compensation<sup>1</sup> and without an eye to the interests of agriculture. The

---

<sup>1</sup>His Excellency the Governor-General withheld assent to the Madras Estates Land (Second Amendment) Act, 1934, because, in his opinion, the Act was expropriatory in that "it involves the loss of the Kudivaram of lands included in their inams by those inamdars who under the existing law would be in a position to establish their ownership of the Kudivaram, and that a measure producing this result with no provision for the compensation of persons adversely affected should not be allowed to become law." Accordingly, the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, provides that if an inamdar proves that the Kudivaram right in any land which does not satisfy the requirements of private land was vested in him on the 1st November 1933, he is entitled to compensation for the loss of the said right. But in Bengal the landlord was deprived of his right to have anything to do with the choice of his tenant, a right very vital to the institution of landlordism, but the question of compensation was side-tracked.

money value of the consent was statutorily fixed by section 26D of the Tenancy Act in 1928 and the new Act extinguishes both the money value and right of consent. The landowning community thus loses enormously, both in money and in the content of right.

(3) The suspension of the provisions regarding enhancement of rent will lead to the under-capitalisation of land. The provisions regarding abatement of rent remaining intact, it was unfair to landlord to, practically, do away with the provisions in the matter of enhancement of rent. Moreover, we have shown previously that the landlord's right to enhance rent is essential in the interest of efficient farming. Low rent is accompanied by low farming. In any scientific theory of rent the opportunities of enhancement, on legitimate grounds shown, are never bolted.

(4) The deletion of section 158A of the Tenancy Act, whereunder a private landlord could apply to the local Government for availing himself of the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act, of 1913 in the matter of realisation of arrear rents, is extremely unwise and unfair, the more so when there has been no effective machinery, devised anew, for speedy realisation of rents. The Tenancy Act of 1938 raises serious apprehensions in the minds of landlords because it is felt that Government is not evidently alive to the need for prompt payment of rents by raiyats. The amendment of section 147 by restricting the successive number of rent suits is a definite encouragement to raiyats to default payment of rents. The accumulation of arrear rents and the indirect encouragement to the mentality of non-payment of rent by laxing and deleting relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act are fatal to the institution of private landlordism.

(5) The reduction of the rate of interest to six and a quarter in the amendment of section 67 will administer a deep cut across the contractual rights of landlords, in addition to the financial loss involved therein for the landlords. This reduction is already having a disparaging effect on the matter of payment of rents. The incentive of payment of dues in time by raiyats is lost because of a lower rate of interest on arrear rents. The landowning community is already feeling hurt by this new amendment.

(6) Under the new amendment of section 88, there can be a division of a tenure or holding, or a distribution of rent payable in respect thereof, by the order of the Civil Court without the consent of landlord.

That is a clear infringement of the right of the landlord. Moreover, the division of the holding may be made which would result in bringing the rent for any portion upto one rupee. That is practically permitting the division of a holding to one bigha which is unreasonably small and uneconomic. Such a division prejudicially affects raiyats and ultimately damages landlords because they cannot play their part well under a system of uneconomic holdings.

(7) The substitution of a new section for section 86A, regarding abatement of rent on account of diluvion and re-entry into lands which re-appear, is definitely damaging to landlords. It is fair that the raiyat will have abatement of rent on account of diluvion, but how can the same equity dictate that the landlord will not have freedom to settle at an enhanced rent when the lands reappear, especially when those lands become more productive after reappearance. All this is a definite invasion on the proprietary right of landlords.

(8) The state of actual tillers who have no occupancy right is further worsened by the fact that the freer commercialisation of the occupancy right will lead to further rack-renting oppression of the cultivating classes. The Act has adversely affected the value of proprietary right of the landlord, and naturally the value of landed property has shrivelled. The occupancy right has been, in fact, made more valuable and prize-worthy than the proprietary right, and in the game of enhancing the value of occupancy right at the cost of the landowning right, the interests of farms and farmers have been coldly neglected.

#### *Abolition of transfer fees curtails landlord's income.*

The estimate of the loss of landlord's income owing to the abolition of the transfer fees is, on the authority of a statement by the Hon'ble Revenue Minister (Sir B. P. Singh Roy), in the neighbourhood of Rs. 40 lakhs, and the middle classes of Bengal, already hard hit by the economic depression, are laid low by this fatal blow.

#### **Addenda to question 3.**

In answer to question 3 the Committee supplied certain figures illustrating the contributions of some of the distinguished Houses of Bengal towards the economic regeneration of Bengal. The figures undoubtedly suffer from incompleteness, but they seek to indicate, although in an imperfect manner, the liberality and sense of responsibility of the landowning community. The figures of some other Houses, not mentioned in the answer, are collated and given below illustrations. There are hundreds of estates whose figures are not mentioned here and even in respect of the Houses whose contributions are

placed on record, there is no near approach to completeness. These figures are to be taken merely as illustrative.—

*The Estate of Maharaja, Mymensingh.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Maharaja Mymensingh Estate.

Education—Rs. 9,32,180.

Medical Help—Rs. 4,88,600.

Religious Charities—Rs. 7,00,300.

Water Supply—Rs. 2,00,000.

Roads, etc.—Rs. 1,00,250.

Industrial and Agricultural Development—Rs. 5,92,300.

Miscellaneous—Rs. 12,09,500.

Total Contributions—Rs. 43,23,030.

*The Estate of Satyendra Chandra Ghosh Maulik.*

District—Murshidabad.

Name of Estate—Satyendra Chandra Ghosh Maulik Estate.

Education—Rs. 74,800.

Medical Help—Rs. 1,23,000.

Total Contributions—Rs. 1,97,800.

*The Estate of Pramatha Nath Roy Choudhury.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Santosh.

Education—Rs. 1,67,500 excluding contribution to Calcutta Sahitya Parishad and establishment of High School in Pogaldighar.

Medical Help—Rs. 1,05,035.

Religious Institutions—No financial record. Established “Bindu-bashini Debalaya” at Santosh at a cost of many thousands of rupees, spent Rs. 3,000 for Darga at Kagmari. Established Darga at Dighoolia, and donated more than thousand bighas of lands for religious purposes, contributed land for Namaj and so on.

Water Supply—No financial record, though as many as 19 tanks, 8 wells, and one very big tank at Santosh at a cost of more than Rs. 1,00,000 were built.

Roads—Donated all lands for roads in Tangail and land of 14 acres for Tangail Coronation Park.

**Industrial and Agricultural development**—Donated more than Rs. 1,00,000 towards (1) Oriental Soap Factory; (2) Factory at Chitratoli; (3) Paragon Press; (4) Handloom Factory.

**Miscellaneous**—(a) Barahanagar Anath Asram—Rs. 200 and annually Rs. 20. Also established *hats* and markets in various places, donated lands for playgrounds, grazing fields, etc.

*The Estate of Manmatha Nath Mookerjee.*

**District**—Twenty-four Parganas.

**Name of the Estate**—Manmatha Nath Mookerjee Estate.

**Education**—Rs. 21,350.

**Medical Help**—Rs. 6,150.

**Religious Charities**—Rs. 1,12,000.

**Water Supply**—Rs. 6,000.

**Industrial and Agricultural Development**—Rs. 60,700.

**Miscellaneous**—Rs. 2,150.

**Total Contributions**—Rs. 2,09,634.

**Recurring Expenditure of the Estate**—Rs. 1,284.

*The Estate of Nirmal Chandra Biswas.*

**District**—Hooghly.

**Name of the Estate**—Nirmal Chandra Biswas Estate.

**Education**—Rs. 1,10,400.

**Medical Help**—Rs. 125.

**Religious Charities**—Rs. 1,00,000.

**Water Supply**—Rs. 21,000.

**Roads, etc.**—Rs. 2,500.

**Industrial and Agricultural Development**—Rs. 19,000.

**Miscellaneous**—Rs. 1,255.

**Total Contributions**—Rs. 2,54,880.

**Recurring Expenditure of the Estate**—Rs. 600.

*The Makhalpore Family Estate.*

**District**—Hooghly.

**Name of the Estate**—Makhalpore Estate.

**Education**—Rs. 37,020.

**Religious Charities**—Rs. 96,000.

Roads, etc.—Rs. 800.

Industrial and Agricultural Development—Rs. 43,775.

Total Contributions—Rs. 1,77,645.

*The Estate of Aghore Bandhu Guha.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Estate of Aghore Bandhu Guha.

Education—Rs. 1,55,000.

Medical Help—Rs. 8,000.

Religious Institutions—

Water Supply—Tube-wells at Bahirsimul.

Roads, etc.—Khals and roads at Bhelua and Haluaghat police-stations respectively.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—Established East Bengal Commercial Bank with branches in various places.

Miscellaneous—Three *hats* are maintained.

Recurring Expenditure made by the Estate—Rs. 3,240 (for education).

Remarks—Established Mrityunjoy H. E. School and Radhasundari H. E. School for girls in Mymensingh. Established East Bengal Commercial Bank, also “Jagadamba Ayurveda Vidyalaya,” at Benares.

*The Upashi Estate.*

District—Faridpur.

Name of the Estate—Upashi Estate.

Education—Rs. 11,400 (valuation of land granted not included).

Medical Help—Rs. 815 (excluding valuation of lands granted).

Water Supply—Canals and tanks constructed. One canal  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles long was constructed in Charbhuta.

Roads, etc.—Rs. 4,430.

Miscellaneous—Markets established in Kaliganj, Alabaddi, etc. Profusely helped in famine of 1274 and flood of 1283.

*The Kalipara Estate.*

District—Dacca.

Name of the Estate—Zamindar, Kalipara, P. O. Medinimandal, Dacca.

**Education**—A High School at Kalipara, Sanskrit tol in Kalipara; a Middle Vernacular School at Medinimandal; one High School at Chāmpakdi village and two Libraries.

**Medical Help**—One charitable dispensary at “Kalipara.”

**Religious Institutions**—Monetary help as annual grants to priests, at. Kashi, Gaya, Muttra, Brindaban, Hardwar, Chandranath, Kamakshya, etc., and temples in the locality, large grants towards building of stone steps at Chandranath.

**Water Supply**—Constructed 23 tanks, some of big size known as “Dighis”.

**Roads, etc.**—Pucca roads at Kalipara and Kusumpur and Khals in Kalipara and Palong, Faridpur. Pucca roads at Medinimandal and Champakdi.

**Miscellaneous**—Grazing lands in Kalipara and elsewhere, markets in various villages in Faridpur, Dacca, Barisal; guest houses in nearby villages.

*The Estate of Kamakshya Chattopadhyaya and Others.*

**District**—Faridpur.

**Name of the Estate**—Estate of Kamakshya Chattopadhyaya and others.

**Education**—Rs. 31,615.

**Medical Help**—Rs. 2,160.

**Water Supply**—Rs. 35,850. Also tanks in two villages.

**Roads and Canals**—Many khals and roads of which one big road taken over by the District Board. Rs. 3,025 for canals in certain areas and Rs. 1,000 for a road at Damda.

**Miscellaneous**—Rs. 1,235.

**Total Contributions**—Rs. 70,760 (approximately).

*The Estate of Saicran Kumar Saha.*

**District**—Barisal.

**Name of the Estate**—Swarna Kumar Saha's Estate

**Education**—Rs. 200.

**Medical Help**—Rs. 500.

**Water Supply**—Tanks in certain places.

**Roads and Canals**—Certain Roads and Khals.

**Miscellaneous**—Contribution to Banaripara Aaram. Guest house in Tushkhali station, etc.



*The Baisharashi Estate.*

District—Faridpur.

Name of the Estate—Baisharashi Estate.

Education—Rs. 76,840.

Medical Help—Rs. 7,000.

Religious Institutions—Rs. 56,000.

Water Supply—Rs. 43,000.

Roads and Canals—Rs. 5,000.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—Rs. 2,000 (canals).

Miscellaneous—Rs. 16,000.

Total Contributions—Rs. 2,05,480.

Recurring Expenditure—Rs. 6,800.

Remarks—Established Rajendra College, Faridpur, Female ward called "Kamini Sundari Ward" in Sadar Hospital, Faridpur, and "Kamini Sundari Chatuspathi" at Barisal.

*The Estate of Digindra N. Ghose.*

District—Dacca.

Name of the Estate—Digindra N. Ghose's Estate, Harbaida, Dacca.

Education—One primary school in own village.

Religious Institutions—One Musjid for Muslims, and lands for worship of Hindu temples and Muhammadan festivals of about 36 acres.

Water Supply—4 tanks in four villages.

Roads and Canals—3 big roads in own village.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—One big canal for agricultural purposes.

Miscellaneous—Playground in own village and also market.

Total Contributions—Rs. 6,000 (approximately).

*The Estate of Abdul Gafur Niparthasya.*

District—Barisal.

Name of the Estate—Abdul Gafur Niparthasya's.

Education—Land for school and money for building and monthly grant.

Medical Help—Lump sum grant towards dispensary and casual donations.

- Religious Institutions—Wakf properties for religious purposes.
- Water Supply—4 or 5 tanks.
- Roads and Canals—4 roads from Baleswari River.
- Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—3 or 4 canals for agriculture.
- Miscellaneous—Playground and financial grant towards improvements of sports.
- Total Contributions—Rs. 10,000 (approximately).

*The Estate of Promathanath, Muktagacha.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Promathanath's Estate, Muktagacha, village Iswargram.

Education—Rs. 574.

Medical Help—Rs. 200. Also 25 rugs to Mymensingh Hospital.

Water Supply—Rs. 2,000.

Miscellaneous—Rs. 599 towards earthquake and flood relief, also charities out of Government paper worth Rs. 10,000.

Total Contributions—Rs. 3,373 (approximately).

*The Dhala Estate, "Bara Hissya".*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Dhala Estate. "Bara Hissya."

Education—Built High School at Dhala and donated land for the purpose; monthly grant Rs. 50; land for School at Kishoreganj; big lump sum grant towards Mymensingh College.

Medical Help—Charitable dispensary at Dhala and land for the purpose; annual grant Rs. 150; Rs. 12, annually to Mymensingh Lady Dufferin Fund. Land for Hospital at Kishoreganj. Big lump sum grant towards Mymensingh Surjya Kanta Hospital.

Religious Institutions—Rs. 2,000.

Water Supply—Arrangements for drinking water in various places in the Estate.

Roads and Canals—Built 3 or 4 roads in collaboration with District Board and donated land for the purpose.

Miscellaneous—Built station, burning ghats, and donated lands for courts, post office, jail in Kishoreganj.

Total Contributions—More than Rs. 1,00,000.

• Recurring Expenditure—Rs. 762.

*The Baliati Ten Annas Estate.*

District—Dacca.

Name of the Estate—East House Ten Annas Estate. Baliati (Dacca).

Education—Rs. 100 towards Girls' School, Mymensingh, and playground to Gheor School. Iswarchandra School at Baliati at a cost of Rs. 1,00,000.

Medical Help—Lump sum donation of Rs. 312-8 to Manickganj Charitable Dispensary also monthly subscription. Rs. 500 towards Ramkrishna Mission Charitable Dispensary.

Religious Institutions—Established "Madhab Gauranga Math" at a cost of Rs. 60,000 and several other temples and religious institutions in various nearby places.

Water Supply—"Jenkins-tank" in Manickganj, a big tank in Tangail, also tube-wells and wells in certain other villages.

Miscellaneous—Several *hats* and markets, established burning ghats and helped in times of famine, flood, earthquake, etc.

*The Estate of Jagabandhu Dhar.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Jagabandhu Dhar's Estate, Gazaria, Mymensingh.

Education—Rs. 1,615 and contribution to school in own village.

Medical Help—Rs. 1,565 and established charitable dispensary in own village.

Religious Institutions—Donated building to Siva temple, Simul-kandi Mosque in own village, and Jumna Mosque in Bajitpur.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—Constructed canal for agriculture in Mauza Gazaria.

Miscellaneous—Established markets in several villages, as also burning ghats; gave lands for grazing and donations to certain funds.

Total Contributions—Rs. 3,180 (approximately).

*The Estate of G. Ghose.*

District—Dacca.

Name of the Estate—G. Ghose's Estate.

Education—Rs. 14,100 also another Higher Primary School and maintenance.

Medical Help—Rs. 18,000.

Religious Institutions—Rs. 300 and monetary help towards guest houses in sacred cities.

Water Supply—Rs. 20,700 also another tank. . .

Roads and Canals—Built certain roads and canals.

Miscellaneous—Rs. 500 to famine funds and bazars in certain places also other petty charities.

Total Contributions—Rs. 53,600 (excludes items whose monetary valuations are not available).

*The Ulania Joint Estate.*

District—Barisal.

Name of the Estate—Ulania Joint Estate.

Education—Rs. 27,465.

Medical Help—Rs. 412.

Religious Institutions—Rs. 42,535.

Water Supply—Rs. 500 also many tanks whose monetary valuations are not available.

Roads and Canals—Rs. 495. Also other roads whose monetary valuations are not available.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—Rs. 3,100.

Miscellaneous—Rs. 2,100. Also established market. Also petty charities.

Total Contributions—Rs. 76,607.

Recurring Expenditure—Rs. 3,275.

*The Hemnagar Estate.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Hemnagar Estate.

Education—Rs. 72,597.

Medical Help—Rs. 8,833.

Religious Institutions—Rs. 1,69,640.

Water Supply—Rs. 55,430.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—Rs. 15,291

Miscellaneous—Rs. 1,08,557.

Total Contributions—Rs. 4,30,348.

Recurring Expenditure—Rs. 25,668.

Remarks—Noted for widespread donations in various religious, medical, educational and other institutions.

*The Maloochi Estate.*

District—Dacca.

Name of the Estate—Maloochi Estate.

Education—Established 4 minor schools and 4 girls' schools.

Medical Help—Rs. 1,35,000 and free medical help to eradicate malaria.

Water Supply—A number of wells, tanks, and tube-wells in some villages.

Roads and canals—Rs. 5,000. Also several other roads and canals.

Industrial and Agricultural Improvements—Organised scientific agriculture and arranged lectures for improvement.

Miscellaneous—Some markets and hats.

Total Contributions—Rs. 1,40,000 (approximately).

*Donations towards the establishment of the Carmichael Medical College.*

	Rs.
1. Raja Profulla Nath Tagore ...	25,000
2. Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan ...	10,000
3. Kumar Bishnu Prosad Roy ...	6,000
4. Lord Sinha of Raipur ...	5,000
5. Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu ...	5,000
6. Sir B. C. Mitter, Kt. ...	4,000
7. Kumar Arun Chandra Sinha ...	2,500
8. Messrs. Nirmal Chandra and Kamal Chandra Chandra ...	2,000
9. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherjee of Utterpara ...	2,000
10. Babu Monohar Mukherjee ...	2,000
11. Raja Sati Prasad Garga Bahadur of Mahisadal ...	1,250
12. Rai Gopal Prosad Garga Bahadur ...	1,250
13. Raja Kristo Das Law ...	1,000
14. Raja Reshee Case Law ...	1,000
15. Rai Debendra Nath Ballav Bahadur ...	1,000
16. Kumar Manindra Chandra Sinha Bahadur of Paikpara ...	1,000
17. Mr. Nanda Lall Gupta ...	1,000
18. Raja Sreenath Roy ...	1,000
19. Mr. G. C. Gupta ...	1,000
20. Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore ...	500
21. Messrs. G. N. Tagore & Bros. ...	500
22. Raja Promodanath Roy of Dighapatia ...	500
23. Mr. Chandi Churn Law ...	500
24. Mr. Ambica Churn Law ...	500
25. Kumar Manmatha Nath Mitter ...	500
<b>Total</b>	<b>76,000</b>

*Carmichael Medical College, Belgachia.*

\*Donors who paid donations for the construction of blocks or constructed blocks at their cost or endowed beds and wards in the hospital attached to the Carmichael Medical College:—

	Rs.
1. H. H. the Maharaja of Tripura pays Rs. 1,200 a year for the maintenance of the Maharani Tulsibati Ward ...	1,200
2. Raja Debendra Nath Mullick constructed the ground floor of the outdoor of Carmichael Hospital named after him ...	1,13,000
In addition to the above the monthly subscription from the Estate for the maintenance of beds and outdoor (recurring monthly grant) ...	325
3. Maharaja Sir Manindra Chandra Nandy of Kasimbazar for the "block" in his name ...	7,000
4. Rani Kasturi Manjuri for the block in her name ...	40,000
5. Raja Gopendra Krishna Deb ...	500

*Presidency College, Calcutta.*

	Rs.
Maharaja Tej Chandra Bahadur of Burdwan ...	10,000
Babu Gopee Mohan Tagore ...	10,000
Raja Buddinath Roy ...	50,000
Babu Hurryrath Roy ...	20,000
Babu Kalee Sankar Ghosal ...	20,000
Gopee Mohan Deb of the Sobhabazar family.	
Joy Kissen Singh, grandfather of Kali Prasanna Singh, the translator of Mahabharat into Bengali.	Substantial contributions; exact amounts not known.

*Medical College, Calcutta.***Donors of the Centenary Fund. (Landholders.)**

	Rs.	a.
1. Rai Bahadur Bhupati Nath Deb ...	99,179	4
2. Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy of Cossimbazar ...	50,000	0
3. Sir Hari Sankar Paul, Kt., and Mr. Hari Mohan Paul ...	20,000	0
4. Hon'ble Sir B. P. Singh Roy, Kt. ...	4,000	0
5. Dr. B. C. Law ...	1,000	0
6. Raja P. N. Tagore ...	1,000	0
7. Mr. Chandi Charan Law ...	500	0
8. Mr. Satis Charan Law ...	250	0
9. Mr. Bhabani Charan Law ...	250	0
10. Mr. Tarini Charan Law ...	250	0
11. Mr. Naresh Nath Mukherje ...	200	0
12. Kumar Rajendra Narayan Roy ...	101	0
13. Mr. T. P. Ghosh ...	100	0
<b>Total</b> ...	<b>1,76,830</b>	<b>4</b>

*Medical College, Calcutta.*

	Rs.
Babu Dwarkanath Tagore founded early prizes to the value of Rs. 1,000 for the several classes and Government assisted in the same object ...	1,000
The Pertub Ch. Singh Ward (Donation Rs. 50,000)	50,000
The Sattya Charan Ghosal Ward (Donation Rs. 10,000) ...	10,000
The Mutty Lal Seal Ward (Grant of land for hospital) ...	12,000
Maharanee Swarnamoyee placed a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 in 1884, for the promotion of female education. The Swarnamoyee Hostel attached to the Medical College was constructed out of this fund ...	1,50,000
In 1906 Maharaja of Darbhanga placed at the disposal of H. R. H. the Prince of Wales Rs. 1,00,000 and this amount was utilised for the completion of the Lady Minto Electrical Annexe ...	1,00,000

*Donors to the Building of the New Lady Dufferin Victoria Hospital.*

	Rs.
Radhika M. Roy Estate ...	500
Jaf Bazar Ward Estate ...	250
Bhowanipore Ward Estate ...	500
Mahishadal Ward Estate ...	200
Raha Ward Estate ...	500
Total ...	1,950

*List of Donors, Dufferin Hospital (old).*

	Rs.
Raja Ashutosh Roy of Cossimbazar ...	1,00,000
Maharani of Huthwa ...	50,000
Raja Shib Chandra Banerjee of Bhagalpur ...	25,000
Maharaj-Kumar Bijay Chand Mahtab of Burdwn ...	25,000
Maharaja Rameswar Singh Bahadur of Darbhanga ...	20,000
Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandy of Cossim- bazar ...	10,000
Nawab Sir Khwaja Ashanullah Bahadur, K.C.I.E., of Dacca ...	10,000
Raja Rajendra Narain Roy Chowdhury Bahadur of Dacca ...	5,000
Raja Mahima Ranjan Roy Chowdhury of Kakina ...	5,000
Maharaj Surya Kanta Acharyy Chowdhury of Mukta- gacha ...	5,000
H. H. Radha Kishore Deb Barman Manikya of Tipperah ...	3,000
Kumar Dakshineswar Malia of Searsole ...	2,000
Nawab Sahar Banu Begum Saheba of Khagra ...	2,000
Rai Budh Singh Dudhuria Bahadur and Bijoy Singh Dudhuria of Azimgunje ...	1,000
Rani Hemanta Kumari Devya of Putia ...	1,000
Her Highness Nawab Sam-i-Jāhan Begum Saheba of Murshidabad ...	1,000



	Rs.
Maharani of Darbhanga ...	20,000
Maharani Aditani of Burdwan ...	5,000
Maharani of Huthwa ...	5,000
Maharani Saheba of Bettiah ...	5,000
Maharani Saheba of Dumraon ...	5,000
Maharani of Cossimbazar ...	3,600
Rani of Baniali, Purneah ...	1,500
Maharani Saheba of Gidhaur ...	1,050
Wife of Rai Kamaleswari Prosad Singh Bahadur ...	1,000
Mother of Raja Jagat Kishore Acharyya Chowdhury ...	1,000
H. H. the Maharani of Cooch Behar ...	1,000
Rai Ganga Prosad Singh Bahadur of Darbhanga ...	10,000
Bettiah Raj ..	6,000
Raja Ram Narain Singh of Khaira ...	4,000
Shama Charan Law of Calcutta ..	5,000
Raja Rameswar Sing Bahadur of Darbhanga ...	5,000
Bungso Gopal Nandu of Burdwan ...	5,000
Nawab Sir Khwaja Abdul Gani, K.C.S.I., of Dacca ...	3,000
Maharani Swamnamoyee C. I., of Cossimbazar ...	2,000
The Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad ...	2,000
Maharaja Gobinda Lall Roy of Rangpur ...	1,000
Maharaja Durga Charan Law, C.I.E. ..	1,000
Babu Janaki Nath Roy of Dacca ...	1,000
Total ...	3,59,150

*School of Tropical Medicine, Calcutta.*

Raja Birendra Chandra Sinha of Paikpara and Raja Debendra Nath Mallick and other landholders donated considerable sum towards the School of Tropical Medicine, Calcutta.

(Corrected list).

*The Gouripur Estate.*

District—Mymensingh.

Name of the Estate—Gouripur Estate.

Present Proprietor—Mr. Brojendra Kishore Roy Chowdhury.

Annual Recurring Grants—

	Rs.
Education ...	43,000
Medical Aid ...	13,800
Agricultural Development ...	14,927
(Embankments, khals, agricultural farms, etc.), Improvement Works ...	7,722
(Roads, hats, bazars, clearing of water hyacinth, etc.).	
Water Supply ...	3,150
Charities to persons and institutions, excluding staff and relations of the Zamindar ...	7,950
	<hr/> 90,549

The amount spent by the Gouripur Estate during the last fifty years  
on different works of public utility.

	Rs.
1. Education ...	12,58,193
2. Medical Aid ...	3,39,635
3. Industrial Improvement (in round figures) ...	24,00,000
4. Agricultural Development ...	2,17,977
5. Improvement Works ...	4,93,860
(Roads, hats, bazars, clearing of water hyacinth, etc.)	
6. Water supply ...	2,52,491
7. Charity to various persons and institutions, excluding the staff and relations of the Zamindar ...	7,93,893
8. Religious Purposes ...	15,93,190
	<hr/> 73,49,239

**Oral evidence of the British Indian Association, 13th and 14th March 1939.**

**PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION.**

- (1) Maharaja Sashi Kanta Acharyya Choudhury, M.L.A., of Mymensingh.
- (2) Raja Bahadur Bhupendra Narayan Sinha, M.L.C., of Nashipur.
- (3) Mr. Tarak Nath Mukherjee, M.B.E.
- (4) Mr. S. C. Ghose Maulik, C.I.E.
- (5) Mr. P. N. Singh Roy.
- (6) Mr. Sachin Sen.

In reply to the Chairman, Mr. Sachin Sen said that in the view of the Association the intentions of the Permanent Settlement have been carried out by the zamindars, but the series of Tenancy Acts from 1859 onwards has impaired the landlords' position seriously and the result has been that they can take little interest in the welfare of their tenants. He cited as examples the tenants' unrestricted right of transfer and the abolition of the landlords' right to choose their own tenants and to keep out undesirable tenants. The Association has no objection to occupancy rights being hereditary. The result of Tenancy legislation has been to increase subinfeudation, particularly subinfeudation below the occupancy raiyat. In the Regulations the only subinfeudation envisaged is that between the zamindar and the raiyat.

Another result of subinfeudation below the occupancy raiyat has been that agriculture has been most prejudicially affected. Subinfeudation below the zamindar is rather a social question and has nothing to do with the interests of cultivation. It does not affect cultivation whether the landlord above the raiyat is a zamindar or a tenureholder. Subinfeudation below the raiyat leads to the creation of uneconomic holdings and to a tendency for raiyats to become mere rent receivers. Subinfeudation above the occupancy raiyat is really a diffusion of ownership, and has led to the development of a middle-class who have a stake in the country and who have invested their capital in developing agriculture. The landlord has one function and the tenant another. The business of the landlord is to invest his capital and apply his intelligence to the development of his estate: the duty of the tenant is to cultivate; and subinfeudation below the raiyats must lead to a deterioration in agriculture. He agreed that a tenureholder and a raiyat who sublet might both be regarded as rent receivers, but a raiyat who sublets is a *de facto* tenureholder. The view of the Association is

that occupancy rights should attach to the land and not to the person. Asked how the middle-classes, who are merely rent receivers, can influence the condition of agriculture he explained that the object of the Permanent Settlement was to interest zamindars and talukdars in the development of their estates. The trouble started with the Tenancy legislation which sanctioned subinfeudation among the raiyats. Had there been no such legislation it is likely that the middle-classes would have pooled their resources and done more to develop agriculture. When a zamindar creates a permanent tenure he parts with practically all his rights. Tenureholders have grown up as a result of social and economic factors. During the 19th century no other form of investment was possible. It was impossible for zamindars of large estates to manage them and to apply their capital to the whole of their estates: they therefore sublet to enterprising tenureholders who were in a position to do so. It might be argued that economically this procedure was unsound, but the Permanent Settlement has formed the basis of the province's social structure. It has certainly led to subinfeudation below the zamindar but this has had no harmful effects. It has built up a middle-class which serves as a bulwark against social upheavals. The present system should not be abolished in the interests of society and of agriculture.

The present method for recovery of rents is very slow and cumbrous and Tenancy legislation has left no incentive to the landlords to spend capital on improvements. Even when improvements are made it is very difficult to obtain enhancements. Another drawback is the withdrawal of the right of pre-emption. Nowadays landlords are practically powerless to effect improvements. The Chairman enquired whether in the opinion of the Association the present system can survive under the existing conditions. Mr. Sachin Sen replied that under the handicaps of Tenancy legislation and the consequent agricultural deterioration, landlordism cannot flourish, and unless conditions improve it may be difficult for it to survive. The Chairman asked whether it will be practicable under present conditions to go back and restore the right of pre-emption, distraint, etc. Mr. Singh Roy replied that under modern political conditions progress cannot be retarded. There should however be restriction on free transfer which has greatly damaged agriculture. He would also propose that sales should be confined to agriculturists:—meaning not necessarily tillers of the soil, but all persons who have an interest in the land. He was in favour of preventing sales to speculators like moneylenders, and thought that such restrictions would be possible as have been tried in the Punjab by the Alienation of Land Act. If occupancy rights are taken away from every one except the actual tillers of the soil, the result would be to dispossess all the Hindu middle-classes.

He thought that collective farming as carried on in Russia would not be suitable in Bengal, where the rights in property are so individualistic. In order to carry out co-operative farming the rights of all the tenants concerned must be the same but in Bengal the rights of raiyats and under-raiyats are different. Indian opinion would not favour such a system. He would prefer the system of "small holdings" but not in the sense in which the term "peasant proprietorship" is used. That is a political catchword. If any system of peasant proprietorship is examined it will be found that individual rights have been taken away and vested in the State or a Country Council or some such body. The Chairman explained that small holders in England are directly under the State and are in the position of ordinary tenants. In Ireland the landlords were bought out and the tenants have acquired proprietary rights. Mr. Sen said that the Association would have no objection to the "small holdings" system and of giving proprietary rights to raiyats provided they pay for such rights.

As regards the Association's reply to question 14, Mr. Sachin Sen said that if the landlords are bought out and compensation is paid in cash no sinking fund would be necessary. He explained that the reply had been given on the assumption that part of the money will be paid in bonds and part in cash. If payment were made in bonds, the Association would expect non-terminable bonds to be granted; but if the bonds were made redeemable after a period, the question of a sinking fund would arise. In the case of an estate, valued at Rs. 20,000, if Rs. 5,000 compensation were paid in cash, and 5 per cent. interest paid on the balance of Rs. 15,000, then the principal would not be liquidated so long as the payment of interest continues. The sinking fund comes in when the principal has to be liquidated; and it depends whether the principal is liquidated by the State, or whether the tenants buy the proprietary rights from the State. If non-terminable bonds were granted the Association would have no objection. The bonds would be saleable and it is to be hoped that they would be honoured by future Governments.

The Chairman enquired whether in a scheme for the levy of agricultural income-tax the land revenue should be taken into account or should be excluded. Mr. Sachin Sen replied that whether land revenue is regarded as a tax or not, it deprives the landlord of a part of his income in the same way as cesses do. It would be extremely difficult for the landlords to bear any such tax. Mr. Sen pointed out that there are other difficulties connected with the question of tax on agricultural income. The Tea Industry for the development of which Scotland and Bengal have invested a good amount of money enjoys exemption of 60 per cent. of income from income-tax on the ground of its being agricultural. This industry will be seriously handicapped if a tax on

agricultural income is imposed. The Permanent Settlement has produced a prosperous middle-class and the income-tax paid by them is greater than that paid in any other province, because the middle-classes have, as a result of the Permanent Settlement, been given a higher purchasing power. It is not correct to say that the high percentage of income-tax paid in Bengal is the result of a concentration of industrial concerns in Calcutta. The Permanent Settlement has also resulted in a large income from Court fees, stamps, and customs duty. It is true that it has also resulted in litigation and it is believed that 60 per cent. of cases consist of rent suits. This source of taxation may not be regarded as being altogether desirable, but it is certain that one result of abolishing the Permanent Settlement would be a decrease in litigation and a great fall in the revenue from Court fees and stamps.

Mr. P. N. Singh Roy said that the British Indian Association is a body which comprises all the landlords of Bengal, Bihar and Assam.

The Association has made enquiries into the levy of abwabs. Practically speaking abwabs are not being realised nowadays, but it may be true that certain zamindari employees have realised them. When tenants are not even paying their rents it is hardly possible that landlords could realise abwabs. Some of their dishonest officers may levy abwabs without the knowledge and consent of the landlords, but the same is true of Government estates. He could also cite instances where gratuities are taken in Government offices. The system is embedded in the country. The Association has always deprecated this practice and has sent out appeals to landlords asking them to stop the practice. Many landlords have issued proclamations to their tenants that they should not pay them. It sometimes used to happen that naibs took something when they realised rents. The reason is that when the accounts are drawn out, the landlord is legally entitled under the Bengal Tenancy Act to a fee of 4 annas. They have not however insisted on this fee and the naibs have taken generally 2 pice per rupee for themselves. Zamindari employees are now better paid and generally get Rs. 10, Rs. 15 or more.

When rent is paid, it is to be credited to the year for which the tenant wishes to liquidate his arrears, but landlords naturally prefer to credit payments to the oldest arrears. The rent receipts show the year to which the payment has been credited. Nowadays the tenants know what are their rights even better than the landlords or the lawyers.

In reply to Khan Bahadur M. Hossain, Mr. Sachin Sen said that the Permanent Settlement has not outlived its utility and such a meaning could not be inferred from the words "falling off of liberality and vitality" in answer to question 3. Tenancy legislation has been the cause of the landlords' lack of interest in their tenants' welfare. He

explained that he is not against the grant of occupancy rights but thought that the main object of granting occupancy rights should be to benefit agriculture. The basis of occupancy right is freedom from arbitrary enhancement and freedom from eviction, subject to the punctual payment of rent. This was the idea that was in force from the days of the khudkasht raiyats, but nowadays the occupancy right is not attached to the land but may be attached to mere rent receivers. Agriculture ought to be the primary consideration of tenancy legislation. Tenancy legislation has not led to land going out of cultivation. Legislation has however led to subletting and consequently to holdings becoming uneconomic, with the result that it is more difficult for tenants to pay their rents. The laws of inheritance are one reason why holdings have become uneconomic but he did not agree that this is the cause in 90 per cent. of cases. Tenancy legislation allows subinfeudation and subdivision of holdings:—had there been no such legislation, the present position might have been postponed for 50 years. There might have been legislation to prevent holdings being subdivided below a certain area, although the shares might be subdivided through inheritance. There might be an arrangement by which one member of the family may cultivate; but the holding and the rent should not be split up. He agreed that before 1928, raiyat's right to sublet was restricted to a 9-year lease. The landlords' incentive to benefit their tenants has disappeared because improvements cannot be effected or enhancements obtained for them. It is true that the Tenancy Act provides for registration of improvements, but it is very difficult in practice to prove them and the section has been little used. Another reason is that the occupancy raiyat is virtually the owner of his holding and consequently it is difficult for the landlord to effect any improvement. It may be true that until 1928 the raiyats had no legal power to excavate tanks or cut trees, but they actually did so. In any case, this does not affect the question of the landlord's power to make improvements. He agreed that during the last 50 years few lakheraj grants have been made: the reason is that the landlords' incentive to make such grants was beginning to disappear as their margin of profit was decreasing. Khan Bahadur M. Hossain pointed out that the margin of profit for Bengal as constituted in 1793 was 20 lakhs and it has now increased to 10 crores. Mr. Sachin Sen replied that the profits at the time of the Permanent Settlement could not be compared with those of to-day. The country in 1793 was in an exhausted condition. With the extension of cultivation landlords' profits increased. Part of the profit however goes to the tenureholders. Cess and increased litigation have diminished the landlords' profits. In the 19th century, rent was more regularly paid. Nowadays, rents have to be realised to a much greater extent through the Courts. Collection has dropped very greatly during the last two years.

As regards the reply to question 24 he said that the samindars may have been originally officers of Government, but the reply refers to the early Hindu times. Later, there came a period when landlordism developed, and the State began to deal with the landlords instead of dealing individually with the raiyats. Thus the landlords became the dominant factor and the raiyats' rights were subordinated. Rights in India are customary. Even if zamindars were originally officers of Government, they had developed to the status of proprietors by the Moghul period.

In reply to Khan Bahadur A. Momin, he said the Association's view is that raiyats had primarily the right of cultivation, and that if they did not cultivate they could be evicted.

Continuing to Khan Bahadur M. Hossain, he agreed that the Paramount Power has the power to modify the rights of landlords in accordance with the spirit of the Permanent Settlement Regulations. That Regulation reserved the right to Government to protect the rights of raiyats. But the Permanent Settlement is not to be judged simply by the criterion whether it has been for the greatest good of the greatest number. It has also to be considered whether the capital invested has been used in accordance with the expectations of the Permanent Settlement. If the present Government holds that the system should be changed, it may abolish the Permanent Settlement subject to the grant of adequate compensation under section 299 of the Government of India Act. The figure for the revenue paid by Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, viz., 2.85 crores was taken from authorities like Baden Powell. He agreed that the present revenue of Madras may be three or four times that of Bengal, but the figures in answer to question 5 represent the facts as they were at the end of the 18th century. He agreed that the Customs duty comes from foreign imports but it could not be called "undesirable" unless one lives in a world where the laws of supply and demand do not operate. As a result of the Permanent Settlement and the consequent higher purchasing power of the middle classes, Bengal has contributed largely to income-tax. The occupancy raiyats too have a higher purchasing power, but while the raiyats pay a low average rent, they have rack-rented their under-raiyats.

Last year the floods cost Government 64 lakhs in remission and suspension. Had there been no Permanent Settlement, Government would certainly have had to pay very much more, not only last year, but in previous years also. It might be true that more money would be available were there no Permanent Settlement, but that would be taking a narrow view of finance, because the Permanent Settlement has spread prosperity to the middle classes and Government sources of revenue, other than land revenue, have been greatly increased. As



regards the figures for the area under cultivation given in answer to question 6, he explained that Colebrooke included Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur in Bengal, and the figures are not for Bengal alone. It might be true that in Western Bengal some irrigation tanks have fallen into disuse. He said that it would be a fallacy to calculate the assets of Bengal proper at the time of the Permanent Settlement by taking the present revenue of 2.15 crores and adding 10 per cent. for collection charges. Famine wiped out half of the population and reduced one-third of the country to jungle. The East India Company settled the revenue at 2.76 crores without considering the zamindar's assets. Whether the zamindars had a margin of profit at that time is not certain. He agreed that the assets for Bengal proper might have been about 2 crores at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The increase to 12 crores is mainly due to the extension of cultivation. It has however to be remembered that the Commission's figure of 12 crores representing the present raiyati rental includes khas mahal and temporarily settled areas.

With reference to the quotation from Lord Cornwallis' Minute in answer to question 46, the Khan Bahadur said that by the use of the word "only", the intention was that enhancement of rent could only be made on account of cultivation of more valuable crops. Mr. Sen replied that Lord Cornwallis' opinion was never embodied in the law. Shore and other authorities gave different opinions. He maintained that the Permanent Settlement Regulations must be the final authority. The Khan Bahadur then quoted from the despatch of the Court of Directors, dated the 19th September 1792, to indicate the intention to give the same certainty to the raiyats' rent as to the revenue of the zamindars. Mr. Sen replied that what the Court of Directors might have intended was not included in the Regulations issued at the time of the Permanent Settlement. Presumably the draughtsmen were capable of expressing the Court of Directors' decision.

As regards the effects of subinfeudation on agriculture, he said that if the margin of profit of the zamindars is distributed among the tenureholders, the raiyats are not thereby affected. It is not true that when tenureholders come in, they immediately attempt to enhance rents: otherwise it is most unlikely that the average rent could have remained at Rs. 3 an acre for so long. He agreed that rents of raiyats under landlords and tenureholders may differ, and that the profits of tenureholders may be smaller than those of landlords, but this does not mean that no tenureholders are in a position to help their tenants. Nor can it be inferred that subinfeudation tends to make the landlords more "indolent". It would not be correct to say that Government does not help agriculture because of its limited revenue. There must first be an agricultural policy. It is true that more money might be

necessary but if there is the will on Government's part, they could raise money. Even so, it is essential first to lay down a sound agricultural policy. If it is said by anyone that 80 per cent. of the assets goes to the landlords, the conclusion would be that he does not understand the Permanent Settlement. It is not correct that the Permanent Settlement has resulted in investment on land at the expense of industry. It is no retrograde step to invest in land and the circumstances of Bengal are such that it should remain primarily agricultural. He did not believe that Bengal can be industrialised. If the raiyats have a lower purchasing power, industries cannot thrive. Landlords have undoubtedly helped to finance agriculture: in fact during the first part of the 19th century, landlords were the only agency. It was in the latter part of that century that the mahajans appeared, and in the 20th century Government began to consider the question. Even if the mahajans charged exorbitant interest, they have done something to provide rural credit and to save the tenants in times of need. He could not say what sums have been lent by landlords to tenants in more recent years.

The Khan Bahadur queried the correctness of the figures in answer to question 11 and Mr. Sen explained his position.

The failure of the Patta Regulations was due to the raiyats, who were unwilling to execute agreements with their landlords. Tenancy legislation was enacted in 1859 not to introduce anything novel in the system of land tenure but because judicial decisions had made it necessary to codify the existing system. There were no other reasons for legislation at that time. Before the Act of 1885, the Pabna riots had taken place but the despatches prior to 1885 show that the primary reason for legislation was to provide for the realisation of rent.—Then the Rent Law Commission added other recommendations. It is not correct that legislation was necessary because relations between landlords and tenants were not cordial.

As regards the present price of zamindari he said that the position at present is abnormal and is no guide to the value of zamindari properties. Tenancy legislation has reduced the value and has made the occupancy rights even more valuable. He regarded as a serious statement by a Member of the Commission the suggestion that compensation should be calculated on the basis of the assets received at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The judicial decisions of many years regarding enhancement of rents cannot be set aside. It cannot be said that Rs. 3 an acre is a heavy rent even for an uneconomic holding. If that is the case, what is the position of under-raiyats who are paying twice as much? If landlords are accused of neglecting the raiyats, *a fortiori*, the raiyats have actually plundered their under-raiyats. Tenancy legislation has made holdings uneconomic and it is

now too late to come and complain about the rent. The Taxation Enquiry Committee said that the tax on agricultural holdings should be one-fourth of the income. This would be more than Rs. 3 per acre. It is true that if a tenant has 10 acres, he can easily pay one-fourth of his income. Mr. P. N. Singh Roy added that even if a holding is uneconomic not only would he say it is difficult for the tenant to pay, but he would go further and say he should pay no rent because he would get into debt. This was the conclusion of the Taxation Enquiry Committee.

Mr. Sen explained that, as regards the reply to question 23, Mr. S. C. Mitter's view is that when a share of the crop is converted into fixed money-rent, the State ceases to be a partner and the raiyat obtains a proprietary right. Khan Bahadur M. Hossain quoted from Justice S. C. Mitter's Law Lecture to indicate that the cultivators had proprietary rights and that the East India Company set aside the Muhammadan theory that revenue, and not the land, belongs to the sovereign. Mr. Sen replied that Akbar's settlement was for 10 years and was fixed on the basis of the productivity of the land. It was optional to pay rent in cash, or one-third to one-fourth of the crop, i.e., the quantum of produce was fixed but not the rate of rent. As regards the status of the raiyats, by proprietary right is meant the right to cultivate. Even Mr. Justice S. C. Mitter holds that he forfeits the right if he does not cultivate. In his opinion however there were higher authorities than Mr. Justice S. C. Mitter, such as Phillips. He did not advocate the restriction of occupancy rights to "tillers of the soil" but would confine it to agriculturists in the wider sense of the word. He did not agree that the Permanent Settlement was concerned with non-agricultural tenants. He said that paragraph 8, Article 7, of Regulation I of 1793 refers to "all classes" of people, but the wording later on also refers to agriculturists, viz., talukdars, raiyats and other cultivators of the soil. The word "raiya" was not synonymous with non-agricultural "tenant" at the Permanent Settlement. The income from non-agricultural lands is governed by the Transfer of Property Act and is assessed to income-tax. Had non-agricultural lands been included in the Permanent Settlement Regulations, they could not have been subjected to payment of income-tax. Pargana rates were altered before the Permanent Settlement and were always variable. They were not revised by any survey after the Permanent Settlement.

Mr. P. N. Singh Roy said that occupancy rights should not be given to bargadars. They are not on the same level as the old raiyats who paid a share of the crop. The raiyat is a tenant whereas a bargadar is a labourer who gets remuneration for his labour. He pointed out that all bargadars do not supply seed, cattle and plough. Those

who do so get a greater share of the produce as their remuneration than the ordinary bargadars. He would not be in favour of giving occupancy rights to bargadars who provide the seed, cattle and plough. The grant of occupancy right is not contingent on the supply of agricultural implements. Mr. Singh Roy compared the case of a mason who constructs or repairs his house. He brings his own instruments with him and the householder does not supply them. In the same way, a person employing a cartman does not supply him with cart and bullocks. For the supply of implements or the cart and bullocks the mason or the cartman gets the remuneration for his labour only. It may be true that the bargadar loses his share of the crop if there is a failure of crop, but so does the landlord, and so does the ordinary labourer.

In reply to Khan Bahadur A. Momin, Mr. Sen said that, as regards the answer to question 24, the existence of village communities and of headmen indicates that the State dealt with the headmen and not with individual raiyats. The headmen might be called officials but not in the sense in which the word is used to-day. When the State began to deal with the headmen it virtually ceased to consider the individual raiyats. It is not possible to say exactly when landlordism arose in Bengal, but authorities show that by Akbar's time the zamindars were numerous, powerful and had acquired hereditary rights. The Permanent Settlement merely confirmed them as proprietors of the soil.

He agreed that shortly before the Dewani zamindars had to supply rations to troops and had to carry out police duties and to perform judicial functions. They were therefore something more than simply proprietors. But it would not be correct to say that their functions were those of Government officials: they received no remuneration for such functions.

In reply to Dr. R. K. Mukerji, the Raja Bahadur of Nashipur said that after they were relieved of their police functions the landlords' police lands were resumed by the State and they had to pay extra revenue. The landlords also used to receive fines in their judicial capacity.

Continuing to Khan Bahadur A. Momin, Mr. Sen said that Murshed Kuli Khan tried for three years to remove the landlords and to collect revenue direct but he failed. When the landlords were dispossessed they were given malikana, which is an indication of their proprietary rights.

He did not agree that the restrictions in the Patta Regulations limited the proprietary rights of zamindars. Section 52 of Regulation VIII of 1793 lays down that subject to the restrictions regarding

mokararidars and khudkasht raiyats the zamindars could let the remainder of their lands as they liked. He agreed that there is no such thing as the absolute proprietorship of land. Landlords certainly do not exercise more power nowadays than at the Permanent Settlement.

As regards the supply of capital for improvement of their estates, Mr. Sen stated that there are many factors in production of which labour is only one: there is the land, the capital supplied, the risks and the employment of labour. The landlords provided all of these except the labour. At the time of the Permanent Settlement the country was in a chaotic condition. The landlords had to induce tenants to settle at lower rates of rent and sometimes rent-free for several years. It is certainly the landlords' enterprise which extended cultivation and was responsible for building embankments and excavating tanks. The tenants were poor and had no capital to invest. It is true that the landlords may have had a small margin of profit but when the tenants had no capital he asked where the money could have come from. He undertook later to give instances of landlords who have extended cultivation by the supply of capital.

He did not agree that if the increase due to the fall in the value of money is applicable to raiyats' rents it should also apply to the zamindars' revenue. The quantum of revenue payable by the zamindars was fixed at the Permanent Settlement and for years afterwards they got practically no profit.

He mentioned that the Permanent Settlement has been of benefit to the raiyats not only because it brought peace and security to the Province but for the other reasons mentioned in the reply to question 10.

He said that during the last 50 years relations between the landlords and tenants have been on the whole cordial as will be clear from Settlement Reports. The idea that tenants are oppressed by landlords has arisen only in the 20th century. At the present time the causes of unhappy relations between the landlords and tenants are both political and economic. So long as the present agitation and Tenancy legislation on the present lines continue, it is likely that strained feelings will remain. He agreed that the Praja Party may acquire more power than it has at present and make the landlords' position even more difficult.

He did not agree that the landlords have outgrown their usefulness, and referred to the suggestions in the reply to question 25. The present system is capable of serving the country in a better way than the provisions of Tenancy legislation, but the difficulty is that the

landlords' utility has been restricted by legislation. Landlords in the past have tried to effect improvements for the benefit of their tenants but they are handicapped now by Tenancy legislation. As more recent examples of estates which have tried to effect agricultural improvements Mr. Singh Roy mentioned the Makalpur estate in Hooghly, the Gouripore estate in Mymensingh, Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy's estate in Rajshahi, and the Mallik family of Ranaghat who are tenureholders: the Mymensingh and Nashipur estates have made similar attempts. He could not give the percentage of such estates but said that those who can help their tenants in this way have done so.

Mr. Sen said that the landlords' margin of profit nowadays is only on paper, and realisation of rents through the Civil Courts is very slow and harassing. Tenureholders find it difficult to pay the rent to their superior landlords and he agreed that their difficulties are likely to continue. It is only right that Government should give landlords better facilities to realise their rents.

He thought that most landlords would be glad to part with their zamindaries if they are given proper compensation. This should be paid on the basic principles of the Land Acquisition Act. If the removal of the landlords is compulsory, an additional 15 per cent. should be paid above 20 times the net profits. He did not agree that the relief resulting to zamindars by taking over of their estates could be considered a reason for withholding the additional 15 per cent. If Government takes over all zamindaries now they should follow the principles of the Land Acquisition Act and should not take a purchasing price prevailing in abnormal times. At the present time 15 times the net profit would be the purchase price.

If an agricultural income-tax is levied, the position of the landlords would be worse and the value of their property might decrease. In each case the size of the estate, the margin of profit and similar considerations would have to be examined. In reply to the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, Mr. Singh Roy explained that 15 times the net profit is the minimum which should be paid and it might be more in other cases. There are landlords who even to-day would not part with their estates if they were given 15 times the net profit.

As regards the effect of State purchase on the social structure of the province, Mr. Sen referred to the reply to question 16. Most of the middle classes are tenureholders and jotedars. Their property as well as the property of the landlords would be taken away by State purchase. The result would be that the present social bonds between the different classes of society would be destroyed and the cultivating class would find itself under a different system with a different ideology. He did not agree that if tenureholders were allowed to retain their

homes and khas lands there would be no practical change in their condition. They would lose all interest in the land and the connection with their tenants would be severed.

As regards fragmentation of holdings, Mr. Sen said that consolidation is desirable but it would be difficult to make it effective if an attempt is made to carry it out on a voluntary basis. He agreed that it would be easier to carry it out if there was one landlord. Subdivision cannot be stopped without interfering with the laws of inheritance. The zamindars might agree to this change but he thought that the tenants would not. He referred to his suggestion that subdivision should not be allowed below the size of an economic holding even though the shares are subdivided. He believed that the system of a preferred share would be possible but difficult. He was not in favour of allowing lands to accumulate in one hand except in cases where tenants want to farm lands on a large scale.

Explaining the last sentence of the reply to question 57 he said that when the proposed revision of rent is made, the rent might either be enhanced or decreased. As regards the reply to question 73 Mr. P. N. Singh Roy said that it is not possible for individuals to restore the fertility of the soil. A long programme of irrigation improvements is essential. Government has not done enough in the past. If Government gets back only the cost of carrying out irrigation works he thought that the people would be ready to pay for such a programme. Government has shown a commercial spirit:—for example, under the Development Act Government demands half of the estimated increase in yield resulting from irrigation improvements. He did not agree that the Permanent Settlement could be blamed because Government has to find additional revenue for such improvements. The land has to pay for them and even the landlords would have to pay if their khas lands are improved. He did not agree that the khas mahals have done much to improve irrigation. As regards the reply to question 83 he had not recommended the development of industries because in Bengal people are not as a rule willing to leave their homes. The development of cottage industries would be helpful, and the surplus population should be diverted to home industries.

The co-operative system has failed to liquidate debts and the present volume of debt is too great for the department to tackle. Some improvement might however be possible by reorganizing the department's methods. Debt Settlement Boards have removed agricultural credit. He thought they could only function if Government could find the money to meet the credit needs. They should be abolished and a moratorium should be declared.

In reply to Dr. R. K. Mukerji, Mr. Sen said that the State should be for the greatest good of all citizens. The "greatest good of the

largest number" rather implies that minorities will not be considered. He agreed that the Paramount Power could remove the Permanent Settlement if it considers it in the interest of the country, subject to the payment of compensation.

Mr. Singh Roy said that the area of the average holding is uneconomic. The value of the gross produce per acre would average about Rs. 45. Taking the figure as Rs. 40 for the sake of argument, the raiyat has to pay as rent 1/13th of the produce. The cost of cultivation might be 1/3rd of the produce. The average number of persons per family is 5 according to the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee's Report. If each member of a family were allowed one anna per day for subsistence the necessary income would be Rs. 10 per month. The area of an economic holding should be 5 acres: this is a minimum area. The reasons for the growth of uneconomic holdings are the laws of inheritance and Tenancy legislation.

Cultivators remain idle for about 6 months in the year. Some of the old handicrafts such as the production of muslin in Dacca have disappeared. The landlords had nothing to do with this. The reason has been the development of trade from the days of the East India Company onwards. Rice husking has been introduced into some villages successfully. The silk industry exists in Murshidabad, and the bell-metal industry is capable of development. He agreed that the State should finance the programme of industrial development. It is not primarily the duty of the landlords to do so. The Department of Industries has produced practically no results.

As regards reduction of rent on account of fall in prices, Mr. P. N. Singh Roy said that this is provided for by the Tenancy Act. During the boom period some resettlements of holdings may have been made at higher rents but there was no general assessment of rents in permanently settled estates: the existing rents which were fixed long before it at customary rates merely continued. Dr. Mukherji suggested that tenants might be given the option of paying the rent in cash, or kind as bargadars now do. Mr. Singh Roy replied that the two cases are not the same, because bargadars can be evicted at will and are not tenants. He thought that commutation of the produce in accordance with the value of money would be very difficult, and that it would also be difficult for the landlords to collect rent in kind on a large scale. He agreed however that in theory the proposal might be considered provided there are adequate safeguards. Mr. Sen said that the decreasing fertility of the soil is not the responsibility of the landlords. The decreased yield of produce is due primarily to the poor health of the cultivators owing to the increase of Malaria, and to the lack of scientific agriculture, Mr. Singh Roy added that it is the



business of Government to supply improved seeds through the Agricultural Department but even after the floods last year the department supplied no seeds. The landlords would be prepared to help their tenants with small irrigation schemes, but nowadays their incentive has been removed. Enhancement for such improvements cannot be made during the next 10 years and it is unlikely that the former law will ever be restored.

Mr. Singh Roy gave as an analogy the case of house property in Calcutta, the tenant of which asks to have electric light installed. If this were done the landlord would naturally expect an enhancement of rent to cover the cost of the improvement; and if he could not get an enhancement he would not carry out the improvement.

As regards the increase in raiyati assets through the extension of cultivation, Mr. Sen said that about the time of the Permanent Settlement, Grant estimated that 18,000 square miles out of a total of 90,000 square miles was under cultivation. In Bengal as it is to-day, the cultivated area is 29 million acres according to the Commission's figures, i.e., over 45,000 square miles. The increase is therefore mainly due to the extension of cultivation. At the time of the Permanent Settlement, rents in Burdwan were as much as Rs. 5 or 6 per acre whereas in other parts of the province they were lower. According to Grant the average rent per acre was Rs. 2, but other authorities have different views. Generally speaking however, there has been little enhancement in permanently settled estates since the Permanent Settlement: the rent has continued much the same for 150 years.

Mr. Singh Roy explained the Association's calculation in answer to question 11. The Association assumes that the raiyati assets in the permanently settled area amount to about 11 crores; land revenue 2.35 crores; cost of collection 15 per cent.; cost of litigation 15 per cent., of which about 10 per cent. is recovered through Courts; and unrealisable arrears amount to 15 per cent. The landlords' share of the cess is 48 lakhs. The total of the landlords' outgoings is thus about 4 crores. It follows that 7 crores are intercepted by landlords and tenureholders. The number of revenue-paying estates is 1 lakh and the number of tenures 27 lakhs. Taking 5 as the number of persons in each family of all rent receivers, there will be 14 lakhs of rent receivers in Bengal, amongst whom the profit of 7 crores is distributed. The average income is thus Rs. 5 per head.

In reply to Sir F. A. Sachse, Mr. Singh Roy agreed that some tenureholders may have more than one tenure, or a share in estates. If a reduction of 15 per cent. is made on this account, the number of rent receivers would be 11.9 lakhs and the income Rs. 7 a head.

Continuing to Dr. Mukherji, he said that landlords' realisation of rent amounted in some years to 100 per cent. in some districts but this was the result of both the current and arrear demands. Landlords have to give remissions of rent to their tenants, and if the State purchased the interests of the landlords it would also be compelled to give remissions. To give a rough idea of the amount, Mr. Singh Roy said that in the total khas mahal area of 5,710 square miles Government had to grant remission of Rs. 63,04,206 in 34 years (1904-1937). Remission in the same proportion for the rest of Bengal having a total area of 66,671 square miles calculated for 146 years (1793-1939) would be about Rs. 32,48,52,000. In recent years, the political situation has changed and Government nowadays is subjected to much greater political pressure. Last year the amount spent for loans, gratuitous relief, relief work and remissions amounted to not less than 64 lakhs, compared with very small amounts which the previous Government used to spend. He was quite definite that in future political pressure will be so great that remissions will be very much higher than that figure. In the permanently settled area, remissions are borne by the landlords. Reduction is often given by them when land deteriorates.

Mr. Sen said that the revenue from stamps, court-fees and customs duty in Bengal is due to the greater purchasing power of the people and this has resulted from the Permanent Settlement. Under State management, the income from these sources would undoubtedly decline. Bengal pays a large share of the Central revenues from customs duty and income-tax because of the higher purchasing power of the people. It is because of this purchasing power that the imports into Bengal are greater than any other provinces and consequently the customs duty is higher. The reason why land revenue is higher in Madras is that the area of Madras is double that of Bengal. The incidence of revenue in Madras according to the Commission's figure is 14 annas whereas in Bengal it is 15 annas; but in Madras the Government rate of rent is much higher than in Bengal. The greater area and the higher rate of rent together result in a higher revenue.

Under-raiyats were not in existence at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The zamindars cannot be held responsible if the raiyats rack-rent their under-raiyats. This can only be stopped by legislation.

In reply to the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, Mr. P. N. Singh Roy said that if the State purchases the interests of zamindars, compensation must include arrears of rent which are undoubtedly assets. He would not claim compensation for arrears which are time-barred, but it would be equitable to include all recoverable arrears less 10 or 15 per cent. on account of bad debts. He agreed that the mineral rights would also have to be acquired by the State and the underground rights should be separately assessed.

In reply to the Chairman he said that if oil was discovered in Bengal, compensation would also have to be paid on that account. The whole question of underground rights has been tested in the Courts and the decision was that the zamindars possess these rights. The Chairman mentioned that in England, legislation had been passed which secured to the State the oil rights without payment of compensation.

Continuing to Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, Mr. Singh Roy said he had not considered the possibility of Government taking a lease of permanently settled estates. He thought that zamindars would be willing to give their estates in Ijara to Government.

He regarded land revenue as a tax and said that if equality in taxation is taken into consideration, the imposition of an agricultural income-tax would not be justified. The revenue and cess now payable by landlords is already more than income-tax would be. If agricultural income-tax is levied, there must certainly be a limit. He suggested that such a tax should only be levied in estates where the net profit is more than 50 per cent., i.e., where land revenue plus cesses and collection costs are less than 50 per cent. He agreed that if the State purchases all zamindari and tenures, there would be a loss in revenue from court-fees and stamps. Mr. Sen estimated this at about 2 crores.

The free right of transfer has not benefited landlords or tenants. Ilbert, who was a great critic of the landlords, observed that "a landlord is concerned to see that no undesirable tenant is forced on him and this should be prevented by giving the landlord the right of pre-emption." Mr. Singh Roy suggested legislation by which a landlord would receive a notice of sale giving the name of the intending purchaser and the price offered and if he (the landlord) considered him undesirable, he might have the first right to purchase the holding by paying the price offered by the intending purchaser within a statutory period to be fixed.

In reply to Khan Bahadur M. Hossain, he agreed that legislation might also restrict the subsequent settlement of the holding to agriculturists.

Continuing to the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, he said that the figures for collection of rent in khas mahal show first the percentage of collection on both current and arrear rent. The Hon'ble Minister, Revenue Department, had recently said that Government realises 52 per cent. of the current demand. Mr. Singh Roy said it would be difficult to give figures showing the percentage of charities given by landlords for the benefit of their estates as distinguished from

outside charities. He undertook however to try and collect such figures.

Mr. Sen said that if the landlords had been in control over water channels, it is possible that the position as regards irrigation might be better than it is to-day; but the Irrigation Act stands in the way.

In reply to Mr. B. K. Roy Chowdhury, Mr. Sen said that in considering subinfeudation below the zamindars it was not a question of the landlords' incapacity to provide capital for the whole of their estates. Up to the first quarter of the 19th century, their margin of profit was so small that historically speaking, it was a necessity to introduce tenureholders. The Permanent Settlement did not take away any rights from the tenants. Looking at the Permanent Settlement Regulations as a whole, it is clear that the raiyats were given security against eviction and arbitrary enhancement. Occupancy raiyats to-day have acquired full proprietary rights as a result of tenancy legislation, culminating in the Act of 1938. Practically speaking, rent-free raiyats are no better off than rent-paying raiyats because rent is such a small portion of the tenant's budget. He agreed that agricultural improvement by themselves will not solve the economic problem, which has arisen through the pressure on the land. The increase in population will have to be checked. If the Permanent Settlement is abolished, 14 million rent receivers will be deprived of their livelihood and the existing social system will be dislocated. He did not regard it as correct to say that the Permanent Settlement has resulted in investment in land at the expense of industry. The cost of management is 15 per cent. for collection and nowadays the cost of litigation has increased to the same figure. Zamindari management is more expensive than khas mahal management because the zamindars have not the same power behind them as Government has. The increased cost of collection nowadays is due to abnormal condition.

Landlords who have property in several districts cannot be called absentees because it is impossible for them to be in all the districts at the same time. Absenteeism is a misnomer and a phrase used by political agitators. Property in Bengal is detached and scattered and not compact as in England. If the Permanent Settlement were abolished, Mr. Singh Roy said that his Association would be prepared to accept temporary settlements, but not on the system which now exists in Bengal. The landlords would prefer the United Provinces system and compensation would also have to be paid for the loss of their rights. Temporary settlement would not however improve the condition of the agriculturists. Rights in agricultural property must be treated on the same footing as rights in other private property. If the Permanent Settlement is abolished, the landlords would undoubtedly demand compensation in cash. As regards payment of rent

by money orders Mr. Singh Roy said that it is provided for by the Act of 1928. If punctual payment by this system is made, the number of tahsildars might be reduced and the landlords might even be prepared to pay the money order fees. He agreed that the collection of cess should be transferred to Union Boards. Landlords often cannot realise cesses and have to pay from their own pockets. They cannot go to the Civil Courts for sums amounting to a few annas.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Hashem Ali. Mr. Singh Roy said that the membership of the British Indian Association is about 200 from all districts of Bengal and from Bihar. It is true that some estates are encumbered but he did not agree that the majority are. Asked whether purchases of zamindari property have been made after 1930, he mentioned that he himself purchased a property in Burdwan about six years ago. The price paid was 19 times the net profit. This estate was not contiguous to any other property owned by him: it was an investment. He could not say what is the percentage of profit remaining to individual estates after paying revenue and all costs of management. He declined to answer questions of a personal nature and said that the representatives of the Associations were there to give the views of all landlords. He repeated the figures which he had given to Dr. Mukherji to show the revenue paid, costs of collection, etc. He could not however give any definite percentage to show the amount paid in charities. Percentages, he said, are apt to be misleading. If one goes by the law of averages, the conclusion might be that the landlords and tenureholders should pay nothing at all on their average income *per capita*. Mr. Sen pointed out that in the matter of taxation it was not the average income but the dispersion of income which was the factor to be reckoned with. The number of big landlords is small. The criterion for votes in the landlords' constituency is the payment of Rs. 2,000 as revenue in Eastern Bengal and Rs. 3,000 in Western Bengal, yet in the whole province less than 1,000 landlords have votes. Mr. Sen said that under the Regulations, waste lands were to be settled at pargana rates. Rates above that would be illegal but the pargana rate was a variable rate fixed in accordance with the capability of the land.

As regards reduction of rent, Mr. Singh Roy said that he himself had given reduction on account of deterioration in fertility in some of his properties in the Trans-Damodar area and in the Arambagh subdivision. He did not agree that there has been any deterioration in Mymensingh. It is open to the tenants to go to the Courts for reduction of rent on account of fall in prices and it is not true to say that they have not done so because of fear of oppression. Landlords did formerly exercise the right of pre-emption. The number of cases was given by the Revenue Member, Sir B. L. Mitter, as 1,300 a few years

ago. Pre-emption is in the interest of tenants, and landlords have exercised the power at the request of co-sharer tenants. He mentioned the case of a benami purchase by one co-sharer, in which the other co-sharers asked for pre-emption. Landlords and tenants have been equally affected by the economic depression. It may be true that tenants have sold some of their lands to mahajans since the depression—it is equally true that the number of revenue sales has increased though the number of private sales has not increased. It would not be true to say that landlords generally do not visit their estates. Mr. Singh Roy mentioned that the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan had recently been to Arambagh subdivision—an area which is not even visited once a year by the Collector, and had also visited his estates in Orissa. If the State purchases the rights of zamindars, they are entitled to get back the capital which they have invested and not simply the margin of profit after deducting all their outgoings. There are other considerations which are worth more than mere cash compensation. The landlords accepted a Permanent Settlement that was thrust upon them. He agreed that the future of the zamindars will be uncertain if the present agitation and the Krishak Party movement are allowed to continue. The present Government has done nothing to stop this agitation: it seems to be encouraging it. There is no doubt that trade, commerce and revenue from customs and stamps will decline if the Permanent Settlement is abolished. It would be impossible for industry to absorb all the landlords and tenureholders who would lose their property. Landlords would never agree to additional taxes for the development of industry. Such taxation would merely be another evasion of the Permanent Settlement Regulations. But if the landlords could realise their rents punctually, he had no doubt that they would agree to contribute towards ameliorative measures.

In reply to the Secretary, Mr. Singh Roy explained that his proposal to limit an agricultural income-tax to estates whose revenue, cess and cost of collection is less than 50 per cent. would not be applicable in the case of small zamindars and tenureholders whose income is less than a certain amount. There should also be a monetary limit to such a tax.

In reply to Sir F. A. Sachse, Mr. Sen explained in connection with the reply to question 80 that co-operative system of agriculture cannot function if the members have different rights. Rights of members must be equal. He agreed that it would be easier to introduce such a system if there were one landlord, one grade of raiyat and one rate of rent. He agreed that tenancy legislation has recognised existing facts, e.g., it was a fact that the law limiting under-raiyati leases to 9 years was never observed in practice, but he maintained that had tenancy legislation not recognised subinfeudation

it could not have extended as it has done. In Europe there is no subinfeudation because legislation has discouraged it. Sir F. A. Sachse enquired whether it is practically possible to stop subinfeudation when a margin of profit exists. Mr. Sen replied that even so, legislation should endeavour to stop subinfeudation: otherwise agriculture will be ruined. He agreed however that a judge or a lawyer who has lands should be allowed to cultivate through labourers who should be paid daily or monthly wages or by a share of the crop. Subinfeudation of holdings below the economic level should not be allowed. Whether this is provided by legislation or whether the system of preferred heir is adopted, is a matter of expediency. Mr. Singh Roy thought it possible that co-sharer tenants might agree to let one of the members of the family cultivate and be responsible for maintaining the others. This system will certainly be possible in a family where the brothers are engaged in different occupations but he agreed that it would be difficult to work in the case of purely agricultural families.

Sir F. A. Sachse queried the figures which were given in answer to question 81 which show that in the Burdwan Division only 60 per cent. of the land is under cultivation. Mr. Sen replied that Burdwan was originally a prosperous and thickly populated area. In the last part of the 19th century its decline began. There has been a progressive decline from 1901 to 1931, the principal reason being the deterioration of the rivers. Sir F. Sachse pointed out that the figures showing the area under cultivation in answer to question 73 are not correct. According to the Settlement Report of the Burdwan district, the cropped area is 995,000 acres. Mr. Sen replied that the figures had been taken from Professor R. K. Mukerji's book "The Changing Face of Bengal," page 90. Sir F. Sachse explained that the statistics of the Agricultural Department are based on estimates made by Collectors and suggested that it is hardly possible that when the value of land was increasing and prices were rising the cultivated areas in Burdwan and Hooghly could have decreased by 40 per cent. and 45 per cent., respectively. Mr. Sen agreed that this might be so and said that the Association would make further enquiries and forward revised figures later.

## Reply by the Burdwan Landholders' Association.

**Q. 1.** The description given of the objects of the Permanent Settlement is only illustrative and not exhaustive. British statesmen found in the feudal society of India a valuable ally. The much criticised Permanent Settlement of 1793 was imposed on a subject people by the rulers themselves as a measure of triumphant public policy primarily in the interest of the State and only secondarily in expectation of the resultant benefits arising therefrom. It was a far-sighted policy and the great English statesmen of those days who recommended the system did not refuse to look beyond their nose and did not intend to ruin the country by despotic exactions. They took a long vision of things and realised that what was lost in land revenue would be more than compensated by the receipts under other sources of direct or indirect taxation due to the all round prosperity of the province and the reclamation of the waste lands.

The primary object of Regulation I of 1793 was to stabilise the revenue system of the province and to ensure punctual payment. It was a device to exact the maximum possible revenue out of the available assets at that time. It was decided upon after 25 years of occupation and after long deliberations when all other experiments by the revenue experts of those days for raising a steady and unflinching revenue had ended in disaster. In the words of Sir John Anderson, "the Settlement (of 1793) was not the outcome of the grasping and short-sighted policy of a parochially-minded provincial Government, but was deliberately imposed by the highest authority in India. Incidentally, it was the same authority who announced that it was '*fixed for ever*'."

The great English statesmen who composed the Board of Directors of the East India Company of those days appreciated that the country wanted rest from constant change. The establishment of the principles of the Permanent Settlement was considered to be the great remedy for the evil consequences of constant fluctuation. At that time 1/3rd of the cultivable area in Bengal, and according to some historians half of the cultivable area lay waste and infested by wild beasts. They could not reclaim the lands themselves. They did not believe that any inducement short of a permanent tenure and fixed assessment would induce private individuals to reclaim the waste areas. They decided that it was a good policy to surrender their claim *for ever* to any future increase of revenue whether from such reclamation or *from other sources* connected with the land in order to encourage the great work of extending and improving the cultivated area of Bengal. They were convinced that the magic touch of property would set a certain



“productive principle” in operation which would abundantly recompense them in future for the supposed sacrifices then made. These expectations have not been belied but have been amply fulfilled as I shall show later on.

If ever there was a great question of administration decided upon what seemed, at the time, to be sound economic principles, it was the Permanent Settlement. In the words of Lord Hastings “never was there any measure conceived in a purer spirit of generous humanity and disinterested justice, than the plan for the Permanent Settlement in the lower Provinces. It was worthy of the soul of a Cornwallis.”

The Permanent Settlement was not a hasty measure at all, but was the thoughtful outcome of intelligent brains and was fashioned with great care, after very long deliberations. It must be admitted that in deciding on this momentous measure the Board of Directors was guided by considerations of a higher order than ordinarily enter into business routine. The Board of Directors gave utterance to an eternal truth when they remarked “No conviction is stronger in our minds than that of all the generated evil of the unsettled principles of administration, none has been more baneful than the frequent variations in assessment. Impolitic as such a principle must be, at all times, it is particularly so with respect to a dependent country, paying a large annual tribute and deprived of many of its ancient supports.”

It was pertinently pointed out to the Hon’ble Board of Directors by Mr. John Shore in his Minute, dated the 18th of June 1789, that “if the Government be not secured with respect to its revenues, it must stand to all losses and accidents of the seasons; where the raiyats fail or are unable to pay there is no remedy and the annual amount of the revenue must be subject to considerable variations.” It was realised by the framers of the Permanent Settlement that in a country subject to periodic devastations of nature, due to uncertainty and unequal distribution of rainfall and the silting up of the river beds, floods and famines were a very common occurrence and that the Permanent Settlement would be an insurance against such natural calamities. There can be no gainsaying the fact that, in times of famine or distress, the falling off of revenues in the permanently settled areas is much less than that in the raiyatwari or khas mahal areas.

The terrific experiences of the devastating famine of 1770, recorded by Mr. John Shore in verses and quoted by Mr. Hunter in his “Annals of Rural Bengal” shock humanity even to this day. Writing in 1772, Mr. Warren Hastings sets down the loss of population at “at least 1/3rd of the inhabitants of the province.”

Mr. Pattle, sometimes a member of the Board of Revenue, thus comments on the Permanent Settlement “the country brought under

the Decennial Settlement was for the most part wholly uncultivated. Indeed, such was the state of the country from the prevalence of jungle infested by wild beasts that to go, with any tolerable degree of safety, from Calcutta to any of the adjacent districts, a traveller was obliged to have at each stage four drums and as many torches; besides, at this conjuncture public credit was, at its lowest ebb, and the Government was threatened with hostilities from various powerful Native States. Lord Cornwallis's great and comprehensive mind saw that the only resource within his reach, in this critical emergency was to establish public credit and to redeem the extensive jungles of the country. These important objects, he perceived, could only be effected by giving to the country a perpetual land assessment made on the gross rental with reference to existing productiveness and therefore promising to all those who would engage, the encouragement of an immense profit from extending cultivation. Admitting that the sacrifice was very great, I think it cannot be regretted when it is considered what difficulties it conquered, and what prosperity it has introduced and achieved. For my part, I am convinced that our continuance in the country depends on the adoption of that measure and that our stability could not otherwise have been maintained unaltered."

It will be seen from the above accounts that the Permanent Settlement of 1793 was a political necessity and an economic gain. It was hailed as a godsend, when the Government was at its wit's end to balance the budget. This steady and unvarying income from the soil enabled the British nation to build up their Indian Empire. Bengal, paid the expenses of the ambitious wars and annexation in Northern and Southern India. Madras and Bombay never paid the total cost of their own administration during those years. • •

This guaranteed income from land revenue cannot be produced by magic. As the Government does not stand to lose in years of distress and famine, the zamindars must of necessity be allowed a decent margin of profit in years of prosperity, in order to make good their losses, in lean years. The zamindars' liability remains constant in theory, but ever-increasing in practice. Road and public works cesses, and education cess, in many cases, have been added to their liability of land revenue. It matters not whether they can realise any rent whatsoever from the actual tillers of the soil, they must either fulfil their engagements of 1793 punctually or be wiped out of existence. Neither flood nor famine, nor earthquake can be pleaded to delay the payment of revenue beyond the fixed date, in the permanently settled areas.

It was no doubt expected that the zamindars would extend to their subordinate tenants the same generous treatment which they were to receive from Government. It is common sense that when there was plenty of unoccupied and uncultivated land in Bengal and population

was sparse, the competition was not among the tenants for land, but amongst the zamindars for raiyats. It was to the interest of the zamindars to treat their tenants with moderation. Tenants once induced to settle in the village were fostered. In a state of society in which rents were regulated by custom and not by competition, new tenants did not often present themselves. If the zamindars were oppressive, the tenants would have left their estates and repaired to other territories, when the village communities were still in a nomadic state. Generous treatment and moderation were necessary to induce the nomads to settle in particular villages.

It is a fallacy to suppose that the tenants in the pre-British period, i.e., immediately before 1793 had any clear cut or well defined rights. Under the despotic local administration that prevailed during the disruption and decay of the Great Moghul Empire, the only limit to exactions was the tenants' ability to pay. The tenants' rights were very much vague and undefined. Custom was the sole legislative power. The Permanent Settlement rather secured the prescriptive rights of the khudkhast raiyats who had cultivated lands for a continuous period of 12 years previous to 1793. The Permanent Settlement recognised certain rights of the raiyats, as there were, but did not take away any existing rights of the tenants.

**Q. 2.** The Permanent Settlement of 1793 was concluded with "the zamindars, independent taluqdars and other proprietors of land", limiting the public demand *for ever* and "leaving the zamindar to appropriate to his own use, the difference between the value of the proportion of the annual produce of every bigha of land which formed the unalterable dues of the Government according to the ancient and established usage of the country and the sum payable to the public."

In the preamble to the Regulation XLIV of 1793, we find the following passage:—

"It is essential.....that the proprietors of land should have a discretionary power to fix the revenue payable by their dependent taluqdars and to grant leases or fix the rents of these lands for a term sufficient to induce the dependent taluqdars, under-farmers and raiyats to extend and improve the cultivation of their lands."

The zamindars no doubt had the right even before 1793 to demand higher rents from their raiyats when any higher assessment was forced on them by the ruling powers.

Colonel Munro observed in 1806, "I suppose that the zamindars of Bengal are to be at liberty to raise their rents, like landowners in other countries, for if they are restricted from raising the assessment fixed by the Government, and at the same time are liable for all losses, they have

not the free management of the estates and hardly deserve the name of owners."

The following passages occur in the Minutes, dated the 3rd February 1790, of Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor-General of India:—

"Now, if Mr. Shore's calculation of the proportion which the zamindars in general receive of the produce of their lands be accurate, it is obvious that every temporary loss must fall upon Government; for so long as we profess to leave the zamindars no more than that proportion, and claim a right to appropriate the excess to the public use, from what funds are they to make these losses good? But when the demand of Government is fixed, an opportunity is afforded to the landholder of increasing his profits, by the improvement of his lands, and we may reasonably expect that he will provide for occasional losses from the profits of favourable seasons."

"And, indeed, how could it be expected, that whilst the Government were increasing their demands upon the zamindars, that they, in their turn, would not oppress the raiyats or that a farmer whose interest extended little further than to the crops upon the ground, would not endeavour to exact, by every means in his power, as large a sum as possible over and above the amounts of his engagements with the public."

"The rents of an estate can only be raised, by inducing the raiyats to cultivate the more valuable articles of produce, and to clear the extensive tracts of waste land, which are to be found in almost every zamindari in Bengal."

"Neither is prohibiting the landholder to impose new abwabs or taxes on the land, tantamount to saying to him that he shall not raise rents of the estate."

Mr. John Herbert Harington, the celebrated author of "The Analysis of Bengal Regulations" in his book, defines zamindars as constituted by the Permanent Settlement in the following words, "A landholder possessing a zamindari estate which is heritable and transferable by sale, gift or bequest, subject under all circumstances to the public assessment fixed on it; entitled to any surplus rents and profits which may be lawfully receivable by him from the under-tenants of land in his zamindari or from the cultivation and improvement of untenanted lands, subject, nevertheless, to the rules and restrictions which may be enacted by the British Government for protecting the raiyats and under-tenants from undue exaction or oppression."

Again Mr. Harrington says at page 434 of his book (Vol. III), "I do not think the raiyats can claim any right of alienating the lands rented by them by sale, or other modes of transfer, nor any right of holding them at fixed rent except the khudkhasht raiyats who from prescription, have a right of possessing the lands as long as they paid regularly the rent stipulated for by them."

It must be mentioned, however, that Regulation I of 1793 and the other Regulations, which followed make no exception in favour of the khudkhasht raiyat and leaves the zamindars' right of eviction unrestricted. There is a provision, however, that the rents of the khudkhasht raiyats shall not be raised unless the zamindar can prove that they have paid less for these lands for the last 3 years than the nirik of the pargana.

Again Mr. Harrington says in his celebrated book "on the whole .....that no perpetual right of possession, on condition of paying a fixed rent should, at present, be conferred on those raiyats who have not already a declared or prescriptive right to such."

It will be found that the 52nd section of the Regulation VIII of 1793 runs as follows—"The zamindar or other actual proprietor of land is to let the remaining lands of his estate or zamindari, in whatever manner he may think proper....."

It will be clear from the above texts that the zamindar had absolute discretion in choosing new tenants for the reclaimed waste lands, in evicting paikhast or temporary tenants and in refusing to recognise transference, and that he was directed to regulate the usage of the land to the economic interest of the province.

**Q. 3.** In 1793 one-third and according to some historians half of the cultivable area of Bengal lay waste and infested by wild beasts. The pioneer landlords by their industry, enterprise and business capacity converted the vast tracts of waste lands into fertile agricultural fields. The origin of most of the irrigation, and other tanks that we find scattered over the countryside today is to be traced to the industry and enterprise of the zamindars. It is a well-known fact that within 22 years of the Permanent Settlement almost half of the landed property in the province was transferred by public sale and it is difficult to produce the accurate figures of investment of money by the zamindars for improvement of waste areas, after the lapse of 146 years. I can only refer to the record of contemporary historians, in support of my proposition that the zamindars of Bengal "have been very powerful and active factors" in the improvement and economic development of the country.

I beg to append below a few extracts from the expert opinions of historians and economists which go to show the part played by landlords in the economic development of the country. . .

The well-known historian Mr. Marshman writes in his history of India (*vide* 1871 edition, Vol. II, p. 35), "The Permanent Settlement of Bengal was a bold, brave and wise measure and under the genial influence of this territorial charter, which for the first time established indefeasible rights and interests in the soil, the gradual improvement has become visible in the habits and comforts of the people since then."

Mr. R. C. Dutt, I.C.S., a late member of the Hon'ble Board of Revenue, Bengal, writes in his "Economic History of British India", "The Permanent Settlement is an unqualified boon to the country. Cultivation has largely extended within the last 100 years, the income from land has largely increased and the increase has remained with the people and for the good of the people."

"All through the fifteen years, from 1795 to 1810, Bengal has showed a surplus because of the certainty of land revenue. Madras and Bombay had showed deficits.

Great Britain never contributed anything towards the acquisition of India."

Mr. P. N. Roberts writes in his "History of British India," thus: "The Permanent Settlement gave popularity and stability to the British Government and has helped to make the province the wealthiest and the most flourishing in India."

Indian capital is proverbially shy. It was because of the Permanent Settlement and the security it gave to the landed community of Bengal that the Indian capital was released towards the economic development of the country.

I shall adduce the testimony of the Commissioner, Burdwan Division, who was pleased to report on the 20th October, 1883, to the following effect—"the wealth and prosperity of the country have marvellously increased, and increased beyond all precedent, under the Permanent Settlement and the zamindars have been very active and powerful factors in the development of this prosperity."

The Indian Statutory Commission in their Report Vol. I (published in May 1930, at page 340) state as follows—"Whatever may be said for the wisdom of the policy carried out by Lord Cornwallis, and however absolutely the guarantee then given to the zamindars and their

*'heirs must be fulfilled, the consequence at this time of the day are remarkable.'*

I do not consider that the zamindars as a class have failed to perform the functions expected of them at the Permanent Settlement. There was a time when the zamindars were readily acknowledged as the natural leaders of the people, and they commanded the love and esteem of their raiyats for their generous treatment and the beneficial works that they had done, in the villages, to improve the lot of the poor agriculturists. All tenancy legislation since 1859 which has looked to the interest of the tenant only ignoring the rights and interests of the landlords has only tended to embitter the relations between landlords and tenants, fostered litigation and impoverished the people and landlords and tenants alike. This point was stressed by the late Sir P. C. Mitter, in his deposition before the Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1924-25.

The landlords have fallen, on evil days, now, due to their inability to continue the beneficial activities of their predecessors, owing to their financial stringency brought about by a system which makes them liable to pay revenue and cesses to the Government punctually but offers no corresponding facility to them for the speedy realisation of rents from their under-tenants and cultivators. In vain have they cried for redress. The modern legislators, the representatives of the people, have not thought it fit to make any arrangements for the speedy realisation of rents, but have devised measures to delay payment and to put off the landlords' legitimate dues to an indefinite date, so that it may be impossible for him to carry on and his valuable properties may be sold at revenue sales for nothing. There is now, probably, a dearth of sympathetic British statesmen like the Collector of Burdwan who on January 9, 1794, realised the situation and reported to the President, Board of Revenue, in the following words explaining the causes of inability of the Maharaja of Burdwan to pay up the revenue demands: "He (the Maharaja of Burdwan) begs leave to submit to your consideration whether or not it can be possible for him to discharge his engagements to Government with that punctuality which the Regulations require, unless he be armed with powers as prompt to enforce payment from his renters, as Government have been pleased to authorise the use of, in regard to its claims on him, and he seems to think it must have proceeded from oversight, rather than from any just and avowed principle, that there should be established two methods of judicial process, under the same Government, the one summary and efficient for the satisfaction of its own claims; the other, tardy and uncertain in regard to the satisfaction of claims due to its subjects, more especially in a case like the present, where ability to discharge the one demand, necessarily depends on the other demand, being previously

realised." Mr. S. Davis, the Collector of Burdwan, submitted this report when there was a default of only one of the renters of the Maharaja. But even if all the renters of a zamindar default in payment, nowadays, nobody would consider it necessary to help him, in any way. The trend of modern tenancy legislation is to devise the shortest cut to the zamindars' ruin and extinction.

The zamindars of 1793 were politically and economically a necessity and they were therefore sought for in those days. They had devoted their life-long energy, anxiety, industry and savings to the conversion of the vast arid tracts of waste lands into smiling agricultural fields and therefore, they are no longer necessary elements of society. They may now be cast aside safely with ignominy and contempt, like discarded toys. The zamindars cry in wilderness now, but nobody pays any heed to their legitimate grievances.

**Q. 4.** It is a travesty of truth to say that the Permanent Settlement converted the status of zamindars from collectors of revenue to actual proprietors of the soil. In loyalty to truth and history which I owe, above all others, I must say that such a description of the zamindars is based on ignorance of the actual facts.

The status of a rent collector is neither hereditary nor transferable. But we find from the Minute of Sir John Shore and the record of contemporary historians that the zamindari was a permanent, heritable and transferable interest even before 1793. It was only subject to a formal confirmation of the Ruling Power. Volumes have been written on this subject and it is natural to suppose that some of the English historians misunderstood the incidence of a zamindari in the 1st half of the nineteenth century, as the indigenous system of land-tenure was foreign to their ideas. It must be admitted that ownership of land which corresponded with that aggregate of rights, the highest known to the English Law and which is termed a "fee-simple" was unknown to India.

#### *Origin of the Bengal zamindars.*

Mr. Harington thus defines or rather describes the position of a zamindar before the Permanent Settlement of 1793, in the following words:—

"The zamindar is a landholder of a peculiar description not definable by a single term in our language. He was (a) a receiver of the territorial revenues of the State from the raiyats and other under-tenants of land, (b) allowed to succeed to his zamindari by inheritance, yet in general required to take out a renewal of his title from the Sovereign, on payment of a fine on investiture to the Emperor and a *nazarana* is present to the provincial Nazim, (c) permitted to transfer his zamindari by sale or gift, yet, commonly, expected to obtain previous special



permission,—privileged to be generally the annual contractor for the public revenue receivable from the zamindari, (d) entitled to a *jaagir* or *altamgha*—authorised in Bengal since the early part of the eighteenth century to apportion to the parganas or villages the *abwab* or cesses, imposed by the subedars, yet subject to the discretionary interference of the public authorities, (e) entitled to any contingent emoluments proceeding from his contract during the period of his agreement, (f) responsible by the same terms for keeping the peace within his jurisdiction but, apparently, allowed to apprehend only and deliver over to a Mussalman Magistrate for trial and punishment.”

### *Hindu Period.*

Mr. Harington's analysis of the rights and liabilities of the zamindar are based on facts immediately preceding the British period. It is, however, wrong to suppose that the zamindars, as such, did not exist in the Hindu or Muhammadan periods.

Looking back through the mists of two thousand years or more one seems to discern that India was then, as now, a land of innumerable villages. Each village community had its own territory and its own local administration under a headman who in consultation with the elders of the village decided all questions relating to customary rights and duties in the area. Excepting the produce of the royal domain which, of course, belonged exclusively to the King, the entire harvest of the village was collected into a common heap and the share of the State was set aside by the headman before the general distribution. Between the village headman and the King were a gradation of intermediate functionaries who were entrusted with the collection and administration of the State revenues.

In the *Dattaka-Chandrika*, mention is made of “Gramashwami” (গ্রামস্বামী) or village landlord. The relevant passage is quoted below:—

বাজো বিপ্রকৃষ্টে গ্রামস্বামিনঃ ।

বন্ধুনাহ্ন শরীংস্ত গ্রামস্বামিনমেব চ ইতি শ্রবণং ॥

Old princes and chiefs who were brought under subjugation were often continued in possession of their lands on condition that they collected and paid into the public treasury the tax levied upon their tenants deducting or reserving a certain share for themselves.

The old rulers and independent sovereigns never claimed to be proprietors of the lands of their subjects and for the expenses of Government took a defined share of the produce, estimated at from 1/10th to 1/6th.

### *The Muhammadan Period.*

The zamindars have grown out of the ancient Rajas, local leaders and sometimes out of the sovereign powers defeated in battle. Mr. Rouse in his "Dissertations" says—"If the zamindari be an office and such office gives possession of land which has by claim or custom descended from father to son or to collaterals with other circumstances incidental to property such as mortgage, alienation, bequest or adoption it is really a landed inheritance."

Under the Mussalman government of Bengal confirmation of succession to the big zamindaris was insisted on, in the earlier periods. But, in later times, the zamindar succeeded to his estates as a matter of course and simply by inheritance, sometimes taking a Sanad, afterwards, and sometimes never taking one at all.

(Ref. "Tagore Law Lectures."—1874-75 by Mr. Arthur Phillips.)

#### *Calcutta Case, 1828.*

I must admit, however, that it was left to the British Government to recognise the zamindars as permanent proprietors of the soil and to limit the public demand on their estates *for ever* as a piece of far-sighted public policy. This controversy about the legal position of the zamindars before the Permanent Settlement of 1793 has been finally set at rest by two important decisions of Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the Calcutta Case of 1828, the Lord Chancellor held "considering with the best attention, in my power, all these papers, they confirm most strongly the opinion I should have derived from the Permanent Settlement Regulations, viz.,—the proprietors of the soil (zamindars) had a permanent interest in it at the time when the English established themselves in that settlement. Moore's Indian Appeals—Vol. I, Freeman *vs.* Fairlie, 1828).

#### *Bombay Case.*

In another case from Bombay, Their Lordships of the Privy Council disposed of all the unwarranted inferences hostile to the zamindar's right of private property in the soil. (*Cf.* The Collector of Trichinopoly *vs.* Lekkamani & others decided in 1874, *cf.* Macpherson's Indian Appeals—Vol. I, 1873-74, pages 282-315).

**Q. 5.** Yes, the annulment of the Permanent Settlement of 1793 would be a violation of the solemn pledges of an established government and breach of contract not "of a parochially-minded provincial Government, but of the deliberate policy of the highest authority in India." It will mean that a solemn proclamation in the name of the sovereign, the promises contained in the despatches and declarations of the then Governor-General of India may be scattered to the four

winds, at the whims of the Provincial Legislature. It will prove that the zamindars were fools in pinning their faith on these clear pledges and contracts and in investing large sums of money on land, fondly believing in the promises of the Government.

A contract generally implies two parties and not three or four. The tenants did not undertake to pay revenue punctually to the Government in the permanently settled areas and were, therefore, not necessary parties to these contracts. As a matter of course they were out of the picture altogether.

It is wrong to suppose that the Permanent Settlement has permanently crippled the financial resources of the country. At a superficial reading of things it may appear that the land revenue system of the province, being inelastic, the resources of the province are crippled. The statistics however tell a different story. It is true that Bengal's income from land revenue is a fixed guaranteed figure not capable of expansion but it cannot be overlooked that Bengal pays more in stamp duties, income-tax, customs duties and pays cesses of different kinds, in addition to land revenue. Land revenue itself has gained in certainty what it lost in elasticity. The Meston Committee of 1920 calculated that 90 per cent. of the income-tax collected in the provinces came solely from Bengal. About 24 crores of rupees are collected as customs duties from ports within the territorial jurisdiction of Bengal. The consumption in Bengal of cotton manufactures, foreign liquor and tobacco, machinery, articles of food and drink, cutlery, hardware, etc., is comparatively higher. Madras with a population of 42 millions pays a little over six crores of rupees, Bombay 23 crores and United Provinces one crore only. Bengal is the most heavily taxed province even now, excepting Bombay.

Many estates have been settled permanently even after 1793 and the income from land revenue in the permanently settled areas of Bengal has now been calculated by Dr. Radha Kumud Mukherji, M.A., Ph.D., at 4½ crores of rupees. Bengal also pays in road and public work cesses Rs. 92,55,000 per annum of which the zamindars' contribution may be computed at Rs. 41,50,000 per annum. I shall conclude with an extract from the speech of Dr. Radha Kumud Mukherji delivered in the Bengal Legislative Council on the 9th February, 1938, when the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Bill, 1938, was being considered. He said, "The British Government thus got a very good start out of the peasantry of Bengal, 4½ crores of immediately settled revenue by means of which Bengal had to finance its wars in the Deccan, Madras and Bombay. In those days, Madras and Bombay were deficit provinces.

Even during the 5 years, 1780-1784 Bengal had to send away about 3 crores of rupees in order to finance the wars in other parts of India.

We may say that in dealing with this system in which the whole of Bengal is concerned and involved,

we are not considering the interest of a mere class, of a microscopic minority like the so-called zamindars. The Permanent Settlement means an annual revenue of 7 crores of rupees—4½ crores of the Permanent Settlement, 3½ crores from the consequences of the Permanent Settlement—a harvest which we are reaping today in arranging our revenue system and in producing our balanced budget. If calculation is made in this way, the revenue from stamp duty amounts to about three crores and it has been calculated that 60 per cent. of the stamp duties is made up of revenue suits and 90 per cent. out of money suits, also, are for kistibandi and therefore directly or indirectly from the Permanent Settlement. The Bengal Government still gets a revenue of seven crores of rupees, out of the total revenue of eleven crores. Now, this is the system that is supposed to be outgrowing the needs of the times."

*Amortisation of land values.*

It must, also, be borne in mind that whatever be the increase in land values it has been amortised through a thousand sales and transfers. The unearned income of the zamindars is, in many cases, only a dream. The zamindars of today are not, necessarily, the descendants of the zamindars of 1793.

There is absolutely no justification for a breach of faith with these persons who have acquired zamindaris for valuable consideration. The annulment of the Permanent Settlement will mean confiscation of properties acquired for valuable consideration. • •

**Q. 6.** Yes, the zamindars have, amply, fulfilled the expectations of the framers of the Permanent Settlement in extending cultivation and in developing the country as I have already shown in my answers to questions 1, 2 and 3. The Fifth Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons submitted in 1812 contains the following—"Due to the Permanent Settlement, Bengal exhibited in every part of it, improvement on a general view, advancing with accelerated progress, in later times."

His Honour Lt.-Governor Sir Peter Grant in his Memorandum, dated the 10th of August 1861, stated, "The Settlement, as a whole, was a heavy assessment, at the time, and its wonderful financial success is beyond all question."

It is well-known that the zamindars have been chiefly instrumental in reclaiming almost half of the cultivable area of Bengal which lay waste in 1793. It has been acknowledged by the contemporary historians and high Government officials that the zamindars have been the

active and powerful factors in the development of the prosperity of the province which we find from the revenue receipts, under different heads of direct and indirect taxation.

It is commonsense that persons having the permanent interest in land would try to improve their estates in the hope of enjoying exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry. The Permanent Settlement did not offer to the raiyats any permanency of tenure or fixity of rent, excepting in the case of Mokarraridars and istemraridars, as such the tenants had no incentive to develop their leasehold lands. The tenants had neither the means, nor the capacity to undertake any such large project.

**Q. 6.** (i) The Census figures show that population has increased, and increased rather tremendously during the last five decades but it must also be borne in mind that the great famine of 1770 swept away almost one-third population of the province. That void in population had to be filled up. Moreover due to the insanitary condition of some of the villages and the want of opportunities for employment in the rural areas, there has been a continuous exodus of population from villages to town. An examination of the population statistics of 1921 shows that towns with population of over 50,000 increased by a little over 16 per cent. in that decade. Increase of population in the towns or cities is no cause of increase in the area under cultivation. However, the pressure of population on the soil is a factor which cannot be ignored. I think 5 per cent. of the increase in the area under cultivation may be ascribed to this factor.

(ii) The enterprise of tenants as such, independent of the initiative and the pecuniary assistance of the landlords, has not been instrumental in the increase of the area under cultivation. After the Permanent Settlement of 1793 the tenants derived all their rights from the landlords and having neither capital nor the incentive to improve undeveloped areas, their enterprise was a negligible factor in the reclamation of waste areas, except in so far as they co-operated with the landlords by their manual labour. It is difficult to assess the extent of such enterprise. But at a liberal estimate, I may put it down at 15 per cent. of the increase in area.

(iii) The settled order of things brought about by the Permanent Settlement and the initiative and the pecuniary assistance of the zamindars must have been the chief factor in the reclamation of waste areas, as I have already shown in my answers to questions 1, 2 and 3. The junglebari leases go to show that large areas had been leased out on very favourable terms for reclamation of waste areas. In such leases, ordinarily no rent was payable for the first 5 years and then a graduated scale of low rent was assessed in proportion to the greater area of land brought under cultivation.

The origin of the patni taluks may also be ascribed to an assignment for money by the samindar who wished to have waste areas brought under cultivation and was compelled by necessity to raise money, by restricting his interest in the estate.

\* As I have already shown in my answers to the previous questions, the initiative and pecuniary assistance of the zamindars were the chief factors for the increase in area under cultivation and I think 80 per cent. of the increase may be ascribed to this factor.

Q. 7. The gross rent roll of Bengal estimated at 12 crores, which is based on settlement reports, does not take note of the large areas that may have been rendered unfit for cultivation in the meanwhile, by diluvian, permanent deposits of sand, overgrowth of weeds, due to depopulation in some of the malarious villages and other factors. There must have been surrenders of many holdings or portions of holdings due to these factors. An allowance of at least 5 per cent. shall have to be made on these accounts.

It also assumes that the total gross rent rolls are paid into the coffers of the zamindars, readily, by the tenants without any deduction, kist by kist. This estimate totally ignores the litigation expenses, other out of pocket expenses, in the civil courts, and the heavy collection charges. It also, does not take into account the fact of bad debts. At a very moderate estimate, at least 12½ per cent. shall have to be deducted from the gross rent rolls on account of the collection charges, 2½ per cent. on account of the illegal realisations from the landlords' servants by the process-servers of the civil courts and at least 5 per cent. on account of irrecoverable bad debts.

It will thus be seen that much of the estimated increase in rent rolls is imaginary and is based on the assumption that the rents are paid by the tenants, punctually, and without any deduction.

If calculation is made after allowing the deductions mentioned by me, it will be found that the net increase in profits of the innumerable holders of estates and tenures is not more than Rs. 714 lakhs per annum.

A statement of my calculation is given below, for ready reference—

	Rs.	Lakhs.
Gross rent rolls (as per Statement X of the Statistics)	1,264	
Less revenue payable to Government	257	
Nett demand of the landlords	1,007	
Less 5 per cent. on account of diluvion, sand deposits, etc.	50	

	Rs. Lakhs.
Less 15 per cent. on account of collection charges and irrecoverable litigation, etc. ...	155
	802
Less 5 per cent. on account of irrecoverable bad debts	50
	752
Less cesses paid by the landlords from their own pockets under section 41 of the Cess Act ..	41.50
	714

The cess valuation of the khas lands is, in many cases, arbitrary. Waste areas or areas not fit for cultivation have been in some cases assessed at an annual value which they may never fetch. If a proper scrutiny is made, I think, at least 33½ per cent. may have to be deducted from the khas valuation, in many cases.

**Q. 7.** (i) Whatever may be the actual increase in the rent rolls after allowing for the items I have mentioned, the industry, good management, business capacity, prudent and anxious care of the zamindars must be responsible for at least 90 per cent. of this increase.

(ii) As I have pointed out in my answer to the previous question (question No. 6), the independent efforts of the tenants are a negligible factor in this increase, but if an allowance is to be made for their manual labour under the initiative and guidance of the landlords, I think 9.5 per cent. of the increase in valuation may be ascribed to this factor.

(iii) As Statement XVI of the Government statistics goes to show, there has been only an increase of 15.94 lakhs of rupees in the rentals of the permanently settled estates during the 25 years from 1910 to 1935. This statement also shows that the rate of enhancement is gradually on the decline. If out of the rental assets of 11.84 lakhs of rupees there has been an increase of roughly 16 lakhs in course of 25 years, the annual increase in rental would come up to  $10\frac{14}{37}$  pie in the rupee, i.e., less than .054 per cent. On no account, may the increase on this head be more than .5 per cent. according to the Government statistics, at a liberal estimate.

**Q. 8.** Yes, the Permanent Settlement required the zamindars to conduct themselves with moderation and to secure to them the same equity and generous treatment that they were supposed to have

received from the Government. I think they have discharged their obligation faithfully. At a time when land was plenty and a large area remained uncultivated, there was a competition amongst the landlords for tenants and not amongst the tenants for lands. Tenants had to be coveted, and new tenants once introduced into the land had to be fostered with care. It is commonsense that landlords could not but be generous to their tenants under these circumstances.

It is wrong to suppose that the expectation that was made of the zamindars has not been fulfilled. The zamindars must have behaved with moderation and that was the reason why raiyats settled down in the villages and population increased in the first few decades following 1793. Had they oppressed and evicted their tenants, indiscriminately, the lands would have remained uncultivated and increase of the area under cultivation would have been an impossibility.

Q. 9. I have already dealt with this matter in my answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7. A very considerable portion of the improvement of the estates by way of increase of the area under cultivation, and the increase in valuation, must be ascribed to the pioneer zamindars, as I have already pointed out before. The zamindars as a class have not failed to carry out the duties that was imposed on them, by the Permanent Settlement.

#### *Absentee landlordism.*

Much capital has been made of the absenteeism of the landlords in the papers and on the platforms. I beg to submit that it is a meaningless expression, in the case of big zamindars who own 1,000 or more villages in 8 or 10 different districts. It is not physically possible for one man to live in all the different villages, in all the different districts, at the same time. If he is a resident of one village, he must be an absentee landlord in all the other villages unless he manages to tour the innumerable villages throughout the year and passes a few minutes everywhere.

Only a village landlord who owns a handful of villages may stay in one village and move about in the other villages, at his convenience. In the case of big zamindars it is an impossibility. They must remain at the central place whether it be a town or a city or a village and control their affairs from there. Residence in the towns and cities is also sometimes necessary for the education of their children, for the medical aid of their ailing relatives, for association with a cultured society and lastly for being in touch with the Government officials who do not reside in villages.

I do admit that a close touch with the tenants is desirable and it is necessary that the landlords should superintend and supervise their affairs, personally, so far as practicable and inspect their village



properties, whenever possible. It is also desirable that they should be accessible to their tenants whenever the tenants care to visit them.

I must also mention that the railway system in India is indirectly responsible for the absenteeism of the landlords and the continuous exodus of people from villages to towns. Dr. Bently, the late Director of Public Health, Bengal, held that the railways in India have obstructed the natural drainage systems and have been partially responsible in converting healthy villages into hot-beds of malaria and other preventible diseases.

**Q. 10.** In answer to this question, I shall quote the opinion of Mr. R. C. Dutt, I.C.S., who was some time a member of the Board of Revenue, Bengal. Mr. Dutt writes thus in his "Economic History of British India"—"There may be some doubt as to the wisdom of Pitt's Permanent Settlement of the land tax in England; there can be no doubt as to that of Cornwallis' Permanent Settlement; in England the Settlement benefited the landed classes only; in Bengal the Settlement has benefited the whole agricultural community; the entire peasant population shares the benefit and is more prosperous and resourceful on account of this measure. In England, the Settlement limited the tax on one out of the many sources of national income; in Bengal it has afforded a protection to agriculture which is virtually the only means of the nation's subsistence. In England it precluded the State from drawing a large land tax to be spent in the country for the benefit of the nation; in Bengal it has precluded from increasing the annual economic drain of wealth out of the country. In England it saved the landlord class from added taxation; in Bengal it has saved the nation from fatal and disastrous famines."

**Q. 11.** All the grounds enumerated here are fallacious. Prejudice thrives best on ignorance. Uninformed critics have misled the people and have erroneously preached that the abolition of the Permanent Settlement is the panacea for all the evils that a mortal is subject to.

**Q. 11.** (i) I have already shown in my answers to question 7 that the net income intercepted by the long chain of intermediaries between the State and the raiyat cannot on any account be more than 714 lakhs of rupees. It appears from the Statement XI of Government Statistics that there are 61.88 lakhs of tenures and estates in Bengal paying cesses to the Government. Assuming that there are at least three co-sharers in every tenure or estate, the net assets intercepted must have to be distributed amongst 185.64 lakhs of persons. Calculated at this rate, the average income of a zamindar or a tenureholder in Bengal would come up to Rs. 3-13 per annum.

It is also a fact that, ordinarily, about 50 per cent. income from land is appropriated by the tenant.

(ii) It is true that the Permanent Settlement has, of necessity, led to sub-infeudation, which is not an unmixed evil. I maintain that it has led to equitable distribution of the national wealth and prevented the accumulation of agricultural profits in one individual.

(iii) I have shown in my answers to question 7 that the enhancement of rent in the permanently settled areas is a very negligible factor, the total enhancement during 25 years of which statistics have been supplied to me, may be computed at .054 per cent. Even with the little enhancement the average rate of rent in the permanently-settled areas is only Rs. 3 per acre whereas it is Rs. 4-11 per acre in the khas mahal areas (*vide* Statement IX).

(iv) The zamindars have very limited powers of enhancement under the statute. The powers of eviction are also very much restricted under the present Bengal Tenancy Act. The system of overlordship, as it is called, has not led to any harassment. The raiyats under the tenureholders enjoy the same rights and privileges as the direct tenants under the zamindars. Had the zamindars been oppressive, the tenants would have left the permanently settled areas and repaired to the khas mahals, in search of better facilities, if any.

History tells a different story. I beg to submit that the criticism is not justified and is based on ignorance of the actual facts.

**Q. 12.** I do not advocate the abolition of the Permanent Settlement on any of the above grounds. If the Settlement is only permanent in theory but in practice loaded with fresh impositions, every time there is a demand for increased revenue and if the trend of modern tenancy legislation be to put off or abolish the legitimate dues of the landlords and to make it impossible for them to carry on, I do advocate the abolition of the Permanent Settlement, before there is any further depreciation of the properties by fresh impositions.

If the larger interests of the country demand it, or if it be necessary to take away the legal rights of the zamindars guaranteed under the solemn pledges and contracts of the highest authority in India, as a matter of public policy, the zamindars as a class will not stand in the way except in so far as they may claim adequate compensation for the valuable rights they have acquired and the large investments they have made in land, believing in those pledges.

**Q. 13.** I have already shown that the argument rests on a wrong premise. The Permanent Settlement does not involve a loss to the State to the extent of about 75 per cent. of the raiyati assets, as I have already shown in my answers to questions 5, 7 and 11. Admitting that it involves a loss, it is more than compensated by the receipts under other heads of revenue. The Permanent Settlement cannot be regretted

when we consider what difficulties it conquered and what prosperity it had introduced and achieved.

\* I shall again quote from the speech of Dr. Radha Kumud Mukherji, M.A., PH.D., delivered in the Bengal Legislative Council on the 9th February 1938. He said:—"I have also calculated that at present this land system involves fifty seven lakhs of holdings and if you bar out the higher zamindars by this standard that they must have an income of at least Rs. 12,000 per annum, you will find that there are only seven hundred such landlords in the whole of Bengal out of a total population of fifty millions. Therefore they really are a microscopic minority, in the picture. What is of most consequence is that the entire landed interest of the province involves the bulk of its vast population. I have further calculated that a nett income of about ten and a half crores is intercepted by the landlord class while the gross income from land amounts to about fifteen or sixteen crores. If we deduct the charge of collection at 10 per cent., if we deduct cess and land revenue, we find that a nett sum of ten and a half crores has been intercepted by the zamindars. If we take fifty seven lakhs of holdings to be under superior landlords and if we give to a holding at least three co-sharers, we find an income of Rs. 6 per head per such landholder. This system is really supporting about half of Bengal's population. As you know Bengal is still intrinsically the richest province in the whole of India. Her gross revenue is *thirty-eight crores* of rupees, but on account of deductions by the Centre, her residual revenue amounts to about eleven or twelve crores. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intrinsic wealth of Bengal is the highest, on record, in India. Bengal is, artificially, reduced to the condition of the poorest province in India. We have a sore financial quarrel with the Centre always and we must carry on this fight up to the end.

What I am going to say is: how is Bengal so rich? All her wealth comes from her prosperous middle class which is really accountable for her high purchasing power, which again is reflected in the highest income-tax receipts which Bengal pays to the Centre. Bengal, you know, is the richest province in India in regard to the receipts from income-tax. Therefore I say that this purchasing power of Bengal is bound up with the most important industry of Bengal, *viz.*, the land industry, agriculture; so that if we want to rehabilitate agriculture, if we want to set the peasant on his feet again, we must not be carried away by the idea that we can do so by merely depriving another class of its rights. Nothing of the kind, we must make this supreme industry of India more paying, more economical, more yielding of benefits to the rural peasants who have been driven to the verge of starvation, in spite of the fact that on the basis of this industry has been reared up

• prosperous middle class which is paying so much to the revenues of Bengal and to the Federal Government.”

Q. 13. (i) The argument is wrong. If the Permanent Settlement is abolished, the receipts under the following heads of revenue will record a large fall: (a) Stamp duties, (b) Income-tax, (c) Jute tax, (d) Customs and, the land revenue will fall off in years of distress and famine which are very common in a poor country like India.

(ii) This will not be a new adventure. Temporary settlements of estates were tried before 1793 and they dismally failed. Temporary settlement will take away the incentive to improve lands and the summary process of the realisation of the rent and rack-renting will accelerate the progressive pauperization of the country. The income shall be uncertain, and there may be large defalcations by the rent collectors. It will also add to the costs of administration, without any proportionate increase in revenue.

(iii) Land revenue is not to be looked upon as an ordinary mode of taxation. It combines in itself both the characteristics of rent and tax. Taxation on land in India in the shape of land revenue or rent and cesses of different kinds (road and public works cesses, education cess, etc.), has reached its maximum limit. Land is overburdened with too many taxes and any further taxation would make agriculture unremunerative and a losing concern. It will also be a failure as a fiscal policy, as the yield will be comparatively low in proportion to the cost and difficulties involved in ascertaining the income. It is neither administratively feasible, nor practically worth while to impose taxation on agriculture which has ceased to be a paying business in India due to low production, low price of the staple food crops, heavy indebtedness of all those concerned in agriculture and excessive fragmentation. I cannot advocate agricultural income-tax either from a purely fiscal point of view or on the grounds of justice, equity and good conscience. The Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1924-25, in spite of its findings was constrained to report, for practical reasons that the abolition of the exemption of income-tax on agricultural incomes is both “inopportune and undesirable.”

I shall conclude my answer with an extract from the Minute of Lord Cornwallis, dated the 3rd February 1790, when he dealt with this question as Governor-General of India:—

“The supreme power in every State, must possess the right of taxing the subject, agreeably to certain general rules, but the practice which has prevailed in this country for some time past, of making frequent valuations of the land, and where one person's estate has improved, and another's declined, of appropriating the increased produce of the former, to supply the deficiencies of the latter, is not

*taxation, but in fact a declaration*, that the property of the landholder is, at the absolute disposal of the Government. Every man who is acquainted with the causes which operate to impoverish or enrich a country, must be sensible that our Indian territories must continue to decline, as long as the practice is adhered to.

The maxim that equality in taxation is an object of the greatest importance and that in justice, all the subjects of a State should contribute as nearly as possible, in proportion to the income which they enjoy under its protection, does not prove the expediency of varying the demand of Government upon the lands; on the contrary, as we shall find that, in countries in which this maxim is one of the leading principles in the imposition of taxes, the valuation of the land upon which they are levied is never varied.

In raising a revenue to answer the public exigencies, we ought to be careful to interfere, as little as possible, in those sources from which the wealth of the subject is derived.

Agriculture is the principal source of the riches of Bengal, the cultivator of the soil furnishes most of the materials for its numerous manufactures. In proportion as agriculture declines, the quantity of these materials must diminish, and the value of them increases and consequently the manufactures must become dearer, and the demand for them be gradually lessened. Improvement in agriculture will produce opposite effects.

The attention of Government ought therefore to be directed to render the assessment upon the lands, *as little burdensome as possible*: this is to be accomplished only by fixing it. The proprietor will then have some inducement to improve his lands; and as his profits will increase in proportion to his exertions, he will gradually become better able to discharge the public revenue."

**Q. 14.** I do not advocate abolition of the zamindari system on the grounds mentioned in questions 13 (i) and 13 (ii). But if the Permanent Settlement is to be abolished for the reasons mentioned in my answers to question 12, the sooner it is done, the better. Whatever may be the counter-scheme offered by the Government for the amelioration of the condition of the masses, in case of abolition of the Permanent Settlement, adequate compensation must be paid to all the zamindaris and tenureholders. As is done in the case of compulsory land acquisition, full market value assessed at 20 years' valuation of the annual rent roll (as per cess re-valuation figures of the Government) less 10 per cent. collection charges added to which 15 per cent. of the annual value will have to be paid for compulsory acquisition of private property in land. The zamindars and other persons who have acquired zamindari for good consideration have invested large sums of money

in land in good faith, believing in the solemn pledges of the Government. There is no equitable reason why they should not be paid back their good money in case of compulsory acquisition. As the raiyati assets are calculated by the Government at 12 crores of rupees, a sum of 240 crores of rupees may be required to buy up the zamindaris and tenures. If the khas lands of the zamindars and the tenureholders are also to be bought up, a compensation of rupees 320 crores may have to be paid.

The zamindars may also claim a certain price for the unsued arrears of rent and the unrealised decretal dues of rent for which 15 years' purchase value may be paid, on the nett arrears, calculated at 80 per cent. of the outstanding demand.

**Q. 15.** If compensation is paid in bonds and not in cash, I think it may be paid in 5 per cent. income-tax free bonds, redeemable after 20 years. The bonds should be termiable. A moderate yield of 5 per cent. may be asked for in view of the higher prices that must have been paid by many persons in acquiring these zamindaris and also, in consideration of the loss, in social status and prestige that the compulsory acquisition of zamindaris will entail on the present holders.

**Q. 16.** The State purchase of zamindaris will compel the zamindars to curtail or stop the social activities and charities. The middle class, which supplies the strata of educated men, will disappear. The majority of the middle class people live on the profits of land.

**Q. 17.** Yes. In case of State purchase of zamindaris the interest of all the tenureholders between the zamindar and the raiyats should be purchased at 20 years' value calculated on the nett annual rent-roll, less 10 per cent. collection charges.

I am afraid the history of the revenue system of Bengal before 1793 will repeat itself. But the tenureholders being freed from the cares and worries of management and the constant anxiety for raising money to meet their liabilities, will divert their attention to other profitable industries.

**Q. 18.** The additional machinery necessary to carry on the administration will consist of a chain of officers and staff which may cost the Government about 2 crores of rupees.

**Q. 19.** I am afraid the raiyats would not prefer to come under the khas mahal administration of the Government, as the summary process of realisation of revenue and agricultural loans is considered oppressive by the raiyat and the Government is the most successful enhancer of rents. It is also a fact that the average rate of rent is higher in the khas mahal areas than in the permanently settled areas. I am not aware that the tenants in the khas mahal areas enjoy any advantages over or are better off than the tenants in the permanently settled areas.

**Q. 20.** Yes, the subinfeudation has come as an economic necessity after 1793. When the zamindars found the estate too big for them, they sublet it to others and so on. The social and economic condition of the raiyats has not been much affected as they enjoy equal facilities and advantages with the direct raiyats under the zamindars. It has, however, prevented the growth of economic holdings. In some cases, the rate of rent of the under-raiyati holdings is rather high. But the number of under-raiyats is so small that they do not form a class in themselves.

**Q. 21.** With the disappearance of the tenureholders who form the bulk of the middle class, the social and economic activities of the province will be seriously affected. Private charities will disappear and many of the village institutions maintained by the tenureholders, such as schools, dispensaries and places of religious worship may be abolished. The avenues of employment for Indians being very limited many of these dispossessed tenureholders may swell the ranks of the unemployed.

**Q. 22.** In case of State purchase of zamindaris, compensation in the shape of 20 years' price on the annual cess valuation of the khas land of the zamindars and tenureholders should be paid and the khas lands also to be purchased by the Government. The homesteads with existing structures, if any, must be left to them on payment of a fair rent to the Government. The criterion for the zamindars' khas lands shall be their title deeds and possession.

**Q. 23.** A prescriptive right similar in nature to "occupancy right" was supposed to exist and was recognised in favour of the khudkhast raiyat who had cultivated his land for a continuous period of 12 years previous to 1793. No protection from eviction in favour of any other class of raiyat was provided for by the Permanent Settlement Regulations. The "occupancy-right" as such was a creation of the British legislation.

**Q. 24.** I have already dealt with this question in my answer to question 4. "Proprietorship" in the English sense of the term or ownership in land corresponding to that cluster of rights, the highest known to the English Law, namely, "fee-simple" was unknown to India. During the Hindu and Muhammadan periods, even the independent sovereigns never claimed it and the tillers of the soil never dreamt of it.

Whether land revenue is a tax or rent was the subject of considerable controversy for nearly a century and a half and the nature of land revenue in India puzzled the early English administrators for a long time. But it is no longer a live issue. The question is now only of academic interest.

• No doubt there has been divergence of opinion among the English economists and the historians on this point. This question has been thrashed out by the Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1924-25. It is needless to enter into that controversy now.

• Sir Louis Mallet has pointed out that "to treat rent as a tax is to counteract and neutralise the law of supply and demand to renew the demand afresh without increasing the supply and tends directly to a *progressive pauperization of the country and the community.*"

In the Bombay High Court Case of 1875 (*Vyakuntha Bapaj versus The Government of Bombay*, reported in the Bombay High Court Report, Vol. xii, 1875), the learned judges of the High Court, after an elaborate survey and review of the authorities on the subject, have held that "the proprietary right of the sovereign derives no warrant from the ancient laws or institutions of the Hindus and is not recognised by the modern Hindu lawyers as exclusive or incompatible with individual ownership."

"The allegation that the cultivating raiyats have always been the actual proprietors of the soil" is now an exploded theory and it is now too late, in the day, to reassert it.

The misconception is due to the fact that the term "cultivator" in the ancient texts very often meant the actual tiller as well as the landlord or the rent receiver and that in some parts of India, as for instance, in Bundelkhand, the village landlords were the actual cultivators.

In the series of questions put by Sir John Shore to Gholam Hossain Khan, the celebrated author of "*Siyar-ool-Mutakherren*" given in Harrington's Analysis, Vol. III, at page 314, it is reported that the historian demolished all objections that were raised against the proprietary rights of the zamindars and cited some instances where the zamindars succeeded by inheritance without confirmation of the Ruling Power. Gholam Hossain Khan stated "that this has been always the case with the zamindars of Bijapore, Tirhoot, Bettiah, Sirca-Saraun, etc." Gholam Hossain further stated that "the Emperor was proprietor of the revenue but not of the soil, and that if the Emperor wanted lands, he had to purchase it from the zamindars." He gave some such instances.

The following passage occurs in the Minute of the Board of Revenue, Madras, dated the 5th January 1818, which throws light on the subject. "In investigating the rights of the *raiya*s, the Board deem it proper to premise that the term which is familiar to all connected with Indian Finance is here employed by them to distinguish that *particular class among them only who employ, superintend and sometimes assist the labourer and are everywhere the farmers of the country, the creators and the payers of the land revenue.*"



The Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone in his "History of India" at page 72 describes the rights of raiyats in the following lines: "As much of the produce as comes into the hands of the landholders after the King's share is provided, is his; and his power to dispose of his right to it for all future years is unrestrained. The tenant has what remains of the produce after the King's proportion and the landlord's rent is paid; and this he enjoys in perpetuity, but the right is confirmed to himself and his heirs and cannot be otherwise disposed of."

It will thus be seen that the absolute proprietorship of the cultivating raiyats is only in the imagination of the pseudo-politicians.

**Q. 25.** Yes, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1929 gave occupancy-right to a large number of under-raiyats. I am not in favour of maintaining or extending this principle to the case of more than one grade of tenants. In my opinion, occupancy right should only be given to the statutory raiyats and to nobody else. If this right is granted to more than one grade of tenants, it will only help further sub-infeudation. The actual tiller of the soil is very often the day labourer. He neither claims nor is he entitled to any protection from eviction. If the occupancy right are given to actual tillers, in every case, the statutory raiyats will be expropriated and the middle class will vanish.

**Q. 26.** The extension of occupancy right to more than one grade of raiyats will only lead to still further sub-infeudation and add complications to the already complicated land tenure system of Bengal. I do not advocate the principle that the occupancy right should vest in the cultivating raiyats in every case. The further section of the question do not arise.

**Q. 27.** No. Only the khudkhast raiyats occupying lands for 12 years previous to 1793 were protected from eviction. Under Regulation VIII of 1793, no patta of a khudkhast raiyat was to be cancelled except upon proof of collusion. There was also a provision that the rents of the khudkhast raiyats could not be raised, unless the zamindars could prove that they had paid less for those lands during the last three years than the "nirik" of the pargana. Article VII of the Bengal Regulation I of 1793 mentions, "dependent talukdars, raiyats and cultivators of the soil" but not the non-agriculturist tenants. Non-agriculturists were not contemplated by the Permanent Settlement Regulations.

I am in favour of giving occupancy right to such non-agricultural tenants only as have taken leases from landlords, on any such terms or contracts.

**Q. 28.** Not necessarily. Ordinarily the zamindars should have the right to forfeit such leases.

\* The question of State intervention does not arise. So long as the Permanent Settlement stands, the State has absolutely no right to levy any additional tax or rent for conversion of such lands. The zamindar under the Permanent Settlement is entitled to the additional rent or tax, if any, for the conversion of such lands.

In the case of town lands the owner of the building pays municipal taxes for the holding and income-tax for his business profits, if any. If land revenue on the building site converted into non-agricultural purposes is again assessed on the annual value of the land, it will be in the nature of a double assessment.

**Q. 29.** Yes, in some areas the number of bhagechasis may be on the increase, due to the causes mentioned in question 30. Ordinarily the number is steady.

**Q. 30.** I think all the three factors, (i), (ii), (iii) are responsible for the increase, if any, in the number of bhagechasis or adhiars.

**Q. 31.** The area of land normally held by a bhagidar is two or three acres.

No. Ordinarily the bhagidars do not hold lands in raiyati or under-raiyati right.

**Q. 32.** No. The bargadars are practically agricultural labourers and are paid in kind by a share of the produce. They neither claim, nor are entitled to any protection from eviction.

**Q. 33.** Yes. In my humble opinion, the barga system is economically sound. There is no harm in its extension. It provides employment for a section of the landless class.

**Q. 34.** The effect of giving occupancy right to bargadars will be robbing the statutory raiyats of their legal rights and would spell the ruin of the middle class.

Yes. The zamindars and others will keep the khas lands in their direct possession or sell them away. It will throw all the bargadars out of employment.

**Q. 35.** Ordinarily 50 per cent. of the gross produce is paid to the landlords which may be said to be a fair proportion. Custom varies in different areas. If any limit is to be fixed the maximum of the landlords' share may be fixed at 60 per cent. of the gross produce.

**Q. 36.** The wages of agricultural labourers are usually 4 to 5 annas per day in addition to food. They are sometimes better off than the bargadars and under-raiyats.

**Q. 37.** Yes, the Act of 1929 has increased the tendency of passing considerable areas of raiyati holdings to non-agriculturists. The results will certainly be prejudicial to the interests of the cultivating raiyats as a whole. The Tenancy Act of 1938 has made such transfers still more easy and in course of time, the *bona fide* raiyats may cease to hold any agricultural lands whatsoever.

Yes, I am in favour of restricting the transfer to agriculturists only, if practicable, by legislation. The other method is to restore the landlords' fee on transfers which may operate as a check, on easy transfers.

**Q. 38.** In my opinion, the size of an economic holding for cultivation, in the traditional manner, may be fixed at 20 acres. Fragmentation of holdings involves large expenses or costs of cultivation and a comparatively smaller yield. It has been calculated that expenditure of cultivation increases by 5·3 per cent. per every 500 metres of distance for manual labour and ploughing; 32 to 35 per cent. for transport of manure and from 15 to 32 per cent. for the transport of crops.

It entails wastage of labour, time and cattle power and leads to large loss of land owing to boundaries. In the case of fractional holdings intensive cultivation is not possible and introduction of outsiders with more capital is an impossibility.

An "economic holding" no doubt means a holding of which the yield is sufficient to maintain the agriculturist and his family, in reasonable comfort after defraying the costs of cultivation. In the case of cultivation in a more scientific manner with the aid of tractors and other modern implements, I think an agricultural holding should comprise at least 500 acres of land.

**Q. 39.** Yes, unfortunately, it is a fact. The laws of inheritance, the statutory rights of easy transfers and subdivision, the increase of population will, of necessity, lead to further subdivision and fragmentation of holdings.

The average unit of a raiyati holding for 10 districts has been calculated as 1·94 acres in which there are at least 5 co-sharers.

**Q. 40.** It is a difficult problem. This may only be practicable by acquisition of small holdings on co-operative basis and making the individual raiyats shareholders, in the society.

**Q. 41.** Yes, "reserve bidding" as in the case of partition of estates may be provided for to help the cultivator to consolidate his holdings.

The Bengal Land Improvement Act may be amended so as to provide for loans for these purposes.

**Q. 42.** The question is problematical. It cuts both ways. Accumulation of large areas in one particular hand may make the holding economic, at the same time it may deprive others of their holdings. The law of demand and supply must operate. I do not consider it desirable to place any limitation by legislation on the accumulation of holdings.

**Q. 43.** Yes, coparcenary is detrimental to good cultivation. The appointment of a common manager may minimise some of the evils but it has its disadvantages also. The co-sharer common manager may try to cheat the smaller holders and refuse to render accounts. The law of inheritance shall have to be changed to deal properly with this question.

**Q. 44.** Practically nothing, unless the Hindu and Muhammedan laws of inheritance are changed and the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1938 is amended so as to restrict easy transfers and to check fragmentation.

The method of buying up coparcenary property on co-operative basis and allotting shares to individual holders may be tried, if possible.

**Q. 45.** The law is there already. Section 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1938, provides for the appointment of a common manager, under certain circumstances.

**Q. 46.** Yes, the Permanent Settlement of 1793 was a device to exact the maximum possible revenue out of the ascertained assets at that time, with the least possible inconvenience to the Government. Even, to-day, nobody can enter on any business on such a small margin of profit. The zamindars were caught in the trap and are now paying the penalty of their folly by the development of subsequent events.

In order to show what was in the minds of the framers of Permanent Settlement, I quote below an extract from the Minute of Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General of India, dated the 3rd February 1790, “\* \* \*

“\* for so long as we profess to leave to the zamindars no more than that proportion of the produce which they generally receive from the raiyats and claim a right to appropriate the excess to the public use, from what fund are they to make good the losses they suffer, in years of distress and failure of crops? \* \* \* We may reasonably expect that they will provide for occasional losses from the profits of the favourable seasons.”

The preamble to Regulation XLIV of 1793 runs as follows:—“It is essential \* \* \* that the proprietors of land should have a discretionary power to fix the revenue payable by their dependent taluqdars and to grant leases or to fix rents of those lands for a term sufficient to induce the dependent taluqdars, under-farmers and raiyats, to extend and improve the cultivation of their lands.”

The following extract from the Despatches of the Board of Directors will go to show that it was contemplated by the framers of the Permanent Settlement that the zamindars would increase their income by reclaiming waste lands and by enhancing the existing rents.

The Board of Directors wrote to the Government of Bengal in their letter, dated the 15th of January 1812, "the Permanent Settlement has secured to the proprietors of the estates, the whole of a *rise in their rentals.*"

Again in the year 1815, the Board of Directors wrote as follows—"the effect of the Permanent Settlement on lands, such as has been established, in the Lower Provinces of Bengal is to *augment the landlords' rent.*"

Sir Edward Colebrooke held, in his Minute, that under the Permanent Settlement the zamindar had the power of fixing his rents, in his own discretion.

**Q. 47.** No, that is a wrong notion, as the purport of the Regulations and the intention of the Government discoverable from what the Government did and allowed the landlords to do, will go to show.

The language of the kabuliyat or engagement for the Permanent Settlement runs thus:—"I will not demand any sum *beyond account* from the raiyats." This only refers to abwabs or cesses above the agreed rent. As I have shown in my answers to question 46, the preamble to Regulation XLIV of 1793 goes to show that the enhancement of rents other than those of the raiyats that were *expressly protected* from increase was clearly contemplated.

Colonel Munro writing in 1806 observed: "I suppose that the zamindars of Bengal are to be at liberty to raise their rents, like land-owners in other countries; for if they are restricted from raising the assessment by the Government and at the same time are liable for all losses, they have not the free management of their estates and hardly deserve the name of owners."

The Regulation further says: "that the Permanent Settlement fixed the public demand of the whole estate and left the proprietor to appropriate to his own use, the difference between the value of the proportion of the produce payable to the State and the sum payable to the public." It is certainly beyond controversy that the value of the certain proportion of the annual produce to which the Government was supposed to be entitled, was never fixed and definite, the difference between the indefinite quantity and the definite demand must have been indefinite and the authors of the Permanent Settlement must have known this. They must have known that the zamindar's income under the Permanent Settlement was indefinite, variable and subject to increase or decrease.

In order to discover the intention of the parties to an instrument, we may properly see what they have done under it. If we find that the zamindars, immediately after the conclusion of the Permanent Settlement, enhanced the rents of the raiyats, and the Board of Directors and the Government of India, not only took no steps to prevent it, but practically aided it by subsequent legislation and the Government itself in private estates under management of the Court of Wards enhanced rents and *enhanced them more determinedly and effectually than private proprietors did or could*, we may reasonably conclude that this enhancement was intended at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The Government is a *corporation having perpetual continuance*. Government itself was and is the most successful enhancer of rents.

**Q. 48.** I have already dealt with these matters, at some details, in my answers to questions 46 and 47: The only tenures of which rent was fixed in perpetuity were mokarraridars and istemraridars who had held (a) at a fixed rent for more than 12 years prior to 1793, or (b) contracted for payment, at a fixed rent, with the zamindar or actual proprietor. The second class of tenureholders were not protected in the case of revenue sales under Act XI of 1859, unless they had their interest registered in the special register or common register.

The khudkhaast raiyat was protected from eviction under certain circumstances as I have already shown. Other tenancies existing at the time of the Permanent Settlement were not protected by the Bengal Regulations—

- (a) The terms of the Permanent Settlement Regulations;
- (b) The Bengal Regulations that followed;
- (c) The Acts and declarations of the authorities prior to the Rent Act of 1859 prove my contention.

In this connection I quote an extract from a judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council which is relevant to the point.

*Privy Council (Radhika Choudhurani vs. Bumasundari Dasi, 13 Moore's Indian Appeals, page 248).*

"A suit to enhance proceeds on the presumption that the zamindar holding under the Perpetual Settlement has a right from time to time to raise the rents of all rent-paying lands within his zamindari according to the pargana or current rates, unless he be either precluded from the exercise of that right either by a contract or the lands can be brought within one of the exemptions recognised by the Permanent Settlement of 1793. *The right of the zamindar to enhance rent is presumable until the contrary is shown.*"

**Q. 48.** (d) The Rent Act of 1859 and the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 went beyond the intentions of the framers of the Permanent Settlement. This was the opinion held by an eminent Jurist,—I mean Chief Justice Sir Barnes Peacock who in the dissentient judgment in the Great Rent Case of 1865 (*Thakurane Dassi vs. Biseshwar Mukherji*, 3 W.R. Act X, Ruling, p. 29) held “By the terms of the Permanent Settlement Government pledged themselves to the zamindars that they were to have the full benefit of the assessments having been made permanent. To hold that the landowners are not fairly and equitably entitled to receive from the raiyats since the Permanent Settlement, as much as they would have done if the assessment had not been made permanent and the land had been re-assessed is, in my opinion, to put such a construction upon Act X of 1859 as to render it a *violation of the pledge* made by Government to the zamindars, at the time of the Permanent Settlement, for there is no doubt, in my mind, that to give the landholder the full benefit of that engagement, they ought to be allowed to collect as much from the land and to enjoy as large a portion of the nett produce, without an increase of the assessment, as they would have done if the Settlement had not been made permanent and the landlords had been re-assessed in fact, they were to have full benefit of the assessment being fixed *for ever*, instead of being subject to have it increased, in proportion as the value of the land increased” (at page 115 of the judgment).

And, again, with an indignation which a judicial mind alone can feel, at the wanton invasion of the rights of others, Sir Barnes Peacock observes at pages 117-118 of the judgment “to raise the status of the raiyat, and instead of leaving him as an agricultural labourer without capital or property, to convert him into a co-proprietor, with interest equal to or greater than those of the zamindars, would doubtless be very benevolent, if one were to do so, *at his own expense*. But, for the legislature by sacrificing the rights of the zamindar would, as it appears to me, far from being fair and equitable be *an act of the greatest injustice*”—and he goes on to say “on the contrary I should consider that I was holding that the legislature, in passing the Act of 1859 had *violated the engagement* which the Government made with the zamindars, at the time of the Permanent Settlement and had exercised a power which Government stated no longer existed, when in *Regulation II of 1793*, they declared in the most emphatic language that “No power would then exist in this country by which the rights vested in the landholders by the Regulations could be infringed or the *value of the landed property effected*, that land must in consequence become the most desirable of all property and the industry of the people would be directed to those improvements in agriculture which were as essential to their own welfare as to the prosperity of the State.”

**Q. 48.** (e) This is the fallacy which does not stand a moment's scrutiny. I have already shown in my answers above that the declarations contained in the Minute of Lord Cornwallis, dated the 3rd February 1790, the letters and despatches of the Board of Directors, the opinion of the contemporary writers on the Land Tenure System of Bengal, all go to show that the rents of the raiyats were not made unalterable, and the enhancement of rents by the zamindars was clearly contemplated.

It will, perhaps, appear to persons of ordinary intelligence impossible to argue, in the face of the texts and authorities I have cited, that the authors of the Permanent Settlement intended to fix the demand upon the cultivators or the rents of the raiyats.

**Q. 49.** The argument rests on a false premise. I have already shown in my answers to questions 46, 47 and 48 that it was not the intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement that the rents of the tenants, then existing, should never be increased.

There is no case absolutely either on historical or economic grounds, to reduce the rents of the raiyats to the rates prevailing, at the time of the Permanent Settlement. It is nowhere said in the Bengal Regulations or in the despatches of the then Governor-General that the rents of the raiyats were fixed for ever, excepting in the case of the two kinds of tenures mentioned above. A cursory glance at the price lists of the staple food crops from 1897 to 1926 will convince all critics that the slight increase in rent is justified.

In the 22 years following the Permanent Settlement almost half of the landed property in the province was transferred by public sale and it is impossible to trace the prevailing rate of 1793 or successors in interests of tenants existing at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 50.** I have already shown in my answers above that it was not the intention that the rents of either class of raiyats should remain unalterable. On the contrary, the Rent Act of 1859 and all tenancy legislations that followed rather violated the pledges of 1793 and ignored the interests of the landlords.

I have quoted above the remarks of Chief Justice Sir Barnes Peacock in the Great Rent Case to show that the Rent Act of 1859 violated the covenants of 1793 and barred the enhancement of a certain class of raiyats. I beg to submit that this was the first inroad into the rights of the zamindars.

**Q. 51.** No, it was not the intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement that future settlements of waste lands were to be made, at the pargana rates.



It is apparent from the "Bengal Regulations themselves. The preamble to the Regulation XLIV of 1793 shows that "the proprietors of land should have a *discretionary power* to fix the revenue payable by their dependant talukdars." Section 52 of the Regulation VIII of 1793 runs thus—"the zamindar is to let the remaining lands of his estate or zamindari in *whatever manner* he may think proper."

**Q. 52.** There cannot be any hard and fast rule for determining fair and equitable rent. It must vary according to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Collector of Rajshahi rightly observed—in his report—"the infinite varieties of soil and the further variations of value from local circumstances are absolutely beyond the investigation or almost the comprehension not merely of a Collector, but of any man who has not made it the business of his life."

This question was thrashed out by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court who tried the Great Rent Case of 1865.

**Q. 52.** (i) This is one of the definitions of economic rent. If literally followed this may lead to rack-renting. The new rent must be lower than a full rack-rent as the old rent was lower than the full rack-rent. The prevailing rate payable by the same class of raiyats, for lands of a similar description, with similar advantages, in the neighbourhood may be taken into consideration. The learned Judges in the above case held that the most equitable thing would be to give the land-owner  $\frac{3}{4}$ ths and the tenant  $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the nett increase.

(ii) Yes, this is another version of economic rent, It is perhaps more reasonable.

(iii) Yes, this may be a disadvantage in the case of the poorer lands, but a gain in the case of the better class of lands.

(iv) This is another principle which may be tried in some cases.

(v) Custom has been the most important factor in the determination of rents in Bengal. Uncertain and variable though this item is, according to the demand for the produce grown and the nature of the soil in different localities, it is not unfair as a guiding principle in the determination of rents. The rent to be fixed must bear the same proportion to the present gross value of the produce as the old rent did to the former gross value of the produce.

(vi) Where land is fully developed and there are moneyed men in the locality, and the pressure of population on the soil high, competition comes in as a factor in the determination of fair rents. It is to be considered along with other circumstances.

**Q. 53.** I have no personal knowledge of the state of affairs in the Government estates. Regarding the permanently settled estates I may

say that all the principles or most of them enumerated above must have been at work in the determination of the present rents paid by the cultivators. I do not think that the majority of rents may be described as lump rents.

- It is difficult to assess the extent to which these principles have come into play in the determination of rents. I think (a) custom, (c) consideration of the productivity of the land, these two factors must have been initially at work in the determination of rents.

• The second factor (b) competition, came in at a later stage, with the growth of population and the increase of demand for land.

Yes, it is true that the rates differ greatly for lands of similar description in different localities, according to the variations of demand for land and the nature of the produce grown. Generally, the rates for a similar class of land do not vary in the same village.

**Q. 54.** Unfortunately this may happen in some cases, as the poorer tenants being unable to purchase the better class of land or to make any capital outlay for the better mode of cultivation, may take lease only of the inferior qualities of land. The rent of the inferior qualities of land may appear to them to be proportionately a little higher, in view of the low yield of those lands. Such tenants do not usually pay any premium or salami to the landlord at the time of the settlement.

• **Q. 55.** Even if all the zamindars and middlemen are removed, re-adjusting of rent on a uniform basis throughout the province is an impossibility. Rates must vary in different localities for the same class of land according to custom, competition, price levels, nature of produce grown, etc. No new record of rights is necessary.

**Q. 56.** If a definite share of the produce or its equivalent in cash is paid, I would recommend 60 per cent. of the gross produce, for payment to the existing landlord or the State, as the case may be.

**Q. 57.** If the State limits its demand in perpetuity not only in theory but in practice and ceases to impose fresh taxation by way of road and public works cesses, education cess, agricultural income-tax, death duties on succession to landed properties, etc., the necessity for enhancing the rents of raiyats would cease. In that case, I think the rents of raiyats now determined on the above or any other principle may be fixed in perpetuity.

It is not desirable to vary the land revenue according to the varying needs of the State as was very pertinently pointed out by Lord Cornwallis in his Minute, dated the 3rd February 1790, which I have quoted in my answers to question 13 (iii). Land revenue is not to be looked upon as an ordinary mode of taxation, be it called rent or tax

or by whatever name, its variation shakes the foundation of settled government. If the Government ceases to make any further imposition of tax and withdraws the assessment of education cess which the land is unable to bear, I think the necessity for re-examination of the rates of rent of the raiyats, from time to time, would cease.

Otherwise the rates of rent of the raiyats will have to be re-examined every 15 years, as now.

**Q. 58.** I do not think there would be any advantage in the substitution of an income-tax on the profits from agriculture in place of rent. It will only reduce everything to a temporary expediency and destroy all enlarged views of improvement. It will reduce the State to a tax-collector only and will keep it engaged perpetually in the degrading struggle for taxes and still higher taxes. The Government will have no leisure to turn its cares to the other functions of a Sovereign Power—I mean the improvement in the sanitary and economic condition of the people.

It will make the method of collection more cumbrous and still more complicated. Considering the involved condition of the petty agriculturist, I think a minimum income of at least Rs. 500 from agriculture will have to be exempted from income-tax in case it is substituted for rent. A large proportion of land in Bengal may consequently escape payment of revenue or income-tax.

**Q. 59.** If there is any defect in the principles or the procedure for fixing fair rents, it is on the side of leniency. I think the procedure for fixing the fair and equitable rents and for enhancing rents under the Bengal Tenancy Act is very rigid and needs no modification.

**Q. 60.** No, I do not object to the enhancement of rent as a result of fluvial action. Even fluvial action has to be paid for in these days. The landlords pay the canal rates and rather high rates, where there are irrigation facilities. It is only fair that rent of the raiyat should be enhanced in such cases according to law. It is also equitable because the tenant has the corresponding relief under section 38 of the Bengal Tenancy Act by way of reduction of rent where the soil permanently deteriorates by deposit of sand or otherwise.

**Q. 61.** No, I do not object to the limited enhancement of rent, on the ground of a rise in prices, as the landlord has a share in the produce and has to pay increased indirect taxation on account of rising prices.

It is, also, common sense that the landlord should make good his loss in the years of depression by sharing a part of the profits, in the years of agricultural prosperity.

Moreover it must be borne in mind that the raiyat has the corresponding relief under section 38 (i) (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act for reduction of rent where there is a fall in the average local prices of staple food crops.

**Q. 62.** This practically makes no difference. But the fact may be taken into consideration in fixing the rate of enhancement.

**Q. 63.** The term "prevailing rate" is a very vague and ambiguous expression as it is an uncertain and variable item. It is difficult to ascertain this as the same class of land under similar conditions may command different rates of rent in different localities, according to custom, competition and the nature of the produce grown.

I do not object to the enhancement of rent on this ground, in principle, but all other factors must be taken into consideration.

Salami or premium paid to the landlord is not an advance payment of rent. It represents the difference in income to the landlord from khas possession of the land and income from possession through a tenant, and the improved market value of the land.

**Q. 64.** Section 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides against high contractual rents. The limitation of rents for new settlements is economically and fiscally unsound.

**Q. 65.** The time limit for applications under sections 105 and 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act may be extended to 6 months.

**Q. 66.** I do not know of any such case.

**Q. 67.** Yes, I think that is the object.

**Q. 68.** I do not know of any.

**Q. 69.** If the Government enhanced rent of any raiyat during the years when prices were steadily going down and had gone down lower than the average prices of the staple food crops during the currency of the present rent, it would be a mistake. Such cases will naturally cause hardship to the tenants.

**Q. 70.** The law of demand and supply operates. The rates may vary according to the presence or otherwise of moneyed men in the locality and also, according to custom, competition and the nature of the produce grown.

I am not aware of any such case, where the Government has granted substantial remission of land revenue, in the permanently settled areas, in the years of distress and famine on the conditions mentioned, in the first part of the question.

Yes, remissions of revenue are very rarely granted. The reasons set forth by the Government are that the distress is not sufficiently acute and that remission of land revenue would paralyse the normal administration of the Government. A more liberal policy may be followed.

**Q. 72.** The average yield and cost of cultivation per acre of staple food crops varies according to local conditions. No uniform average for all areas is possible.

If, however, any empirical average yield and cost of cultivation per acre of jute, paddy and sugarcane are to be given, I would give the following figures collected from the Government statistics:—

	Paddy.		Jute.		Sugarcane.	
	Rs.	a.	Rs.	a.	Rs.	a.
Yield price	...	...	36	6	73	0
Cost of cultivation	...	...	22	0	60	0
					185	0

**Q. 73.** Yes, the absence of modern scientific methods, want of manure and fertilisers, all these factors set the law of diminishing returns in operation. The steps taken by Government for improving the methods of cultivation are inadequate and do not reach the countryside.

**Q. 74.** The Bengal Land Improvement Act does not provide for loans for redemption of old debts or for consolidation of holdings. The Acts mentioned in the question are not availed of because of the alleged out-of-pocket expenses involved in getting a loan sanctioned, the summary process of realisation and the very short-term instalments that are adopted, under these Acts. The provisions for improvement under the Bengal Development Act of 1935 are penal and have proved a failure. The estimate of the increased outturn is arbitrary and is probably based on the yield of the best land calculated at the highest rate of the produce. The irrigation projects in the Burdwan division will fail, unless the canal rates are reduced.

**Q. 75.** Yes, probably because the areas are now fully developed.

**Q. 76.** I have been informed that salami is realised by Government nowadays. I am not aware that any portion of the salami is utilised in improving the agricultural condition of those lands.

**Q. 77.** The late Mr. R. C. Dutt, I.C.S., sometime a member of the Board of Revenue, Bengal, held that over-assessment of the raiyats in the raiyatwari areas is a contributory cause of the distress of the agriculturists in those areas. The taxation on land, if increased any further, will only lead to the impoverishment and ruin of the people.

\* The Permanent Settlement is by no means the cause of the present uneconomic condition of the raiyats. The evils of low production, heavy indebtedness and excessive fragmentation of the holdings may be attributed to the antiquated modes of cultivation, want of manure, the laws of inheritance, want of thrifty habits, pressure of population on the land, paucity of alternative employments and chiefly to the abnormal fall in the price of staple food crops. According to some economists, the present rate of exchange which has increased the purchasing power of rupee, in foreign currency, tends to produce an adverse balance of trade by reducing exports and increasing imports.

The Permanent Settlement may have been responsible for some amount of sub-infeudation but that is not an unmixed evil. Unless the laws of inheritance are changed and the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1938 is amended, the establishment of economic holdings is only a dream.

**Q. 78.** Assuming an agricultural family to consist of 5 members, the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee of 1929-30 estimated the average income of a raiyat (a) from his holding at Rs. 16 per annum, (b) from subsidiary occupation at Rs. 8-8 per annum.

The village life in India being very simple, the majority of the agriculturists, if they are thrifty and if they curtail the expenses on social and religious ceremonies, may maintain themselves and their family from the income of agriculture, provided the Government takes steps to fix a minimum remunerative price for the staple food crops.

**Q. 79.** Yes, I think it is satisfactory.

The method, in vogue, in the United Provinces may be tried provided it does not entail any additional cost on the persons interested in land. I do not think it will lead to any advantage.

**Q. 80.** This is a question which vitally interests the tenants and landlords alike. I have already dealt with some of the suggested methods in my answers to the previous questions. The methods mentioned in the question and a few others may be tried for improving the income of the agriculturists or the cultivating raiyats. I shall deal with the proposed methods, one by one.

**Q. 80.** (i) The law of diminishing returns operates on land more quickly unless cow-dung manures and fertilisers are applied to the fields properly. The use of cow-dung as a fuel is a wasteful practice and reduces the supply of manures. The possibilities of afforestation for increasing fuel supplies may be explored. The sweepings of the households may be thrown into pits and conserved for purposes of manure. The cultivation of leguminous crops, and the rotation of crops are also methods of improving the fertility of the soil.

The primitive plough may also be modernised. Dr. Clouston suggests that the M. S. N. Plough is only 34 lbs. in weight and can be drawn by a pair of bullocks. The agricultural officers are practically useless to the villagers as their knowledge and learning are confined to themselves and are reserved for submitting reports to the higher authorities. The villagers hardly get any benefit of the erudition and learning of the District Agricultural Officers.

(ii) Yes, the provision of subsidiary occupation for the agriculturists during the off season is very much desirable. Hand-spinning of yarn, weaving, construction of cane chairs and other handicrafts and cottage industries may be encouraged.

(iii) In Japan, rearing of silk worms is an important subsidiary rural industry. In France, Germany and Italy, dairy farming, rearing of pigs, poultry farming are important supplementary industries.

The sale of cocoanuts, betel-nuts and other fruits may be suggested. In Malda, Rajshahi, Birbhum and Murshidabad, seri-culture and cultivation of lac may be encouraged. The rearing of goats and sheep is a paying industry. In eastern Bengal, service as boatmen is, also, an important subsidiary occupation.

(iv) The development of collective or co-operative farms is a crying need. The co-operative societies have made very little headway in this direction. The co-operative credit system is extremely meagre and inadequate to meet the needs of the agriculturists. The establishment of co-operative farms may help the growth of economic holdings to some extent.

The absence of proper marketing facilities prevents the agriculturists from obtaining full value for his produce. A large proportion of the value of agricultural produce is intercepted by middlemen, who intervene between the agriculturists in the field and the consumers in large towns or cities. In order to eliminate or minimise the middleman's profit, it is necessary to improve the village roads and to link up the villages with big towns and important trade centres. Construction of central granaries, in every district, or subdivision for storage purposes may also be necessary. The urgent necessity is to construct motorable roads reaching up to the villages so that they may be in closer touch with the towns.

(v) The poor quality of Indian cattle was commented on by the Indian Agricultural Commission. There can be no doubt that the improvement of the breed of cattle is an urgent necessity. This again depends on an adequate supply of fodder. The available grazing fields are not sufficient for the purpose.

• It appears, however, that out of a total cultivated area of 28.9 million acres of land in Bengal only about 6.1 million acres are cropped more than once. As an alternative method, it may be suggested that the 22.8 million acres of land which yield a single crop only and remain fallow for a number of months in the year may be utilised for the growth of fodder or any kind of pulses.

Otherwise provision of adequate fields is not possible.

The chief factor of the economic distress of raiyats, however, has been lost sight of. All other methods will fail unless *immediate steps* are taken to fix a minimum remunerative price for jute and the staple food crops, by imposing import duties on foreign imports, restricting the area under cultivation or otherwise. Unless this is done all schemes will end in theories only.

**Q. 81.** The pressure of population on land is no doubt one of the factors but I do not consider it to be the chief factor for the poverty of the agriculturists. I regret I cannot assess the percentage of population that is considered surplus in respect of the agricultural needs of the country.

As I have already explained above, low yield, heavy indebtedness, excessive fragmentation of holdings are the symptoms of a disease the causes of which are to be found in the paucity of alternative employments, the laws of inheritance, the attachment of the people to the soil and to agriculture which yields diminishing returns as years pass on, as also according to some economists to the present *rate of exchange* which tends to produce an adverse balance of trade.

Japan by her methods of intensive cultivation and improvement of agriculture can maintain comfortably 56 millions of people on a cultivated area of 17 millions of acre but in India a total cultivated area of 28.9 million acres of land is considered inadequate to maintain 34.2 millions of people who live on agriculture. It is a problem which economists and politicians may very well ponder over.

Poverty of the masses in India is appalling and the low *per capita* income of Indians is, also, no less striking. Lord Curzon in his budget speech calculated the average income per inhabitant of British India at Rs. 30 per annum. The Indian Statutory Commission reporting in May 1930 held that since the beginning of the century, the purchasing value of rupee had fallen by 100 per cent. and even at the most optimistic estimate the average income of Indians per head in 1922 was equivalent at the prevailing rate of exchange to less than £8 while the corresponding figure for Great Britain was £95.

**Q. 82.** The starting of Government-aided factories or joint-stock private or public companies may divert the surplus agricultural population to large industries.



Late marriages, birth restriction, emigration, intensive system of cultivation are the other suggested means for reducing the pressure of population on land.

**Q. 83.** Co-operative credit facilities are to be extended. The Government organisation for agricultural credit is extremely meagre and cannot meet the requirements.

The arbitrary activities of the Debt Conciliation Boards have dried up the little agricultural credit that was available in the villages. If creditors are harassed in the realisation of their good money and their legitimate demands decreed by civil courts are reduced or cancelled by the Debt Conciliation Boards, at their pleasure, no creditor in his senses will lend money to agriculturists again. It is true that the rates of interest charged by the village moneylenders and the various loan offices are sometimes very high and the interest rate varies on secured loans from 18½ per cent. to 37½ per cent. and on unsecured loans the rate of interest is sometimes 300 per cent. according to the report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee of 1929-30. But there is no help for it. Unless the Government sets up any alternative system of finance, providing loans on easier terms, reduction or cancellation of the existing debts will not solve the problem.

**Q. 84.** I have already dealt with this question in my answers to question 83. The estimate that 25 per cent. of the gross produce of agricultural lands goes to the mahajan may be correct.

But reduction or cancellation of debts will not induce creditors to lend money to agriculturists on easier terms. It will only drive capital away from agriculture to other profitable industries. There is no way of hope for the agriculturists unless the Government is in a position to set up an alternative form of agricultural finance. Reformers may talk with complacent benevolence on paper, but that will not help the raiyats, in any way.

**Q. 85.** The co-operative credit societies of Bengal have not touched the fringe of the colossal problem of agricultural indebtedness. The total agricultural debts of Bengal have been estimated at over Rs. 100 crores but the loans supplied by the co-operative societies amount to a little over Rs. 4½ crores only.

If 6½ per cent. per annum be considered a fair rate of interest for arrears of rent, I do not see why the co-operative village societies should be allowed to charge 12½ per cent. interest on long-term loans and rupees 9/6 per cent. on short-term loans. This rate of interest must be reduced to make the society more popular. The reasons why these

societies are not popular are that the rate of interest is high, agriculturists generally have no valuable security to offer and solvent agriculturists are naturally unwilling to join hands with their insolvent brethren.

I have calculated that only about 85 per cent. of the agriculturists are members of the co-operative societies. The Burdwan district figures show that no co-operative society has, so far, succeeded in wiping out the debts of its members. The percentage is almost nil.

**Q. 86.** No law, which is unduly severe to one class of people can, in the long run, benefit the other class for whose welfare it is intended. Interests of creditors and debtors alike should have been equally safeguarded by any Act which intended to improve agricultural credit. But, any reasonable consideration for the interests of the landlords and creditors is only conspicuous by its absence in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act of 1935. I cannot but admire the destructive genius of the framers of this Act who have spared no pains to dry up agricultural credit, altogether, and to push on the agriculturists to the verge of starvation and ruin.

This Act, I am sure, will complete the progressive pauperisation of the agricultural community. Section 15 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act seems to imply that the object of this short-sighted Act is to help amicable settlement of debts, but it is only an eyewash. A cursory glance at section 21 of the Act would convince any unbiassed critic that the Debt Boards have been armed with very large and arbitrary powers to force their awards, however unfair, on the unwilling landlords and creditors. The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Amendment Bill of 1939 aims at tightening the noose round the necks of the landlords and the creditors. If this bill is passed into law, it will be impossible for the landlords and creditors to carry on their business.

The definitions of "agriculture" and "debtor" under the Act are so delightfully vague that anybody and everybody, whatever his profession or income from other sources, may take shelter under the Act, if he so chooses. So far as I know, the Debt Boards, ordinary or special, have been very liberal in the interpretation of the term "debtor" and they have entertained applications from persons whose income from other sources is a considerable amount. It is desirable to amend the definition of the term "debtor" so as to exclude non-agriculturists. Orders under section 20 of the Act should also be made liable to be set aside on appeals to the civil courts. Provisions for appeals or revision applications to the Subdivisional Officers have proved to be practically useless.

Section 8 of the Act fixes the jurisdictions of these applications with the Boards established within the local jurisdiction of the debtors' residence. This causes very great hardship to the creditors and landlords as they have to send numerous agents to different outlying places to attend to these cases. I think this section ought to be amended so as to fix the jurisdiction of applications under the Act within the local jurisdictions of the holdings concerned or places where monetary transactions are completed.

Section 32 of the Act only provides for stay of proceedings before the Debt Boards but does not fix any *time limit* for the debtor to apply to the civil court for setting aside the *ex parte* decree, so that the landlord or the creditor is left without any relief so long as the debtor chooses to do nothing, in the matter. A time limit of 30 days should be made for such applications, failing which the applications shall stand dismissed under section 17 of the Act.

The powers given to the Debt Boards under section 19 of the Act to settle debts irrespective of the decrees of the civil courts are arbitrary and liable to be abused. These powers should be withdrawn.

The imposition of double court-fees under rules 136 and 139 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act are productive of extreme hardship to the landlords who have already paid court-fees in the civil courts. These rules should be withdrawn or cancelled.

Landlords are not jugglers. They cannot produce something out of nothing. If the landlords are to receive rents from the raiyats in 10 or 20 years according to the awards of the Debt Boards it is perhaps too much to expect that the landlords would be able to meet their revenue engagements punctually, every three months, and to pay the pattani rents to the superior landlords, every six months. It is asking them to do an impossible thing. It looks like drawing water from a tank of which the source of supply has been shut up. The Act has no doubt been fashioned, with great care, as a contrivance to devise the shortest cut to the ruin and extermination of the landlords.

If a business man has been imprudent enough to supply any building materials to a so-called agriculturist, he may find, one fine morning, that his bill for materials has been cut down by half and that he has been asked to receive the other half in 20 years instalments by the wise judges of the Debt Settlement Boards. It does not matter whether the business man had to wind up his business or seek relief in the Insolvency Court. That concerns nobody. The agriculturist is saved. That is all.

I shall conclude my remarks with a quotation from the Durbar speech of Mr. H. P. V. Townend, C.I.E., I.C.S., the Commissioner of

the Burdwan Division, who was constrained to set forth some of the abuses of the Act, in the interest of justice and public good.

"There are tendencies," says he, "developing which threaten to lose more ground than work for village uplift can possibly gain. These tendencies are two in number—and they are symptoms of one disease which, at bottom, is nothing more or less than *dishonesty*—a tendency to defraud landholders by withholding rent and a tendency to defraud creditors by withholding payment of debts."

"I need hardly say that the tendency to defraud is bound up with the working of the Agricultural Debtors Act. A great part of the troubles of the creditors is due to the two facts that proceedings in the civil courts are stayed until applications have been disposed of and that applications have been coming in faster than Boards could be formed to deal with them. For this the debtors are not responsible. But many applications have come from people whose chief object is to *delay payment* and who have no real intention of settling their debts. These debtors behave as if the main object of the Act was to delay payment, but its object was to make it easy for debtors and creditors after amicable discussion to settle terms."

"It provides that the applications of those who seek to make dishonest use of its provisions should be dismissed and steps will be taken to see that this is done."

"But apart from this, attempts to misuse the Acts are recoiling on the heads of borrowers generally."

"Two things are certain: one that the Government cannot possibly undertake to finance all the cultivators and the other that *dishonest tactics* will be an obstacle to the setting up of any alternative form of finance through co-operative societies or mortgage banks."

Mr. Townend also pointed out the *widespread nature* of the tendency to withhold payment of rent. His comments on the causes of such tendency are also instructive. He says—"It is interesting to speculate why this tendency to refuse rents has grown up. Undoubtedly it has its origin in the irresponsible electioneering speeches made by candidates of all parties, who sought election to the Legislature early last year. To get the cultivators' votes they spoke as if the *interest of the cultivators alone* would be considered in future. There was a talk of abolition of the Permanent Settlement, which was understood to mean the abolition of all tenures, and everything possible was done to *arouse discontent and to inflate expectations*."

“Even from the point of view of the most drastic of reformers, mere refusal to pay rent is an *impossible policy*. However bad in their opinion the existing system is, it is only common sense to adhere to it until a new system has been evolved to take its place. The alternative would be *anarchy* which no Government could tolerate. For the present the rents are legally payable and must be paid.”

The learned Commissioner has thought it fit to sound this note of warning to stop the abuses of the Act.

As doubts have arisen as to whether the costs incurred by a landlord or a creditor, in a pending suit in the civil court would come under the definition of “debt” under section 2, sub-section 8 of the Act, it is desirable that this section should be so amended as to eliminate the ambiguity and to include, specifically, the costs incurred by the landlord or the creditor in a pending suit. These court costs should not be subjected to reduction or cancellation, at the pleasure of the Debt Boards. Unless directions are issued to include the full court costs in the settlement of debts under section 19 or awards under section 25 of the Act, the landlords and creditors would be penalised for no fault of theirs, as they had instituted suits to save limitation before they had any notice of the filing of applications by the debtors, in the Debt Settlement Boards.

**Q. 87.** Yes, it is a good suggestion. Government Agricultural Banks may be useful and of great help to agriculturists if loans are advanced in times of need on easy terms. Only short-term loans will not be sufficient. Long-term loans will also have to be provided for.

Land mortgage banks of the co-operative type may perhaps be more suitable, and those banks may be grafted on to the existing Central Co-operative Banks. The Central Co-operative Banks may be authorised to finance these mortgage banks by floating debentures at 5 per cent. per annum or the Government may subsidise these mortgage banks by cash credit, on easy terms.

**Q. 88.** The land mortgage banks are very few in number and are unable to cope with the colossal problem of agricultural indebtedness. There must be many more such land mortgage banks providing long-term loans on cheaper terms.

In case of town co-operative or land mortgage banks, where loans are advanced against valuable securities, movable or immovable, joint liability and personal securities should be dispensed with to make these banks popular. Otherwise, private moneylenders and other joint stock banks will capture the business, as they advance loans on these terms.

**Q. 88.** Yes, the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938 and the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act of 1935 have made the procedure for realisation of rents more costly and still more cumbrous as I have already explained in my answers to question 86. Practically there is no course open now to the private landlords for prompt realisation of rents.

If there is any real intention anywhere, to treat the landlords sympathetically or to help them in any way in the realisation of their dues, "rents" and "rent-decrees" must *at once* be taken away from the purview of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and the certificate procedure for realisation of arrears of rent should be restored to the landlords.

The machinery now available for realisation of rents is unnecessarily harassing and expensive to the landlords and not to the tenants.

**Q. 90.** Not necessarily, unless it is used in times of distress or in seasons when there is no harvest.

My humble suggestion for speedy recovery of rents is that the Debt Settlement Boards be debarred from settling claims on account of arrears of rent or rent decrees or decrees for shares of the produce, which should be tried by the civil courts only and the civil courts may be directed to expedite these matters. The interest on arrears of rent or cesses under the Public Demands Recovery Act should be reduced to 6 per cent. on the lines of the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938.

In this connection, I may quote an extract from a letter of the Collector of Midnapore, dated the 12th February 1802, which will throw lurid light on the events that followed after 1793.....a."The system of sales and attachments has in the course of a few years reduced most of the great zamindars of Bengal to *distress* and *beggary* and produced a greater change in the landed property of Bengal than has ever happened, in the same space of time in any age or country, by the mere effect of internal Regulations. It was notorious that many of them had large arrears of rent due to them which they were utterly unable to recover while Government were selling their estates for arrears of assessment."

These significant words have proved only too true, in the sequence of events that followed.

**Q. 91.** I do not support the repeal of the Bengal Regulations and earlier Acts and replacement of them by a new Act.

**Q. 92.** Yes, the Revenue Sale Law operates harshly on the zamindars. I beg to suggest that the Revenue Sale Law be amended so as to make the sales liable to be set aside on deposit of arrears and

costs within 60 days and the penalty on arrears be reduced to 6½ per cent. at the maximum.

Where a separate account has been ordered by the Collector; and the holder of the separate account has deposited his share of dues, the sale of the residuary estate may be made *free from encumbrances*, as under section 37. If the section is amended in this manner, the sale will fetch a greater value and the putnidars will not be able to defraud the zamindar by buying a small share in the zamindari and withholding payment of rent.

**Q. 93.** The Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938 will tell adversely on the landlords and tenants alike. It is a device to benefit a class of statutory raiyats who have ceased to be actual tillers of the soil and are in the nature of tenureholders.

Section 86A of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1938 provides for abatement of rent on account of diluvion in the case of raiyats but there is no such provision for abatement of putni rent or revenue in the case of putnidars or zamindars. The repeal of sections 26D and 26E of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928 and amendment of section 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act have facilitated the easy transfer of holdings to non-agriculturists and helped still further fragmentation. It has made the realisation of subdivided rents through civil courts unremunerative.

The amendment of section 26G of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928 has resulted in the expropriation of the village moneylenders and has made rural credit illusory.

The loss to the landlords' income on account of the abolition of the landlords' fees may according to the Government statistics be estimated at 36·74 lakhs per annum on an average of the last 8 years upto 1936-37.

## Reply by the Chittagong Landholders' Association.

**Q. 1.** No.

**Q. 2.** No.

**Q. 3.** (a) Done a great deal.

(b) No.

(c) Does not arise.

**Q. 4.** Prior to Permanent Settlement they were the actual proprietors of the lands. After that their proprietorship has been confirmed by the Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 5.** (a) Yes.

(b) No.

**Q. 6.** Has been fulfilled, as was expected

(i)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

(ii)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

(iii)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

**Q. 7.** (i)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

(ii)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

(iii)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

**Q. 8.** (a) Yes.

(b) Does not arise.

**Q. 9.** (a)  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

(b) No.

(c) Chittagong zamindars are in close touch with their tenants.

**Q. 10.** (a) Yes.

(b) No.

**Q. 11.** (i) No. This criticism is not justifiable.

**Q. 12.** No. Its abolition cannot be advocated on any of the grounds..

**Q. 13.** This argument is entirely fallacious.

**Q. 14.** Does not arise.

**Q. 15.** Does not arise.

**Q. 16.** Social structure will collapse into lawlessness.

**Q. 17.** No.



**Q. 18.** Expenditure will exceed the income.

**Q. 19.** No. The raiyats do not like the idea of being under khas mahal, as the khas mahal has become very oppressive and unaccommodating.

**Q. 20.** No.

**Q. 21.** Most disastrous effect will ensue.

**Q. 22.** (a) Possession of homestead and khas lands should be retained by them.

(b) 25 times the gross income.

**Q. 23.** See record.

(b) Does not arise.

**Q. 24.** (a) No.

**Q. 25.** (a) Yes.

(b) No.

(c) No.

**Q. 26.** Does not arise.

**Q. 27.** Yes.

**Q. 28.** No.

**Q. 29.** (a) Yes.

(b) Increase in population.

**Q. 30.** No.

**Q. 31.** (a) Approximately Rs. 12½.

(b) Yes.

**Q. 32.** (a) No.

(b) They may be well protected by allowing them to cultivate their own raiyati lands and of others as Bargadars and also working as labourers.

**Q. 33.** (a) Yes.

(b) Does not arise.

**Q. 34.** Yes.

**Q. 35.** (a) According to the contract fitting the circumstances.

(b) No.

**Q. 36.** (a) From 4 annas to 10 annas per head.

(b) Worse.

**Q. 37.** (a) Yes.

(b) Yes.

(c) No.

(d) No. That will not fetch proper value.

(ex. 1.) No.

(ex. 2.) Present system is all right.

**Q. 38.** 6 acres.

**Q. 39.** (a) Yes.

(b) Yes.

**Q. 40.** Desirable, by legislation.

**Q. 41.** Facilities as far as practicable may be allowed.

**Q. 42.** Accumulation of large areas is desirable according to the circumstances.

**Q. 43.** No.

**Q. 44.** By common management such as Court of Wards and common manager or by limited company.

**Q. 45.** Yes.

**Q. 46.** Yes.

**Q. 47.** No.

**Q. 48.** X.

**Q. 49.** X.

**Q. 50.** It was not a mistake.

**Q. 51.** No.

**Q. 52.** The existing system is all right.

**Q. 53.** (i) Higher rents have to be paid in the Government estates than the permanently settled estates.

(ii) No.

**Q. 54.** No. In view of the answer to question No. 53 this does not arise.

**Q. 55.** (a) No.

(b) According to the productivity of lands.

(c) Yes.

**Q. 56.** A uniform share for universal adoption cannot be recommended.

**Q. 57.** The rates of rent should be re-examined every 30 years.\*

**Q. 58.** No.

**Q. 59.** We do not consider it defective.\*

**Q. 60.** No.

**Q. 61.** No.

**Q. 62.** Yes.

**Q. 63.** Existing provisions of law are sufficient.

**Q. 64.** No.

**Q. 65.** (1) No such objectionable defects.

(2) Yes.

**Q. 66.** (1) No.

(2) Does not arise.

**Q. 67.** Yes.

**Q. 68.** Noabad taluk Chota Sanua, police-station Banskali, in the district of Chittagong, and many others.

**Q. 69.** Yes.

**Q. 70.** In khas mahals, Settlement Officers have always looked at enhancement and have always been reluctant to reduce rents. Where there has been no opposition, enhancement has been easily effected. Whereas in the case of opposition or objection from tenantry small enhancement has resulted. Hence the variation.

**Q. 71.** (a) Partially true.

(b) In permanently settled areas tenants pay lower rents than those of khas mahals. In khas mahals the affected areas are not properly reported as the reporting officers do not dare to submit correct report for fear of Government revenue being reduced.

(c) If considerate higher authorities personally enquire.

**Q. 72.** Paddy—Yield Rs. 30, cost Rs. 20.

Sugarcane—Yield Rs. 90, cost Rs. 60.

**Q. 73.** (i) Yes.

(ii) Want of manure.

(iii) Nominal step only.

**Q. 74.** Public are not aware of the advantage of these Acts.

**Q. 75.** We are not aware of any such expenditure for improvement of agriculture.

**Q. 76.** (i) Yes.

(ii) At least for the last 30 years.

(iii) No.

**Q. 77.** Government policy is mostly responsible. Lowering the cost of administration.

**Q. 78.** (a) and (b), cannot be definitely said 20 per cent.

**Q. 79.** (i) Present system is not satisfactory.

(ii) Classification of land is essentially necessary. It should be made in conformity with C. S. survey in some respects, i.e., khewat and boundaries of lands and name of estates in every khatian. Land records should be maintained in respective unions.

**Q. 80.** (i) Yes.

(ii) Yes.

(iii) Yes.

(iv) Both systems satisfactory but collective preferable.

(v) Yes.

**Q. 81.** (i) Yes.

(ii) 40 per cent.

**Q. 82.** Yes. Industries both large and minor.

**Q. 83.** (i) Introduction of interest-free and easy agricultural loan.

(ii) No.

**Q. 84.** (i) Yes.

(ii) Government should come forward with interest-free loans.

**Q. 85.** (i) Not at all.

(ii) Too high.

(iii) No.

(iv) Co-operative societies have supplanted mahajans.

**Q. 86.** (i) To some extent.

(ii) Defects—

(a) Agriculturists' credit market tight.

(b) Definition of debtor should be strictly narrowed. Rent should be excluded, etc.

**Q. 87.** Yes.

**Q. 88.** Divisional land mortgage bank should have their branches in every subdivision and also in additional subdivision.

**Q. 89.** (a) Yes.

(b) Yes.

(c) Introduction of such machinery for prompt realization with least expense, i.e., Patni Sale Act.

**Q. 90.** No. Recovery through Public Demands Recovery Act is less expensive than through civil court; beneficial for the tenants. As in 89 (c) above.

**Q. 91.** (i) Advisable.

(ii) No.

**Q. 92.** (i) Sunset Law (Act XI of 1859) to be amended; provision should be made for depositing sale-money within 30 days and sale should be stayed. Also mode of realization in respect of co-sharer dues.

**Q. 93.** (i) Zamindars and tenureholders are hard hit by Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938.

(ii) No definite estimate can be given.

## **Reply by the Dinajpur Landholders' Association.**

**Q. 2.** The Permanent Settlement is silent with regard to the right of the tenant to transfer his holding. But the Permanent Settlement made the zamindar the proprietor of the soil and from the English idea of proprietorship, the holding became inalienable without the consent of the landlord. And this gave the zamindar the right to choose his tenant whenever there was a transfer. But this right has been scarcely exercised by the landlords, unless the transferee refused to pay the salami for mutation.

**Q. 3.** The landlords played an important part in the economic development of the country. Being assured of a fixed demand from Government they have tried to increase their income by bringing more lands under cultivation, in which they have succeeded. Due to the Permanent Settlement they could amass some wealth which they have spent in fostering art, education and industry. Many religious and charitable institutions have been supported by them.

The landlords have not failed to perform their duties imposed upon them by the Permanent Settlement. They conducted themselves with moderation towards their tenants. The enhancement of rent in the permanently settled areas has not been so high as that in the temporarily settled areas or khas mahals. The tenants in permanently settled areas are happier than those under the khas mahals. (*Vide* Statement No. IX, Circular No. 3, Land Revenue Commission.)

It may be argued, then, why subsequent tenancy legislations were necessary. The subsequent tenancy legislations were required not so much to check the oppression of the zamindars, as to meet the growing demands of the tenants for better rights and to clarify many doubtful points. This is evident from the fact that such tenancy legislations have been necessary not for the tenants of the permanently settled area only but for tenants in all the provinces. Such legislations were not called forth by the immoderation of the Bengal zamindars.

**Q. 4.** It seems, that before the Permanent Settlement the zamindars were not proprietors of the soil but were collectors of rent. This may be evident from the fact that they could not transfer their zamindari without the consent of the King or his agent. But then there were such wide powers in the hands of the zamindars of the pre-British days, that they could do anything with their raiyats in the name of realisation of rent. Their only protection was in the village custom which the zamindars scarcely overrode.

**Q. 5.** The annulment of the Permanent Settlement will surely be a breach of a solemn pledge given by the East India Company. Regulation I of 1793, Article VI, lays down "orders fixing the amount of the

assessment irrevocable", and Regulation VIII of 1793, Article 62, lays down, "neither their rights nor the value of their property can be affected in future by the real produce of their estates being known". The agitation against the Permanent Settlement began from the beginning of the 19th Century. Those who were against the Permanent Settlement argued that the Permanent Settlement has permanently crippled the financial resources of Bengal and they did not like that it should be extended to other provinces. But none of those high English Officials ever said that the pledge given by the East India Company should be broken, because they knew that it would be a breach of a solemn pledge.

But now because due to the recent settlement-operations Government has come to know of the large profit of the zamindars and also because the Government is now carried on by the people of this country who perhaps think that their honour is not so much involved by the breach of a pledge given by Englishmen, they turn their eyes to the increased profit of the zamindars in direct contravention of the principle laid down in Regulation VIII of 1793. And those honourable Englishmen who are in the helm of affairs perhaps will see with satisfaction the much desired undoing of the Permanent Settlement by the autonomous Government.

**Q. 6.** Yes, zamindars helped in the extension of cultivation and no doubt they have so long enjoyed the fruit of this extension of cultivation.

The extension of cultivation has been possible with all the factors enumerated in the question acting together.

**Q. 7.** In the district of Dinajpur even now in the average the revenue is about 50 per cent. of the gross rental. The assessment at the time of the Permanent Settlement was so high and waste and unclaimed land so little that even after 150 years the zamindar has not been able to bring down the level of revenue to less than 50 per cent. of the gross rental. The rental in this district has not on the average been increased by more than 6 annas in the rupee in these long years. The increase of rental due to reclamation of waste lands has not been very great, as the proportion of land to be reclaimed was very small.

The last cess revaluation in this district was most arbitrarily done and only to increase the revenue of District Board a high valuation was settled. The total cess in the last revaluation has been doubled.

The condition in other districts may be different of which we have no knowledge.

**Q. 8.** The answer to question 3 deals with this question.

**Q. 9.** The zamindars fulfilled the obligations imposed on them by the Permanent Settlement. Now a cry has been raised that many of the ills of the tenants are due to absenteeism of the landlords. This is a false cry. The proportion of landlords who have permanently shifted to the town is small compared to the number who still reside in the mofussal. But certainly there has been a tendency to move to the town. This is the effect of modern civilisation where all middle class men and even tillers' sons after getting some education flock to the town. The zamindars find it more and more difficult to live in the village without any society. Then it is not clearly known what is meant by absenteeism. A landlord having an extensive zamindari cannot possibly be present everywhere and listen to grievances of tenants personally. It has to be done through officers. The Government is also run by officers. The District Collector does not go from village to village.

Then there are persons who were not originally zamindars but who carried on moneylending business and other business in the town and incidentally acquired zamindaris. Even Englishmen and Marwaris came to possess zamindaris in this way. Some of them are not even permanent residents of this province. Then how can it be expected that as soon as they acquired zamindari they will come away from their home and live in a Bengal village. Though absenteeism has its defects, the general cry against absenteeism is raised only "to give the dog a bad name" in order to hang it.

**Q. 10.** The Permanent Settlement was in the interest of those foreign conquerors who made it. At that time they were in need of assured regular payments of money for extending their conquests in the neighbouring provinces. They also needed the loyal support of the zamindars at that time, so they fixed the revenue permanently, though they fixed it as high as possible at that time. But after the British Government was firmly established in India they began to regard the Permanent Settlement as a mistake from their experience in other provinces. Of course now it has become an advantage to the landlords at the expense of the State but certainly not at the expense of the tenants. Had there been no Permanent Settlement they would have to pay higher rent.

**Q. 11.** (i) Though it is not 80 per cent. of the income, still a large part of it is appropriated by the zamindars. In the district of Dinajpur it was never more than 35 per cent.

(ii) Wherever there is a bigger margin of profit between the gross rental and the revenue, subinfeudation comes in. Subinfeudation is less where the margin of profit is less.



(iii) Subinfeudation has little influence over enhancement of rent. All subinfeudations are made on the basis of the rent paid by the raiyats. The tenureholders cannot do anything which the zamindars could not do. Subinfeudation acts harshly only in case of under-raiyats.

(iv) The overlordship created by the Permanent Settlement is not more harassing and oppressive than the Government landlordism.

**Q. 12.** The Permanent Settlement can be abolished only on one ground and that is the increase of the Government revenue.

**Q. 13.** The abolition of the Permanent Settlement or the substitution of temporary settlement in its place will upset the social balance of Bengal and will increase the hardship of the tenants. So these two methods cannot be advocated.

Tax on agricultural income seems to be the best of the three methods.

**Q. 14 and 15.** If Permanent Settlement be abolished, the zamindars should be given compensation equal to twenty times the net profit of the zamindars.

The net profit = Gross rental — (Government revenue + 12 per cent. of the gross rental).

The compensation should be given in irredeemable and irrepudiable bonds carrying interest at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum free of income tax.

**Q. 16.** The middle class of Bengal has originated from the land system of Bengal and all the culture and progress of Bengal has been due to this middle class. If this land system be abolished by State purchase of zamindaris, there will be serious unemployment and the present middle class will be ruined till a new industrial middle class comes into existence at some distant future.

**Q. 17.** If the zamindari system be abolished then as a matter of principle, all the middlemen between the cultivating raiyat and the Government should also be abolished. It will have the advantage of raising the Government revenue to the maximum limit. It will also have the advantage of bringing the general mass face to face with the Government. So that all the grievances and disaffection of the general mass will be directed against the Government and this will lead to rapid transformation of the Government according to the will of the people.

**Q. 19.** The raiyats will not prefer to come directly under Government. Because they know that they can appeal against the oppression of the zamindar to the Government. Also the zamindar is too weak to resist the organised actions of the tenants. But against the oppression of the all powerful Government they know not whom to appeal

10. **Khas mahal** tenants are worse off than tenants under private landlords.

**Q. 20.** Subinfeudation does not affect the position of the raiyats economically and socially. His position remains the same whether there be subinfeudation or not. His immediate superior landlord cannot do anything which the zamindar could not do, and he has to deal with none but his immediate superior landlord.

**Q. 27.** If occupancy rights be not given to non-agriculturists, it will extinguish the rights of the middle class at one stroke of the pen.

**Q. 29.** Bargadars and adhiars seem to be on the increase. The reason for this is the passing of the land of poorer cultivators to richer cultivators and mahajans owing to increasing poverty of the cultivators. There is another ground for the increase of adhiars. Due to depreciated value of crops in recent years, the middle class men find it more profitable to let out lands in adhi than to cultivate it by hired men. Cultivation by paid servants is scarcely profitable nowadays. Increase of cultivating population is also another ground for the increase of adhiars.

**Q. 30.** This question has been dealt within the reply to question 29.

**Q. 32.** The bargadar should not have the right of occupancy. But his share of the produce in no case should be less than half the produce.

**Q. 33.** Barga system is not economically unsound. With a pair of bullocks at Rs. 40 a cultivator can earn by bhagchash at least Rs. 50 per annum. He can use the same pair of bullocks for at least 3 years. The bullocks' fodder also he has from his land. That barga system is more economic than service is seen every day. A labourer whenever he has the possibility of securing a pair of bullocks, leaves his service which gave him Rs. 60 to Rs. 70 per annum, and takes some land on adhi system. Moreover he can keep a cart and earn Rs. 30 or Rs. 40 by hiring it out.

**Q. 34.** There is likelihood of bargadars being thrown out of employment as the effect of giving occupancy right to them.

**Q. 35.** Replied in answer to question 32.

**Q. 36.** Wages of agricultural labourers was about Rs. 100 per annum without fooding and Rs. 60 with fooding before the depression. Now it has come down to Rs. 70 and Rs. 40 respectively. Bargadars and under-raiyats are in a better position than the wage-earners. Bargadars may engage themselves in other pursuits during the off seasons.

**Q. 37.** There was no restriction on transfer of holdings at any time. Rather the Act of 1929 put some restrictions on transfer where *nazarana* had to be paid at the time of registration. The transfer of lands has always been due to impoverishment of the cultivators. Restriction of transfer of land to non-agriculturists will lead the cultivators to great financial difficulties without any gain to the poor cultivator.

**Q. 38.** The minimum size of raiyati holdings should not be less than 10 bighas, i.e., the least area which a cultivator can till with one plough.

**Q. 39.** Many present day holdings are uneconomic.

**Q. 40.** Though consolidation of holdings is desirable it is not practicable.

**Q. 46.** The Permanent Settlement did not contemplate non-enhancement of rent. It allowed landlords to increase their income by all means within legal limits. The subsequent Rent Acts have also recognised the right of the landlord to enhance the rent. Only Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which came into existence nearly hundred years after the Permanent Settlement, lays down that rents which have not been enhanced after the Permanent Settlement will not be enhanced after 1885. It does not lay down that all enhancements subsequent to the Permanent Settlement are illegal. Thus it recognised the right of the landlords to enhance rent. It simply laid down that the rents which have not been enhanced during one hundred years should be regarded as fixed.

**Q. 47.** The Permanent Settlement never contemplated fixity of rent. It simply fixed the revenue which was the greatest concern of the Government. Moreover they fixed the revenue so high only in the hope that the zamindars will be able to discharge their obligations by increasing their income by extension of cultivation and enhancement of rent. The Permanent Settlement enjoins the zamindars to conduct themselves with moderation towards the tenants and the Government kept the power in its hands to frame Acts for the protection of raiyats. Had there been any intention to fix the rent that point would have been clearly laid down. The Government gives some latitude to the zamindars to deal with tenants but the ultimate authority is in its hands for the protection of the tenants.

**Q. 48.** Answer to this question has been given under questions 46 and 47.

**Q. 49.** It is quite impracticable to reduce the rent to the rate prevailing at the time of the Permanent Settlement. The rent cannot be traced back. The rents should rise and fall with the rise and fall of the price of the produce.

**Q. 52.** The rent of an agricultural holding, to be fair and equitable, must be on the basis of the price of the produce of the land. The price of the land depends upon many factors. One main reason is dearth of land compared to the population. Whatever may be the price of an agricultural holding it can never be economic to the actual cultivator if the rent be high compared to the yield. High price of land may be advantageous to a non-agriculturist who may agree to pay high rent in the hope of making a profit by resale of the land. But a cultivator does not want to convert the land into ready money. He is concerned only with the yield of the land. The rent should be a definite share of the gross produce and should not be more than  $\frac{1}{4}$ th of such produce.

**Q. 53.** The rents are fixed according to custom and on consideration of the yield of the land. Custom is the greatest factor. Sometimes competition also comes in. Rent does not vary greatly in the same locality for similar kinds of land.

**Q. 54.** It is not true that weaker and poorer tenants pay higher rents. Sometimes those persons who render service to the zamindar pay slightly lower rent than others.

**Q. 56.** Cash equivalent of  $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the gross produce.

**Q. 57.** If the Permanent Settlement be abolished, the rent should not be fixed in perpetuity but should be alterable with the rise and fall of the price of the produce and not according to the needs of the State. The poor tenants should not be compelled to pay a higher rent according to the needs of the State. Besides rent, they should not be made to pay any other taxes by whatever name they may be called. The rates of rent may be examined every 20 years.

**Q. 58.** If the Permanent Settlement is abolished, in all fairness to the agriculturists income tax on agricultural profit should be substituted in place of rent. In levying rents from agriculturists, the State does not deal fairly and equally with all its subjects. The State can claim taxes from its subjects only on the ground of protection of person and property of its subjects. All subjects are equal in the eye of the State. Then why is it that a subject having a net profit of Rs. 1,900 has to pay nothing to the State in lieu of the protection it affords to him whereas a poor cultivator having 5 bighas of land and a profit of Rs. 25 per annum is made to pay a tax of Rs. 4 in the shape of rent.

By substitution of tax on agricultural profits many poor tenants will be exempted from payment of tax. But they ought to be exempted. The Government may bring down the level of the assessable income to compensate the loss of revenue. The Government should treat all its subjects equally. It is no good torturing the poorest of the poor for filling the Government coffer.

**Q. 73.** Productivity of the soil in Bengal seems to be on the decrease. One reason is the irregularity of the rains and want of irrigation in Bengal. Of late years there is no timely rains. Government has done nothing in improving the fertility of the soil. Distribution of manures and seeds is practically nil.

**Q. 74.** Most of the people and even the educated jotedars do not know anything about the Acts mentioned in the question and the advantages they can afford.

**Q. 77.** The uneconomic condition and the gradually increasing debt of the raiyat is mainly due to three factors:—

(i) Destruction of cottage industries and the consequent pressure on land. In this machine age, cottage industries cannot compete with the machines and soon die out. The people living on such industries have to fall on land for their subsistence. And thus pressure on land is ever increasing.

(ii) The pressure on land is also brought by increase of population.

(iii) The most important factor is the general rise in the standard of living. Formerly the necessities of life were very few. Now the machine with the help of science is turning out daily new necessities of life. And in the name of trade the products of the factories are carried into the remotest corner of the country and sold to the cultivators. The cultivator has only one source of income, i.e., the yield of his land. He has to purchase all articles of life out of this yield. What few necessities the cultivator had previously, he could meet from his meagre income. Now his necessities have been increased several times and even if his land remains the same, he cannot meet the demand of the higher standard of living. Consequently he has to run into debt. Non-agricultural middle class men also with their increased income find it difficult to meet the demand of the higher standard of living and they also run into debts. Thus the zamindars, middle class men and the poorer men are steeped into debt nowadays. Only the agents of the foreign exploiters, i.e., the traders and the manufacturers are flourishing at the expense of the general public. Had these manufacturers been natives of the soil, they would have to spend at least a big part of their profit in this country and the general public would have been benefited by this. But we are at the mercy of foreign exploiters who are continuously draining India. Unless this drain be stopped and unless means are devised to return to the consumer in some shape or other the profit made by the manufacturer, the cycle of consumption and production must stop. If the drain be only in one direction, the consumer will soon lose his purchasing capacity.

The Government's policy of free trade is responsible for such a state of affair. The land system of Bengal has very little to do with

the poverty of the tenants. It seems even if the tenants be allowed to enjoy their lands free of rent they cannot keep themselves out of debt for the demand of the higher standard of living is ever increasing. There are so many bare necessities nowadays that everybody thinks that he has not the barest necessities.

**Q. 80.** (i) The cultivator's income may be increased by improved method of cultivation. There should be Government agricultural farms in every union to demonstrate these improved methods to the cultivators. The officer in charge of the agricultural farm should not be a salaried man. He must be a man who can maintain himself out of the profit of the farm. Of course the capital and land will have to be advanced to him by the Government. This will demonstrate that by improved methods of agriculture, it is possible for a man to live decently.

(ii) It is impracticable on the part of the Government to supply occupation to the cultivators during slack season.

(iii) No cottage industry can thrive unless competition by mills be stopped. Spinning and weaving has gone long ago. Vain has been the attempt of Mr. Gandhi to revive the charkha. The village oil man and paddy huskers are also soon going out of existence. Now we get cutleries from factories. It may be that the aluminium and china clay potteries will soon drive out the village potter. What then remains? The land only.

**Q. 82.** The pressure on land may to a large extent be removed by starting large industries by Government. It will also have the additional benefit of saving the people from foreign exploitation. This point has been dealt with in the answer to question 77.

**Q. 83.** Due to the operation of the Debt Settlement Boards, the agricultural credit has come to a standstill. There was no Government agricultural credit system. Private credit system was supplying all the needs of the agriculturists and this can still be revived with sufficient checks with regard to interest to the advantage of the agriculturists as well as middle class men. Government credit system will be against the interest of the debtors as it acts very harshly at the time of realisation.

**Q. 84.** The drain will continue, only the Government can divert the drain to its own coffer by establishing Government credit system.

**Q. 85.** The co-operative credit system has done very little in the district of Dinajpur. The joint liability and the harshness of realisation is not liked by the debtors.

**Q. 86.** The Debt Settlement Boards have removed the pressure of the creditors and saved many debtors from ruin at least for the time

being. But it is feared that most of the debtors cannot pay off even the reduced instalments. The Debt Settlement Boards are operating under a lawless law having no regard to the interest of the creditors. They are moreover conducted by men who have neither intelligence nor any legal knowledge. It would be better if the Chairman of the Debt Settlement Boards be paid officers of Government with some legal knowledge or the Boards' works may be done by the Munsiffs.

**Q. 87.** Unless private credit system be abolished Government agricultural banks may not flourish.

**Q. 89.** Landlords never file rent suits unless their claim is going to be time barred. Landlords regard rent suits as a necessary evil. They will be glad if rents can be realised without going to law courts. The suits are always expensive and dilatorious. Though the suits are expensive and harassing both to the landlords and tenants, the tenants get the advantage of delaying payment. The tenants will always raise objections to any mode of speedy recovery of rents such as realisation by certificate procedure. But as things are coming to, the landlords find it more and more difficult to realise rents through the present procedure. The matter may be much improved if the following method be adopted:—

(i) The landlord will have to file a petition with 12 annas court fee setting forth his claim and praying for sale of the holding.

(ii) A notice for objection to the sale will then be issued to the tenant.

(iii) If the tenant files any objection, the objection petition must be accompanied with a deposit of the amount claimed. The court can exempt deposit if the tenant can file rent receipts for rent of the period in suit.

(iv) After the hearing of the case is concluded the landlord will have to deposit 6 per cent. interest on the deposit money from the date of deposit and both the contending parties will have to deposit each other's legal costs.

(v) After the judgment the successful party will withdraw the amount he is entitled to by the judgment.

(vi) If no objection be filed by the tenant, nor any deposit be made sale proclamation will be issued.

(vii) Before the sale is confirmed the landlord will have to pay ad valorem court fee on the total demand in cases where no objection have been filed.

(viii) The tenant will have the right to file a petition for setting aside the sale within one month of delivery of possession.

on depositing the total claim, the legal costs and the subsequent rent, etc., upto the date of deposit.

• If this procedure be adopted, rents will be speedily recovered and it will be a safeguard against frivolous and false petitions on the part of the landlords and tenants. It will also ensure recovery of costs by the tenant which he can never do at present. It will give a further advantage to the tenant to recover his holding even after possession is taken by the landlord.

• **Q. 90.** Recovery of rents through the Public Demands Recovery Act becomes very objectionable when indiscriminate distress warrants are issued. The suggestion for speedy recovery of rents has been dealt with in the answer to question 89.

**Q. 92.** Revenue Sale Law is harsh to the zamindars. It should be provided that the zamindar can set aside the sale by depositing the amount with 5 per cent. compensation within one month from date of sale like sales held under all other laws.

Also it should be provided that when a share of an estate having a separate account is sold for arrears of revenue, it should be freed from all encumbrances just like when the whole estate is sold.

• **Q. 93.** Due to the amended Tenancy Act of 1938, it is likely that there will be rapid transfer of holdings from cultivators to non-agriculturists. As the tenants do not get any loan and they need money and the purchasers will not have to pay landlords' transfer fee nor has he any fear of non-recognition by the landlord, there will be free transfer of holdings. And in near future an Act may be necessary to deprive the non-cultivators of their lands in order to restore them to the cultivators. The amending Act of 1938 will help greater fragmentation of holdings and cause difficulty in realisation of rent. The abolition of the transfer fee has caused the landlords a loss equal to about 8 per cent. of the gross rental.



## Reply by the East Bengal Landholders' Association, Dacca.

**Q. 1.** The description given in question 1 of the duties and obligation of zamindars after Permanent Settlement is exhaustive. The Permanent Settlement did not take away any existing right or rights from the tenants.

**Q. 2.** The Permanent Settlement made the zamindars, proprietors of the soil; thus it gave them the power to choose whom they would like as their tenants and to use the land to the interest of the province.

**Q. 3.** The landlords played a great part in the economic development of the country—they cleared jungles, reclaimed waste lands and made a wholesale improvement of all lands; provided facilities for irrigation and communication, dug tanks, and founded charitable dispensaries and educational institutions; and rural Bengal was what the zamindars made it. Majority of the charitable and educational institutions in Bengal are the creation of zamindars. The zamindars did not fail to perform the functions expected of them.

**Q. 4.** The zamindars were proprietors of the soil from before. They were only recognised and confirmed as such by the Permanent Settlement. They were never mere collectors of revenue. They had rights in land as actual proprietors. Rights of the zamindars were defined even by Act of 1784 (24 George III Cap. 57).

**Q. 5.** The annulment of the Permanent Settlement would certainly be the breach of a solemn pledge given by the East India Company to the zamindars. The tenants were no doubt not a party to the contract and they had no right to be a party because both according to Hindu and Muhammadan law, soil belongs to the Crown and the Crown has the right to give it to any one it pleases and it merely recognised the right, viz., proprietary right which the zamindars already possessed.

At the time when the contract was made between the Crown, i.e., the East India Company and the zamindars, the revenue assessed was only a little less than what was collected as rents from the tenants. It was only after a century of labour and huge expenditure of money, that the total rental from tenants has increased. In view of the solemn promise given at the time by the Regulation that the revenue would never be increased or changed, it would not only be an act of injustice but a breach of a solemn pledge. It would neither be equitable nor honest.

If a man purchases a house at Rs. 2,000, enlarges it by raising structure at a huge cost, enriches it by making gardens, and its worth becomes Rs. 10,000, is it just, fair and legal for the vendor to insist on having it back or demanding Rs. 8,000 more for it?

There was contract completed 150 years ago and the parties, viz., the Crown and the zamindars, were acting on the strength of the contract so long; can the Crown revoke that contract now? By the Permanent Settlement, the financial condition was never crippled but rather improved. See R. C. Dutt's Memorial to Lord Curzon in 1900.

**Q. 6.** The zamindars have helped to extend cultivation and are enjoying the fruits of their industry and good management. *Vide* answer to question 3.

The large increase in cultivation has been mainly due to the initiative and pecuniary assistance of the landlords.

Cultivation has not only increased owing to the enterprise of tenants and the increase in population but has been mainly due to the gratuitous help of the landlords, who have made waste and jungle lands habitable and culturable.

**Q. 7.** The increase in the rent roll is three-fourth part due to the good management of the zamindars, one eighth part due to enhancement of rent and not more than one-eighth part due to the reclamation of waste lands by the efforts of the tenants themselves.

**Q. 8.** If the Permanent Settlement enjoined on the zamindars to conduct themselves with moderation towards their tenants, they have more than fulfilled that obligation.

The rent which a tenant usually pays for one acre of land does not exceed Rs. 3-12 and it is usually Rs. 3. What does he get for one acre of land per year? He gets at least 15 mds. of jute worth Rs. 75 and rabi crops worth at least Rs. 25—total Rs. 100. Thus while the tenant gets Rs. 100 at least he is to pay only Rs. 3-12, i.e.,  $\frac{1}{25}$  of the profit which he makes—and even this he does not pay and  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the tenants is always in arrears and sometimes even half.

**Q. 9.** The zamindars did not fail in any duties enjoined on them by the Permanent Settlement. They have improved their estates by good management and by incurring heavy expenditure. Absence of some landlords now from villages is principally due to economic causes.

**Q. 10.** The Permanent Settlement was in the interest of Bengal economically, and for the good of all. For the time being, when it was made, the revenue system was for the benefit of the province itself. It has done good to all classes of landlords and tenants because of this Permanent Settlement. Bengal is economically richer than any other province. The all round ruin in which the agriculture of Bengal was involved at the time of Lord Cornwallis, and the terrible famine of 1770 imperatively called for drastic solution and accordingly Regulation 1 of 1793 was promulgated. It has made famine unknown in the province. *Vide* R. C. Dutt's Memorial to Lord Curzon. And Bengal peasants are better off than the so-called cultivators of other provinces, who have no right in the land, which they cultivate.

**Q. 11.** The zamindars never claim to be overlords over tenants nor do the tenants admit them to be so. There has been subinfeudation—this right was recognised and confirmed by the Regulations and any one having proprietary right has certainly the power to use it to his advantage. The cry that 80 per cent. of the income from land goes to the zamindars is not correct. 33 per cent. of rent remains in arrears, 20 per cent. for management and collection charges, 20 per cent. for litigation expenses, so what is left for small landlords whose number is 90 per cent., is hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together. Moreover, Government should never grudge the increase in value of a property, with which it parted 150 years ago.

**Q. 12.** The Permanent Settlement should not be abolished on any or all the grounds mentioned in question 11.

**Q. 13.** The total abolition of the zamindari system would be a breach of a solemn promise given by the Crown in 1793. The evils of temporary settlement are too well known to be mentioned again. Those evils led to the great famine which wiped off  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the population of Bengal with a fall of revenue which necessitated the introduction of Permanent Settlement. The imposition of a tax on agricultural income would nullify the provisions of the Permanent Settlement, which made revenue fixed for ever.

**Q. 14.** In case Government intends to purchase the interest of all the zamindars, Government should pay at least 20 times the gross income. The total sum required would be about 300 crores of Rupees.

**Q. 15.** If compensation at the above rate be paid in bonds, they should be permanent and not redeemable. The rate of interest should be 4 per cent. per annum.

**Q. 16.** The purchase of zamindaris by the Government would no doubt change the social structure of Bengal. But in view of the recent enactments doing away with almost all the legitimate rights of the landlords and saddling them with the additional taxations and the new education cess and the hardship the landlords are suffering in consequence, they are willing to part with their zamindaris, if they get a fair compensation.

**Q. 17.** In case the Crown is determined to buy up the rights of zamindaris, it should purchase the rights of the tenureholders as well.

**Q. 18.** Those who are really raiyats, not those political agitators who have neither raiyati holdings nor tenures, and who have nothing to lose and who pose themselves as friends of the raiyats, never prefer to come under Government direct.

Far from enjoying any advantages over tenants under zamindars, the khas mahal tenants pay rent at almost double the rate. They are not allowed to be in arrears and rents are sometimes realised from them by means of Government gorkhas.

**Q. 20.** Subinfeudation or the right to sub-lease by zamindars was recognised by the Regulation I—it was a right compatible with the proprietary right of zamindars. When owing to the tenants being bad it was difficult to realise rent from them, subinfeudation was resorted to just after the Permanent Settlement and it is even being done for exactly the same reason. The position of the raiyats had not been changed in any way by subinfeudation—the tenureholders who are local men, are better able to realise rents from tenants than zamindars, who hold estates in different districts.

**Q. 21.** *Vide* answer to question 16.

**Q. 22.** If the zamindaris and tenures are purchased, their homesteads and khas lands should be immuned. The test of finding out khas lands will be the same as is given in the provisions of Bengal Tenancy Act and the rulings under it.

**Q. 23.** The occupancy right of raiyats is a creation of British legislation—the term came in use for the first time in Act X of 1859. Before then there were khudkasht raiyats, i.e., those who lived in the village and held lands therein—they were of course protected from eviction, if they paid rent. Act X of 1859 settled the unsettled ideas by fixing a 12 years' period of prescription.

**Q. 24.** The cultivating raiyats were never the actual proprietors of the soil. The king was always regarded as the "lord paramount of the soil". Indeed the property in land as a transferable mercantile commodity, absolutely owned, is not an ancient institution but a modern development only.

In the greater part of the world, the right of cultivating particular portions of the earth is rather a privilege than a property. Rent is never a tax.

**Q. 25.** We are not in favour of maintaining or extending the right of occupancy to more than one grade of tenant.

**Q. 26.** Occupancy rights should never be confirmed to actual cultivators alone, but to all those who are entitled to gain them by statute as enumerated in the Bengal Tenancy Act of before 1929.

**Q. 27.** The Permanent Settlement only gave protection to one class of tenants, viz., "khudkasht" tenants. Thus Mr. Shore writes: (Harrington's Analysis, Vol. II). "There are two other distinction of importance with respect to the rights of the raiyats. Those who cultivate the lands of the village to which they belong, either from length of occupancy or any other cause, have a stronger right than others, and may in some measure be considered as hereditary tenants, the other class cultivate lands belonging to a village, where

they do not reside. They are considered tenants-at-will." Non-agriculturists should not be debarred from occupancy rights, when they purchase or gain lands with rights of occupancy. In fact many in Bengal own lands, which they do not themselves cultivate and it would be preposterous and dishonest to deprive them of the rights of occupancy and confer them on those labourers who, for mere wages or for part of the produce, cultivate.

**Q. 23.** There is no reason for levying additional tax by the State on lands converted for non-agricultural purpose. The land belongs to the landlord, who is the proprietor and he is entitled to use it in any other way than cultivation. The State has no right or power to interfere, it having divested itself of all proprietary interest in favour of the landlord. Imposition of additional tax by the State would surely retard the improvement of land even when necessary. The landlord has the right either to allow such user or to sue for ejectment for using the land in a way which renders it unfit for the purpose of the tenancy.

**Q. 29.** There is no great increase in the number of bargadars or others cultivating on a share of the produce. The cause of slight increase in their number is due to the fact that the bhradralok class, is migrating to cities for economic reasons and leave their lands to be cultivated by others.

**Q. 30.** None of the causes mentioned in this question has contributed to the slight increase in the number of bargadars.

**Q. 31.** The area normally held by a bargadar is not uniform in all places. In this part the area held by a bargadar is about 5 or 6 bighas, i.e., 2 or 2½ acres.

**Q. 32.** The majority of bargadars hold occupancy rights in other lands. The right of occupancy should never be extended to bargadars with respect to their barga lands for they are mere labourers having no interest in those lands.

The question of protection hardly arises, in as much as no right or interest in land is conferred on them. They are merely allowed to cultivate the lands for wages or on produce basis.

**Q. 33.** The barga system can hardly be called unsound. It gives lands to persons, who have not the means to purchase or take settlement of them. With a small holding, not sufficient for meeting all his wants, the cultivator becomes a bargadar with respect to other lands. He is only to give labour and gets half the produce. This is a great asset to him.

**Q. 34.** To give occupancy rights to bargadars would not only be a great anomaly but a great injustice too. A man has purchased 10 acres of land at a price of Rs. 2,000. He lets out the land in barga and the bargadar without spending a farthing, gets land worth Rs. 1,000. It will be most inequitable too. People such as zamindars

and others will not let out their lands in barga and will rather prefer to keep them under khas cultivation. Thus many who gained their livelihood by these means will fall in difficulties and will be out of employment.

**Q. 35.** The fair proportion of produce payable by a bargadar is half the produce and this is well established by long usage and custom. No law should be enacted for fixing the maximum limit.

**Q. 36.** The wages of an agricultural labourer per day vary from 4 annas to 8 annas in East Bengal in accordance with demand. A bargadar is generally better off than an agricultural labourer. The former always gets a fixed amount as his share while the latter gets wages only in season time and soon spends them away.

**Q. 37.** The rights of transfer of holding given by the Act of 1929 was indeed a great evil to the raiyats. They are improvident and there was no check in their voluntary transfer of holdings or those sold away in execution of decrees against them.

There was a little check on transfer as landlord's fees were to be deposited and there was the right of pre-emption by exercising which for their dispossessed tenants the zamindars re-purchased those lands and let them have the lands again.

This little check was done away with by the new Act of 1938, which took away the right of the zamindars to have 20 per cent. salami and the right to pre-emption.

The result is disastrous. By a stroke of pen and a hasty legislation, the proprietary rights of the zamindars have been taken away, their right of pre-emption is gone, the tenants are allowed unrestricted liberty to transfer their holdings at will and none is there to restrain him. Within thirty years the Bengal tenants will be mere labourers, as in other provinces. The measure does not benefit the raiyats for whom it is intended, while it ruins the landholders.

In our opinion, jote rights should be non-transferable as before 1929 or if made transferable, transfer fee and the right of pre-emption should not be abolished, but should be retained as before. It would be impossible to restrict transfer to agriculturists alone, because most of them have not the means to buy—and any measure to restrict it would only bring in more confusion and anomaly.

**Q. 38.** There can hardly be any fixed standard of an economic holding. It will vary largely in proportion to the members and demands of the family which owns it.

**Q. 39 & 40.** Raiyati holdings are becoming uneconomic owing to the (1) Hindu and Muhammadan laws of succession and inheritance, (2) jote rights being made transferable without the slightest check.

Consolidation of holding is desirable no doubt, but not practicable so long as the laws of inheritance remain in force, and jote rights are allowed to be transferable.

**Q. 41.** Cultivators must have funds to purchase holdings to increase their lands. Unless there be Crown grant of lands without charging any price for it, there is hardly any special facilities, which can be given to a cultivator to increase his holding. The zamindars will have no objection to give facilities to tenants to consolidate their holdings at their own cost.

**Q. 42.** There should be no limit to a man acquiring lands, if he has the means to do so. Artificial restraint enacted to prevent acquisition of many raiyati holdings by one man will hardly produce any good nor is it practicable.

**Q. 43.** Co-parcenary is inevitable so long as the laws of inheritance remain in force.

**Q. 44.** Nothing can be done to stop the evil effects of co-parcenary and fragmentation in estates and tenures, unless the laws of inheritance are changed.

**Q. 45.** No. The Bengal Tenancy Act contains provisions for appointment of common manager under certain conditions.

**Q. 46.** One of the means, adopted by landlords for increasing their income, was certainly enhancement of rent or rates of rent.

**Q. 47.** The framers of the Permanent Settlement never contemplated the permanency or fixity of the rates of rent in the case of tenants then existing or who might subsequently come on the land.

By the Permanent Settlement, there was full recognition of the right of zamindars, to let the lands comprised in the zamindaris to whomsoever they pleased and in whatever manner they pleased (*vide* section 52 of Regulation VIII of 1793) excepting lands comprised in any mokatari (under section 52) or taluks (under section 51) and also except lands that were in occupation of khudkasht raiyats (section 60, clause 2). There were certain restrictions. The restrictions do not refer to the amount of rent; they refer merely to illegal cesses and abwabs. The regulations speak of pargana rates, *vide* Regulation XLIV of 1793.

The preamble says:—

(i) That at the renewal of a patta, the rate of rent was to be determined by the contracting parties.

(ii) That there exist certain usages of pargana rates.

(iii) That according to established usages, Government was entitled to get a certain proportion of the annual produce of every plot of land.

(iv) That the proprietor of land was to get it after Permanent Settlement.

Thus the pargana rate was a certain proportion of the annual produce of every plot of land which, according to ancient usages, was the share of the ruling power which was made over to the zamindars by Permanent Settlement. Thus the zamindars would be entitled to all advantages arising from the increase of prices. The foregoing restriction of pargana rates might have applied to khudkasht or resident cultivator raiyats, but with respect to newcomers there was no reservation; they were to be bound by the contract under which they held lands.

**Q. 48.** There was a great encroachment on the right of zamindars by section 50 and section 6 of Bengal Tenancy Act by which presumption of fixity of rent was held to be deducible from 20 years' payment of the same rent or rate of rent.

By the Permanent Settlement, the revenue was fixed for ever, the zamindars were made proprietors of the soil, which empowered them to let out their lands on whatsoever terms they liked without any State interference.

**Q. 49.** There was no intention of the framers of the Permanent Settlement that the rents of the tenants, then existing, should never be increased. *Vide* answers to questions 47 and 48.

There is no necessity for reducing the present rent and there is no standard to determine the rent or rate of rent prevailing at the time of Permanent Settlement. Nor is it practicable to determine who are successors in interest of those who were raiyats then and who came in subsequently.

The real tenants have no grievance as to amount of rent which they are to pay, for they pay only  $\frac{1}{25}$ th part of the produce which they get (*vide* answer to question 8). So there is no legitimate ground for reduction of rent.

**Q. 50.** Zamindars being proprietors, they have the right to get a certain share of produce of every land and so if the price of food crops rise, necessarily the rent, which is nothing but produce reduced to money value, must also rise. Government was perfectly right in providing for enhancement of rent on the ground of rise of prices of staple food crops.

The last portion of the question does not arise.

**Q. 51.** It was not the intention of the Government that zamindars would settle all lands at pargana rates.

Zamindars being proprietors of the soil, they had every right to settle the lands on any terms they liked and enjoy a substantial profit.



Again, pargana rates are vague. They were not definite. They were different with respect to different tenants. They might be one with respect to khudkasht raiyats, different as regards other tenants who took new lands and who were not resident cultivators.

**Q. 52. *Economic rent.***—The various modes enumerated for determining the so-called economic rent will only bring in confusion. There can not be any common standard in the cost of cultivation and the fooding expenses of an agriculturist's family, every year and in every part of Bengal. Family members may be more or less in different families.

A huge expenditure will have to be incurred in accepting share of produce as rent. Moreover this will fluctuate every year. The same difficulty will arise in determining the market value of each holding, for it will be different in different parts of Bengal.

The "customary rates" are also impracticable to find.

Rent in kind instead of in money should bring more hardship on the tenants. And if the system of rent in kind is introduced it should confer power of distraint on landlords.

**Q. 53.** So far as the Government estates are concerned, the rates of rent are much higher than those of permanently settled estates. Moreover we do not exactly know the basis on which Government fixes its rate of rent.

In permanently settled estates, the rate of rent is generally fixed on custom, never on competition or consideration of the productivity of land. There is a rate of rent called "nirikh" prevalent in every mauza and any one taking settlement agrees to pay rent at that rate.

It is not true that in practice, the rates differ greatly for lands of similar value in almost every village.

So far as an estate is concerned it consists of different mauzas or villages situated in several districts and the rate of rent can not therefore be the same in all villages of one estate.

**Q. 54.** It is not true that weaker and poorer tenants pay higher rents, and there is no reason for such discrimination. The settlement of lands was principally based on the productivity and demand and supply of it. And when once the rate was so settled in a village it became customary rate with respect to that village and underwent very little or no change during all the years.

**Q. 55.** Even assuming that all zamindars and middlemen are removed, re-adjustment of rents on a uniform basis throughout the province is not possible and there can be no change with respect to the

rates of rent prevailing in different mauzas. Lands in Bengal are not of the same kind everywhere, so it is not practicable to frame a uniform rate in all parts of it.

**Q. 56.** To take rent in kind or its equivalent in cash is impracticable as previously stated. To determine it, will require a huge amount of expenditure and labour every year and this will be for no purpose. Moreover it will be an innovation, which is conducive neither to the welfare of the tenant nor to that of the landlord.

**Q. 57.** Rents should never be fixed in perpetuity. Neither can it be altered on the needs of the State from time to time. They may be enhanced, if there are sufficient grounds as embodied in the Bengal Tenancy Act.

**Q. 58.** The question is difficult to understand. Whether the framer means raiyati rent or revenue to be paid by landlords, is not clear. Perhaps, he makes a confusion between the two words "rent" and "revenue". If he intends to mean "rent", the suggestion will practically deprive landlords of at least 50 per cent. of the rents realisable from tenants. If he means "revenue" payable by the landlords, then as there are more than 80 per cent. of small landlords, they would be exempted from payment of revenue and will enjoy their estates revenue free. Revenue can never increase because it was fixed forever by the Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 59.** There is no defect in the procedure for fixing fair and equitable rents and for enhancing rents in the Bengal Tenancy Act.

**Q. 60.** Landlords are proprietors of the soil. If the productivity of the land has increased owing to fluvial action and the tenants get more or better crop, it is but reasonable that the rent should also increase. It is unfair that a tenant should get the sole benefit of improvement, and the State or the landlord, who has got the rights of the State, should get nothing.

**Q. 61.** On the same ground, there should be enhancement of rent on account of rise in prices of staple food crops.

**Q. 62.** It should be inequitable to give up enhancement on the ground that the whole produce of the tenant would be consumed in meeting the family needs. And if once this principle is adopted there would be no enhancement and no end of litigation in finding out whether the produce got by a tenant is sufficient for his family needs or not.

**Q. 63.** Advance rent and salami are two different things. Salami is what is paid as nazar to the landlord for taking settlement of land and advance rent is rent for 2 or 3 years paid in advance. In East Bengal there is no case in which advance rent is paid for raiyati land.

There was first the pargana rate applicable to khudkasht tenants only, then came the word prevailing rate, i.e., the rate of rent paid by tenants in a particular mauza.

If other tenants pay at a particular rate of rent, there is no reason why a particular tenant whose rent is less should not pay at the same rate.

If the raiyat has improved his holding or land which was lower in value, the Court in granting enhancement should certainly take that fact into consideration.

**Q. 64.** There should not be any provision for reducing contractual rents or for limiting rents for new settlements.

**Q. 65.** There are no defects in Chapter X of Bengal Tenancy Act.

**Q. 66.** In granting enhancements under section 105, Bengal Tenancy Act, the Settlement Officer and Special Judges rather erred in leniency towards tenants and there is absolutely no reason to doubt their ability and impartiality.

**Q. 67.** Revisional settlements are sometimes made with the object of enhancing revenue.

**Q. 68.** No.

**Q. 69.** We do not know of any such instance.

**Q. 70.** We are not conversant with rates of rent in different khas mahals of the Government of Bengal. Perhaps rents vary according to local conditions.

**Q. 71.** The zamindars are not as a rule allowed remission of revenue in any circumstance. We do not know of any instance in which this has been done in the Dacca district. The conditions, enumerated in question 71 for remission of Government revenue, are such as can not be proved, and the procedure being impracticable has never been availed of in East Bengal. Even when the tenants do not pay rent, revenue has to be paid, otherwise estates are sold away.

In case of acute distress, such as the present year flood, there should have been remission of revenue. On the other hand the present Government did not even keep the imposition of education cess in abeyance in the Dacca district, though petitioned again and again.

**Q. 72.** So far as agriculturists are concerned, they have not to incur any cost of cultivation as they or their family members plough and reap themselves.

Even when day labourers are engaged for particular times, the total cost per acre in the case of jute does not exceed Rs. 15 and in the case of paddy Rs. 10.

**Q. 73.** There are no materials before us to show that the productivity of the soil of Bengal is on the decrease. The measures taken by the Government to improve the fertility of the soil are not adequate.

**Q. 74 and 75.** We do not know anything about these questions.

**Q. 76.** Salami is realised by the Government at the time of settlement of new lands in khas mahals. No portion of salami is utilised in improving the agricultural condition of those lands.

**Q. 77.** In our humble opinion, the land revenue system of Bengal is not responsible for the condition of the raiyats. They always live beyond their means and incur debts which they can not pay.

The districts of eastern Bengal are jute growing districts. The price of jute had fallen down. Unless a standard price of jute is fixed and enforced by statute, there is hardly any possibility of improving the condition of raiyats.

**Q. 78.** Thrifty tenants are able to maintain themselves from the produce of their land

**Q. 79.** The method suggested is hardly practicable and it will entail a huge cost and will give rise to endless controversies as to the truth of the entries

**Q. 80.** We are in agreement with the suggestions contained in the question for the increase of the income of the cultivating raiyats. But we think that their condition cannot be improved unless there be substantial State aid and more wealth comes in the province. And this is possible if the crops which they grow, especially jute, gets a decent price, which it will never fetch, unless there is legislation.

**Q. 81.** We do not think that the pressure of population is the main reason of the poverty of agriculturists.

**Q. 82.** To divert them to large industries by starting Government aided factories is no doubt one of the means for relieving the pressure of population.

**Q. 83.** Agricultural credits can be increased when men believe that if they lend money to agriculturists they would get back their money. But this belief has been sadly shaken by the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, by which the hands of law courts and even of the High Court have been paralysed.

Unless that Act is repealed or salutary provisions are introduced, by which applications are to be filed before Munsifs and appeals are to be preferred before Subordinate Judges, agricultural credit is gone for ever in Bengal at least. Private mahajans were ever ready to help the agriculturists. They are now shy because of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. It is not possible for the Government to supply the needs of every agriculturist in Bengal.

**Q. 84.** We do not know whether 25 per cent. of the gross produce of land goes to the mahajans every year. But a portion is spent for payment of interest. Now the mahajans have fallen in difficulties. Their ruin is staring them in the face and 90 per cent. would be satisfied with the principal amount lent, with a small sum as interest. Is the Government ready to find out that sum? If it is so, the debts of the agriculturists may be wiped off in no time.

**Q. 85.** Co-operative credit societies are sheer failures in tackling the credit problems of the agriculturists. The system of lending is bad and owing to the paucity of competent officers in the Department, Government has incurred only loss after loss.

**Q. 86.** The principal defects besides those mentioned in answer to question 83 are:—

- (1) Rent should never have been included under the operation of this Act. It has been a great hardship to landlords inasmuch as they are liable for prompt payment of revenue while payment of their dues are indefinitely postponed.
- (2) Sanctity of a contractual relation is brushed aside and ignored.
- (3) The personnel of all Boards under the Act are highly unsatisfactory and this has rudely shaken the faith of the people in the British administration of justice.
- (4) Arbitrary and summary powers has been conferred on unlettered persons without the slightest knowledge of law and procedure without any check even from the Highest Court of Justice and even the appearance of lawyers have been shut.
- (5) Rural credit is almost gone due to the operation of the Act.
- (6) The administration of justice in regular courts has been paralysed.

**Q. 87.** The suggestion is good no doubt, but it will not be practicable.

**Q. 89.** To confer facilities for speedy realisation of rent was an obligation which the Government took upon itself at the time of Permanent Settlement.

The various Bengal Tenancy Acts passed have made rent suits costly and lengthy. There are instances where for a claim of 12 annas or Re. 1, Rs. 15 to Rs. 20 are to be spent, when there are co-sharer landlords and tenants. The time spent is never less than 1½ year or 2 years.

In helping the landlords in speedy realisation of rent, there should be drastic change in the Bengal Tenancy Act, and a provision added in

it by which as soon as a tenant is in arrears for 4 years or so, on the expiration of a prescribed period, he will no longer be a tenant having right in the land but a trespasser only and the landlord will be entitled to eject him.

In the opinion of this Association, the procedure for rent suits should be simpler and more speedy. As for instance, in the place of serving summons on co-sharers, landlords and tenants, there should be a provision for service of registered notice or summons and on the expiry of the time fixed (never exceeding a month) a decree should be passed at once and instead of the elaborate rent execution proceedings, the decree should be executed forthwith without a formal application for the same. The provisions of Act VIII of 1819 (Patni Regulation) should be made applicable to rent suits. Excepting those estates which are managed by the Court of Wards, at least 30 per cent. of rent remains in arrears every year in the case of most other estates. Tenants have means to pay, yet they will not do so.

**Q. 90.** Recovery of rent through the Public Demands Recovery Act is neither objectionable nor harassing. This special power should be more widely given to landlords, so that they may easily realise their rents. Section 158A of the Bengal Tenancy Act should find place in the statute without the imposition of maintenance costs.

**Q. 91.** We are in favour of retaining the old Regulations and we are rather afraid of new legislations, hastily compiled and more hastily made into laws.

**Q. 92.** In the Civil Procedure Code and in the Bengal Tenancy Act, there is provision that if a property is sold in execution of a decree, the sale can be set aside if the decretal amount with 5 per cent. compensation be paid to the purchaser within a certain time. But in revenue sale law there is no such provision, we would welcome some such section in the revenue sale law itself.

**Q. 93.** The economic effect of Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938 is disastrous on the landlords and the tenants. By the Permanent Settlement up till 1938, the landlords were recognised as proprietors of the soil and jote rights were non-transferable. In 1929, there was a compromise, which recognised the proprietary right of the landlords and allowed them 20 per cent. salami and the right of pre-emption and they agreed that the jote rights may on those conditions be transferred. But the amending Act of 1938 confirmed the transferability of jote right, while it abolished the provision of 20 per cent. salami and the right of pre-emption. By a stroke of pen, on the face of opposition of all landlords the Bill was made an Act.

The average income from landlords' fees amounted to about  $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the annual gross income and the Bengal Government has thought fit to

deprive the landlords of this for no fault of theirs. By taking away the right of pre-emption from the landlords, the Bengal Government has conferred it on the co-sharer raiyat.

While causing this heavy loss to the landlords, has the measure benefited the tenants? Certainly not, if transferability of jote rights remains as it is now without any check, these tenants, at least a major portion of them, will be landless, within the next 30 years.

In addition to those enumerated above some defects of the Bengal Tenancy Act are:—

- (1) Suspension of the enhancement of rent.
- (2) Retrospective effect of wiping off usufructuary mortgage debt after 15 years.
- (3) Remission of rent in the case of diluvion keeping the raiyats interest intact, without any proportionate remission of revenue.
- (4) Abolition of section 158 (A) of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
- (5) Conferring the right of pre-emption on co-tenants.

## **Reply by the Faridpur Landholders' Association.**

**Q. 1.** (i) Yes. The duties and obligations of the zamindars are indicated by Regulation I of 1793. The duties and obligations so indicated are exactly those of the Government, if raiyatwari settlement instead of the Permanent Settlement with the zamindars were concluded.

(ii) No. The quinquennial returns submitted by the zamindars at the time of the Permanent Settlement show that there were shamilat, talukdars, howladars, mirasdars, ordinary raiyats, even from before the Permanent Settlement. The right and liabilities of the various grades of tenants were not touched by Regulation I of 1793. The Regulation merely expressed the Government's intention, that the zamindars would extend to their subordinate tenants the same generous treatment which they were to receive from the Government. On the contrary the subsequent legislation, e.g., Act X of 1859, Act VIII B, C of 1869 and Act VIII of 1885, the present Bengal Tenancy Act with all subsequent amendments show that the zamindars' rights have been curtailed to a certain extent.

**Q. 2.** The Permanent Settlement did not convey any power to the zamindars nor did it take away any existing power which existed from before the Permanent Settlement to choose their tenants. The fact that the Regulation I of 1793 required the zamindars to exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands and they were to enjoy exclusively the fruits of their good management and industry and further more the subsequent legislation, i.e., Act X of 1859, which recognised the right of the zamindars to eject raiyats for non-payment of rent—even when the occupancy rights under certain circumstances was given to the raiyats and also the fact that the raiyats interest was not transferable except with the landlords' consent and except in the case of custom clearly indicate that the zamindars had the power to choose their tenants.

**Q. 3.** It appears from the note of Lord Cornwallis on Mr. Shore's Minute, that one-third of the Company's territory in Hindusthan was jungle inhabited by wild beasts. At the time of the Permanent Settlement, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa were the permanent territories of the East India Company in Hindusthan. It follows, therefore, that about one-third of the territory of which Permanent Settlement was concluded was jungle land. The jungle has been cleared and lands brought under cultivation since the Permanent Settlement. In Bengal, specially lower Bengal, there were large water-logged areas at the time of Permanent Settlement. That area has nearly been reclaimed. No doubt this reclamation may be partially due to fluvial action but still it cannot be denied that the zamindars spent large amounts of money for the reclamation of the lands and also materially helped extension of cultivation by granting leases at progressive rate of rents and by the grant of rent-free leases or leases at nominal rates in expectation of



their future profits as guaranteed by Regulation I of 1793. The fact that there have not been so repeated famines in the permanent settled areas as in non-permanently settled areas is a clear proof of the economic development of Bengal since the Permanent Settlement. No doubt there has been no practical development of industry. For this absence of industry the zamindars are not to blame but the industrial and commercial policy of the East India Company and of the present Government is to blame. The British statesmen in the early years of the 19th century, as well as now, did all they could to promote British industries and commerce at the sacrifice of Indian industries and commerce.

**Q. 4.** No. Zamindars were actual proprietors from before the Permanent Settlement. Shore's Minutes reported in 5th Report, Vol. II, page 745—referred to in Dutt's Economic History of India, p. 88.

**Q. 5.** (i) Yes, it would be a breach of pledge. In speaking of local cesses on land during Lord Mayo's time Sir Erskin Peary, C. J., Bombay, said "that the language and acts of Lord Cornwallis and of the members of the Government of his day were so distinct, solemn and unambiguous that it would be a direct violation of British faith to impose special taxes. If imposition of fresh local cess is in violation of the pledge, the annulment of the Permanent Settlement would be a greater violation of the pledge. The annulment of the Permanent Settlement would not only be a breach of pledge but a breach of contract. Permanent Settlement was a contract between the East India Company who were grantees of the Dewani from the then Emperor. East India Company were not then the Crown. The legal position of the parties was that of a landlord and tenant. The Company were the landlord and the zamindars the tenants—permanent tenants. The East India Company were abolished in 1858. Their capital was paid off by loans which were made an Indian debt on which interest is paid from Indian taxes. So the present Government is a mere transferee from the Company. The Government is bound by the contract between the zamindars and the Company. A conqueror may not respect the rights of the subjects of the conquered territory, may confiscate the property of subjects and may make new settlements. But the East India Company were not and the British Government is not, a conqueror in Bengal. So the pre-existing rights of the zamindars, who were actual proprietors of the soil could not be infringed and their properties confiscated by the Company. So their rights were recognised. The Muhammadan Government had their rights of making periodical assessment of revenue so the grantees of the dewani made periodical assessment which was ultimately made permanent. The Permanent Settlement was a pure matter of contract between the Company and the zamindars. The present Government being a successor in interest of the Company is bound by the contract.

The tenants were and are now subordinate to the zamindars and they are bound by legal and valid contracts between them and the zamindars. It is perfectly immaterial whether tenants were or were not parties to the pledge. But Regulation I of 1793 reserved the right of the Company to enact such Regulation as might be thought necessary for the protection and welfare of the tenants of the soil and subsequently various legislations were adopted to safeguard the interests of the tenants.

(ii) As to crippling the financial resources of the country:—

To allow the subjects of the State to enjoy the profits of their own industry and good management and to prescribe a limit to land tax is an act of political wisdom. This was the policy on which land tax was made perpetual in England in 1798, five years after the Permanent Settlement of Bengal. At the time of the Permanent Settlement only 1/10th of the rental, most insignificant part—was left for the zamindars and the revenue assessed was 9/10ths of the rent roll. It is only by reclamation of waste land and extension of cultivation that the rent roll since Permanent Settlement has increased from 3 crores to 12 crores if the figures be correct. The zamindars are not to be penalized for the improvement they made. No doubt the improvement was effected with the help of the raiyats. The raiyats also took their legitimate share.

**Q. 6.** Impossible to ascertain the extent due to—

- (i) increase of population,
- (ii) enterprise of tenants, and
- (iii) initiative or the pecuniary or other assistance, of zamindars.

**Q. 7.** Combined effect of—

- (i) the industry and good management of zamindars,
- (ii) increase in cultivation and reclamation of waste lands by the efforts of the tenants, and
- (iii) enhancement of rents.

**Q. 8.** Since the Permanent Settlement several legislations were enacted restricting the powers of the zamindars with respect to tenants, but still in comparison of Government treatment with the khas mahal tenants, the zamindars are more generous and lenient towards their tenants. The zamindars have to pay revenue under sunset law, the zamindars are not entitled to any reduction or remission of revenue on account of drought, inundation and failure of crops but the zamindars have to realise rents by law suits if not amicably realised. Realisation by suit takes tremendously long time, not to speak of additional expenditure. In case of drought, inundation or failure of crops, zamindars

have often to grant remission or to suffer delay in realisation. It is not unoften that they suffer their arrears of rent to be barred by limitation. In case of Government khas mahals arrears are realised by certificate, promptly kist by kist. Seldom any remission or reduction of rent is allowed on account of drought, inundation or failure of crops.

**Q. 9.** So far as industrial development by landlords is concerned, see reply to question 3, last part.

**Q. 10.** Yes. It is due to the Permanent Settlement in Bengal that Bengal is not so frequently visited with famines as other provinces are where there is no Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 11.** (i) The criticism is not justified. When the Permanent Settlement was concluded, the zamindars were allowed a margin of only ten per cent. as their share of the rent roll on the clear understanding that they would enjoy the benefit of improvement by cultivation and industry. As a matter of fact allowance of 10 per cent. would not cover the collection charges. Besides the revenue, the zamindars have to pay additional cesses out of their own profits from the land.

(ii) The system of subinfeudation of tenancy was in vogue from before the conclusion of the Permanent Settlement as will appear from the quinquennial returns on the basis of which the revenue was assessed at the Permanent Settlement.

(iii) Enhancement of raiyats' rent is regulated by the tenancy laws passed since the Permanent Settlement.

(iv) Raiyatwari system where there is no Permanent Settlement is not free from overlordship. The only difference is that there the overlord is Government but where the permanent system prevails the overlordship has been conferred upon the zamindars but it is not true to say that this overlordship is harassing and oppressive over the cultivators of the soil as the Government has got the control over the zamindars. The cry of the zamindars being harassing and oppressive is not justifiable. In cases of dearth, scarcity or famine, the zamindars in some cases allow remission or suspension of realisation of rent but the Government hardly does it although there may be rules for suspension or abatement in case of khas mahals. The rate of raiyats' rent in case of khas mahal lands is much higher than that in case of permanently settled lands.

**Q. 12.** No.

**Q. 13.** No, because economic condition of the tenants in places where raiyatwari system prevails is not better rather worse than that of the raiyats of Bengal. The coolies or the ordinary day labourers come to Bengal from those parts of the country where temporary settlement prevails where raiyats' rents are enhanced every 20 or 30 years and consequently the lands are rack rented.

Those who are for the abolition of the Permanent Settlement proceed upon the idea that the zamindars are (a) rolling in wealth, (b) the raiyats are starving, and (c) also upon the idea that the Government revenues would increase if the zamindars and intermediate tenureholders be removed and the Government receive rents directly from the cultivators; as to (a) and (b)—On a calculation of the figures from the Land Revenue Administration Reports of Bengal and other papers it will appear that the average income of every landlord is something like Rs. 6 per annum and the average income of the raiyats both from land and from subsidiary sources would be Rs. 6 per head. Thus the income of the zamindars as well as of the cultivators being the same, both are starving and then as to (c) there will be an increase but that increase will be apparent but not real, the increase will be consumed by the increase in the collection charges and by the interest on debentures if issued to zamindars instead of cash payments.

**Q. 14.** In view of the above answers the question does not arise.

**Q. 15.** In view of the above answers the question does not arise.

**Q. 16.** Abolition of zamindari will necessarily involve the question of the abolition of the intermediate tenancies. In Bengal the most advanced class of people is the intermediate middleclass man. They will be hard hit by the abolition of the intermediate tenures. The social structure of Bengal will not be improved rather the social system will be revolutionized to the detriment of the people.

**Q. 17.** If the zamindari right be purchased by the Government necessarily the rights of the tenureholders between the zamindars and the raiyats shall have to be purchased otherwise the assets from the raiyats will be intercepted by the tenureholders. The question whether the tenureholders' interests shall be purchased comes in only when the zamindari is abolished. But when in answer to the previous question it has been said that the zamindari interests should not be abolished nor purchased necessarily the opinion as to the propriety or desirability of purchase of the intermediate interests must be adverse to the purchase of intermediate tenures as well.

As to the question "will this change lead to any advantage" the answer will be "no". Although the Government may receive the rent direct from the raiyats and thereby the Government revenue on the face of it may be increased but this increase will simply be apparent but not real because the Government shall have to maintain extra staff for collection directly from the raiyats and also to pay either the purchase money in cash or by debenture carrying interest which shall have to be paid regularly to the debentureholders. The question

as to how much of the increased revenue will be consumed by the extra staff and the interest on the debentures, is a matter of calculation.

In land acquisition cases, compensation in respect of tenanted lands is allowed at 20 years' purchase of actual collection minus the land revenue which is abated. On that analogy the purchased price of the landlords' interests would be 20 years' purchase of the actual profits of the zamindars.

Now from the figures as supplied in the question it appears that about 80 per cent. of the raiyats' rent roll is appropriated by the zamindars, in that case the compensation to be allowed to the zamindars will be  $20 \times 80$  per cent. of 12 crores—a very big amount though not too big for the Government and if debentures be issued instead of cash payment of compensation to the zamindars, 3 per cent. on the total amount of the compensation would be again a big sum.

**Q. 18.** Has been practically answered in reply to question 17.

**Q. 19.** It is for the khas mahal tenants to say but so far as is known the raiyats prefer zamindars as the landlords to being khas mahal tenants.

**Q. 20.** Subinfeudation was in vogue before the Permanent Settlement so it has been said in answer to question 11, clause (2).

The position of the intermediate tenants does not affect the cultivating raiyats under khas mahals—as is evident from a comparison of the rental of the khas mahal tenants with that of the rental in Permanent Settlement areas.

**Q. 21.** The abolition of the intermediate tenures will reduce the tenureholders to abject poverty without any additional advantage to the raiyats.

**Q. 22.** The homestead and khas lands of zamindars and tenureholders should be left to them if they so desire.

As to the criterion of ascertainment of zamindars and tenureholders' khas lands reference may be made to section 120 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

**Q. 23.** Yes. Before the Permanent Settlement, there were khudkasht raiyats whose tenures were rather permanent in point of duration whereas the paikasht raiyats were temporary.

**Q. 24.** No. At the time of the Permanent Settlement, the zamindars were found to be the actual proprietors of the soil, as has been shown in answer to question 4.

The proprietors have the absolute right to deal with the land, e.g., to sell, to lease, to mortgage, to excavate, for the purpose of brick

manufacture, and to carry on operation to raise permanent structures. So the word proprietor connotes absolute right to deal with the land whereas the cultivators had not those rights. It is only lately that the raiyats have been by legislation given some of those powers, but not all.

**Q. 25.** Yes, there can be no objection to extending the right of occupancy to more than one grade of tenants provided such occupancy rights of under-raiyats of whatever grade be not the protected interest as defined in the Bengal Tenancy Act and the Revenue Sale Law, but the occupancy right should not be confined to cultivating tenants only but should also be extended to non-agricultural tenants.

**Q. 26.** Does not arise in view of the reply to question 25.

**Q. 27.** Yes, *vide* section 8, paragraph II of Regulation I of 1793.

Answer of the second part is given in reply to question 25.

**Q. 28.** The reason is that the Bengal Tenancy Act, section 155 provides for the ejectment of tenants on the ground that he has used the land in a manner which renders it unfit for the purpose of the tenancy, i.e., agricultural tenancy. Therefore, there is no guarantee of protection of the tenants using the land of agricultural tenancy for non-agricultural purposes. Income-tax is leviable on use of such land for non-agricultural purposes. So a separate land tax is not desirable.

**Q. 29.** Yes. The number is increasing. The reason seems to be that the sons of the cultivating classes are getting education and after getting some sort of education, they are not inclined to plough their lands with their own hands.

**Q. 30.** (i) Not correct.

(ii) Correct.

(iii) Correct.

Part (ii) and (iii) are also some of the causes of this increase of bargadars.

**Q. 31.** The first part cannot be answered without definite statistics. As to the second part, not the majority but some of the bargadars hold lands in raiyati or under-raiyati when their raiyati or under-raiyati is not sufficient for their maintenance and when they have spare time to cultivate as bargadar in addition to cultivating their raiyati or under-raiyati rights.

**Q. 32.** No. According to the Bengal Tenancy Act some of the bargadars are tenants and others are not. The last class gets remuneration as a labourer. The first class being treated as tenant, their rights and liabilities are controlled by the Bengal Tenancy Act and so they get protection under the existing law.

**Q. 33.** Yes, as otherwise poor cultivators who cannot afford to take settlement of land on payment of salami would be out of employment as a cultivator and shall have to take to other courses for their maintenance—the only course left for them would be simply to work as coolies.

The second part of the question does not arise.

**Q. 34.** Giving occupancy rights to bargadars in general would be detrimental to the interest of the person whose land is held in barga because in case the bargadar does not pay adequate attention to the cultivation of the barga lands or does not deliver his master's proper share the latter would be helpless as he would not be entitled to settle the same land to some other bargadar or to settle it on rent to some other person.

Bargadars may be of two classes, one class that has its own rented land and also barga land, the other class which may not have its own rented land but simply cultivates others' lands in barga. It is common experience that the first class pays greater attention to his own rented land but does not pay adequate attention to the bargalands. In that case the person who lets out in barga does not get his adequate share though he may get relief by suit but that is a difficult and expensive matter. The other class which has got only barga lands may not invariably grow full crop, in that case too the owner of the land will not be able to settle the land in barga with some other person or bring it under his own cultivation and if by tedious process of litigation he can secure a decree it will be useless as the bargadar may have no property to be seized in execution or he may take recourse to the provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act.

As regards the last portion of this question the answer is in the affirmative.

**Q. 35.** The proportion depends upon the nature of the soil and the kind of crop. The proportion of the share is not the same in all parts of the country. The custom prevails in respect of shares—not necessary to fix maximum.

**Q. 36.** There is no standard of wages of agricultural labourers. Wages depend upon demand and supply.

Their economic position is much worse than that of the bargadar and under-raiyats as the latter even employ day labourers for their cultivation and harvesting and make some profit by such employment.

**Q. 37.** Yes. There is a tendency and this tendency will increase as a result of further facilities given by the Act of 1938.

Freedom of transfer of agricultural land will ultimately bring about a condition detrimental to the agricultural society. Economic condition of Bengal agriculturists though better than that of agriculturists of other parts of the country is not a solvent one. They have to incur debts from the creditors who are mostly non-agriculturists and generally not landholders. Agricultural lands will inevitably pass into the hands of the creditors and the agriculturists will be either bargadar or under-raiyats of different grades or landless fellows unless the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act gives them some relief.

Restriction of transfer to agriculturists only will stand in the way of a fair price for sale. Thus the vendor will not get adequate price either by private sale or court sale.

Restriction is not practicable. Section 155, Bengal Tenancy Act, is a sufficient check against use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes.

**Q. 38.** Four acres for a family of five members.

**Q. 39.** Yes, the size of many raiyati holdings are uneconomic according to the answer to question 38. There are also many raiyati holdings of much larger size.

Answer to the second part of the question is in the affirmative.

**Q. 40.** Consolidation is desirable in case of small tenancies which may be made either with the consent of the tenants in a body as well as the landlord or landlords in a body or by an application by either party in the civil court in the same way as the tenancy may be divided.

**Q. 41.** No objection.

**Q. 42.** Accumulation of large areas in one hand may be undesirable but prevention is not possible.

**Q. 43.** Not always, it cannot be minimised without interference with the laws of inheritance.

**Q. 44.** Can only be done by introduction of a law of primogeniture—but that will interfere with the Hindu and Muhammadan laws of succession.

**Q. 45.** Desirable.

**Q. 46.** No. Paragraph 3, section 7, Regulation I of 1793 contemplated that the zamindars will exert themselves in the cultivation of their land and will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their good management and industry and so the law has recognised restriction of enhancement of rents in cases of tenures by section 7 and in cases of both tenureholders and raiyats by section 50, of the Bengal Tenancy Act.



**Q. 47.** No. They did not contemplate similar permanency and fixity of rates of rent either in the case of tenants then existing or in the case of tenants subsequently introduced. From before the Permanent Settlement in Bengal raiyati settlement was in vogue in several provinces. In such raiyatwari settlements Government increased the rent from time to time but in Bengal there was no raiyatwari settlement but assessment of revenue used to be made at intervals with the proprietors of the soil on the basis of the proprietors' rent roll irrespective of the question of the fixity of rent of the subordinate tenants so no question arose as to whether the subordinate tenants' rent should be fixed or the zamindars would be free to adjust their rent rolls with the tenants. The question of enhancement of the subordinate tenants' rent arose subsequently, so by subsequent legislation certain restrictions were placed upon enhancement of rents as such power was reserved by section 8, clause (1) of Regulation I of 1793 to the Governor-General in Council.

**Q. 48.** In view of the answers to question No. 47, this question does not arise.

However as the question has been put, the answer is—

(a) The terms of the Regulation do not support the view that the rents of tenancies were fixed in perpetuity.

(b) No other Regulation supports that view of rent having been fixed in perpetuity.

(c) No.

(d) No. Act X of 1859 and Act VIII of 1885, Bengal Tenancy Act, simply created a bar to enhancement of rents of the tenancies existing from the time of Permanent Settlement. That shows unmistakably that as early as 1859 the landlords' power of enhancement of rent was recognised.

Act X of 1859 was passed 66 years after the Permanent Settlement, same rent continuing unvaried for over sixty years was a good indication of rent being fixed at its inception, so section 6 of Bengal Tenancy Act and similar provision in Act X of 1859 was made.

As it was physically impossible to prove something of great antiquity beyond the memory of living generation, some presumption has to be made. So the legislature in 1885 enacted section 6 of Bengal Tenancy Act and similar provision has been made in Act X of 1859.

Section 50 (1), Bengal Tenancy Act, is only a mode of proof, that is a presumption from certain proved fact.

(e) This general ground is fallacious and unsustainable.

At Permanent Settlement the zamindars were allowed a margin of only 10 per cent. which was quite insufficient to cover the collection.

expenses. So apparently to recompense the zamindars' loss no restriction was then placed on probable enhancement of rent of tenants and provision was also made in section 31 of Regulation 2 of 1819 for excluding waste lands, etc., within the limits of the zamindari from operation of resumption. Subsequently and long afterwards when properly unreasonable enhancement used to be made by zamindars the legislature thought of placing some restriction by Act X of 1859 and Act VIII of 1885 on enhancement of rents.

**Q. 49.** This is a purely hypothetical question. If the rate of rent has subsequent to the Permanent Settlement been changed and increased not in violation of any law, by contract or decree of court, then it is neither possible, nor legal nor equitable to bring down the rate to a lesser one which might have existed at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 50.** No. It was just the policy of Lord Ripon to give a Permanent Settlement to cultivators in provinces where there was no Permanent Settlement when he said to the cultivators "You are secured henceforth from all uncertainties and all harassing enquiries, the land tax you pay shall not be an enhanced share of your produce." But at the same time he said to the Settlement Officers "You shall have a legitimate increase in the land revenue if there is an increase in the prices of crops". This was said by Lord Ripon in connection with the settlement of land revenue in Madras and Bombay (*vide* R. C. Dutt's Economic History of India, page 504, Victorian age). The increase or decrease in the price of crops affects the economic condition both of the landlords and the cultivators. If the prices of crops increase the landlords can legitimately claim a share of that increase in the shape of rent. So the provision of increase of rent on the ground of increase of the price of crops in 1859 as well as in 1885 was *not a mistaken policy*.

**Q. 51.** There was no such intention expressed in the wording of Regulation I of 1793.

The second part of the question does not arise in view of the above answer.

**Q. 52.** Fifty per cent. of the nett rental may be fair and equitable in case of tenureholders of all descriptions subject to the conditions: (a) contract between the parties, (b) the amount of premium as salami paid at the inception of the tenancy, and (c) the improvement effected by the landlord or the tenant, (d) the nature of the land settled originally. There is no hard and fast rule in the Bengal Tenancy Act in determining what would be fair and equitable rent in respect of occupancy raiyats but section 27 of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides for a presumption that the existing rent is a fair and equitable

rent, and certain rules have been formulated by sections 30-35. With respect to non-occupancy raiyats section 46, clause (9) gives an indication as to the rent generally paid by raiyats for lands of similar description and with like advantages in the same village.

Section 48B deals with money rents of under-raiyats. The solution of the question as to what is fair and equitable rents depends on various circumstances, e.g.—

- (1) the prevailing rate;
- (2) the rise of the average local prices of staple food crops;
- (3) productive power of the land both by the landlords' action and fluvial action.

The rules regarding fair and equitable rents with respect to occupancy raiyats, non-occupancy raiyats and under-raiyats given in the Bengal Tenancy Act may be taken to be based on sound principles.

**Q. 53.** (i) So far as the rent of permanently settled area is concerned the raiyats' or the cultivators' rents are not based on any uniform principle but enhancements have been obtained under section 105 and section 105A on the principles indicated in sections 7, 30 and 46 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and in Government estates enhancements are generally made during every renewal of those settlements on the principles indicated in those sections.

Yes. So far as old tenancies are concerned materials are not available for us to say to what extent rates are fixed on (a) custom, (b) competition, (c) productivity of land.

(ii) Yes. In practice rates differ for lands of similar value almost in every village and estate.

**Q. 54.** If by poorer and weaker tenants, it is meant, the non-occupancy raiyats, the under-raiyat or the bargadars, then they pay a higher rent in many estates, otherwise poorer and weaker tenants of the same class do not pay higher rents than that paid by the richer and more powerful tenants.

No other factors.

**Q. 55.** No. Because it appears in khas mahal estates that the rents of the raiyats which are fixed on certain principles enunciated in the Bengal Tenancy Act, are generally higher. Any readjustment of the rents of the cultivators of the permanently settled area will be to their disadvantage.

Any readjustment of rents on a fixed principle will unsettle the settled tenancies and would be to the prejudice of the cultivators and would not be to their advantage and any such readjustment cannot be effected without a fresh record of rights.

**Q. 56.** Not more than 50 per cent. or less of the nett produce. Nett produce means produce after deducting the cultivation expenses, price of seeds, cattle expenses and costs of implements also the cultivators' family expenses as almost all the members of the cultivators' family in one shape or another contribute to the agricultural labour without any fixed remuneration.

**Q. 57.** Yes, it should be fixed in perpetuity subject to variation according to the rise in the price of staple food crops but not according to the increased value of the land or the needs of the State from time to time. If rent is fixed in perpetuity subject to the qualification, stated in the above answer, there would be no necessity of re-examination of the rate of rent from time to time. If rate of rent is not fixed in perpetuity and if re-examination of rents be considered necessary, it should not be done before the expiration of 30 years.

**Q. 58.** No. There would be no advantage from tenants' point of view in the substitution of an income-tax on profits from agriculture in place of rent. There will be no security of tenants' position.

Yes, in that case, a large proportion of land in Bengal would escape the payment of revenue, if income below a certain figure were exempted from the tax.

Yes, the proportion of exemption will steadily tend to increase as population and fragmentation of holdings will increase.

Any land tax may in case of scarcity and famine greatly be reduced.

**Q. 59.** To ascertain the prevailing rate, according to the rules of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is a difficult matter and too difficult for small landlords. The cost itself is prohibitive. The Government has got a separate staff to carry on the settlement operation from time to time but the private landlords have got no such separate staffs with the power to settle fair and equitable rent. The private landlords have invariably to seek the help of courts, where the cost is prohibitive and ruinous both to the landlords and tenants and the hard and fast rule enacted in section 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is also a bar to an amicable adjustment between the landlords and tenants even when increase of rent of more than 2 annas in the rupee may be more advantageous to the parties, than obtaining such increase, through the intervention of courts.

**Q. 60.** If the tenants be entitled to reduction of rent owing to deterioration of land by fluvial action, certainly he should pay for improvement caused by fluvial action, otherwise not.

**Q. 61.** No. Not fair, that a particular tenant should get all the benefits and the State or the landlord nothing.

**Q. 62.** It would really be a hardship on such a tenant.

**Q. 63.** No. There can be no objection to reduction on this principle as enhancement is allowed on the ground of prevailing rate. It will be equitable to enhance or to reduce the rent on grounds of prevailing rate of rent. But allowance should be given for improvement by cultivator and salami, if any, paid.

**Q. 64.** Parties should be left free to contract. But contracts may be avoided or rejected on grounds specified in the Contract Act and not otherwise.

**Q. 65(A).** (a) Here the settlement is made by the Revenue Officer on the rent roll prepared *ex parte*.

(b) There is no rent roll prepared as in the case of Government estates but rate of rent is to be determined on principles indicated in sections 30 to 35, Bengal Tenancy Act, which in practice is a very difficult matter.

**Q. 65(B).** Settlement under section 105, Bengal Tenancy Act, should be made by the Civil Court rather than the Revenue Officer as in Bengal Tenancy Act.

**Q. 66.** No.

**Q. 67.** Yes. It is true.

**Q. 68.** No.

**Q. 73.** Yes, generally on the decrease.

*Cause of decrease.*—In Bengal productivity of the soil mainly depends on fluvial action. The Bengal rivers are mostly dead or dying. The Irrigation Department of Bengal is not much in evidence. No attempt is made to open out silted up water channels or to drain out swamps and water-logged tracts. On the contrary, roads and rail lines are constructed without due regard to the drainage and sometimes natural outlets are blocked.

Water hyacinth (kachury) has been of late years a big pest. Attempt to remove the water hyacinth is futile without the discovery of any scientific method for its destruction.

This committee is not aware of any steps having been taken by the Government to improve the fertility of the soil.

Some seeds and manures are sold by the Agricultural Department of Government. But that is very inadequate. Seeds and manures are sold at agricultural offices which are few and far between. Cultivators of the interior of the district seldom get any advantage of such seeds and manures.

Q. 74. This committee is not aware of any provisions of these Acts being taken advantage of.

Q. 75. Not known to the public.

Q. 76. This committee has got no information as to since when salami is realised. This committee is not aware of any way in which Government has utilised any portion of salami money.

Q. 77. The general policy of the Government from the time of the East India Company and not the land system of Bengal, is responsible for the uneconomic condition of the raiyats. By raiyat is meant the cultivating raiyats.

In olden times India was known to be the "Gorgeous East" when India was not only an agricultural country but India was rich in trade, commerce and manufactures. India's wealth and property attracted the attention of many eastern and western countries including Great Britain. Vast quantities of piecegoods manufactured in India were exported by the Arabs, the Dutch, the Portuguese and other European nations who competed with one another for this lucrative trade with India. Misfortunes began with the advent of British Dominion in India. British manufacturers in India to give an impetus to British manufactures repressed Indian industry. Their main policy was to reduce India to a country of raw produce and to make it subservient to the manufacturing industry of Great Britain. Thus cotton industry, silk industry, cutlery and other industries dwindled. Santipur, Dacca, were famous for fine cloths, Berhampore for silk industry. Bengal weavers could not compete with Lancashire manufacturers. Marwaris and Bhatias became big importers of foreign cloths. Heavy tariffs and excise duties played an important part in discouraging indigenous industries. For these and other causes Indian industry and manufactures dwindled and India was reduced to a purely agricultural country and Bengal is no exception. Thus artisans and industrialists, all more or less, took to cultivation. Indigo cultivation was stopped and the imported coolies from the provinces and hilly and jungli tracts settled in Bengal and took to cultivation. Thus heavy pressure was brought to bear upon agricultural land in Bengal. Bengal raiyats mainly depend on land, their subsidiary income is not substantial. Land is the only means of subsistence of Bengal peasants. They do not cultivate lands for profit but only for subsistence. The raiyats are not prosperous. But their uneconomic condition is not due to the Bengal land system. Bengal raiyats are better off than those of other provinces where there is no Permanent Settlement. The Government Industrial Department takes no steps to educate the raiyats in industries by application to which they can derive greater benefit than by mere sale of raw materials. Cottage industries are wanting amongst raiyats. Facilities for cottage industries are wanting.

So it is the Government policy rather than the land system in Bengal that is responsible for the uneconomic condition of Bengal raiyats.

The following may be suggested as a modification of Government policy:—

- (a) Re-opening of dead and dying rivers in Bengal.
- (b) Increase of marketing facilities by construction of more village road and opening water communication in the interior of the districts.
- (c) Affording facilities and help for cottage industries with the help of electric energies for the raiyats during slack seasons.
- (d) Wealth and property of Bengal peasants depends most on jute cultivation. Jute forecast is taken and published by the Government. Jute millowners take advantage of this forecast. It is they who regulate and control the price. Peasants, poor as they are, cannot stock jute for season of high price. Jute workers enter into advance contracts with the millowners and they make purchases in dull season and sell when the price rises high. The producers do not get advantage of high price.

If the Government fix a price and the middlemen, i.e., the brokers, are restrained from buying at a lower price than the producers can get full value for their labours, otherwise on account of their poverty, they are compelled to sell at whatever inadequate price the buyers offer, much to the detriment of the interest of the producers. The economic condition of the peasants may thus be improved.

(e) Rural banks should be established to help the agriculturists in time of need by loans at a reasonably moderate interest as by the Bengal Agriculturist Debtors Act the private moneylenders have well nigh been ruined.

*Vide* also answers to question 80.

**Q. 78.** This question cannot be answered without an economic survey.

**Q. 80.** The suggestions are good. To these may be added.

(1) *Sanitary improvement.*—Bengal of late has become a hotbed of malaria, smallpox, tuberculosis, beri-beri and other epidemic diseases. If better preventive sanitary measures be not adopted, the people will be decimated in large numbers and the survivors will be weaker day by day and economic condition will necessarily be on the wane.

Hospitals are necessary but prevention is better than cure. So preventive measures should be adopted.

(2) *Density of population*.—If the following figures be correct; viz. :—

			Per square mile.
In Bengal	...	...	579
Madras	...	...	297
Bombay	...	...	143
United Provinces	...	...	414
Bihar and Orissa	...	...	340
The Punjab	...	...	184
Great Britain	...	...	485
France	...	...	184
Netherlands	...	...	544
Denmark	...	...	194
Germany	...	...	332
Italy	...	...	313
Belgium	...	...	654
United States of America	...	...	32

Then the density of population in Bengal is only next to Belgium.

If density of population has any effect upon the economic condition of the people, as really it has in an agricultural country where the people depend solely on land, attempt should be made to lessen the density or to divert the people as best as possible from agriculture to industry.

**Q. 81.** Yes, pressure of population is one of the causes of the poverty. Not possible to say without an economical survey, what percentage of population is surplus.

**Q. 82.** Yes, introduction of industries, small or large, coupled with amendment of tariff giving protection against foreign imports including British imports and encouragement of exports of finished goods and abolition of excise duty or reduction of excise duty on indigenous products.

**Q. 83.** Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act should be abolished. Agricultural banks or rural banks in every union should be established. That will be a check upon the private moneylenders charging exorbitant rate of interest. Absolute power of sale of raiyati holding



should be curtailed at least to the extent of half the holding otherwise raiyats will be reduced to the position of day labourers.

**Q. 84.** Without any definite data it is not possible to answer the first part of the question.

As to second part, *vide* answer to question 83.

**Q. 86.** Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, Act VII of 1936, was passed in April 1936. It has been in working order only for a short time of less than 3 years. The Debt Settlement Boards have not been able to deal with the problem of agricultural debts. The provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder are almost impracticable and inconsistent, e.g., when a debtor makes an application there may be a settlement of debts in absence of the creditor if he does not appear on notice. But if the creditor applies his application shall be dismissed if on notice the debtor does not appear—section 13, clauses 2 and 3 of the Act.

**Q. 87.** Establishment of agricultural banks in each union is commendable. *Vide* also the answer to question 83.

**Q. 89.** Yes, too costly, specially for the landlords.

Landlords have to pay for separate court-fee and separate process-fees for tenants of the same village and separate vakalatnames. But the cases may be tried analogously and the tenants shall have to bear all costs in case of separate decrees. Thus the litigation cost is prohibitive.

## Reply by the Hooghly Landholders' Association.

**Q. 1.** This description is practically exhaustive of the duties and obligations cast on the "zamindars, independent taluqdars, and other actual proprietors of land" by the Permanent Settlement Regulation (Regulation I of 1793), except that the zamindars, etc., were not enjoined to extend to their subordinate tenants the *same generous treatment*, which they were to receive from the Government. They were enjoined to "conduct themselves with *good faith and moderation* towards their dependent taluqdars and raiyats". Here "good faith" means nothing more or less than honest dealing, and "moderation" is anti-thesis of violence, extortion, etc. We do not know what the framer of this question meant by the words "the same generous treatment". If by these words he means fixity of rent and permanency of tenure our answer must be emphatically "no". The Government of the day did not intend the zamindars, etc., to grant leases to all tenants permanently or for an amount of rent fixed for ever. (*Vide* section 52 of Regulation XLIV of 1793.)

In our opinion the "Permanent Settlement" did not take away any of the existing rights of the tenants. Rather the tenants were placed in a better position after the Permanent Settlement Regulation and Regulations passed on the same date. The rights of dependent taluqdars and certain classes of tenants were given statutory recognition just as the rights of the landholders of the day. And all tenants, generally speaking, were promised protection by the State against the oppression of their landlords. It is superfluous to describe how severe this oppression was in the early days of the East India Company or earlier still, during the decadence of the Moghul rule. We can go so far as to say that the Permanent Settlement Regulation has been the "Magna Charta" of the raiyats and subsequent Regulations and Acts are simply confirmations and practical fulfilments of the promise of protection to the raiyats proclaimed therein. In fact Article VII of the Permanent Settlement Regulation has been the genesis of all legislations in favour of the raiyats, sometimes to the great detriment of the landholder's income and substantial encroachment on his rights.

**Q. 2.** By the Permanent Settlement the zamindars, who were known to be "proprietors of land" by custom, were formally recognised to be absolute proprietors of the soil, subject to some reservations one of which being that the State would from time to time control the relation between the landlord and his tenants. Regulation VIII of 1793 passed on the same day as the Permanent Settlement Regulation (Regulation I of 1793) by the same high authority, accordingly laid down the

rights of some classes of tenants ("istimrardars" and "dependent taluqdars"). The same regulation (Regulation VIII of 1793) also declared that all lands belonging to the landholder, except those held by the above mentioned tenants, could be let out by him in "whatever manner" he might "think proper", subject, of course, to some statutory restrictions, mentioned in the same Regulation. If the zamindar laid down in his "patta" that the land was not to be transferred by the tenant, as generally the zamindar did, until very recently, he had every right to refuse his tenant's transferee admission into his lands. Thus he had the power to choose his tenants.

The zamindar by contract with his tenant at the time of admitting him into his lands by a lease (patta), could lay down whether the land was leased for homestead purposes or for agriculture or for fishery rights and so on. In fact the Permanent Settlement Regulation did give him the power to regulate the usage of land to the economic interest of his own lands, which practically coincided with that of his own province. For it is superfluous to point out that if lands of every individual landholder were improved the lands of the whole province would be improved also.

A great part of the province was full of jungles and was uncultivated, when the Permanent Settlement was made. The Government of the day hoped that as a result of this settlement, wherein formal recognition of landholders as proprietors of the soil was made, the landholders would "exert themselves in the cultivation of *their* lands under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry". The language of the Regulation is so clear that there can be no shadow of doubt that the landholders were vested with the authority of improving *their* lands and of regulating the usage of the same to their own economic interest which practically meant the economic interest of the province.

**Q. 3.** At the time of the Permanent Settlement lands were, for the most part, full of jungles and uncultivated large areas of swampy lands lay fallow. Road communications were in a very unsatisfactory condition. The zamindars by investing their huge capital and labour constructed roads, bridges and embankments, excavated tanks, reclaimed jungles, and swamps, and by their judicious management extended and improved agriculture and thus increased the wealth and prosperity of the country beyond expectation. Under the security assured by the Regulation of 1793, landlords let loose their capital for investment in lands and tried hard to increase the economic productivity of the soil. Schools, colleges, libraries, hospitals and charitable dispensaries sprang up in different parts of the country. All these owe their origin and existence to the munificence and welfare activities of the zamindars who brought new light to the province and were very

active and powerful factors in developing the prosperity of the country. Fine arts, architecture, literature, and music, all flourished under their patronage. Huge religious endowments were made by them. They with their many-sided activities became natural leaders of the country. In fact, Bengal of to-day is their creation.

In this connection the report of the Commissioner of the Burdwan Division, dated the 20th October 1883, is worth considering. It runs as follows:—"The Bengal of to-day offers a striking contrast of Bengal of 1793, the wealth and prosperity of the country have marvellously increased beyond all precedents under the Permanent Settlement ..... a great portion of this increase is due to the zamindari body as a whole and they have been very active and powerful factors in the development of this prosperity."

We think that zamindars have ably performed the functions expected of them under the noble Regulations of 1793, until their powers had been crippled by the tenancy legislation and its subsequent amendments. The tenancy legislation has widened the power and extended the rights of tenants making constant inroads upon the statutory rights of the zamindars, who have now become mere rent-receivers. It is well-known that demands for tenancy legislation originally came from landlords for being vested with effectual powers for speedy realisation of rents, but it is regrettable that their fair and legitimate claim has been deliberately ignored by the Act. Since the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act, legislation after legislation has been introduced to grant greater rights and privileges to the tenants at the expense of the landlords. It must be admitted that this extension of privileges does not cast any corresponding obligation on them—not even the obligation of improving their lands or cultivation. Landlords, who have the greatest interest in the improvement of land of which they are the actual proprietors, have no right to question if cultivation is neglected and lands are left fallow. It is enough for a landlord if he gets rents. Landlords have got to perform their obligations to the Government with uncertainty of collection. The recent legislation has palsied their hands, snapped the tie of landlord-tenant relation and there is none to perform the function of landlordism.

Q. It is not correct that the Permanent Settlement converted the zamindars to actual proprietors of the soil from mere revenue-collectors. There were zamindars long before the Permanent Settlement. The Hindu system of jurisprudence was conducive to the growth of the zamindars, as their rights were hereditary. During the Muhammadan rule, large, rich and powerful zamindars came into existence, as even then, the Hindu principles were dominant.

Mr. Shore in his Minutes of the 2nd April 1788 and 18th June 1789, says: "The origin of proprietary and hereditary rights of the zamindars

is uncertain, that in Akbar's time the zamindars of Bengal were numerous, rich and powerful, that they were not of his creation and probably existed with some possible variation in their rights and privileges before the Muhammadan conquests in Hindusthan" (page 40, Field).

Hastings unwilling to deal with the abstract question of zamindars' right of property said, "I mean not here to enter into any discussion of their (zamindars') fact and form, as applied to their situation. Our Government.....has admitted the opinion of their rightful proprietorship of the lands".

The Hon'ble Sir George Campbell traces their origin to,—(1) old tributary Rajas, (2) native leaders of Hindu clans, (3) adventurers who rose to power and subsequently came to terms with the Government agreeing to pay revenue or tribute for the tract of the country they controlled, (4) Revenue Collectors who during the troubled times and long continued weakness of the provincial Government gained their footings as hereditary proprietors, and (5) enterprising land-speculators who during the decadence of the Moghul Empire, taking contracts of paying revenues came to power as Farmer Generals and handed their rights down to their successors.

The "Ain-i-Akbari" says that there were numerous rich and powerful zamindars in Bengal. "In the 17th century the territorial magnets" and the great zamindars of Bengal "became independent." In the 18th century vigorous attempts were made to level down these zamindars whose hereditary and proprietary rights were established beyond dispute." Sir William Hunter observes,—"Bengal zamindars at the Permanent Settlement represented heterogenous results of two sets of influences: the long continued weakness of the provincial Government which made for their independence down to the end of the 17th century; and the stringent fiscal policy of Murshid Kuli Khan of the early part of the 18th century, followed by the farming system of East India Company from 1765 to 1789 which tended to reduce the zamindars to mere agents for the collection of the land-tax."

In 1793 when the Permanent Settlement was made with this "Composite body of zamindars" their rights in soil were recognised by the Regulation declaring them as proprietors in perpetuity and placed them on a uniform legal basis. As regards conflicting and contradictory statements as to the rights and claims of the Bengal landlords prior to the Permanent Settlement, it should be borne in mind that various historians "had in their minds certain classes of landlords to the exclusion of the others."

**Q. 5.** The annulment of the Permanent Settlement would be a serious breach of the solemn pledge given by the then Government of

the Hon'ble East India Company to the zamindars. The State demand having been fixed at the 9/10ths of the gross rental of the province, the zamindars were put into a very precarious position with the scanty income of 1/10th left to them. Many houses fell down to meet the State demand. It was then very risky to buy zamindaris, but in spite of this many speculative persons hazarded themselves in the task. Zamindars had to invest their capital and labour for increasing their income. The uneconomic lands were brought under cultivation. Their ingenious investments, strenuous efforts, untiring energy increased the productivity of the soil and made land profitable. It was their capital and intelligence and labour, that have converted a very large portion of the province (estimated "at one-third by Lord Cornwallis, at one-half by others and by some at two-thirds of land, capable of cultivation", lying waste) into rich cultivated areas, giving employment and living to millions of their countrymen. The present day zamindaris were built by the zamindars themselves. All this was done on the solemn pledge given to them in the Permanent Settlement—a pledge solemnly declared by the Governor-General of India on behalf of the Court of Directors under the orders of the British Parliament. We think such a pledge is inviolable and its annulment on any ground would be to strike at the root of the fundamentals of equity and justice.

• We do not think that it can be seriously contended that tenants were not parties to the Settlement. The Settlement was concluded by the Government on their own behalf and on behalf of the tenants as well. The Government being the custodian of rights of all people and specially those, who are most helpless by situation, they made provisions in the Permanent Settlement Regulation for safeguarding and protecting the rights and interests of dependent taluqdars, raiyats and cultivators.

Now, let us examine the question whether the Permanent Settlement has permanently crippled the financial resources of the country. Nobody can disown the fact that the growing prosperity of the people is the best wealth of the Government. If the State is found to lose in land revenue it will be found that the gain is immensely high from stamps, customs receipts and income-tax. Permanent Settlement is responsible for the huge income of the Government under these heads. The income-tax in Bengal collected in 1928-29 was more than 6 crores. "An analysis of income-tax assessment made in 1920 at the instance of Meston Committee showed that over 90 per cent. of the income-tax collected in the provinces came solely from Bengal". "The Judicial statistics would show that out of the total number of civil suits nearly 60 per cent. are rent suits and 90 per cent. of money suits are for kisti-bandi (for rent). Landlords are responsible for the huge figure of the Stamp Duty," which was "Rs. 3,55,00,000 in 1928-29". "Nearly 24 crores are collected from the ports within the territorial jurisdiction of

Bengal". This shows the great purchasing power of Bengal. The purchasing power of people means the taxable capacity of the province. It is the Permanent Settlement which contributes to the comparative prosperity of the people which is a great asset to the Government. The table given below will show high contributions of Bengal under income-tax and customs receipts—

(In lakhs of Rupees.)			
In 1928-29.			
		Income-tax	Customs.
"Bengal	...	615	1,850
Madras	...	131	469
Bombay	...	317	1,921
U. P.	...	90	...

Bengal's contributions to the Central Government is the highest of all the other provinces. In 1925-26 Bengal contributed "more than 26 crores under various heads such as income-tax, customs, excise, etc., whereas Madras with a population nearly the same as Bengal contributed 6 crores only; Bombay 23 crores and U.P. more than 1 crore only. If we examine the incidence of taxation per head of population in India, "we find that Bengal is the most heavily taxed province in India excepting Bombay which is a manufacturing province and not an agricultural one like Bengal"—

			Rs.	A.
"Bengal	...	...	7	8
U. P.	...	...	3	8
Madras	...	...	5	11
B. & O.	...	...	1	12
Punjab	...	...	6	6
Bombay	...	...	19	11
C. P.	...	...	4	7
Assam	...	...	3	13"

It is clear from the facts stated above that inelasticity of land revenue in Bengal is amply compensated by income from various other heads, which is due to the affluence of the people and this affluence is due to the measure adopted by Lord Cornwallis;—  
 ".....in Bengal Permanent Settlement has

benefited the whole agricultural community; the entire peasant population shares the benefit and is more prosperous and resourceful on account of the measure.....in Bengal it has afforded a protection to agriculture which is virtually the only means of nation's subsistence. ....It has saved the nation from fatal and disastrous famines." (*Economic History of British India* by Mr. R. C. Dutt.)

The real state of the country at the time of the Decennial Settlement as compared with the improved condition brought about by the Permanent Settlement has been ably described by Mr. Pattle as follows:—

"The country brought under the Decennial Settlement was for the most part wholly uncultivated. Indeed such was the state of the country from the prevalence of jungles infested by wild beasts that to go with any tolerable degree of safety from Calcutta to any of the adjacent district, a traveller was obliged to have at each stage four drums and as many torches; besides, at this conjuncture, public credit was at its lowest ebb, and the Government was threatened with hostilities from various powerful Native States. Lord Cornwallis's great and comprehensive mind saw that the only resource within his reach in this critical emergency was to establish public credit and redeem the extensive jungles of the country. These important objects, he perceived, could only be effected by giving to the country a perpetual land assessment made on the gross rental with reference to existing productiveness and therefore promising to all those, who would engage, the encouragement of an immense profit from extending cultivation. Admitting that the sacrifice was very great, I think it cannot be regretted when it is considered what difficulties it conquered, and what prosperity it has introduced and achieved. For my part, I am convinced that our continuance in the country depends on the adoption of that measure, and that our stability could not otherwise have been maintained unaltered."

The following is the considered opinion of Sir John Anderson, at St. Andrews Day Dinner on the 30th November, 1932,—"It is, I believe, often said that Bengal would be all right if it were not for the Permanent Settlement. Such a comment does not seem to me to be particularly relevant but let us examine the point. The Settlement of 1793 was not the outcome of the grasping and short-sighted policy of a parochially-minded provincial Government but was deliberately imposed by the highest authority. Incidentally it was the same authority who announced that it was "Fixed for ever". No doubt the provincial Government would have been able, had there been no Permanent Settlement, to derive a larger revenue from the land; but in that case it would have been impossible under conditions prevailing to-day to collect the full amount of the tax on jute".



Thus it is clear that the Permanent Settlement has not crippled the financial resources of the country. It is evident that Government may gain some greater income from land revenue by abolition of the Permanent Settlement, but the huge income which percolates through the various other sources as mentioned above is sure to dwindle.

**Q. 6.** The framers of the Permanent Settlement Regulation expected that the zamindars would extend cultivation and bring uncultivated areas under cultivation. This expectation has been amply fulfilled.

Zamindars have invested their capital in reclaiming lands and swamps by clearing jungles, by taking under hand and finishing drainage schemes, by erecting embankments, by excavating tanks for the purposes of irrigation and drinking. Many of these improvements have to be maintained by continued recurring expenses. Moreover, zamindars have introduced new crops. We cannot speak for other districts, but for our district (the district of Hooghly) we can speak with confidence that potato, sugarcane, jute, etc., were introduced by zamindars. And no one, who has any knowledge of the prejudices of a Bengali tenant, can know how difficult it is to introduce a new crop.

It is not possible to lay down exactly to what extent each of the three factors, mentioned in the question, have contributed to the increase in the area brought under cultivation. All that we can say with confidence is that the "initiative and the pecuniary or other assistance of zamindars" have played the greatest part in the extension of cultivation in Bengal.

(i) Increase of population may foster demand for lands, but in most cases it is the landlord, who has induced tenants to reclaim waste lands on condition that they would enjoy the same for some years free of rent, so that they might be amply compensated for their labour and some outlay of capital. Reclamation of small areas was thus the outcome of enterprise of tenants, but not the reclamation of big areas, which we strongly maintain, has been due to the enterprise of the zamindars and other landholders. Sometimes tenants from other provinces have been brought down to settle in Bengal. The landholders in our district (Hooghly) have even now to bring Sonthals from outside and settle them on their lands in order to keep them in cultivation.

There is no reliable data on the basis of which it can be ascertained to what extent large areas of land were brought under cultivation by the (ii) enterprise of tenants and (iii) by the initiative and the pecuniary or other assistance of zamindars.

**Q. 7.** It is not possible to ascribe how much of increase in valuation is due to each of the three causes mentioned in the question. The

three causes are practically dependent on each other, though we are inclined to give most credit to the good management of the zamindar. It is often very rare that any enterprising tenant or group of such tenants approach the landlord on his or their own initiative to reclaim waste lands of his estates and increase cultivation in the same. The landlord has to persuade the tenants to do so. He has got to finance them for the purpose in such cases. The capital comes from the landlord and the labour from the tenant. The landholder has sometimes to lease the land free of rent for a period and then assess rent at a gradually increasing scale not harassing to the tenants. Enhancement of rent naturally follows improvement of lands.

**Q. 8.** We fail to understand what the framer of this question means by the words "the same equity and generous treatment." We have criticized the words "the same generous treatment" in our answer to question 1.

Zamindars have always treated their tenants with moderation and kindness. In times of big calamities (such as Damodar flood, etc.), they have remitted their tenants' accumulated arrears of rent and have advanced them loans. They have always (even in these days of great economic distress) made remissions of interest and even rents. They have always granted easy instalments for payment of arrears of rent—instalments easier than what the Statutory Debt Settlement Boards can and do grant. The zamindars have always protected their weaker tenants from the oppression of the more powerful—in fact such protection has become proverbial in Bengal. Whenever there has been famine the zamindar has come to the relief of his tenants. In times of epidemics zamindars have been known to have distributed medicines to their raiyats. Schools and charitable dispensaries have always received generous contributions from landholders.

If everything done by a zamindar is taken into account we cannot but hold that the zamindar has not failed to do what was expected of him.

**Q. 9.** The question is divided into three parts. As regards the first portion of the question we have discussed the same subject in our answer to question 6.

As to the second part of the present question our answer is as follows:—

Extension of cultivation in their zamindaris was not imposed as a duty on the zamindars by the Government of Lord Cornwallis. The Government of the day hoped and expected that as a result of the Permanent Settlement extension of cultivation would be undertaken by the zamindars, and we are of opinion that this expectation has been amply fulfilled.

As regards *duties* cast on zamindars the Permanent Settlement Regulation clearly laid down the following:—

- (1) To discharge the revenues at the stipulated periods without delay or evasion.
- (2) To conduct themselves with good faith and moderation towards their dependent taluqdars and raiyats.
- (3) To enjoin the strictest adherence to the same principles in the persons whom they may appoint to collect the rents for them.

The only complaint which the tenants can make is that sometimes officers and servants appointed by landholders do not deal honestly and kindly with them. It must also be said to the credit of landholders that in most cases as soon as any such complaints reach them, they at once take necessary steps and give prompt relief to their tenants.

Much is now made of the “absenteeism” of zamindars. If by the word “absenteeism” is meant non-residence in one’s zamindari, all zamindars would plead guilty to the charge, for it is physically impossible for a zamindar with his extensive properties scattered over a district or sometimes more than one district, to be present in each mauza of his zamindari. Even the framers of the Permanent Settlement did not imagine this to be a necessary duty. Moreover in these days of good communications—railways and bus routes and post offices—any tenant can reach the ears of his landlord without much trouble or expenditure. Much of the evil effects of “absenteeism” has been minimised by these factors of the present age.

We must admit that to some extent failure of enlightenment and leadership in rural area is due to absence of zamindars, who in their turn, by losing close touch with the peasantry, are liable to some extent to be ignorant of the real grievances of the raiyats.

The Bengal Tenancy Act and other pro-tenancy legislations have gradually so much encroached on the rights and privileges of the landholder and so much crippled his powers for doing good to agriculturists that the presence of any landholder in his estate will not bring about the expected results. “The real cause of absenteeism is not the apathy of zamindars but the transference of their powers to a more unimaginative, unsympathetic community.”

**Q. 10.** It is a well-known fact that the Permanent Settlement was not sought by the zamindars; it was thrust upon them for “historical and fiscal reason.” In course of a few years the economic necessities led to subinfeudation. Thus, profits of the landholders are being distributed amongst a large number of middleclass tenureholders of various grades. “Diffusion of ownership of the property has broadened the basis of capitalism” and has protected it “against the massing in hostility to it of all the remaining elements of the society.”

Thus we find that Bengal's middle class people who are really the backbone of the society have a direct stake in the system. The Regulation of 1793 did not leave tenants at the mercy of the zamindars. The Governor-General-in-Council reserved the right of enacting "such regulations as he may think necessary for the protection and welfare of the dependent taluqdars, raiyats and other cultivators of the soil." Certainty of revenue from the land was a great boon to the Government. Owing to the fixity of the land revenue under the Permanent Settlement Regulation income from stamp duty, income-tax and customs receipts is enormous. If we examine the incidence of taxation per head of the population "we find that Bengal is the most heavily taxed province excepting Bombay which is a manufacturing province and not an agricultural one like Bengal." The taxable capacity of the province is dependent on the purchasing power of the people, that is, on the affluence of the people. There is no doubt that the Permanent Settlement was in the economic interest of the people and the Government and for the greatest good of the largest number and not a one-sided measure adopted in the interest of one particular class of people. In this connection we may refer to the comparative effects of the Bengal Settlement of 1793 and William Pitt's Settlement of 1798 of England as shown by Mr. R. C. Dutt in *The Economic History of the British India* ".....in England the settlement benefited the landed class only; in Bengal the settlement benefited the whole agricultural community; the entire peasant population shared the benefit and is more prosperous and resourceful on account of the measure. In England the settlement limited the tax on one out of many sources of the national income; in Bengal it has afforded a protection to agriculture which is virtually the only means of nation's subsistence. In England it precluded the State from drawing a large land tax to be spent in the country for the benefit of the nation; in Bengal it has precluded from increasing the annual economic drain of wealth out of the country. In England it saved the landlord class from added taxation; in Bengal it had saved the nation from fatal and disastrous famines."

We may here also point out the advantages which the Government has reaped from the Permanent Settlement of Bengal—"It is not an exaggeration to state that Bengal, with its Permanent Settlement, yielding a steady and unvarying income from the soil enabled the British nation to build up their Indian Empire. Bengal paid the expenses of ambitious wars and annexations in Northern and Southern India. Madras and Bombay never paid the total cost of their own administration during these years. Great Britain never contributed anything towards the acquisition of India" (Mr. R. C. Dutt).

• Q. 11. This question postulates that the condition of the raiyats was better before the Permanent Settlement and that it has been

daily becoming worse after the Permanent Settlement. Nothing can be farther from truth. The burden of the raiyat, as suggested in the four clauses of the question, was more grievous before the Permanent Settlement. History tells us so.

Now let us examine the four grounds on which the Permanent Settlement is said to have been assailed—

(i) Nowhere in Bengal the rent of an occupancy raiyat exceeds 6 per cent. of the gross produce. So it cannot amount to 80 per cent. of the net profit of the said raiyat. The zamindar, if a hierarchy of tenureholders intervene between himself and the raiyat, gets much less than 6 per cent. mentioned just now.

(ii) The economic necessities of the time combined with the unsettled state of the country and bad revenue policy of the Government did encourage subinfeudation among landholders. But this, we beg to submit, has been more to the good of the country and the raiyat than otherwise. Subinfeudation among tenants (i.e., the system of under-raiyats) is not the creation of the Permanent Settlement, but that of the pro-tenant legislations like the Bengal Tenancy Act, which created a class of petty landlords, who are in fact more oppressive than the landholders themselves.

(iii) Raiyati rent was always enhanced or reduced according to circumstances. The Permanent Settlement did not give any impetus to such enhancement. The growth of population, increase of income from agricultural lands for various reasons, especially improvement in the world trade, etc., raised the market value of raiyati lands and consequently the rent for the same. The Bengal Tenancy Act made clear provisions for such increase and the landholders have taken advantage of that provision of the law. But they cannot act arbitrarily. They have rather always kept an eye to the fact that the rent be not excessive. Numerous cases can be cited where landholders have not increased rents for more than 30, 40 or 50 years out of sympathy for their tenants.

(iv) In our opinion it is not the subinfeudation among landholders that is harassing to cultivators, but the subinfeudation under occupancy raiyats, which is the direct effect of the pro-tenant legislation like the Bengal Tenancy Act.

Hence we conclude that the Permanent Settlement cannot be held responsible for the miseries of the cultivators as suggested by the question.

**Q. 13.** We strongly maintain that the Government has not lost anything by the Permanent Settlement. Firstly, land revenue may have lost elasticity but it has gained certainty. Even during these

hard days of economic depression more than 83 per cent. of revenue of the permanently settled area in Bengal has been realised as opposed to 43.25 per cent. of the collection from the Government estates in the year 1936-37. In the United Provinces and other provinces, where the settlement is made on temporary basis the Government has got to grant, during bad years, remission of rent, which is unknown in Bengal (permanently settled areas).

Collection charges of the Government would amount to a pretty big sum, if the Government cancels the Permanent Settlement.

The fancied loss of the Government in revenue is amply compensated by stamp duty on rent suits, etc. (due to the effect of the Permanent Settlement) and income-tax on middle class people of Bengal and customs duty (including export duty on jute). In Bengal the stamp duty amounts to more than 3 crores; income-tax more than 6 crores and customs duty more than 18 crores—taxes on these heads being much less in other provinces. We are of opinion that the comparative affluence of the people of Bengal and her taxable capacity is due more to the Permanent Settlement than anything else.

The revenue of the province can be augmented by ways more than one. And a Government supported by a big majority can do so without impunity. But it is a fact that the taxable capacity of the people has got a limit and taxation without any corresponding benefit to the people must lead to disaster.

We think that the methods suggested in the question to increase revenue will neither be fair and just nor expedient. We oppose all the methods suggested on the following grounds:—

(1) In our opinion methods (i) and (ii) would not produce the desirable results, for the zamindari system and the Permanent Settlement would have to be substituted by collection from the raiyats directly by the Government. Taking note from the collection charges of rupees one crore and a half in Madras for collecting land revenue of 5 crores and 13 lakhs from 123,541 sq. miles compared with no collection charges on collection of rupees 3 crores from 46,000 sq. miles in the permanently settled area in Bengal, we may safely conclude that nearly  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the revenue will be eaten up by the Revenue Department.

(2) Moreover it is only just and equitable that the Government will have to compensate the landholders of all grades up to the occupancy raiyats for expropriation of their rights, which will mean a very great substantial increase in the amount of national debt and drain on the resources of the province.

(3) No good Government should be jealous of the prosperity of its subjects, for it is an asset to the State. Taxable power of the people depends on its prosperity. We have shown just now that the capacity of the people of Bengal to pay a very big amount of income-tax, customs duty and stamp duty—bigger than most of the other provinces, which pay less than Bengal to the Central Government, shows unmistakably the benefits of the Permanent Settlement.

(4) It is often forgotten how much of the burden of arrears of rent of raiyats are borne by zamindars and other landholders. In these days of economic depression arrears of rent of most of the tenants of our district amount to no less than three years' demand. Examples of relieving their tenants with long-term kistibundi for accumulated arrears are not uncommon. The raiyats will not get this kind of relief in the hands of the Government.

(5) Abolition of the Permanent Settlement would mean ruination of the middle class of Bengal, the glory of the province, for the profits derived by landholders from lands are divided among the members of a hierarchy of landholders, with the zemindar at the top and tenureholder just above the cultivating raiyat at the bottom. And most of these last class of landlords belong to the middle class of Bengali society.

(6) In spite of what the traducers say, the landholders still contribute a considerable portion of their income for charitable purposes and improvement of villages. As soon as the landholders will lose touch with the raiyat and become annuitants of the State, they will feel very much unwilling to continue such charities.

As regards income-tax on agricultural income we venture to say that it will be a deliberate breach of pledge given by the Government at the time of the Permanent Settlement.

At the time of the Permanent Settlement the zamindars and other landholders (with whom the Permanent Settlement was concluded) were given to understand that "they would enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry and that *no demand would ever be made* upon them or their heirs, or successors, by the present or any future Government, for an augmentation of the public assessment *in consequence of the improvement of their respective estates*". (Paragraph 3 of Article VI of Regulation I of 1793). When the Permanent Settlement was made the zamindars had a bare profit of 10 per cent. They and their successors-in-interest have improved their lands and are now enjoying the fruits of that improvement. The Government cannot, without going back on their words and being guilty of breach of a solemn pledge, assess them with an income-tax on the profits thus acquired.

We are aware that the Income-Tax Act of 1860 did not exempt agricultural income but we are strongly of opinion that it was imposed *ultra vires*. The representatives of the landholders supported this tax at that time simply because it was a temporary measure and was enacted with the ostensible purpose of stabilising the finances after the Sépoy mutiny.

We do consider that the road and public works cesses are also imposed in contravention of the pledges of the Permanent Settlement for they are in the nature of taxes on agricultural income.

Another defect of income-tax on agricultural income would be its assessment on landholders and exemption of raiyats, for most of the raiyats would not have the proper qualification for such taxation. This "looks like a punitive measure and has no sanction in the canons of taxation."

If the said tax is imposed in the shape of a cess like the road and public works cess and everyone having any connection with the land is compelled to pay the same, the burden will be too heavy on many agriculturists and raiyats and will prove like the last straw on the camel's back, for Bengal is the most highly assessed agricultural province of India.

**Q. 14.** We do not advocate abolition of the zamindari system or the Permanent Settlement. Still if the Government think otherwise we venture to say that compensation should be given to zamindars. Our suggestion is that the zamindars should be given G. P. Notes or Bonds; the interest derived from which will equal the average annual nett income of a zamindar, calculated after computing his nett income from his estate for 20 years ending in 1930-31.

The consequent increase in national debt would be a monstrous sum. The nett income of the *landholding community* in Bengal has been calculated to be 12 crores of rupees. The face value of papers if carrying 5 per cent. interest would consequently be 240 crores and if carrying 3 per cent. interest would be 400 crores.

**Q. 15.** We do not advise the bonds to be redeemable, for in that case the Government will have at one time—after the lapse of a period, however long it is—to redeem them at considerable expense, which may prove to be prohibitive.

As regards the rate of interest we suggest 5 per cent. (income-tax free).

**Q. 16.** This question read with question 21 seems to indicate that the term "zamindari" here has not been used in the loose sense of the term (*viz.*, all landholders including tenureholders). Hence, we do not discuss here the effect on the social structure of Bengal, if the State purchase of landed properties, including tenures, is made.



To our mind the effect of the abolition of the present zamindaris only on the social structure of Bengal will be as follows:—

(1) The tenureholders, immediately after the rank of zamindar, will be elevated to the position of the zamindar and will have to pay as revenue the same amount, which he used to pay as rent to his superior landlord, the zamindar.

(2) Tenureholders of the 2nd, 3rd and other degrees will be promoted to one degree in social and legal position. But this advancement will not be felt very much in society, because in our society no such distinction is attached to the different grades of landlordism. Of course big zamindars like the Burdwan Raj, Natore Raj, etc., have always been held in special veneration because of their wealth, power, munificence and aristocracy and because of the origin of their zamindaris which can be traced to the pre-British days.

(3) The condition of the raiyats will practically remain the same unless they come directly under the Government (in case they were before directly under the zamindar and not under any tenureholder). But this dignity will be more than balanced by the troubles of collection by certificate procedure.

(4) The zamindars having retired from their business by becoming annuitants of the State, will cease to take any interest in land and welfare of raiyats and other country people.

(5) Consequently their grants to public and private charitable institutions will be stopped. This will be very badly felt by the people of Bengal.

(6) Some of the zamindars may invest money in other businesses, but being without the necessary training for the same, may be involved in financial loss.

(7) Cottage industries may receive a setback for some time, because it was the aristocratic houses of zamindars, that were great patrons of fine arts and cottage industries.

(8) Most of the zamindars are involved in heavy debts. So that most of the compensation money that will be given to them will be seized by moneylenders. Unless the Government gives them sufficient protection by making legal provision for slow liquidation of their debts, the consequence will be that many aristocratic houses will be ruined. Even their families will perhaps be exterminated.

(9) No tenureholder would like the idea of his zamindar being expropriated as his connection with the zamindar is nearly akin to family relations.

**Q. 17.** If the zamindari system is going to be abolished it is illogical and impolitic to exterminate the highest class of landholders and to foster the institution of landlordism by preserving other classes. Landlordism should be abolished altogether, if the Permanent Settlement and the land system based on the same is thought to be an unmitigated evil and a mistake committed by the Government.

It is our confirmed opinion that abolition of landlordism will not lead to any advantage. Tenants of estates purchased khas by the Government at the recent revenue sales do not find themselves better off than when they were under private zamindars.

**Q. 18.** The number of revenue officers will have to be increased. Perhaps a larger Revenue Board with one member for each division of the province will have to be created. Under him will have to be created grades of revenue collectors from the Collector of a district to that of a mauza with innumerable peons and servants.

The cost of administration of this enlarged Revenue Department of the State would not amount to less than 25 per cent. of the gross collection, which means it will equal to nearly 4 crores of rupees.

**Q. 19.** It is doubtful whether the raiyats under private landholders would prefer to come under Government and pay to it direct. Khas mahal tenants have got to pay rents punctually failing which recovery of rent by certificate procedure is taken recourse to; on the other hand defaulting tenants under landholders are generally allowed four years' respite before institution of rent suits for arrears. The rent decree also takes more than a year for execution. A khas mahal tenant has lesser rights than tenants under a private landlord. He cannot sublet his lands. He must cultivate the land to the satisfaction of the Government and so on.

Moreover, tenants under a private landlord are somewhat better off than a khas mahal tenant in another respect. They look up to and approach their immediate superior landlord in times of difficulties, specially when oppressed by a powerful neighbour. Family factions, party feuds, transactions with their moneylenders are very often settled or compromised in the parlour of their landlord, who still has some influence over his tenants by virtue of his position as a landholder and who is generally more intelligent and cultured than his tenants, and as such, is capable of settling such matters amicably. Khas mahal tenants are generally involved in costly litigations for want of a proper leader who can solve their difficulties.

**Q. 20.** We do not think that the Permanent Settlement Regulation was primarily responsible for encouraging subinfeudation. The imperfect revenue policy of the Government of the time, as well as unsettled state of country made it incumbent on zamindars to lease out

portions of their vast zamindaris for the requirements of managing large and scattered estates and for the development and promotion of agriculture. "Pattas" were originally granted for a limited period but Government ultimately thought that it was essential that pattas of proprietors with the taluqdars and under-farmers should be given for terms sufficient to induce them for cultivation. In the absence of effective methods of speedy realisation of rents by landlords the great estates had to be split up, by a system of subinfeudation giving leases in perpetuity for some consideration. Thus the zamindar created a permanent tenure under him intervening between himself and his raiyat, parting with a portion of his zamindari income for valuable consideration. The Government demand was then too high; realisation of rent was uncertain and unsatisfactory. It was then very hard for the zamindars to discharge their obligations to the Government. Revenue sale law was too rigid. The Government by inauguration of the Permanent Settlement made their land revenue secure and certain. But the zamindars with whom the settlement was made, were put into disastrous plight for want of adequate and effective system for realising rents from their tenants. The economic necessities for the time led to subinfeudation. The Burdwan Raj was saved by the creation of Patni tenure system. "The Government by their hesitant and imperfect revenue policy allowed this permanent tenure to grow." If the Government thought that such subinfeudation was detrimental to the interest of the cultivating raiyats they ought to have helped the landlords in realisation of rents. We believe that the creation of such tenures has not adversely affected the interest of the raiyats. For, had that been the case, the raiyats under a zamindar would have been much better off than raiyats under a series of intermediate tenureholders. The raiyat under a zamindar does not necessarily pay less rent than the raiyat under a darpatnidar or any other similar subordinate tenureholder. The provisions of enhancing rents have been equally taken advantage of by a zamindar and a tenureholder of the lowest grade (se-patnidar). And all these landholders cannot increase and have not increased the rents arbitrarily but according to law.

Subinfeudation has "broadened the basis of capitalism" by diffusing the ownership of the property amongst Bengal's middle classes whose interests are directly bound up with the land. This "diffusion of ownership" to a large number of people is always wholesome and congenial to the growth of prosperity.

It is clear that subinfeudation has not actually caused any economic loss to the raiyats. On the other hand, it has brought them to a closer touch with their immediate superior landlords, which has been conducive to their benefit and welfare.

**Q. 21.** This question is divided into two parts. We shall first discuss the effect of abolition of landlordism on the social and economic position of the province, which according to our mind will be as follows:—

- (1) Spread of communism with all the attendant evils.
- (2) Ruin and extermination of aristocratic houses and poverty of middle class people.
- (3) Increase of the problem of unemployment, the officers and servants of zamindars and tenureholders being thrown out of employment.
- (4) Loss of touch of the agricultural population with the educated middle class people which means deterioration of education, agriculture and morality of the people living in villages.
- (5) Increase of the amount of public debt without any corresponding financial and other benefit to the people—which means a very heavy burden on the people without any justification.
- (6) Charges for collection of the revenue will increase inordinately.
- (7) Revenue from sources other than land revenue will surely dwindle. And the loss of revenue on these heads will not be compensated by increase of income from land revenue.
- (8) Many of the charitable institutions will have to be closed.
- (9) Bengal will not be able to contribute to the Central Government so much as she does at present.
- (10) The raiyats will be worse off than at present. As regards the economic and social position of the tenureholders, we dare to say that they will practically be the same as we have illustrated in our answer to question 16, when discussing the social position of zamindars in case of abolition of zamindaris.

**Q. 22.** If at the time of purchase by the State the zamindar or tenureholder consents to give up his claim to his homestead lands and khas lands for value there will be no difficulty. The Government will let out the same to others.

If on the other hand, the zamindar or any other landholder wishes to retain the said lands or homesteads he will be reduced to the position of a raiyat under the Government and will have to pay rent for the same at the customary rate of the locality.

After the final Settlement survey of the whole province no difficulty can arise as to the ascertainment of khas lands of a zamindar or a tenureholder.

**Q. 23.** The "occupancy-right" of a raiyat is the creation of the "British Legislation." The expression "Right of occupancy" was unknown before 1859 the year of the passing of the Bengal Rent Act. The classification of the raiyats into "khudkasht" and the "paikasht" was done away with in that year and the "occupancy raiyat" was introduced with incidence more favourable to the cultivating classes. Section 6 of Act of 1859 lays down, "every raiyat who has cultivated and held land for a period of 12 years has a right of occupancy in the land so cultivated and held by him.....so long as he pays the rent payable on account of the same." By the Bengal Tenancy amending Act of 1929 the occupancy raiyats were given the right of transfer of their holdings subject to the payment of a transfer fee to the landholders as specified in the Act. The Act of 1938 gave them unrestricted right of transfer by abolishing landlord's transfer fee and the right of pre-emption.

At the time of the Permanent Settlement there were only two classes of tenants, (1) the Khudkasht (resident raiyat) and (2) the Paikasht. The former were raiyats cultivating the lands of their own village. They had a customary right of occupying their holdings so long as they cultivated and paid the customary rent. Their rights were originally not hereditary but became so later on by custom. They could not transfer their holdings without the consent of the community and their holdings were not practically transferable by sale. Their rent was liable to enhancement. The rights of paikasht raiyats, who were not residents of the village, were much lesser than those of the khudkasht. They were mere sojourners, and as such, tenants-at-will. Their rights were primarily governed by contracts, though one class of paikasht had hereditary rights over their land subject to custom.

**Q. 25.** We are against subinfeudation among raiyats, for we believe that system causes much hardship to actual cultivators of the soil. We agree with Mr. Field that "rai-yats having a right of occupancy are also more and more getting into the habit of sub-letting; thus a fresh class of petty middlemen, ignorant and useless, if not absolutely pernicious is being created. It would not be unreasonable to enact that any raiyat regularly sub-letting his land should forfeit his right of occupancy."

We are not also in favour of extending "occupancy-right" to the tiller of the soil, if he is a bargadar or a sub-tenant on a "bhag" system. Please see our answer to question 32.

**Q. 27.** The Permanent Settlement Regulation while declaring that the State has the right to make enactments to protect *all classes of subjects*, states clearly that "the Governor-General-in-Council will,

whenever he may deem it proper, enact such Regulations as he may think necessary for the protection and welfare of the dependent taluqdars, raiyats and other cultivators of the soil.' Here the words "cultivators of the soil" clearly point out to agriculturists (rai-yats, under-raiyats, "bhag-tenants", etc.). We are sure that the framers of this Regulation had not "non-agriculturist" in their minds while drawing up the provisions of the same. We beg also to point out that the word "protection" does not necessarily mean conferring of a statutory status like that of the occupancy raiyat. And the framers of the Bengal Tenancy Act in their zeal for restraining the powers of the landholder, have overdone the thing. They have conferred a valuable right to the raiyat without saddling him with any corresponding obligation. And the result is deterioration of agriculture in the province.

This result does not encourage us to be enthusiastic about conferring "occupancy right" on non-agriculturists in non-agricultural holdings. Any one, whether an agriculturist or not, can now purchase the right of occupancy in agricultural lands, but not so in lands let out for non-agricultural purposes. If such occupancy rights are created in non-agricultural lands the effect will be deterioration of non-agricultural pursuits in many cases.

We are not in favour of granting occupancy rights in non-agricultural lands for another reason also. Leases for non-agricultural holdings are governed by the Transfer of Property Act. And most of the valuable non-agricultural holdings are situated within municipal areas and cities and large towns. To unsettle the contractual relation between landlord and his tenant in these parts, by legislation, would be tantamount to robbing landholders to enrich their tenants. It would be a communistic piece of legislation never dreamt of in this part of the continent.

**Q. 28.** There is no earthly reason to extend statutory right granted for one purpose to the use of an altogether different one. We do not think that the State is justified in levying from *tenants* any other tax except income-tax on the profits derived from the holdings thus converted.

All the proprietary rights in land having been vested in the landholder, subject to the payment of revenue, the State should not, in fairness, impose any additional tax on the landholder on his profits acquired by such conversion. The landholder on the other hand can eject his tenant or take any other legal steps, if the tenant has converted the land to a use different from the purpose of the lease granted to him.

**Q. 29.** We do believe that the number of bargadars, bhagchasis, and others cultivating on a share of the produce is increasing. In these days of economic depression, share tenancy is getting popular because of its being more profitable for owners of lands and less risky for growers. It assures certainty of easy collection and is suitable for tillers having less or no capital. Both the owner and the cultivator remain satisfied with their respective shares of the produce obtained without any outlay of capital. Further, want of capital and loss of efficiency for field works of our peasantry due to malaria are also the cause for increasing barga system.

**Q. 31.** About twenty-five years before, share-tenancy was almost unknown in this district. Lands of widow and minor owners were generally used to be let out in bhag system. Now the area under bhag-jote may be estimated to be nearly 50 per cent. of the raiyati lands.

Majority of bargadars do not hold raiyati and under-raiyati lands. There are, of course, smaller occupancy and under-raiyati tenants who owing to smallness of their holdings, cultivate bigger tenants' lands under bhag system.

**Q. 32.** We are against extending the right of occupancy and other rights to bargadars. We have had enough of experience of the tragedy of giving extensive rights to the occupancy holders. These rights do not obligate tenants for proper cultivation of their lands, rather have made them neglect cultivation. The tendency of wilful negligence on the part of the share-tenants is becoming strong to compel the owner of land, in the long run, to settle it on rental basis.

We do not see if there is any need of giving any right to bargadars for protection. The system itself is a form of partnership between the owner and the tiller of the land on some agreed terms. There has rarely been written agreement. "In a share-tenancy it is the mutual trust which is the core of the system and tenants know that a written agreement can be far more easily thrown up than a purely customary title." Further the system adjusts itself subsisting the relations between the partners.

But the wholesome system of share-tenancy is, nowadays, being so much abused by tenants, that if any protection is to be given, it is not to tenants but to landlords. For, trouble is coming from tenants where proja movement is growing strong. In this connection we should like to mention here the incident that happened last year in the district of Howrah at the time of harvesting. The tenants of a large area under share-tenancy belonging to Babu Monmotha Nath Mukherjee, a member of this association, looted away the paddy crop of the area in the presence of the landlord, refusing to give his

legitimate share of the crop and demanded settlement of the lands on rental basis at a nominal rent. The matter went so far, at the instigation of political agitators that more than one hundred and fifty people assembled before the gate of his house at Cossipore (Calcutta) and started *satyagraha* for several days to put forward their demand. The matter, however, was at last settled by the intervention of the Collector of Howrah at a great loss to the zamindar. In an event like this the zamindar is helpless and powerless. If he is to go to the Court for compensation, it is obvious that it is a very tremendous, rather impossible task for him to substantiate his claim in the suit. We have already stated that there has been rarely a written agreement in respect of share-tenancy. And there is no law to obligate a tenant, already in possession of some land, to execute a *kabuliyat* in respect of that land in favour of the landlord.

Under these circumstances it is to be considered who is to be protected—landlord or the tenant. The fact mentioned above was reported in the newspapers.

**Q. 33.** The *barga* system seems to have a very old origin. In olden days rent was paid in kind when the share of the produce was fixed from time to time according to the requirements of the State.

Even in modern days in South and West France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Australia and in the United States share-tenancy is very popular and is in vogue varying in forms. The landlord or tenant-farmer of a farm gives his share-tenant the livestock, capital and farm requisites and shares with him the produce equally or in other proportions. The tiller gives his labour. The direction of field operation is left to the tiller who gives his labour, and the supervision of works to the landlord.

In Italy there is a system according to which the owner after reserving 25 per cent. of the produce as rent, halves the remaining portion with his partner and becomes responsible for providing machinery, drainage and of loan money without interest, required for working.

In America in the one-fourth system (landlord's share is one-fourth) tenant supplies all the equipment and seeds.

In one-third system the landlord controls in detail the kind of crops to be grown and beyond this all other things are left to the tenant's choice. In half-and-half system landlord supplies a part of livestock or owns a half interest in all or a part of the livestock. In two-thirds system "the landlord furnishes everything but the labour" (for information re: share-tenancy in foreign countries stated above *vide* pp. 21-23, *The Tenure of Agricultural Land* by Mr. Sachin Sen).



In our country, in share-tenancy, forms of details vary in different districts with respect to the respective shares of the produce in different kinds of crops grown. In Hooghly half-and-half system is the prevailing system. Here the owner takes half of jute, straw and paddy and other grains without giving anything excepting farm-yard manure, if he has any stock of it and half the cost of oilcakes it applied. If tank-silt is applied, the cost of raising is borne by the owner and of the carriage by the tiller. Paddy for food and some cash if required are advanced to him as loan (without interest) and taken back from his share on the threshing ground after harvest. The tiller gives seed and labour with livestock. Potato is shared equally, the cost of oilcake and seed being borne equally by both the parties. In the case of sugarcane if the owner is to get half share of gur produced, he is liable to pay half the cost of manuring and cuttings and of gur-making including half of the hire of the crushing machine. If he does not give his share of these expenses, he is entitled to get only one-third of the produce.

In Howrah there are large areas in consolidated blocks under share-tenancy known as "khud-khamar". These lands are either directly under zamindar or middle tenureholders. The system, here prevailing, is similar to "kankoot" of the United Provinces. Paddy is grown and the yield is estimated before harvesting. Under this system share is half-and-half leaving the entire quantity of straw to the growers who supply livestock, labour and seed. Landlord does not take his share by actual division from his tenants but after some time collects the value in cash at the local market rate. We find that these share-tenants having acquired occupancy rights owing to long and continued possession are now neglecting cultivation. The result has been markedly visible in the fall of outturn.

In Birbhum there is a two-third system (owner's share two-thirds) in which owner supplies livestock, feed and implements, and the tiller gives labour and seeds. Dhan-thika, gula-thika and sanja—all are the same form of share-tenancy in which the tiller taking all risks and bearing expenses of cultivation gives the owner a fixed quantity of produce. In Bankura tillers for more than 12 years under the "sanja" system have acquired, during the recent Settlement Survey, the rights of occupancy raiyats in the lands they cultivate.

Thus we see that share-tenancy, though a very old system, still holds its grip upon the modern land system even in countries far advanced in agriculture. It may vary in forms according to local customs and conditions, but the principle remains the same. We are of opinion, that the system is economically sound and wholesome as it brings bigger economic gain to the owner of the land and assures certainty of collection. While on the other hand the tiller gains profit of his labour without investment of any capital and hence it is less

risky for him. He is relieved of his anxiety for payment of cash rent for which he always finds himself in a state of insecurity, being dependent on better marketing of his produce. The system adjusts itself to the parties without being least affected by the repercussions due to fluctuations of value of the produce. It is a form of partnership between the owner and the tiller on some agreed term. But it is regrettable that this sound and wholesome system, nowadays, is being abused by the owners of lands who are generally absentee statutory raiyats. They have little skill in agriculture nor do they understand it. They leave their lands at the hands of landless and unskilled labourers without sufficient financial help. They do not care to supervise the works but remain satisfied with their share of the meagre produce which they may get without spending a farthing. On the other hand, the bhag-jotedar goes to work at the fields of somebody else for cash neglecting his share-tenure as long as he possibly can. The result of working of the share-tenancy in this way is the inevitable decline of agriculture, which means loss of national wealth. In our opinion steps should be taken to obligate parties concerned for proper functioning of the system. The owner of the land should not be a sleeping partner.

The latter part of the question does not arise.

**Q. 34.** If rights of occupancy be given to bargadars, as soon as they will be conscious of their rights and privileges, they will become idle and neglectful of the trust and responsibilities hitherto reposed in them by the owners of lands. The effect will be further deterioration of agriculture and speedier accumulation of lands in one hand.

If it be now proposed to give some rights to bhag-jotedars, they will be thrown out of the lands given to them for bhag cultivation by owners of land in anticipation of such legislation. The zamindars and others will arrange for cultivation of their lands, thus brought under khas possession. The bhagchasis may, in many cases, agree to work in these lands as labourers but where there is scarcity of agricultural labourers and where owners of lands are not residents of the village or are absentees, lands may be re-settled, in bhag system.

**Q. 35.** We have already stated that the forms of share-tenancy vary in different districts but the principles remain the same. We know conditions vary greatly in different districts; fertility of soil greatly varies even in contiguous plots; and proportion of shares with respect of different kinds of crops also varies. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to ascertain what should be a maximum limit of share payable by a bargadar.

There is no need of fixing the limit by law. It should be left to local custom.

**Q. 37.** Before 1929, when occupancy holdings were not transferable, such holdings were used to be transferred with the consent of landlords on payment of "salami" by the purchaser. Landlords had the right to take khas possession of transferred holdings without paying any compensation to the purchaser. In those days when a tenant became heavily involved in debts he sought his landlord's protection, and on the other hand, the moneylender, knowing that he could not sell his debtor's land without landlord's permission, had to approach him for amicable settlement. In such cases the landlord intervened and considering his tenant's assets and liabilities settled debts with some remissions and arranging payment by easy instalments without interests or in some cases by making over some reasonable share of the debtor's holdings to the moneylender. Mutation was effected on receipt of "salami" which was settled at the spot and generally paid in instalments. Hence there was no estrangement of feelings between the parties. The landlords, the moneylenders and the tenants all worked in harmonious co-operation and at the same time there was some check to the passing of agricultural lands to non-agriculturists.

The tenancy legislation of 1929 gave occupancy holders, the right of transfer and the landlords, the right of pre-emption. But since then owing to economic depression it appears that there were a few purchasers in the field and voluntary transfer was not so much possible as was expected. Perhaps majority of transfers, during this period of economic depression, was due to sales under execution of money decrees. The percentage of landlords exercising this right of pre-emption was also very negligible and perhaps more than 50 per cent. of the cases were done in the interests of tenants. "The percentage of the area in respect of which pre-emption was exercised (B. 4.556) to the area to which the Bengal Tenancy Act applies (65304 sq. miles) is .003."—Sir P. C. Mitter.

Now in 1938, landlords have been brushed aside, stripped of their right of restricting or regulating the transfer and the door of passing of raiyati lands to the hands of non-agriculturists have been thrown wide open. The results will be that the encumbered cultivating raiyats, improvident and reckless as they are, will soon become landless labourers giving rise to another class of propertied people who are not generally agriculturists. Landlords are not in favour of accumulation of large areas in the hands of non-agriculturists as it surely deteriorates agriculture. We are not against the passing of lands to non-agriculturists provided they take active interest in agriculture and improve their lands. There are people who cannot maintain their family depending exclusively on their particular callings. They are already in possession of some lands as subsidiary means of living. There should be fair distribution of lands. It is not now practicable to restrict transfer under the present law. Landlords may be vested with some tangible power to regulate transfer.

**Q. 32.** An economic holding means such a holding as may produce sufficient for maintaining the cultivator himself and his family with some ease and comfort after paying his necessary expenses. The size of an economic holding will vary according to the following condition factors:—

- (1) Financial position of the owner.
- (2) Fertility of soil.
- (3) Facility for irrigation.
- (4) Methods of cultivation, i.e., whether intensive or extensive.
- (5) The kinds of crop to be raised.
- (6) The number of members of the family to be maintained.
- (7) The situation in respect of markets.

According to the Banking Enquiry Committee a sum of Rs. 420 is annually required to maintain a family consisting of 5 members. We also find, according to the report of the same Committee, that income per acre is Rs. 60 and the subsidiary income of a family of 5 members is Rs. 44.

As an amount of Rs. 420 is required by a family of 5 members and as the income per acre of land amounts to Rs. 60, the land required for maintaining such a family (exclusive of the subsidiary income of Rs. 44) is, therefore, Rs. 420 divided by Rs. 60, i.e., 7 acres.

Now if we take the subsidiary income into account then the required land will be 
$$= \frac{(420-44)}{60} = \frac{376}{60} = 6.26 \text{ acres.}$$

Considering the above figures worked out on the basis of the figures obtained from the estimates of the Banking Enquiry Committee, we are inclined to think that the minimum size of an economic holding should be 5 to 7 acres according to the condition factors stated before. It is to be noted that this quantity of land can be cultivated by a yoke of oxen according to their efficiency and smartness for field work.

We think it will not be out of place, rather it will be interesting to give here an instance of a holding of 3.3 acres of agricultural land as being practically an economic holding owing to proximity of markets and selection of crop grown. The holding is in the village Rajarbathan (tauzi No. 735, Hooghly Collectorate) in Serampore subdivision. The owner of the holding is one Krishna Chandra Denrhey, a Mandal (headman) of the village. He grows paddy in 2 acres—the only low land area of his holding. The remaining land (1.3 acres)—the high land portion is under banana plantation. The annual income from this

plantation comes to Rs. 400 or thereabout. This income comes from the sale of bananas, leaves and inflorescences in the markets of Chandernagar—which is within 5 miles from the place.

This statement was made by the tenant himself to his landlord (the Honorary Secretary of this Association). Thus we see here that owing to the *proximity of market* and *selection of crop* a holding of 3.3 acres has been an economic holding for the *raiya*.

**Q. 39.** Yes, it is a fact that the size of many raiyati holdings is becoming uneconomic. It is a recognised fact that half of the agricultural population have got holdings below subsistence limit. There are various factors which have brought about excessive fragmentation of holdings. The main causes are pressure of population, break-up of joint families, law of inheritance and unrestricted right of transferability of holdings given by the Tenancy Act.

**Q. 43.** Undoubtedly coparcenary in tenancy is detrimental to good cultivation. The evil may be minimised by co-operative system of cultivation. The law of inheritance should operate so far as to define the shares of the respective coparcenars but actual partition of holdings below economic level must be prohibited. The suggestion though theoretically may be good and sound, may prove ineffective in the practical field owing to the growth of individualistic idea which destroys the spirit of co-operation.

**Q. 46.** We are of opinion that the framers of the Permanent Settlement Regulation did contemplate that one of the methods of increasing the income of landlords would be enhancement of rent.

The Government of the time did not contemplate either fixity of the rates of rent or permanency of tenures of *all* tenants of the zamindars.

“Proprietors of land” were expected to improve their estates and manage them well so that they might “enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry”. There is no sense in the words under quotation if in the lands improved through his exertion and good management the zamindar could not claim enhancement of rent from the tenants on account of such improvements.

Moreover these “proprietors of land” were enjoined “to conduct themselves with good faith and *moderation* towards their dependent taluqdars and raiyats”. The word “moderation” would not have been used, if fixity of rent or permanence of tenure was contemplated.

Regulation 8 of 1793, passed on the same date as the Permanent Settlement Regulation, expressly laid down what particular tenants

would not be liable to enhancement of rent (sections 49, 50 of Regulation 8 of 1793). But even therein (section 49) the words "With regard to such istemrardars also as have *not held their lands at a fixed rent* for so long a period, etc." betray the existence of variations of rent of tenants. Again in section 50 of the same Regulation the zamindar is prohibited "to enhance the rent of any dependent taluqdar except upon proof that he is entitled to do so, either by the special *custom* of the district, or by the *conditions* under which the taluqdar holds his tenure; or that by receiving abatements from his jama, has *subjected himself to the payment of the increase* demanded and the lands are capable of affording it." If even the favoured class of tenants such as istemrardars and dependent taluqdars were subjected to an increase of rent under certain circumstances, we can safely presume that other classes of less favoured tenants were also liable to enhancement of rent.

Moreover, the zamindar, etc., was allowed "to let the remaining lands of his zamindari or estate, under prescribed restrictions, *in whatever manner he might think proper*" (section 52 of Regulation 8 of 1793). One of the prescribed restrictions was that the amount of rent and conditions of the lease would only be specific.

Another Regulation (Regulation 44 of 1793) laid down that the jama of the tenant should not be fixed for a period exceeding ten years; which provision again points against permanency of tenure.

The jama of the zamindar was fixed for ever. But the jama of the tenants was left to the full discretion of the zamindar, subject to some statutory restrictions. Hence we can safely conclude that one of the means of increasing the income of the zamindar was contemplated to be enhancement of rent of tenants with moderation.

**Q. 47:** The framers of the Permanent Settlement Regulation did not contemplate either fixity of the rates of rent or permanency of tenures of all tenants of zamindars.

"Proprietors of land were expected to improve their estates and enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry." There is no sense in words under quotation if the lands were improved and the landholders could not claim enhancement of rent from the tenants on account of such improvements.

Moreover these "proprietors of the land" were enjoined "to conduct themselves with good faith and *moderation* towards their dependent taluqdars and raiyats". The word "*moderation*" would not perhaps have been used, if fixity of rent or permanence of tenure was contemplated.

Regulation VIII of 1793 (The Decennial Settlement Regulation) passed on the same date as that of the Permanent Settlement Regulation (Regulation I of 1793) by the same authority that passed the latter, expressly laid down what particular tenants would not be liable to enhancement of rent (sections 49, 50). The Regulation (Regulation 8 of 1793) further empowered the zamindar or other actual proprietor of land to let out lands of his estate to his tenants in "whatever manner" he liked, provided "every engagement contracted with underfarmers were specific as to the amount and condition" (section 52).

Simplification of rent was insisted upon, but not fixity of rent from all tenants in perpetuity.

Rather the Government of the day insisted that the jama of the tenant should not be fixed for a period exceeding ten years (*vide* section 2, Regulation 44 of 1793).

This restrictive provision of the law was never followed by the landholders, and was practically overridden by custom, and at last the Government had to recognize that the proprietors of land "were competent to grant leases for any period, which they may deem most convenient to themselves and their tenants and most conducive to the improvement of their estates" (Regulation V of 1812, Regulation VIII of 1819).

**Q. 48.** In our answer to question 46, we have tried to show that the Government of the day did not intend *all* tenants to be tenants at fixed rate.

There is no ground for believing that *all* tenancies, which existed at the time of the Permanent Settlement were meant to be held at rents fixed in perpetuity.

**Q. 51.** In view of our answer to questions 46, 47 and 48 this question does not arise.

Moreover the term "pargana rates" was always vague and uncertain. Sir John Shore wrote "At present no uniformity whatever is observed in the demands upon the raiyats. The rates not only vary in different collectorships but in the parganas composing them in the village and in the lands of the same village and the total exacted far exceeds the rates of Todar Mal."

In fact, "pargana rates" were statutorily declared so early as 1812 (section 5 of Regulation 5 of 1812). A new meaning of the term is given in the question, viz., rates prevailing in 1793. But it is impossible, perhaps, in most cases to discover what was the usual rate of a particular holding in 1793.

**Q. 55.** We do not recommend the readjustment of rents on a uniform basis throughout all parts of the province. We find rents vary in different districts and villages and even in one and the same village according to local conditions, situation and nature of the soil. In determining the basis, quality of land should be the prime factor. We do not see any other procedure of adjustment of rents in such cases except preparation of a new record-of-rights with the object of classifying lands more definitely (than the present Survey Settlement papers) according to the fertility of the soil and situation of the land, etc. We may suggest that the Government may take note of the system of old zamindari "jamabandi" papers in which such classifications were laid down. Frequent investigations for revision of such settlement papers will, however, have to be made in such cases.

**Q. 60.** If tenants can claim reduction of rents for deterioration of lands caused by fluvial action (such as sand deposit in spill area) or any other natural phenomena, the landlord and the State (in khas mahal) as well, in all fairness, should be entitled to have some portion of the benefit due to the improvement of land caused by fluvial action.

**Q. 72.** The average yield per acre of:—

(1) *Jute*.—In Bengal, according to Settlement Report (*vide* Statement VI, page 4, of the List of Statistical Abstract)—17 mds.

•1925-26, 1926-27, 1927-28, 1928-29.—*Chinsurah Farm* (Government Farm, 4 years' average)—18·585 mds.

Makalpur Farm, Hooghly district (Private)—(11 years' average)—19·875 mds.

(2) *Paddy*.—In Bengal according to Settlement Report (*vide* Statement VI, page 4, of the List of Statistical Abstract)—18·5 mds.

Chinsurah Farm (Government Farm, 10 years' average)—21·82 mds.

Makalpur Farm, in Hooghly district (Private)—(11 years' average)—16 mds.

•*Union Board Farms* (Hooghly) 12 farms, total acreage 60 acres, total outturn 1722·5 mds. for 1936-37,—28·7 mds.

(3) *Sugarcane*.—In Bengal, according to Settlement Report (*vide* Statement VI, page 4, of the List of Statistical Abstract)—57 mds.

1925-26, 1926-27, 1927-28. Chinsurah Farm. (Government Farm, 3 years' average)—59·77 mds.

Makalpur Farm in Hooghly district (Private)—(8 years' average)—51·75 mds.



The average cost per acre of:—

(1) *Jute*.—Makalpur Farm in Hooghly district (Private)—(11 years' average)—Rs. 52·87 (excludes rent, but includes seed, manure, labour, hire of plough, all being paid in cash).

(2) *Paddy*.—Makalpur Farm in Hooghly (Private)—(9 years' average)—Rs. 15·68 (excluding rents, including seed, the cost of labour and hire of plough, all being paid in cash).

(3) *Sugarcane*.—Makalpur Farm in Hooghly (Private)—(8 years' average):—

	Rs.
(a) Cost of cultivating sugarcane ... (excludes rent, but includes seed-cuttings, manure, labour, cattle).	234
(b) Cost of gur-making ... (no depreciation on the value of crushing machine and boiling pan is taken into account).	66

The cost includes labour for harvesting, crushing and gur-making, cattle for driving the machine are available free excepting feed which is also excluded.

Total ...	300
-----------	-----

**Q. 73.** It is difficult to say definitely whether the productivity of the soil in Bengal is decreasing, until reliable data are available. From the decline of yields it cannot be said that the productivity of the soil is decreasing. For there are various other factors contributing to the causes of low outturn, viz., (1) quality of seed, (2) seasonal factors, (3) imperfect cultivation and other operations connected therewith, (4) defective crop planning, (5) pests and diseases.

Sir John Russell says,—"I was on several occasions informed, however, that the yields are declining. No good figures seem to be available but if further enquiry indicated any basis for the belief, it would be desirable for the Council (Imperial Council of Agricultural Research) to arrange for sample surveys to be taken in a region where the decline is said to be going on in order to obtain definite information on the matter." He has remarked that on an examination of 38 years' records in a Bengal rice-farm there is no evidence of deterioration of yield (his Report, page 24).

The second part of the question does not arise.

The Rajapur drainage system in Howrah has brought large areas under cultivation. The drain was cut by the Government making landlords liable for the cost both initial and recurring for maintenance. In fact the Government took the initiative and executed the work at the expense of the landlords, which they could not have done individually or collectively. We hear that the Dankuzi khal was similarly excavated. The drain is now dying out. A few years ago we heard of some agitation by interested people who approached the Government requesting for its re-excavation. But we see nothing has yet been done.

For the purpose of improving decadent areas of Bengal the Rural Development Act of 1935 was passed. The Damodar Canal areas was selected for testing ground for its operation. The first trial was given there in 1936. But the people of the benefited area having started an agitation which ultimately developed into a no-tax campaign, Government have this year suspended the operation of the said Act. The Eden Canal with its inherent defects remains inadequate and irregular in supply of irrigation to its commanded area. We hear that a big scheme for irrigation for Hooghly and Howrah is under the consideration of the Government. So Government's work for improving the fertility of the soil by affording facility of irrigation in this district is, up to this time, not worth mentioning.

• On the recommendation of the Royal Commission of Agriculture in India, 1926, since the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research has come into existence for giving lead and co-ordination to the provincial Agricultural Departments, we find their activities have been greatly intensified.

The Agricultural Department has been trying for expansion of improved varieties of crops for more than 15 years in the district of Hooghly. Chinsura Green Jute, Sugarcane Co. 213 and the Departmental Aus and Aman paddies have proved their superiority over local varieties in different centres. The Sugarcane Co. 213 and the C. G. Jute are now automatically expanding. They are now known to the cultivators.

Improved strains of paddies are being grown in different parts; but the expansion is not yet so satisfactory as in the case of sugarcane and jute. The District Agricultural Officer has been doing as much as he can for expansion of departmental varieties of crops in collaboration with the District Agricultural Association, with his limited allowance for tour and with one or two demonstrators. Now perhaps there are two additional temporary demonstrators.

Now 12 Union Board farms have been started in this district. These small farms are private properties but the works are managed under the supervision of the District Agricultural Officer at the

expense of the Department. These farms have been started for the purpose of giving facility for distribution of seeds of improved varieties of crops. Working of these farms will undoubtedly help speedy expansion in their respective local areas.

Distribution of manures and seeds is very limited owing to paucity of funds. The Divisional Commissioner used to get a grant of Rs. 1,000 which he distributed among the District Associations of his Division for free distribution of Departmental seeds. But that grant has been stopped for the last few years owing to financial stringency. The pressure of office work on the District Agricultural Officer is increasing. The number of demonstrators is urgently needed to be increased for active demonstration, for propaganda and for distribution of seeds.

**Q. 74.** Very little advantage of the provisions of the (1) Bengal Land Improvement Act, (2) Bengal Sanitary and Agricultural Improvement Act, and (3) Bengal Rural Development Act is taken for improvement of lands.

(1) *The Bengal Land Improvement Act.*—Generally we find loans under the Act are granted in times of acute distress or famine; perhaps to lessen the pressure on famine fund. During normal years we hear very little of its operations. In the year 1936 scarcity was declared by the Government in the entire rural area of the Hooghly district. It was reported that up to the 30th September of that year, the amount of loan money advanced under the Act was nearly Rs. 16,600. Schemes of land improvement which are forwarded to the local authorities are generally prepared by the applicant himself. He being a layman, his scheme fails to stand the scrutiny of the investigating officer. Besides, in many cases, applicants come for the loan money on some hidden motive under the garb of land improvement. In such cases it is very often found that the entire estimated amount is not spent over the scheme, a part being spent for some other ends. Then the scheme, being imperfectly worked, soon becomes unremunerative. Ultimately trouble arises at the time of realisation of the loan money. As it often happens, the investigating officer, conscious of his own responsibility, becomes apprehensive of recommending the loan under the Act; for in case of non-realisation he is held responsible (departmentally) for his action. Government money must have sufficient security, but in many cases it is also found that securities are unsound and insufficient. There are many old big silted-up tanks in villages which require re-excavation. Now they are in possession of tenants who are, in many cases, many in number, and as such, do not combine to take the advantage of the provision of the Act.

(2) *The Bengal Sanitary and Agricultural Improvement Act.*—This Act, though passed in 1920, has become antiquated and unknown.

to the people. According to the Act an application for undertaking any work for improvement is to come "from a local authority or local authorities or any person or persons". Local authorities mean local bodies under the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885. Now these local bodies generally have no sufficient funds to advance on a scheme under this Act after meeting the expenses of the responsibilities imposed on them under the Local Self-Government Act. So they do not take or like to take initiative in the matter of improvement that may be done under the Act of 1920. Financial responsibility appears to be very vague. If any person advances money for preliminary surveys, plans and estimates and if under section 4 (1) (a), the Collector rejects schemes there is none responsible for the money advanced for preliminary surveys, plans and estimates. For this reason nobody likes to hazard himself with a risky experiment.

(3) *The Bengal Rural Development Act*.—This is a new Act passed in 1935 and was first enforced in the Damodar Canal area in 1936. For reasons stated in paragraph 5 of the reply to question 73 the operation of the Act, at present, has been kept suspended.

**Q. 73.** (a) The average income of a raiyat from his holding may be worked out in the following manner:—

• The agricultural population in Bengal is—34·2 millions (Census 1931).

The cropped area in Bengal is—24 million acres.

Taking each family of a cultivator consisting of 5 members and by dividing 34·2 millions by 5, i.e.,  $\frac{34\cdot2}{5}$  we get 6·84 millions of families of cultivators. Now dividing 24 millions of acres by 6·84 millions of families we get 3·51 acres—which being average unit per family.

∴ the holding of a member =  $\frac{3\cdot51}{5}$  = 702 acres.

According to the Banking Enquiry Committee the income per acre in normal time is Rs. 60.

• ∴ the income per head from his holding (702) = Rs. 702 × 60 = Rs. 42·12.

(b) According to Banking Enquiry Committee the subsidiary income of a family consisting of 5 members is Rs. 44. This income comes from his vegetables, eggs, milk, and rearing of goats and sheep and poultry farming, etc.

∴ the income of each raiyat (member)

= Rs.  $\frac{44}{5}$  = Rs. 8·8—which is his subsidiary income.

Now to determine what percentage of cultivating raiyats can maintain themselves and their families from the income (which perhaps implies the income both from his holding and from other sources) we may calculate in the following way:—

As from above—

		Rs.
Income of each member of a family from land	... =	42·12
Subsidiary income of each member	... =	8·8
Total income	...	<hr/> 50·92

∴ the total income of a raiyat's family

$$= \text{Rs. } 50·92 \times 5 = \text{Rs. } 254·60.$$

But according to the Banking Enquiry Committee a sum of Rs. 420 is required for the maintenance of such a family.

Thus we see that—

Sum of Rs. 420 is required for the maintenance of one raiyat with family.

∴ Sum of Re. 1 is required for maintaining  $\frac{1}{420}$  raiyat with family

Sum of Rs. 254·6 is required for maintaining =  $\frac{254·6}{420}$  raiyat with family.

Out of 1 raiyat with family only  $\frac{254·6}{420}$  raiyat with family is maintained.

Out of 100 raiyats with family only  $\frac{254·6}{42}$  raiyats with family are maintained.

$$= 60·61.$$

i.e., 60·61 per cent. of cultivating raiyats can maintain themselves and their families from the income of agricultural holdings and subsidiary occupation.

**Q-80.** We agree to the suggestions made for increasing the income of cultivating raiyats.

(i) According to Sir John Russell the following factors are capable improving the yield of crops—

- (1) Better varieties of crop.
- (2) Better control of pests and diseases.
- (3) Better control of water supply for crops.
- (4) Prevention of soil erosion.
- (5) Better use of manures and fertilisers.
- (6) Better implements and cultivation.
- (7) Better system of cropping, in particular better rotation and the use of fodder crop with the view of obtaining more farm-yard manure.

Improvement cannot be had by asking cultivators to do the things suggested by Sir John Russell. It must be planned and executed by Government or other statutory organisation.

The suggestions made in items Nos. (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are all right.

**Q. 81.** Yes, we think that pressure of population on Bengal soil is one of the main causes of the poverty of the agriculturists.

In reply to the previous question (No. 78) it has been shown that the cropped area in Bengal can maintain 60·61 per cent. of 6·84 millions of families, each consisting of 5 members. Therefore the remaining 39·39 per cent. of families will have to be diverted from land. This means 39·39 per cent. of 34·2 millions of agricultural population is surplus in respect of the agricultural needs of the province.

**Q. 82.** The situation arising out of pressure of population on the Bengal soil is not within the control of the land system. A land system however perfect it may be, cannot reduce the pressure. We find that it would remain insistent and go on increasing with the increase in population. The pressure may be lessened (1) by extensive and intensive method of cultivation, (2) by emigration, (3) by diversion of population to industries from agriculture and lastly by social reform movement. Large Government aided factories should be started for absorbing as much of the population as possible.

**Q. 86.** We are of opinion that the Debt Settlement Boards have not been able to deal satisfactorily with the problem of agricultural debt of this province. The causes of their failure are enumerated below:—

- (1) Any scheme of debt conciliation cannot succeed until adequate organisation for carrying out debt clearance has been built up. To

provide for compulsion and not so provide any funds has been at the root of the wrecking of the whole system of agrarian and rural credit.

(2) The Act, which was primarily and perhaps, exclusively meant to relieve poor agriculturists, is being taken advantage of by many unscrupulous people, who are not agriculturists by profession and not poor in the true sense of the term.

(3) The Debt Settlement Boards, composed of rural people, devoid of legal training and sometimes without moral scruples, have been asked to decide most difficult questions of law of mortgage, etc. (which are beyond their intellectual powers to decide), and have been vested with great arbitrary powers, which are often abused.

(4) The unwarranted taking away of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and especially the High Court over these Boards, has created a situation unheard of in the legal history of this country.

(5) Dilatoriness of the Debt Settlement Boards has become almost proverbial.

(6) Arrears of rent and debts in kind (especially seed crops and food crops) having been allowed to be dealt with by the Boards, the feeling between tenants and landholders and agriculturist debtors and their creditors (who supply food crops and seeds in times of greatest need) has been estranged. And consequently poor agriculturists will not perhaps be given the relief that was granted them before. Landholders cannot afford to be generous, when payments of arrears of rent due to them are postponed indefinitely. And the capital of creditors has ceased to flow to the agriculturists for fear of a bad return. And the credit of the agriculturists is gone for ever.

The provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act have sometimes been criticised severely by the High Court. Strong criticisms of the bad effects of the Act have often been made by the Press. We have discussed here, in short, why the Debt Settlement Boards have failed to relieve rural agriculturists. To criticise the Act and rules, section by section thereunder, would require much greater space. We, however, undertake to submit a supplementary note criticising the Act, at the time of giving evidence.

Our suggestions for improvement of the situation are as follows:—

(1) Rent, which has always been the first charge on land of agriculturists, must be given first preference before all other debts.

(2) Creditors, supplying seeds and food crops should be given special facilities for realising their dues speedily.

- (3) The jurisdiction of Civil Courts and especially the High Court must be extended over the Boards.
- (4) Speedy disposal of cases before the Debt Settlement Boards, should be insisted upon.
- (5) The policy of robbing creditors to pay agriculturist debtors must give place to a well defined policy of supplying cheap credit money in rural area. Big Government loans may be raised for the purpose, or reliable Banks, Corporations, Limited Companies, etc., with a well-recognized policy may be encouraged to advance agricultural loans at cheap rates of interest.

**Q. 89.** The certificate power of landlords in the matter of realisation of arrear rents having been withdrawn, there is in fact no machinery available to them for prompt recovery of their dues. The Tenancy Act is the only means which landlords must have recourse to in the event of non-payment of rents by their tenants. Originally landlords wanted to have tenancy legislation for being vested with effective powers of speedy realisation of rents. But it is regrettable that the Act is very negligent in giving them their fair and legitimate claims. The Act prescribes that every matter between landlord and tenant will be decided in the Court; thus it is an indirect gain to the Government and loss both to tenants and landlords. The procedure is too costly and dilatory. Arrears cannot be realised quickly by rent suits. There is no rule for speedy disposal of rent suits within a specified time. The procedure is so lengthy that a suit can be dragged for a year. Application for obtaining sale certificates may be and generally are put off on flimsy grounds. Rent suits are too costly and harassing to both parties. Ultimately the major portion of the cost falls on the defaulting tenants. The Tenancy Act is also very defective in so far as it does not ensure quick and effective possession of lands purchased in a sale under execution of rent decrees.

We may make the following suggestions for improvement in the procedure for a speedy disposal of rent suits.

The two things that are responsible for the delay in the disposal of rent suits are these:—

- (i) The great delay in service of summons, and
- (ii) Want of time of the trying Judge.

Since the Amendment of 1928, identifier has become unnecessary and the peon is directed to go straight to the defendant for service of summons. What the peon nowadays does, is this,—as there is some vigilance over these peons by the Nazir and as no plaintiff's man is



required to accompany the peon as identifier the peon extorts money, by harassing the plaintiff landlord in the following way:—

1. He goes straight to the tenant's house, does not find him there and without waiting or caring to know when he will come back to his house, the peon takes the signatures of two persons of the locality and gives a return that the defendant tenant is not at home or cannot be found. This performance is generally repeated twice and sometimes thrice or more with the result that the suits take a long time before they can be heard.

Another reason for the delay is the numerous co-sharer tenants of a holding and in many cases some co-sharers live away from their home and the result is that summons goes back unserved many times in all such cases. This delay in the service of summons is mainly and essentially responsible for the disposal of rent suits. To remedy this we suggest a double service—

- (1) Service through court peon on the tenant where feasible and if the tenant is not found (in cases where the tenant has left the village and is living abroad) service in the absence of personal service by sticking the summons on the outer door of the tenant's house, and
- (2) Simultaneously sending a registered postcard with acknowledgment due to the tenant and in case of tenants living abroad—postal service.

This should be done only once, as there are some Judicial Officers who order repetition of such service of summons many times over.

We make another suggestion as regards trial of rent suits. Ordinarily, munsiff tries regular suits and takes up the rent suits after mid-day recess. The disposal of rent suits is very distasteful to the munsiffs. We have seen munsiffs keeping gomastas hanging after 5 p.m. for the disposal of *ex parte* rent suits and even adjourning such cases for want of time. Normally there are two munsiffs in each station and we suggest that one munsiff shall be a rent suit munsiff. He shall decide only contested and *ex parte* rent suit cases and if any time is left after the disposal of rent suit cases, he shall take up other kinds of suits.

It is submitted that this practice, if given effect to, will save time and a lot of saving both to the estate and to the tenant and speed up the disposal of cases.

Another suggestion that we make for the speedy disposal of rent suits, is to simplify the procedure of trial in rent suits. A mass of case law has decided that in a rent suit really everything could be decided. The question of abatement of rent whether on the ground of diluvion or on the question that the land has become unfit for cultivation, for any reason whatsoever, may be raised in the rent suit. This

involves an inordinate delay in the disposal of such cases as it involves commission, surveys and measurements, etc. Similarly the question of suspension of rent on the ground of substantial or technical dispossession are raised by the tenants on the flimsiest grounds and take a long time for the disposal of these cases.

We simply give two instances, there are good many other ways for spinning out a case, as it is always in the interest of a tenant to delay the disposal of the cases and consequent payment.

Now that record-of-rights has been prepared practically all over Bengal, there must be a statutory provision for summary procedure in suit on Negotiable Instruments Act as provided in the Civil Procedure Code and the defendant shall not be allowed to defend the suit unless he obtains the leave of the Court to appear and defend the suit.

The provision of section 150 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a dead letter and more honoured in its breach than in its sanction.

There should be three simple matters in a rent suit—

- (1) whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists,
- (2) the amount of rent payable for the jama, and
- (3) payment, if any.

If the tenant wants to raise any other point in a rent suit, he must be ordered to bring a regular suit.

If suggestions on the above lines are given effect to, it is submitted that the agitation against delay in the trial and disposal of rent suits will be a thing of the past.

In execution cases of rent suits, we suggest the abolition of the attachment process. Rent is a first charge under section 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and if attachment is not necessary in a mortgage suit, no attachment can be necessary in rent execution cases and this will reduce the cost of the execution case in the interest of both the landlord and the tenant.

Further simplification in the execution case is necessary for speedy disposal of the rent suit.

Our suggestions are on the procedural methods only. We do not venture to suggest any amendment of any particular section of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as we know that the voice of our five representatives in the Legislature is inaudible in a House of 250 members.

**Q. 92.** We beg to enumerate here some of the laws, which operate harshly on landlords and which should, in our opinion, be amended or repealed. The list, however, is not exhaustive—

- (1) Patni Regulation (Regulation 8 of 1819).
- (2) Bengal Tenancy Act (as amended up to date).
- (3) Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act (1930).
- (4) Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act.
- (5) Income-tax Act.

We shall submit supplementary note discussing sections of these and other Acts and rulings on the same, which operate harshly on landholders.

**Q. 93.** The Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938 has taken away landlord's transfer fee and his right of pre-emption. So landlords have now lost their income they had been receiving as landlord fee. The Act has affected the ultimate value of zamindaris. Attractions for the landed estates in Bengal have gone for ever. There is no reason to think that by abolition of landlord fee the tenants will get better price for their lands from purchasers. For tenants, naturally, do not like to part with their holdings, unless under compulsion due to pressure of heavy debts or sale under execution of money decrees of their moneylenders. Speculative moneylenders generally come upon their debtors when they see that their demand has swelled up so much interest that competitive value will be of no avail. So there is no chance of raiyats getting better price of their lands for the abolition of landlord's transfer fee. Right of pre-emption kept land value at a proper level which is indispensable in the economic interest of the country. Now owing to its abolition deeds of conveyance will be made at under-value to lessen stamp duty. Thus Government will lose their income from stamps. As in trade, publicity of market prices is indispensable in the economic interest of the traders, so in land business publicity of the value of land is essential in the interest of landlords, tenants and the general public. The stipulated value in deeds of conveyance will be misleading and lands will pass to non-agriculturists more freely than ever, at a low rate of price reducing cultivating raiyats to landless labourers. Now the right of pre-emption has been given to co-sharer tenants. The provision will be a dead letter; for tenants have hardly money enough for exercising this right to avoid undesirable intruders. Thus failing to oust the intruders, raiyats will be subjected to harassment which may even lead to serious communal troubles. The Tenancy Act alienating the peasantry from their own zamindars has thrown them at the mercy of the strangers who are comparatively unimaginative and unsympathetic. Formerly when the right of pre-emption was with landlord and if he had to exercise it in the interest.

of tenant, the money required was paid by landlord and was realised later on by instalments either with or without interest from the tenant in whose interest the right was exercised.

We learn from late Sir P. C. Mitter's Council speech (February Session, 1933) on the resolution demanding the repeal of the provision of the landlord's transfer fee and the right of pre-emption in the Bengal Tenancy Act, that before 1928 landlords used to get between 80 lakhs and a crore of rupees from transfer fee and after 1929 when landlord's fee was fixed at 20 per cent. of the consideration money or 5 times the rent whichever was the greater, the landlords were getting 32 lakhs of rupees even in years of great economic depression. Recently the present Hon'ble Revenue Minister stated before the House in course of his debate on abolition of landlord's transfer fee that landlords had been getting 35 lakhs of rupees annually as landlord fee. Thus they have suffered a heavy loss for taking away this customary and statutory right..

## Reply by the Howrah Landholders' Association.

**Q. 1. Duties and obligations of zamindars.**—The description of the duties and obligations of the zamindars are not exhaustive. They had the duty of maintaining peace (police duties, since relieved by Regulation XII of 1793). They had obligations to inform authorities of bad characters within their boundaries and to supply rations to the Government officers and the Army. They had jurisdiction over petty civil suits. These are some of the additional and traditional duties and obligations.

**Rights of tenants.**—The Permanent Settlement did not take away any existing right from the tenant. On the other hand it protected and strengthened those rights. Before the Permanent Settlement the occupation of land was on payment of rent, which was liable to be increased by imposition. The fixity of rent was the creation of British Statute. The avowed object of Lord Cornwallis was to protect the tenants and this was emphasised in Regulation I of 1793. (See Minute of Lord Cornwallis, dated February 1790.) It will be worth noting the Great Rent Case of 1865 in which the classes of raiyats and their rights, and the measures adopted in the period of Dewani for their protection are lucidly analysed in the judgment.

**Q. 2. Choice of tenants.**—The zamindar had power to choose their tenants from before the Permanent Settlement. The Permanent Settlement did not convey any new power to them. In case of transfer of tenancies his express permission had to be taken. Only he could not prevent tenancies descending to heirs of khudkúsh raiyats.

**User of Land.**—The zamindars had the power to prevent conversion of land from one class to another before the Permanent Settlement. The Permanent Settlement did not convey any such right to them.

**Q. 3.** The landlords made new roads, excavated dighis and tanks, dug wells, established schools, charitable dispensaries, hospitals, and many other institutions of public utility. They established huge religious endowments for the public good and were patrons of many local industries and handicrafts. They have brought vast tracts of waste lands under cultivation by clearing jungles, by draining marshes and by protecting low lands with embankments. They brought cultivators from elsewhere and settled them on their lands at their expenses. Under the security of the Permanent Settlement they let loose their capital for investment in lands and tried hard to increase the economic productivity of the soil. That they were the most powerful factors in developing the prosperity of the country is proved by the famine condition of the tenantry in 1770 and by the vast tract of country that came under cultivation since the Permanent Settlement. It is difficult at this date to give positive proof of the part played by landlords. That

increased activity and industry followed the Permanent Settlement is judicially noted in the Great Rent Case of 1865. The report of the Commissioner, Burdwan Division, dated the 20th October 1883, is worth quoting in this connection. It runs—"The Bengal of to-day offers a startling contrast to the Bengal of 1793. The wealth and prosperity of the country have marvellously increased beyond all precedents under the Permanent Settlement.....a great portion of this increase is due to the zamindari body as a whole, and they have been very active and powerful factors in the development of this prosperity."

The Association thinks that the landlords performed the functions expected of them under the Permanent Settlement. They met the revenue demand punctually which helped to stabilise the finances of the Government. They co-operated with the tenants and evolved a settled condition out of the unsettled state of things prevailing before the Permanent Settlement. It is the subsequent tenancy legislations that crippled the hands of landlords by making them mere rent-receivers and snapped the ties between landlord and tenants. Since the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act legislation after legislation has been introduced to grant greater privileges to tenants at the expense of the landlords without any corresponding obligation on the tenants, even of improving their lands or cultivation. The landlords as proprietors of land have no choice even if the lands are neglected and are left fallow. It is well known that even the demand for effective powers of speedy realization of rent is deliberately ignored and the tenants are encouraged by legislature not to pay regular rent. The result is that there is none to perform the function of landlordism.

Q. 4. It is not correct to say that zamindars were not proprietors of the soil before the Permanent Settlement. From the early Hindu times the village zamindars were found to exist side by side with the khudkushit and paikushit raiyats in the village community. They along with the King and the raiyats were the proprietors of the soil as each of them was entitled to a share of the produce. As the Hindu system of jurisprudence tended towards hereditary rights it was conducive to the growth of zamindars as well.

In the Muhammadan period the Hindu system was left undisturbed and mention is made in the "Ain-i-Akbari" of numerous rich and powerful zamindars in Bengal. The zamindars had heritable and transferable rights. If a zamindar was deposed and settlement was made with a stranger he was given portions of land or malikana in money. From these facts the conclusions can be drawn that the zamindars were not mere office holders or collectors of revenue but had interest in the land.

Moreover, if we go back to trace the origin of zamindars we find that there were old tributary Rajas, numerous petty chiefs like the

Bara bhuiyas of Bengal, adventurers who rose to power and acquired a tract of the country, revenue collectors who during the decadence of the provincial government gained their footing as hereditary proprietors. Revenue settlement of the Moghuls recognised these petty chiefs, rajas and adventurers as zamindars and their descendants, are amongst the present day zamindars.

Sir John Shore in his Minute of the 2nd April 1788 says: "the origin of the proprietary and hereditary right of the zamindars is uncertain, that in Akbar's time the zamindars of Bengal were numerous, rich and powerful, that they were not of his creation and probably existed with some possible variation in their rights and privileges before the Muhammadan conquests in Hindusthan" (Field, p. 40).

The Permanent Settlement of Bengal was made with the "composite body of zamindars" who have been proprietors of the soil before the Permanent Settlement. The Regulation merely recognised their rights in the soil which existed before. The policy of the Government has always been against radical change. If the zamindars were not actual proprietors of the soil from before it is unlikely that the British Government in those unsettled times would have acknowledged them as such and the country would have accepted them as proprietors without any objection.

This Association thinks that the discussion of actual ownership of land at this remote date is a mere academic one. The idea of property in land as is understood in English law was not so well defined in the ancient period. There is always the distinction between the right to possess which is a consequence of ownership and the right of possession which is independent of ownership. Elphinstone says: "Many of the disputes about the property in the soil have been occasioned by applying to all parts of the country facts which are true of particular tracts; and by including in conclusions drawn from one sort of tenure other tenures dissimilar in their nature."

**Q. 5.** This Association thinks that the annulment of the Permanent Settlement would be a breach of the solemn pledge given by the East India Company. By making the Decennial Settlement permanent Lord Cornwallis was not acting with ill motives. His object was (i) to stabilise the income from the revenue without a reduction of the revenue demand of the time, (ii) to end the unsettled condition of the country of the time and to place it on the road to progress by inducing in the inhabitants a sense of security and by protecting them from the exactions of the Government officials. His object was achieved and zamindars agreed to pay 9/10ths of the gross collection. In the hope that future will be for their benefit and will yield them sufficient return for their labour and capital they have sunk large sums in the land in

their effort to drain them or to improve waste lands and jungles. Many zamindaris were sold for default of revenue immediately after the Permanent Settlement and thereafter were purchased by capitalists on the faith of the pledge of the Government that the revenue demand will not be increased. It will be hardly fair and equitable to tell them that the given pledges will not be honoured. It will make the investment of their choice, i.e., the zamindaris, worthless and destroy their capital.

As regards the tenants not being made parties to the pledge, the Association submits that the tenants need not be a party to it, which was an agreement between the proprietors of the soil and the Government for settlement of land revenue. All that was done was that the rents payable by the raiyats were ascertained and the revenue was fixed based on such assets of the estate. This was done before the Permanent Settlement and to this day the tenants are not parties to any revenue settlement in temporarily settled estates. The tenants were not affected by the Permanent Settlement; rather it benefited the tenants by putting a stop to the previous practice of enhancing the raiyati rents and then fixing the revenue.

As regards the Permanent Settlement permanently crippling the financial resources of the country the Association answers definitely in the negative. The agricultural assets of the country are mainly due to the Permanent Settlement. These assets are indirectly responsible for increase in revenue in other directions, e.g., stamps, court-fee, customs, etc. A comparison of the finances of Bengal with that of the other provinces will prove the truth of this contention. The Association thinks that the comparative affluence of the people of Bengal and her taxable capacity is due more to the Permanent Settlement than to anything else. It is significant to note in this connection that Bengal's contribution to the Central Government is the highest of all the provinces in India. (*Vide* answer to question 13.)

Q. 6. The first part of this question has been answered in answer to question 3. As regards the extension of cultivation the Association thinks that all the three factors have combined to produce the result. But it is difficult to assess the contributions of each factor separately. There is no doubt that the initiative and pecuniary and other assistance of the zamindars played the greatest part in the extension of cultivation in Bengal. Increase of population may foster the demand for land but the condition of tenantry was not such that they can afford to spend money in major improvements. After the Permanent Settlement many zamindaris were sold as the margin of profit was small and we find zamindaris let out in patni to capitalists at the gross rental of the mauza. It was therefore to the interest of the landlord and patnidars alike to



zamindars by way of private charity. Such commitments might be considered in awarding compensation but it would be difficult to obtain figures showing the amount. He agreed that landlords pay considerable sums as municipal and union board taxes, and if Government became the sole landlord, it would certainly have to pay such taxes.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Hashem Ali, he could not give the number of petty estates from which little or no profit is derived but agreed that they would form a very small proportion of the compensation that will be payable. If the capitalised value of estates and tenures is to be paid there could be no gain to the State: for example, if a tenureholder's net income is Rs. 5, a bond of Rs. 100 would have to be issued at 5 per cent. It may be true that in the last few years, there has been reluctance to invest in land. He doubted whether it would be said that there is any market for zamindaris in the real economic sense of the word. The price paid for estates at revenue sales, which are forced sales, varies from 1 to 282 times the net profit according to the report of Rai Bahadur M. N. Gupta made in 1932. There were no figures for the last three years. He agreed that some landlords might be satisfied with 5 or 10 times the net profit of their estates but others might not be satisfied with 50 times. But in awarding compensation the primary concern is not the figure with which the zamindars would be satisfied. The cost of the acquisition proceedings has been shown in the Department's reply as Rs. 1,000 per square mile. This figure is based on past experience. It represents the cost of revising the records-of-rights, which are completely out of date. In some districts like Barisal it would be impossible for the State to proceed without revising all records-of-rights and ascertaining the net profits of landlords and tenureholders. If the province becomes a khas mahal he thought that the cost of management and the percentage of irrecoverables would increase rather than decrease. An additional 2 per cent. had been added to the estimate for increased cost of management. At present the cost of collection in farmed estates is practically nothing but if these estates were taken over, they would cost the full percentage rate for management. Law charges would increase as a whole, but not proportionately above the present figure. Government expenditure on irrigation would certainly increase: for example, in the Sunderbans there are many miles of embankments which are maintained by the landlords. If these estates are taken over, the cost of maintenance will fall on Government. Even if the cost of maintaining these embankments were deducted from the compensation payable, they would still have to be entered as a liability. They had not been included in the Revenue Department's estimate of 1,000 lakhs as net profits of landlords and tenureholders. The possibility of increasing the outturn of crops by effecting agricultural improvements is a question entirely separate from the proposal to buy out the landlords. If Government

spends more money on such improvements they may get an increased return. He adhered to the opinion (expressed in the quotation from the Finance Department's note written before the introduction of the new Constitution) to the effect that no tampering with the framework of the Permanent Settlement could, in the long run, produce any financial gain to the State. He could not say if that is the present view of the Hon'ble Minister but he had seen a copy of the note. The view of the Department is that to buy out the landlords would be in the nature of a speculation and will upset the existing social system in order to secure an inadequate increase in revenue and that in a cumbrous and questionable way involving a huge expense. For that reason the Department would prefer a tax on agricultural incomes. He agreed that such a tax would not be appreciated by the people paying the tax but pointed out that no form of taxation ever is popular. Both financially and economically, there is a strong case for a tax on agricultural incomes. He agreed that Government require more money for social services. The abolition of the Permanent Settlement would be a financial speculation which would probably result in little gain, but a tax on agricultural incomes would produce a definite increase in revenue without upsetting the existing system and without offending against any canon of taxation. He could not give any opinion if all the estates could be purchased by Government in revenue sales if the Sale Law was rigidly enforced and all Court of Wards estates were released.

In reply to Khan Bahadur Momin, he explained that cess amounting to 50 lakhs had been deducted along with revenue from landlords' gross assets because that is the share of cess which they pay from their own pockets. The figure of Rs. 1,000 per square mile as the cost of acquisition is based on the average cost of all settlement operations. If the records were to be revised without carrying out any cadastral survey, the cost would be reduced but he doubted if it would be as little as Rs. 500 per square mile.

Brokerage and discount would have to be included even if bonds are issued. Discount represents the difference between the face value and the issue price; and if bonds are negotiable, the market is bound to set a value on the bonds immediately after their issue. Brokerage would be necessary because the Reserve Bank would have to carry out the operation for issuing the bonds. The cost of management includes improvements which might not be considered, strictly speaking, as part of the cost of buying out the landlords but he would include them in the estimate, as improvement is a necessary concomitant of management and has always been considered to be an integral part of good management. If the cost of acquisition were reduced by half, the result would be that 62.23 crores would be the cost of compensating landlords and tenure-holders at 10 times the net profit and if the cost of management could be kept at 12½ per cent. there would be a profit of 3.04 crores. This

figure does not however include irrecoverables. He did not agree that 12½ per cent. could cover the cost of management plus irrecoverables for Government.

He could not say at what rate the zamindaris are now being purchased: if people invest in zamindaris they expect to make profit. In the determination of a fair compensation the rate of interest is a chief consideration, but the previous estimates have not taken it into consideration. At present the rate of interest given by the Reserve Bank is 3 per cent., so that the capitalised value would be 33 times the net profit.

In reply to Khan Bahadur M. Hosain, he agreed that in Bengal the *per capita* revenue was probably the lowest. He could not say if this was due to the Permanent Settlement. This is not due to Bengal paying more than other provinces in income-tax and customs: it has to be considered on the basis of the financial arrangement of the Government of India Act as a whole. If the Permanent Settlement had not existed, the income from customs, court-fees, etc., might have been smaller than it is now. If there were not a large body of zamindars and tenureholders, the imports into Bengal might have been smaller.

He could not say whether the cost of management would be decreased if the entire province became a Khas Mahal because the area would be compact instead of being scattered as at present: it might be so.

His figures for remission in the last 10 years include the entire period of depression. He undertook to supply the Commission with figures for the 10 years previous to 1928. Asked how zamindars in temporarily settled estates could make a profit, when they are allowed only 30 per cent. for profit and collection charges, he pointed out that private management is much cheaper than Government management. The cost of revising the record-of-rights in the estates which were given certificate powers could be had from the Revenue Department. Even if bonds were given as compensation and issued at the market price, it would be necessary to pay the full capitalised value of the net profits. Irredeemable bonds would be better than redeemable for purposes of calculation because they would not involve charges for a sinking fund. In the case of a man whose net income is Rs. 100—if interest is taken at the current rate of 3 per cent. he would have to be given over Rs. 3,300 in order to secure to him the same income. If, however, it is intended to expropriate the landlords and tenureholders to the extent of half their net income or more it may be possible for the State to make a profit. The question of imposing a tax on agricultural incomes is now being examined by the Finance Department. It is very much better to have an assured income from that source of, say,

50 lakhs at no cost rather than enter into a speculative transaction which may show a larger profit at a huge cost. As regards the probable yield of a tax on luxuries, he could not say what proportion would be derived from business and trade: to say that half or one-third of the income assessed to income-tax was spent on luxuries is purely guess work. He could not give any opinion about the probable yield until it is defined what are luxuries.

In reply to the Chairman, he said that his impression was that the rent of lands in Calcutta was capitalised at the time when the land was originally transferred. It would be possible for the Finance Department to consider the possibility of raising additional revenue by imposing a tax on Calcutta property similar to that proposed by the Bombay Government. He undertook to have the question examined and to forward a note on the present position.

In reply to the Secretary, he said that he was not at present in a position to give any details in regard to the Finance Department's proposal for a tax on agricultural incomes. In Bihar a similar proposal has been made but the Bill has not yet passed into law. He agreed that the Department's estimate for buying out the landlords and tenureholders does not include the cost of constructing and maintaining additional kutcheries, and quarters for Khas Mahal officers. This expenditure would have to be included. He also agreed that a large number of Khas Mahal officers would have to be appointed and trained for several years before they could take over their duties. This expenditure would also have to be included.

## Notes collected by Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji during his tours in Madras and some Bengal districts.

### A Note on Madras Land System by Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji.

*Different Land Systems.*—In the Madras Presidency, there are in operation three different land systems—

(1) Zamindari under which the assessment payable to Government is permanently fixed. The cultivated area under this system amounts to about 13 million acres from which the zamindars derive rental of about 240 lacs and pay to Government the annual revenue of 50 lacs.

(2) Raiyatwari or State landlordism under which assessment is revised every 30 years. This system covers a cultivated area of 25,266,691 acres, yielding a land revenue of about 6½ crores per annum.

This system is worked as follows:—

*Classification of soil.*—On the basis of a preliminary scientific survey, lands are divided into wet, dry and rain-fed.

Next, soil is divided into several main classes according to its mechanical composition and chemical properties. These classes number 14. Each class is subdivided elaborately. The total varieties of soil marked out in Madras number 66. Irrigated lands lend themselves to further subdivision according to the nature and efficiency of irrigation sources.

*Grain-outturn.*—After this classification of soil as the first step in Settlement, the second process is to ascertain the grain-outturn of each of these various classes of soil. This is done by conducting actual harvest experiments for a number of years. When the outturn is thus ascertained, a deduction of 15 to 25 per cent. is allowed for vicissitudes of season and for barren patches unavoidably measured with the fields.

*Its money value.*—The third process in the Settlement is the conversion of the grain-outturn into its money-value. The basis of this calculation is the average value of grain during the preceding 20 non-famine years. From this average price of grain, a deduction of 8 to 20 per cent. is made to allow for cost of marketing, transport charges and merchants' profits. The resulting balance is adopted as the commutation rate.

*Cost of cultivation.*—The fourth process in Settlement is to ascertain for each kind of soil the cost of cultivation. The difference between the money-value of the grain-outturn determined in the aforesaid manner and the cost of cultivation is taken as the net yield of each kind of soil. Half of it is taken as the State demand or land tax. This system is known as the half net produce.

**Pattadar.**—The person with whom Government enters into engagement for getting payment of land revenue on the above basis is called *pattadar*. Of these pattadars, more than 75 per cent. are small landlords paying less than Rs. 25 as revenue, and more than 50 per cent. are not themselves cultivators but get their lands cultivated by leasing them out to others.

(3) *Inam*, where there is payment to Government of a quit rent varying from 2 annas in the rupee to  $\frac{5}{8}$  the raiyatwari assessment in respect of land of corresponding quality and class.

**Working of the zamindari system.—Peshkush.**—The zamindari tenure is based on an assessment which was fixed at  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the total collections from the cultivators or raiyats at the time of the Permanent Settlement and is called by the technical term of *peshkush*. At the time of Permanent Settlement,  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the total area of each estate was taken to be waste land. The zamindar was given the benefit to be derived from the reclamation of such waste land and extension of cultivation. This explains why Government fixed the zamindari revenue so high. The zamindars were constituted proprietors of land. The tenants, holding of them, were protected by pattas fixing the rents to be paid by them to the zamindars. The rights of tenants were somewhat undefined. This defect was removed by the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 by which—

- (a) Rent was payable either in cash or in kind with commutation of rent payable in kind by suit before the Collector;
- (b) Rent can be enhanced only by suit before the Collector on the ground of rise in prices or increase of productivity consequent on improvement effected by landholder or on fluvial action; and
- (c) Rent can be reduced on account of fall in prices, deterioration of soil or permanent failure of water-supply.

**Rent in kind.**—In zamindari tenures, the rent may be paid in kind. In raiyatwari, the revenue is always paid in cash. This hits hard the pattadars by the phenomenal fall in prices.

**Occupancy rights.**—Again, in zamindari occupancy right has been given to the raiyat in possession in 1908. But in raiyatwari the actual cultivator does not enjoy any such right. The reason for this is that the pattadar who was originally the person in occupation when the raiyatwari system was first introduced has later developed in most cases into a rent receiving non-cultivating absentee landlord.

**Comparison of yield of revenue under zamindari and raiyatwari system.**—The zamindari area covers 37,883 sq. miles = 23,604,687 acres (640 acres = 1 sq. mile).

The raiyatwari area covers 107,683 sq. miles. Land Revenue from zamindari area=65 lacs=roughly Rs. 200 per sq. mile. Raiyatwari revenue on 107,683 sq. miles=569 lacs=roughly Rs. 500 per sq. mile.

The raiyatwari revenue has grown by re-settlements and extensions of cultivation.

*Raiyats and under-raiyats.*—As has been already stated, in the raiyatwari system, the pattadar or registered holder of the land holds it direct from Government, subject to the payment of land revenue. The raiyat is not restricted in his powers of alienation, but is bound to pay the assessment fixed on his holdings, whether cultivated or waste, for a period of 30 years, though remissions of land revenue are usually granted for drought or other causes beyond the raiyat's control. The incidence of land revenue on fully assessed area per acre with reference to the total cultivated area (and not merely the total area)=Rs. 2.9.

According to the last Census Report, of 1,000 persons engaged in cultivation, (1) agricultural labourers number 429, (2) cultivating owners 390, (3) cultivating tenants 120, (4) non-cultivating owners 34, (5) non-cultivating tenants 16.

These figures show that agricultural labourers together with working owners constitute over 80 per cent. of the total number of persons engaged in agriculture numbering 5.09 millions in 1931.

The low proportion of non-cultivating tenants shows to what small extent subinfeudation obtains in Madras and from another point of view indicates the extreme smallness of the average holdings.

*Size of holdings.*—The bulk of the pattas are those which yield a land revenue of Rs. 50 and less. Of these, the pattas giving Rs. 10 and less form the largest number, about 80 lacs. This shows to what extent land is a source of living to the people.

*Crops.*—Of the net area sown amounting to about 34 million acres, about 30 millions or 88 per cent. grows food-crops, paddy alone taking 12 millions. Madras takes the fourth place among the provinces as regards acreage under rice cultivation. The total acreage in Bengal under rice amounts to nearly 22 millions as against about 12 millions in Madras. The yield per acre in Bengal=894 lbs. as against 985 in Madras.

The average yield per acre of rice in Bengal=.38 tons, as against .45 in Madras, 1.37 in Italy and 1.33 in Japan.

*Condition of Peasantry.*—The Madras Banking Enquiry Committee estimated rural debt at 150 crores in 1930. Debt follows credit in India. The more the borrowing power of the raiyat, the more does

he borrow. British rule increased security and increased indebtedness as a consequence.

"In India, agriculture is, with most cultivators with uneconomic holdings, more a mode of living than a business" (Royal Commission on Agriculture). It is a losing concern.

- The gross value of the crops of the Madras Presidency was estimated at Rs. 165 crores for the year 1928-29 by the Banking Enquiry Committee. Owing to reduction of 50 per cent. in prices, this value is to be taken at Rs. 80 crores (for 1933-34) remaining for distribution among a peasantry of 34 millions, leaving a gross income per head of about Rs. 23-8. From this gross income are to be deducted the cost of cultivation, land revenue, interest charges, etc. Cultivation expenses come to about 40 per cent. of the yield. Thus from an yield valued at Rs. 80 crores, there is to be a deduction of about Rs. 32 crores for cultivation expenses and a further reduction of Rs. 8 crores for land revenue assessment and rent paid to zamindars. This leaves a net agricultural income of 40 crores for 34 millions or an income of Rs. 11-12 per head, assuming that no interest is paid on debt. Allowing Rs. 3 to Rs. 4 as income from other sources, the net income of an agriculturist cannot exceed Rs. 15 per head. This proves the utter bankruptcy of the peasant.

While the population increased between 1921-31 by 10.4 per cent., the net area sown has risen only by 1.5 per cent. and the total holdings by 5.7 per cent. The density of population per sq. mile is, however, only 329 as against 646 in Bengal. Thus Bengal's agriculture suffers most from over-population. Over-population is the main cause of rural indebtedness.

*Features of Madras land system relevant to our enquiry.*—These may be described as follows:—

(1) The State as landlord has determined assessment on a scientific basis by relating it to what the soil can yield by (a) an elaborate classification of soils, (b) ascertaining the average yield of each class of soil, (c) converting it into price at an average rate.

(2) The level of assessment under State landlordism is lower than in the zamindari but this is ultimately at the expense of the tiller of the soil. The Government in Madras is concerned only with the world of pattadars or raiyats and not with the under-world created by the raiyats by unrestricted subletting among a rack-rented peasantry.

The Government is thus ultimately more responsible for rack-renting of the tiller of the soil of whose existence and rights the Government does not take any cognizance. The zamindar, on the other hand, by fixing a higher level of rents does not leave any profit and scope to subinfeudation.



\* (3) The Madras level of both assessment and rents is much higher than that of Bengal. Half the net profit is believed to be the highest land tax in the world. Payment of revenue in money adds to the hardship of the system. To add to this, though the assessment is not enhanced during the currency of the 30 years' settlements, there is no limit to its enhancement in the form of water-rates, second crop charges and other miscellaneous items of land revenue during this period.

The average *wet* assessment per acre in the Fasli, 1903-04, was Rs. 5-9-9 as against Rs. 6-6-1.

For *dry* land, it was Re. 1-0-9 in 1903-04 as against Re. 1-1-8.

Enhancement is limited to a maximum of 18½ per cent.

The level of prices for paddy in November 1933 was almost exactly what it was in 1902-03 at the time of previous assessment. The cultivators appropriated the benefit of higher prices which had ruled for about 25 years of this period of 30 years and are now not worse off during the present period of lower prices.

(4) Government in Madras has worked out in a scientific manner the expenses of cultivation for purposes of ascertaining its net profits as the basis of assessment.

In calculating net produce or profit, deductions are made from gross outturn to represent—

- (1) an allowance for cartage of the grain to the nearest market;
- (2) an allowance for merchant's profit;
- (3) an allowance for vicissitudes of seasons;
- (4) an allowance for unprofitable areas such as bunds and channels included in holdings;
- (5) cost of seed;
- (6) cost of ploughing cattle;
- (7) cost of agricultural implements;
- (8) cost of manure; and
- (9) cost of labour.

A deduction of 10-27 per cent. is allowed for (1) and 6½-25 per cent. for vicissitudes of seasons and for unprofitable areas. The remaining deductions are grouped under the head of "Cultivation Expenses".

In actual practice, the Government's share of half the net produce is in most cases only nominal and falls to less. Assessment does not count the cultivator's gains from growing commercial or garden crops. The cultivator may also gain by saving the cost allowed for labour by his own labour. He may save the cost of manure by supplying his

own manure coming from his cattle. Or he may often have much less expense in marketing his produce.

(5) In Madras, the agriculturist remains out of work for about 6 months in the year. This idle labour is sought to be employed by cottage industries such as spinning, weaving, carpentry, pottery, fruit growing, poultry-keeping, cattle-rearing, bee-keeping, sericulture, market-gardening, handicrafts, dealings with gold, silver, brass, bell-metal, iron and wood.

(6) Of the total assessment on raiyatwari holdings amounting to Rs. 602.44 lakhs for the year 1936-37, there was a total remission of Rs. 84.77 lakhs. This amounts to 14 per cent. remission related to season and the continued low level of prices of agricultural produce. This percentage of remissions is to be considered in the case of State landlordism.

Further, of the total arrear demand, only 51.04 per cent. was collected, 4.3 per cent. written off. The percentage of collection in the year 1935-36 was 21.3 and that written off was 72.5 per cent.

(7) The zamindaris in the year 1936-37 covered a total area of 13,242,230 acres. The estimated revenue realised by the zamindaris in the year is taken at Rs. 2,07,65,905. Out of this amount, they pay to Government a revenue of Rs. 46,81,840.

The total area of raiyatwari holdings in the year was 27,572,867 acres yielding the total assessment of Rs. 602.44 lakhs, besides water-rates and second crop charges and other miscellaneous charges which bring the total up to Rs. 7,18,86,414.

*Result of a first hand investigation of the working of a model private farm.*

The farm belongs to Thirumoshi at Poonamallee in Chingleput District.

It has an area of 60 acres of wet land.

Its gross yield consists of (a) 120 carts of first crop, (b) 90 carts of second crop, (c) 90 carts of third crop and (d) 120 carts of straw, valued at a total of Rs. 9,630.

The cost of cultivation per acre is to be counted as follows:—

16 ploughs = Rs. 8. at annas 8 per plough.

Seeds = Rs. 3-8.

2 labourers for transplanting seedlings for 2 days = Rs. 1-4, at annas 5 per head.

\* 10 female labourers for transplanting the seedlings picked = Rs. 2-8, at annas 7 per head.

12 female labourers for 1 day for weeding out extraneous growths = Rs. 3, at annas 4 per head.

16 labourers for 1 day for reaping harvest = Rs. 3, at annas 4 per head.

12 labourers for 1 day for gathering in the harvest and remaining operations = Rs. 3, at annas 4 per head.

Manure of oil cakes = Rs. 15.

Total = Rs. 41 per acre.

The Farm is<sup>a</sup> equipped with—

(a) Three wells.

(b) Three oil-engines.

(c) Twelve bullocks.

(d) Two carts.

(e) A staff of 3 workmen.

(a) Of the three wells, one of 24' diameter cost Rs. 1,000 in its construction. The other two of 16' diameter cost Rs. 500 each. The total capital expenditure on the three wells amounts to Rs. 2,000.

(b) Of the three oil-engines, one of 16 H. P. cost Rs. 2,300, the second of 12 H. P. cost Rs. 1,200, and the third of 8 H. P. cost Rs. 800. The total capital expenditure on the three engines amounts to Rs. 4,300.

The working cost of the three oil-engines involves the following items:—

(i) Cost of oil per day = Rs. 5-15 at Rs. 1-3 per tin for 5 tins required.

(ii) Two gallons of Mobil Oil per day = Rs. 2-4.

(iii) Cost of belting = Rs. 29.

Total cost for 260 working days on account of—

(i) = Rs. 2,160.

(ii) = Rs. 580.

(iv) Add to this the cost in wages of 3 drivers of 3 oil engines = Rs. 480.

(c) Six pairs of bullocks cost Rs. 1,000. Their upkeep costs Rs. 2 per day.

(d) Two carts cost Rs. 240.

(e) The staff of 3 workmen cost Rs. 24 per month.

The total capital outlay thus consists of the following items:—

- (a) Rs. 2,000 for 3 wells.
- (b) Rs. 4,500 for 3 oil-engines.
- (c) Rs. 1,000 for 12 bullocks.
- (d) Rs. 240 for 2 carts.
- Total Rs. 7,540.

The recurring expenditure of the Farm per annum comprises the following items:—

- (a) Interest on capital outlay of Rs. 7,540 at 9 per cent. = Rs. 675.
- (b) Oil = Rs. 2,160.
- (c) Mobil = Rs. 580.
- (d) Belting = Rs. 29.
- (e) Labour at cultivation (for 2 crops) = Rs. 4,920.
- (f) 3 Drivers = Rs. 480.
- (g) Upkeep of 12 bullocks = Rs. 720.
- (h) Staff of 3 men = Rs. 288.
- (i) Kist payable to zamindar = Rs. 450 at Rs. 9 per acre of wet land.
- Total = Rs. 10,302.

Thus the Farm, as a purely agricultural concern, is not a profitable one, owing to the phenomenal fall of prices of its produce. The owner makes it a profitable concern by adding to it several handicrafts such as husking rice, spinning and weaving.

In assessing such a farm, Government as landlord will not allow in the computation of cost of cultivation the cost on account of wells, engines, oil and drivers.

[*References.*—Statistics have been gathered from the following among other Government publications:—

- (1) Report on the settlement of the land revenue of the districts in the Madras Presidency for Fasli 1346 (1936-37) by J. F. Hall, I.C.S., and C. A. Henderson, I.C.S., Commissioners of Land Revenue.
- (2) Report on Agricultural Indebtedness by W. R. S. Sathyanathan, I.C.S., 1935.]

**Village inspection in the Sadar Subdivision of Birbhum district by Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji, M.A., Ph.D., M.L.C., Member, Land Revenue Commission and Mr. S. N. Chatterjee, Subdivisional Officer, Sadar, Birbhum.**

On the 3rd March 1939, we visited Kamalpur and Tarulia in Illambazar police-station, Tantipara in Rajnagar police-station and Bakreswar in Dubrajpur police-station.

\* At Kamalpur, one Sahadev Mondal was examined. He is a typical agriculturist owning 21 bighas of land jointly with his brother. The family consists of 9 members. Of the 21 bighas, he cultivates 15 and he has a bhagidar who tills 6 bighas. Rent varies from Rs. 1-8 to Rs. 1-10 per bigha. Except for vegetables grown on about 10 cottas of land mainly for home consumption, all the plots are on paddy. There is no irrigation facility and the prospect of crops depends entirely on rainfall. The average yield is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  maps = 6 maunds per bigha. The present price of paddy is Rs. 1-11 per maund. Besides the above 21 bighas he cultivates 9 bighas as bhagidar of another person. The yield is much smaller in these plots on account of poor quality of the soil and for want of sufficient manuring. The share of the bhagidar is  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of the produce where the cattle, plough and manure are supplied by the owner, but  $\frac{9}{20}$ th of the produce is due to him if the land is cultivated with his own cattle and plough. A rough estimate of his income is given below :—

Total yield of paddy in 21 bighas at 6 maunds per bigha = 126 maunds.

	Rs. a.
Price of 126 maunds at Rs. 1-11 per maund ...	212 10
Deduct bhagidar's share of produce in 6 bighas ...	20 4
Deduct cost of cultivation, e.g., seeds, manure, oil-cakes for bullocks, etc. ...	30 0
Add income from bhag in 9 bighas of land @ 2 maunds per bigha ...	30 6
Net income per annum	192 12

The rent is to be paid out of this income. At present, he is in arrears for 2 or 3 years because of failure of crops in 3 successive years.

A day-labourer was examined at Kamalpur. He has only  $1\frac{1}{2}$  bighas of land. The daily wages vary from 2 as. 6 p. to 4 as. but he does not get work every day. His case is undoubtedly very hard. He has to maintain his brothers who are young.

At Tarulia, another typical farm was visited. The owner has 32 bighas of land, all on paddy. The rent is Rs. 1-8. He has a family of 4. The yield is 6 maunds per bigha.

We then proceeded to Tantipara and Bakreswar. There is tassar industry at Tantipara. It was too late for a detailed enquiry but all indications tended to show that the industry had suffered much from foreign competition.

**Village inspection by Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji in the district of  
Tippera.**

*Diary of work of 4th April 1939 at Comilla.*

**I.**

Mr. A. E. Porter and I started in the morning for Jorkaran, about 10 miles from the town.

2. We saw there Mr. Nishi Kanta Bose who was the Naib of Jorkaran Kutchery under His Highness the Maharaja of Tripura.

3. (a) He stated that the maximum size of a cultivator's holding was about 5 *drones* = 80 *kanis* = 32 acres.

(b) The rent was about Rs. 3-12 to Rs. 4 per acre.

(c) 1 *Kani* =  $1\frac{1}{4}$  bigha = 0.40 acres, yields Rs. 1-8 as rent and 10 maunds of paddy (both *Aus* and *Pous*) valued at Rs. 20.

(d) Both varieties of rice are grown here.

(e) One bigha would thus yield 8 maunds of both *Aus* and *Pous* paddy.

(f) The rent would thus amount to about 1/14th of the value of produce.

(g) The estimate of the cost of cultivation of such a farm of 5 *drones* = 32 acres was thus worked out—

	Rs.	a.
(1) Cost of 2 ploughs ... ..	3	0
(2) Cost of 4 bullocks ... ..	100	0
(3) Cost of seeds at 5 maunds ... ..	12	0
(4) One labourer with food (cost of food = 2 annas per day) per year ... ..	60	0
(5) Feed of bullocks (per month) ... ..	2	8

It will be seen that items (1), (2), (3) represent capital outlay = Rs. 115 per year.

(h) Recurring expenses on 1 labourer and 4 bullocks amount to Rs. 130 per annum.

(i) The living expenses of the household of 5 members at 2 annas a day = Rs. 17 per month = Rs. 200 per annum.

(j) Total recurring expenses of the farm—(Rs. 130 + 200) = Rs. 330.

(k) A pair of bullocks at Rs. 50 will work for at least 5 years and a plough can be repaired annually at about Rs. 1.4.

\* Annual recurring charges for (1) and (2) should not be more than at the most—

(1) Rupees 2-8-0 and (2) Rupees 20.      ..

(l) Total annual expenditure of the Farm is Rs. 477-8 as comprising rent, Rs. 125; *plus* item (j) above, Rs. 330; *plus* item (k) above, Rs. 22-8.

(m) As the calculation of expenditure is based on cost of rice and no rice will be bought, the income should include the difference between value of rice consumed and paddy husked to produce it. Maximum consumption of rice would be on an average, 6 maunds annually or 20 maunds for the family which at Rs. 4 costs Rs. 120. Paddy (40 mds.) to produce this costs Rs. 80. The balance of Rs. 40 represents the womenfolk's contribution to the income by *dhenki* husking. This may be added to value of total gross produce at 10 maunds of paddy per kani—Rs. 1,600, making Rs. 1,640 in all.

## II.

4. (a) We examined a farmer named Gedu Mia who owns 12 *kani*s of land growing both *Aus* and *Pous*.

(b) He pays the total rent of Rs. 27 = Rs. 5-8 per acre.

(c) He owns 4 bullocks and 2 ploughs.

(d) His is a joint family of 14 members depending on the farm.

(e) His daily cost of food includes  $9\frac{1}{2}$  seers of rice. He has to spend Rs. 2 for bazar purchases of all sorts including the food for his bullocks, oil, cloths, etc.

(f) Thus the daily cost of his food for his whole family may be counted at Rs. 1-4 = Rs. 9 per week = Rs. 36 per month = Rs. 432 per annum.

(g) The value of gross produce of his farm = Rs. 20 per *kani* = Rs. 240 per year. Deducting rent, his net income = Rs. 210 per annum.

[(e), (f) and (g). I should prefer to calculate thus—

(1) Gross produce equals 120 maunds of paddy which goes to produce 90 maunds of rice required for his family's consumption at  $9\frac{1}{2}$  seers daily.

(2) Charges are—

			Rs.	a.
(a) Rent	...	...	27	0
(b) Bazar expenses	...	...	100	0
(c) Depreciation of—				
Bullocks	...	...	20	0
Stock	...	...	2	8

A. E. Porter.]

(h) He is thus not solvent as an agriculturist. The main reason is that he has to support 2 families.

(i) He has thus a debt of Rs. 500 bearing a nominal 36 per cent. interest. Some of this debt he incurred for buying more land.

(j) He has not paid his rent for 3 years.

(k) He adds to his work of cultivation supplementary work in the shape of carting, poultry farming, keeping goats, husking paddy, oil pressing.

His food even includes occasional meat and milk.

### III.

5. (a) We next examined a comparatively well-to-do cultivator (Mafizuddin) who also owns 12 *kanis* of land on which he grows both *Aus* and *Pous* and pays Rs. 24 as rent = Rs. 5 per acre.

(b) His land yields 100 maunds of paddy = Rs. 200.

(c) He hires a plough at 12 annas per day for 24 days in the year for purposes of cultivation.

(d) A plough has to be renewed annually at the cost of Rs. 14.

(e) He has a joint family of 8 members consuming 5 seers of rice per day and buys other necessities for Rs. 2 per week from the *hats* assembling twice a week in the village.

(f) He owns 2 bullocks.

(g) His total expenses thus comprise the following items:—

		Per annum.	
		Rs.	a.
(1) Rent	...	24	0
(2) Food (Rs. 15 + Rs. 8 <sup>0</sup> per month)	...	276	0
(3) Plough account	...	1	4
(4) Cost of two bullocks = Rs. 50 on which interest amounts to	...	6	0
(5) Debt account—			
His debt amounts to Rs. 150 on which he pays interest	...	54	0
Total		361	4



[(g) Here again I would say that of the 100 maunds of paddy, grown 60 maunds goes to make the 45 maunds paddy consumed in a year at 5 seers daily. The balance of 40 maunds is worth Rs. 80: deducting rent at Rs. 24 the surplus is Rs. 56 against which is to be set—

			Rs.	a.
Depreciation of bullocks	...	...	5	0
Renewal of plough	...	...	1	4
Bazar expenses	...	...	100	0

A. E. Porter.]

(h) Thus while his gross income from cultivation amounts to Rs. 200 per annum, his expenditure per annum amounts to Rs. 24 + Rs. 276 + Rs. 1-4 + Rs. 6 = Rs. 307-8 which, together with Interest on Debt, will amount to Rs. 361-8 per annum.

(i) He is thus insolvent as a cultivator. His insolvency is due to dependence of 2 families on his small plot. If he had his own family to support, his annual expenses would amount to Rs. 307-8 - Rs. 138 = Rs. 169-8 and would thus be almost covered by his gross income.

(j) But he is very well-to-do on account of his substantial monthly income as a Chowkidar on a pay of Rs. 13 per month, to which he may be adding tips given by travellers using the bungalow.

#### IV.

##### *Work on 5th April 1939 at Comilla.*

6. We visited the village of Kansanagar about 10 miles from Comilla.

7. (a) We examined a cultivator named Safar Ali who owns 20 *kanis* = 7 acres (at 3 of acre per *kani*).

(b) He pays the total rent of Rs. 42 = Rs. 6 per acre on two crops, if not three.

(c) He grows—

(i) *Aus* on 13 *kanis* yielding 80 maunds of paddy;

(ii) *Pous* on 20 *kanis* yielding 150 maunds.

(iii) *Jute* on 7 *kanis* along with *Aus* (April-September).

8. Taking price of paddy to be Rs. 2 per maund and of jute Rs. 5, he earns a gross income of Rs. 460 from paddy and Rs. 250 from jute amounting to a total of Rs. 710.

9. Even three crops do not give him work for all the months of the year. He is out of work for 4 months during which he has to find some handy subsidiary occupations.

10. This farmer is saddled with a very large family of 14 members comprising his aged parents, their 5 sons, 3 wives of 3 sons, and their 4 children.

11. The living expenses of this family may be roughly taken at 2 annas per head per day at Rs. 56 per month = Rs. 672 per year.

12. The details of expenses may be taken as per rates and calculations already given.

## V.

13. We next examined another cultivator named Maidharali owning 6 Kanis = 1·8 acres.

14. He pays rent of Rs. 11 or roughly Rs. 5-10 per acre.

15. He gave us an unusual fact. He uses cows instead of bullock for drawing the plough.

16. (a) He also goes in for 3 crops, growing—

(i) *Aus* on 2 Kanis.

(ii) Jute on 2 Kanis and

(iii) Pous on 4 Kanis.

(b) The gross yield of his paddy = 14 maunds and jute = 8 maunds.

17. He has a family of 8 members, consuming 5 seers of rice per day = 45 maunds of rice per year derived from 60 maunds of paddy.

18. In spite of much heckling he maintained that his 2 acres of land yielded only 14 maunds of paddy, maximum 18 maunds.

19. To maintain himself and his family, he is compelled to work as a bargadar on 3 kanis, for which he pays a fixed cash rent of Rs. 9 per kani and gets about 15 maunds of paddy.

*Remarks of Mr. O. M. Martin, I.C.S., Commissioner, Chittagong Division.*

The diary is interesting, but it is difficult to draw any conclusions from it as regards the average size of a holding, or what size of holding is "economic". The assumption embodying the use of the word economic in this sense is either (1) when a holding is too small, it cannot be cultivated without undue expense, or (2) when a holding is too small, it can't support a family. In the first sense, no small holding is uneconomic, for the smaller it is, the cheaper it is to cultivate. In the second sense many holdings are "uneconomic", but whether a particular holding is too small or not, must depend on the size of the family, the fertility of the land, and the standard of living.

\* In the first sense, large holdings become uneconomic, when wages are high in terms of agricultural produce.

I think it will be found that under any small holding system, the cultivator tends to be badly off unless he is (1) free from debt, (2) very thrifty, (3) has a fairly low standard of living and (4) has some subsidiary occupation to fall back upon when crops are poor. The eastern Bengal cultivator ought to be well off on the average because—

- (1) his land is fertile;
- (2) he has money-making crops (jute, etc.);
- (3) rate of rent is low;
- (4) except in certain areas, the country is not overpopulated; and
- (5) he does not suffer from famine as in West Bengal;
- (6) he is a hard worker, as a rule.

Actually, he gets into difficulties because—

- (1) He is fond of litigation;
- (2) When prices are high he does not save but increases his living expenses and gets into debt for marriages, etc.;
- (3) Village industries are on the decline, and the cultivator is idle for several months in the year. Generally speaking, he has no subsidiary occupation to fall back on;
- (4) Large families, children's inheritance becoming too small. There are big exceptions, however, to this. Many petty cultivators work as bargadars, fishermen, day-labourers, etc. and so keep fairly prosperous. Maidharali (No. V) is a very good example of this. Thrift and hard work is more important than the amount of land held, in most cases.

**Notes on discussions held by the Comilla Bar Library with Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D., Member, Land Revenue Commission on 5th April 1939.**

Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee visited the Bar Library at about 2 p.m. on 5th April 1939 and was received by the President and other members of the Bar. An informal meeting was held with the President in the Chair. At the outset, the President welcomed Dr. Mookerjee on behalf of the Bar and requested him to open the discussion. After making some preliminary remarks with regard to the land revenue system, and observing that the rent paid by the tenants in the province of Bengal is the lowest in the world, Dr. Mookerjee asked the opinion of the Bar with regard to (1) the

fragmentation of holdings, (2) serious situation owing to the fact that cultivators sit idle for at least 4 months in the year, (3) fall in the prices of jute and paddy and (4) deterioration of fertility of the soil and the question of enhancement of rent if fertility be increased by means of irrigation.

2. With regard to the fragmentation of holdings, Babu Kshetra Mohan Roy stated that this should be checked by altering the law of inheritance and introducing law of primogeniture. Rai Bhudhar Das Bahadur and Babu Akshay Kumar Dutta opposed the proposal and Moulvi Abdul Wahed and Babu Umakanta Das also took part in the discussion. The President said that it was not possible to put a stop to fragmentation of holdings. Babu Nibaran Chandra Ghosh said that in China evils of fragmentation of holdings have been checked and the system in China should be followed. It was then agreed that it was not possible to check the fragmentation of holdings by introducing legislation.

3. As to the fact that cultivators sit idle for 4 months in the year Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee pointed out that it was a dismal picture and the condition of the agriculturists could not possibly improve if they remain idle for 4 months or more in the year. It was agreed that agricultural income should be supplemented by income from other sources and it was suggested that in the district of Tippera it was possible to introduce cottage industries such as basket-making, cane work, pen handles, umbrella handles, dairy, hookahs, buttons, mats seats, bee-keeping for adding to the income of the cultivators and improving their condition.

4. As to fall in price of jute and paddy, fixing a minimum price for jute was pressed. Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee stated that it was not possible to guarantee a fixed price of jute without guarantee in the matter of restriction of cultivation. It was pointed out to him that it was not feasible to fix price for paddy and rice.

5. As to deterioration of fertility of soil, Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee asked the opinion of the Bar as to whether rent should be enhanced if the fertility of soil be increased by irrigation. There was difference of opinion in the matter. Moulvi Abdul Wahed said that tax should be imposed for income from agriculture. The President opposed the proposal. There was no agreement among the members in this matter.

The President then moved a vote of thanks to Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee for kindly visiting the Bar and placing important points with regard to land revenue problem for the opinion of the Bar.

UPENDRA MOHAN DUTT,

*President, Tippera District Bar Association.*

Comilla, 6th April 1939.

## Data collected in Tripura State.

*Agartala, dated the 7th April 1939.*

One interesting and singular fact I discovered in the Tripura State. The State levies export duty on its agricultural products. The principle involved in this arrangement is that when agricultural produce leaves the hands of its grower, the cultivator or tiller of the soil, and passes into those of traders seeking profit from its sale, the State has the right to a share of such profit. Coupled with this is the very commendable regulation that the entire proceeds of export duty on rice and paddy are strictly earmarked for the development of rural areas growing these crops in the shape of roads opening them up.

It is worthwhile considering if this source of taxation can be tapped in the British India districts for purposes of rural development. The middleman may be taxed for the benefit of the countryside and the peasantry growing the raw materials of trade and profiteering.

The Revenue Minister gave me the following statement in reply to my queries.

## Statement.

Agricultural products.	Ordinary price per maund.	Rate of export duty.		Export Statement (5 years' average).	Income (5 years' average).
		Per maund.			
		Rs.	a.	Mds.	Rs.
1. Cotton with seed ..	Rs. 3 to Rs. 5	1	12	52,454	..
Cotton without seeds ..	Rs. 9 to Rs. 13	4	6	..	..
2. Til ..	Rs. 2-4 to Rs. 4	1	6	27,182	1,31,899
3. Mustard seeds ..	Rs. 5 to Rs. 6	0	2	33,643	..
4. Jute ..	Rs. 3 to Rs. 5	0	6	101,967	41,311
5. Tea ..	8 annas per lb. for export.	2½	per cent. (of the gross sale proceeds).	2,424,631 (lbs.)	29,215
	3 annas per lb. for Indian market.				
6. Rice ..	Rs. 3-8 to Rs. 4-4.	0	2	148,960 mds.	18,620
Paddy ..	Rs. 1-8 to Rs. 2.	..	..	..	..

The average rate of jama per kani is Rs. 1-3 in khas mahal land, the maximum being Rs. 25 and minimum 4 annas per kani of jute land.

No rent of land is levied for the land used for cotton and til, cultivation on jhum system and almost cent. per cent. of these commodities are produced by this system.

The entire income from item 6 is earmarked for road-making and road development.

### Work of 9th April 1939 at Comilla.

On a request from the Tippera District Krisak Samity, I went to village Galimpur, about 14 miles from Comilla, with Babu Dinesh Chandra Chanda, Sub-Deputy Collector, deputed by the Collector to accompany me. On my arrival at the place, I met the Secretary and some members of the said Samity, in whose presence I conducted the enquiry.

I selected seven typical cases of cultivators and took down their evidence by examination and cross-examination. The evidence is thus set forth below:—

(1) Harish Chandra Nag owns 4 Kanis ( $120 \times 4 = 480$ ) of land which he cultivates by bargadars from whom he gets half the net produce. He maintains a family of 10 persons. He pays Rs. 5 as rent per Kani. His family consumes 5 seers of rice daily. He gets a gross produce of 40 maunds of paddy = 26 maunds of rice valued at Rs. 104 at Rs. 4 per maund. The family cannot maintain itself by cultivation of a plot too small for its needs, and has to seek supplementary earnings. Thus one son works as a teacher on Rs. 14 per month, and two other sons are earning Rs. 15 on an average as rural physicians. This is a case of a family of cultivators rising from their original status and raising their standard of life.

(2) Nishikanta Acharjya owns  $3\frac{1}{2}$  Kanis of lands ( $120 \times 7/2 = 420$ ) bearing rent of Rs. 6-12 per Kani, and growing both Aus and Pous yielding a total produce of 50 maunds of paddy. He has a family of 9 members; consuming 5 seers of rice daily. He has to find supplementary income which, as a Brahmin, he earns by working as an astrologer to the rural folks.

(3) Ali Ahmad owns 15 Kanis of lands ( $120 \times 15 = 1800$ ). He grows Aus on 5-7 Kanis (during April-September) yielding 84 maunds of paddy; grows jute on 3 Kanis (during same months), yielding 30 maunds valued at Rs. 4-8 per maund; grows Pous (September-December) on 12 Kanis, yielding 100 maunds of paddy. Thus his total income from rice and jute = Rs. 503 per annum. He has a family

of 13 members (including 4 labourers he employs for cultivation). The family consumes 10 seers of rice daily for 9 members. Each labourer is paid Rs. 18 for 7 months' work together with food which costs Rs. 3 per month per head. He spends Rs. 1-8 per *hat* and Rs. 12 per month. He pays rent at the rate of Rs. 8-12 per Kani. His total expenditure thus amounts to (a) Rs. 144 for rice, (b) Rs. 144 for bazar purchases, (c) Rs. 156 for 4 labourers for 7 months in the year and (d) Rs. 131-4, totalling Rs. 575-4. He is thus practically self-supporting and would be much better off, were he not saddled with a large family.

(4) Pateh Ali owns 4 Kanis of lands and as usual, grows Aus, Pous and Jute. Total rent for these 4 Kanis = Rs. 36.

(5) Abdul Jalil owns 3 Kanis on rent of Rs. 27.

(6) Khan Mohammad owns  $3\frac{1}{2}$  Kanis on rent of Rs. 35-8.

(7) Asal Ali owns 3 Kanis on rent of Rs. 12 per Kani. All his lands have been sold out for debt of Rs. 200.

While recording the above evidence I came across some peasants migrating to Hill Tippera from Chandpur in search of 'fresh fields and pastures new' to work as bargadars with their plough cattle for 6 months up to October.

Many other peasants who were present there volunteered to tell me that they were very miserable under the zamindari system prevailing there and that the rent was very high in comparison with that in the neighbouring estates under the Tippera Raj, Khash Mahal, or Court of Wards.

During the enquiry, I could understand that the recent increase in rates of rents was due, in some cases, to increase in area of lands disclosed by re-settlement and, in others, to increase in value of produce of the lands.

R. K. MOOKHERJEE.

DINESH CHANDRA CHANDA,

*Sub-Deputy Collector.*

9-4-39.

SUBODH MUKHERJEE, B.A.,

*Member, Executive Committee,*

*Tippera District Khasak Samity.*

9-4-39.

### **First day's work at Chittagong, dated the 10th April 1939.**

On arrival at Chittagong I met the Collector and the Commissioner. With the latter, I had a useful discussion till midday. At 2 p.m. accompanied by the Collector and Babu R. Chatterjee, the Khas

**Tabeldar, Sadar, Chittagong, I went to Halisahar, a typical seaside village of Chittagong, the revenue system of which is certainly interesting from many points of view, due to its peculiar geographical location and its close proximity to Assam and Burma.**

Many tenureholders, cultivating raiyats and bargadars were present and out of those I picked out eleven typical raiyats of this side and examined and cross-examined them thoroughly. The result of the enquiry thus conducted by me is noted below:—

1. **Monomohan Datta.** He is a tenant who has no lands in his khas possession. He along with 31 other co-sharers, 7 of whom are Muhammadans is the owner of 6.75 acres of land for which he has to pay a rent of Rs. 19-8 to the Government. He has besides this a holding which bears a rental of only 5 annas but that holding consists of only a tank which belongs solely to him. From land the only income he derives is a share of the rent he receives from the under-raiyats who are in actual possession of the lands comprising the tenancy which belongs to him and his co-sharers. He works as a village Kaviraj and anyhow maintains his family. He is typical of Hindu semi-literate raiyat of this side. These classes of tenants think it beneath their dignity to cultivate their lands with their own hands.

2. One Thanda Mea who owns in all 10 kanis of land out of which on 5 kanis, he can grow only one Aman crop. Curiously enough this tenant too does not cultivate his lands himself but he has his lands tilled by bargadars. He says that he gets only 30 maunds of paddy in all as his share of the annual produce of those 10 kanis. He has a family of 7 members and requires at least 5 seers of rice per day. He has to spend Rs. 10 per month on an average on other necessities of life. He has to pay in all Rs. 22-8 as rent. As paddy sells at the rate of Rs. 2-8 per maund this side, his total annual income from land is, according to his own statement, Rs. 75 only. Thus he is compelled to supplement his income by shop-keeping (i.e., by dealing in cloth).

3. One Nazir Ahamad who also owns 10 kanis of land, i.e., 2½ acres but who too does not cultivate his lands himself and gets his 10 kanis tilled by his bargadars. His lands are slightly of a better quality so that he gets 40 maunds of paddy as his half share of the produce of those 10 kanis which yield only one paus crop. His case is similar to that of Thanda Mea. Hence no further details need be noted here.

4. One Badar Samad who owns in all 12½ kanis of land for which he has to pay Rs. 22-8 to zamindars and Rs. 5 only to the khas mahal authorities. 8½ kanis out of 12½ kanis yields only one crop, viz., green paddy which is harvested in Kartick and the other 4 kanis yield two



crops, viz., *aus* and *paus* paddy. He gets 70 maunds of paddy in all, i.e., 39 maunds of rice. He has a family of 16 members as 2 of his brothers and 2 sisters also are dependent on him. He requires 14 ~~seers~~ of rice daily and has to spend Rs. 2 per week for buying other necessities of life. He gets a supplementary income by growing and selling kachu and cocoanuts. He also rears fish in 3 tanks and sells fish. He had so far incurred debts in all amounting to Rs. 800.

5. One Abdul Khayer who owns 10 drones, i.e., 160 kanis. He does not cultivate any land himself. He is a prosperous middleman tenant, so further details are totally immaterial for the purposes of our enquiry.

6. One Aminulla who owns only 8 kanis, i.e., 3.20 acres of land but also works as a bargadar in respect of 12 kanis, i.e., 4.80 acres more. He says that he gets only 24 maunds of rice as his half share by cultivating those 12 kanis as a bargadar. His family consists of himself, his wife and 6 children. He had debts amounting to Rs. 350 in all. He was in debts for purchase of land, for building a house and for marrying two daughters. He requires Rs. 6 per month for buying other necessities of life.

7. One Moslem Khan who is the owner of only 3 kanis, i.e., 1.20 acres and works as bargadar on 4 kanis, i.e., 1.60 acres more. His family consists of 5 members including 2 wives. He spends 8 annas per hat for buying oil, etc., and has to pay Rs. 7 as rent per annum. He gets only 9 maunds of rice as his half share from barga. His debts amount to Rs. 300.

8. One Fazal Rahaman who owns 3 kanis and works as a bargadar on 16 kanis more. He says that he gets only 9 maunds of paddy from his own lands and 20 maunds of rice only as a bargadar. He has a family of 19 members including his 2 brothers and their children who live in joint mess with him. He requires Rs. 2 per hat for buying the other necessities of life. He supplements his income from land by fishing in the sea. He can catch 5 to 8 seers of sea fish per day and sells that fish generally at the rate of 3 as. per seer. The femalefolk of his house husks paddy regularly and he owns 4 bullocks for feeding which he has not to spend anything extra. He incurred debts to the extent of Rs. 400 for maintaining his large family in ten years.

9. One Daran Ali who owns 10 kanis and cultivates 5 kanis more as a bargadar. He has to pay Rs. 35 as annual rent for his 10 kanis (because his lands mostly lie in khas mahal areas, where rents are charged at slightly higher rates than in permanently settled estates, due to periodical enhancement at each succeeding settlement). He has 2 wives and 8 children. He gets 60 maunds of rice from his own lands and 18 maunds more as a bargadar. He requires 5½ seers of rice per

day and has to spend Rs. 7 per month in bazar purchases. He earns Rs. 20 more per year selling chillis and cocoanuts. He owns 5 buffaloes and sells buffalo milk regularly. Yet he has to raise Rs. 80 more per year for maintaining his family. He incurred a debt of Rs. 120 for marrying a second time.

10. One Fazar Ali who owns 4 kanis and tills 4 kanis more as a bargadar. He has 2 wives and 8 children. He grows and sells regularly chillies and water. He originally owned 14 kanis of land. To maintain his family he sold a portion of his lands, losing 10 kanis so far. His debts too amount to Rs. 500. He has to pay annual rent of Rs. 10 for his 4 kanis.

11. One Abdul Gani who owns 4 kanis himself and works on 4 kanis as a bargadar. He has a family of 3 members only and yet incurred debts to the extent of Rs. 200 because he required Rs. 50 once for buying 2 bullocks and Rs. 60 for rebuilding his house which was burnt by accident. He has to pay Rs. 9-8 for his 4 kanis.

We record some general impressions suggested by this enquiry—

(1) Too many of the people with whom we spoke found it evidently beneath them to till their own lands and thus save the cost of labourers or of an adhi share.

(2) Too many of them had more than one wife and consequently unnecessary extra expense.

(3) Not enough of them took advantage of the proximity of the sea and of the opportunity to make some extra income by catching fish therein.

(4) Too few of them bothered with merely making crops such as chillies.

(5) Debt to most of them seemed inevitable and unworthy of special mention.

R. K. M.

P. N. McWILLIAMS,  
*Collector, Chittagong.*

**Chittagong Hill Tracts Land Revenue System, dated the 11th April 1939.**

The following witnesses were examined by me on this subject:—

- (1) Mr. Birupaksha Rgy, brother of the present Chakma Chief.
- (2) Rai Sahib Tanfrau Choudhuri, headman, Bohmong Circle.
- (3) Babu Kamini Mohan Dewan, a Chakma headman.

The valleys which mostly consist of cultivable plains on which various crops are grown belong to the Government. The latter settle those lands for 10 years only at a time, charging at the rate of Rs. 3, Rs. 2 and Re. 1 per acre for three different classes of lands.

The hillocks belong to the three different tribal Chiefs, viz., (1) the Chakma Chief, (2) The Mong Chief and (3) The Bohmong Chief. The hill people known as *jhumias* can grow various crops on hillock also and they have to pay at the rate of Rs. 6 per *jhum*, i.e., as much land as one man can utilise for crop-growing. A *jhumia* never cultivates the same lands consecutively for 2 years. He generally clears up a patch of land by burning the standing jungles of that unit and then he sows several crops together, viz., (1) pahari (i.e., hill) paddy, (2) cotton, (3) maize, (4) linseed, (5) pumpkin, (6) white melon and several other vegetables like barbati and the like.

Out of Rs. 6 each *jhumia* pays as *jhum* rent, Government gets Rs. 1-12, tribal headman Rs. 2, and tribal Chief Rs. 2-4.

The cultivation work begins in Baisakh with clearance of jungle by burning and sowing of seeds. Sowing to harvesting requires about 6 months and for 3 months more in the year he can earn something by extracting forest produce and selling the same in the *hats* or to whole-sale traders of timber. The hill people, however, do not sit idle during any month of the year, because they work on dugouts and cane work in their leisure months and many work as day labourers by immigrating temporarily to other places.

The produce per acre amounts to 20 maunds of paddy, 5 to 6 maunds of cotton (with seeds) and other vegetables of the value of Rs. 3. Thus the market value of the produce per acre comes up to Rs. 67 out of which an amount of Rs. 6 is to be paid as rent.

Generally one family of *jhumias* cultivates about 3 acres of land for which only Rs. 6 are paid as rent out of a total income of Rs. 201 from those three acres. An average family consists of about 10 members. These hill tribes have yet incurred heavy debts. They borrow from time to time money at a high rate of interest because they are of nomadic habits. The main reason for indebtedness is a great increase of population so that at present no *jhumia* can cultivate as much as 3 acres. There are only 2 degrees of subinfeudation. This is a redeeming feature, but for which the economic condition of the tribal people would have been worse still.

R. K. MOOKERJI.

**Camp Patiya, dated the 11th April 1939.**

On arrival at Patiya accompanied by Babu R. Chatterjee, Khas Tahsildar, Sadar, Chittagong, I met many cultivating raiyats present

and after a prolonged talk with them I picked out a few typical cases and I am noting below the details which I could ascertain from them regarding the prevailing rate of rent and their mode of living and present economic condition.

1. One Sona Mea stated that he owns 4 kanis (=1.60 acres) of land for which he has to pay Rs. 15 as rent. Besides those 4 kanis, he also cultivates 4 kanis more as an eksona tenant (i.e., a tenant-at-will for a year). For those 4 kanis he has to pay Rs. 44 as rent. He has to engage for 7 months in the year 2 labourers, one of whom is a boy for helping him in cultivation work. His family consists of 6 members in all and he requires 7 seers of rice daily. He has to spend 12 annas to 14 annas per *hat*.

He grows 2 crops, viz., aus and aman paddy on his own 4 kanis and gets in all nearly 94 maunds of paddy and from the other 4 kanis which he cultivates as an eksona tenant. He gets besides paddy, chillies, brinjals and kachu valued at Rs. 15 to Rs. 20 per year.

The total value of the produce of his labour amounts to Rs. 141 (price of paddy) plus Rs. 15 or Rs. 20 (as price of vegetables), i.e., Rs. 156 or Rs. 161 in all. On the 2 labourers he has to spend Rs. 49 for 7 months and he has to pay Rs. 59 as rent, i.e., his net profit amounts to Rs. 48 or Rs. 53 only per year even if he has not to spend anything over his plough cattle and plough. Up to date this raiyat had incurred debts amounting to Rs. 310 in all because he had to borrow Rs. 150 for marrying a brother of his.

The Khas Tahsildar of Patiya who was present at the enquiry said that the yield of aus and aman crops as stated by this raiyat was an under-estimate. According to him 1 acre of land this side yields 20 to 25 maunds of aus and 25 to 30 maunds of aman paddy, so that by cultivating 8 kanis, i.e., 3.20 acres of land this raiyat must have got at least 144 maunds of paddy valued at Rs. 216, as paddy sells at the rate of Rs. 1-8 per maund locally.

2. One Tajumbal Ali said that he owns 12 kanis of paddy land which he cultivates through hired labourers. He too gets 2 crops but gets in all only 120 maunds of paddy (local Khas Tahsildar's opinion is that this was also a gross under-estimate). This man pays Rs. 35 as rent and has a family of 10 members in all, 4 adults and 6 children. He is a clerk of the local post office hence no further details need be noted as regards this raiyat.

3. One Abdul Mannan stated that he was once a teacher of a primary school but that he had taken to cultivation now. He owns 10 kanis of land (4 acres) for which he has to pay Rs. 32 as rent. He grows 2 crops and has a family of 4 members. According to him he gets 75 maunds of paddy only as his share of the produce of 4 acres

owned by him. His net profits thus amount to Rs. 80-8 (75 × 1½ = Rs. 112-8 minus Rs. 32 paid as rent). This raiyat had no debts however.

4. One Asad Ali (who was carrying milk to the local bazar for sale) said that he owns only 3 kanis (=1·20 acres) of land for which he has to pay Rs. 6 as annual rent. Out of those 3 kanis, 1 kani consists of his homestead and he grows only amon paddy on remaining 2 kanis. He gets only about 25 maunds of amon paddy valued at Rs. 37-8. As he cultivates his 2 kanis himself, he has not to spend anything on hired labourers. He has no bullöcks of his own. He spends only 2 annas only per *hat* for buying oils, salt, etc. His family consists of only 4 members and he requires 4 seers of rice daily. He sells 1 seer of milk per day for 8 months in the year and gets 1 anna 6 pies daily by selling that milk. He sometimes works as a day labourer. He too has no debts.

The net annual profits from land which this raiyat derives amount to Rs. 31-8 only and from all sources his net income comes up to Rs. 80 or Rs. 85 only even if it be taken for granted that he can work as a day-labourer for about 3 months in the year on a monthly pay of Rs. 10 at least.

5. One Ali Ahmad said that he owns 12 kanis of land out of which 7½ kanis are paddy-lands and the remaining 4½ kanis are khila (i.e., land on which paddy cannot be grown). He has to pay Rs. 39 per year for 7½ kanis of paddy land. He grows vegetables enough for family use throughout the year on 4½ kanis of khila land which do not yield paddy. His family consists of 16 members in all as 3 of his brothers with their families live in joint mess with him. According to him he gets about 80 maunds of paddy valued at Rs. 120 as his share of the produce of the 7½ kanis, i.e., his net profits amount to Rs. 81 only from that much of land.

He has no debts, however, because his brothers work in other capacities, one working as a deed-writer in a Sub-Registry Office and another as a clerk in a Khas Mahal Office.

6. One Korban Ali said that he owns 4 kanis of land for which he has to pay Rs. 16 as rent. He grows 2 crops only on 2 kanis and only 1 amon crop on the remaining 2 kanis. He keeps a cow and sells milk to the value of Rs. 3 per month. He cultivates 2 kanis of land more as an eksana tenant and works as a day-labourer also. His family consists of 6 members and he requires 5 seers of rice daily and 4 annas to 6 annas per *hat*. He could not tell what net profits he derives from the lands he cultivates but the profits may be calculated as follows:—

- 50 maunds of aus and pous paddy valued at Rs. 75 from 2 kanis;
- 30 maunds of pous paddy only valued at Rs. 45 from 2 kanis;
- 25 maunds of aus and pous paddy valued at Rs. 37-8 from
- 2 kanis which he cultivates as an eksana tenant.

Thus it is seen that his income from 6 kanis comes up to Rs. 157-8 minus Rs. 16 paid as rent plus expenses of cultivation.

• R. K. M.

R. CHATTERJEE,  
Khus Mahal Tahsildar,  
Chittagong.

### Report of a Conference with Chittagong District Bar Association.

At a Special Meeting held on 11th April 1939 at the District Bar Association, Chittagong, with Mr. S. L. Khastgir in the Chair, there was discussion with the members of the Chittagong Bar by Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji about many points touching the agricultural, industrial and economic conditions of this country. Dr. Mookerji points out that agricultural holdings in our country being more and more divided amongst the descendants or heirs of the deceased agriculturists according to the laws of inheritance of both the Hindus and Muhammadans, no improvement of these holdings for solving the economic problems of the country is possible. He invited suggestions for the improvement of condition of the present agriculturists. There was one suggestion that in these holdings, the legislature should withhold the operation of these laws of inheritance and limit their scope, so that further division of holdings may not be possible to be applied in the case of the agriculturists alone. It was pointed out that such alteration of the laws of inheritance is never possible both in the case of the Hindus and the Muhammadans. It was placed before the Association whether or not economic holdings will suit the country. These are holdings fit to maintain 4 or 5 members of the family. If things are allowed to drift with regard to agricultural holdings and if the families of the agriculturists increase and all rest for their maintenance on the limited income of the holdings, the result will be simply disastrous. It was agreed to by the members that the public and the Government should join hands in making economic holdings popular in this country.

Another question was put to the members for reply, namely—how to strike a balance in price for the agriculturists as the price level of the commodities has gone down by 53 per cent. and the price of other commodities has gone down by 10 per cent. only. In course of discussion Mr. Susil Kumar Choudhury suggested that just in the way in which we had control of rice by the Government during war-time in the years 1914-18 between India and Burma, the price of food-stuffs or agricultural produce and no less the price of commodity-products can be controlled by striking a mean position so that the agriculturists

may have almost proper price for their products and people in general also may reap other advantages of the beneficent measure. It was agreed to by the members that there can be State control of price and the measure is bound to be beneficent for the agriculturists and for all.

There was lively discussion when suggestion was invited whether or not cultivators should be given every right to enjoy fruits of their toil on lands they cultivate and whether zamindars or landlords should be eliminated as the unwanted wheel in the chariot and whether or not rent-receiving is a crime in view of circumstances obtaining in the country.

Mr. Charu Chandra Sen, forcefully argued that rent receiving is never a crime and landlordism still now exists in every country on earth. Landlords form a very important and useful part of our system of society and their overthrow will not only bring about complete chaos in society not only by bringing a large number of unemployed people on the scene but also by dislocating every established mode of life in the country. Mr. Susil Kumar Choudhury opined that rent is unearned increment of land and rent-receiving without doing or having to do anything for the land or the cultivator, may not be crime because it is a strong expression meaning more than we say, but is surely a moral wrong. We have, whoever we are and whatever our status, no right to enjoy fruits of another man's toil, namely, that of the cultivator tilling the land. All benefits or income in any shape or form arising from land should morally belong to him and to none else.

As to giving employment to the huge number of agriculturists who for more than 5 months in a year remain idle at home, a really illuminating discourse followed. One members suggested that the spinning wheel or charkha has been prescribed by Mahatma Gandhi for the profitable use of time and energy by the cultivator during his protracted period of idleness. Swadeshi cloth worn by the people, made out of the coarse of fine thread brought out by the charkha of the cultivator has added income to the poor agriculturists of the country even though the demand of swadeshi cloth may or is more sentimental than permanent in the country. It was unanimously resolved that village industries and products of local artisans having ready market in the district or village should be encouraged both by the State and the public and agriculturists should be taught by the local enthusiasts or Government demonstration parties or propoganda officers free of charge with their simple tools or machinery these industries. Every district, thana, or village should choose the special cottage industries with ready market for home consumption and with small loans sufficient for the purpose advanced by Government co-operative societies. Otherwise these cultivators should usefully devote their time or energy during the protracted period of their idleness. These agriculturists,

unskilled labourers as they are, cannot join big mills or factories in large or small towns to make profitable use of their idle time. Mills or factories, as they are now, cannot give employment to this vast army of unemployed cultivators landless or not, in this country. The difficulty of immobile labour refusing to go from place to place or country to country for highest wages like labourers in Western countries have made the lot of the cultivators who can be labourers also for 5 or 6 months, miserable indeed. As conditions obtain in the country to-day, there is one way mentioned above open to us, viz., to give employment to cultivators during their 5 or 6 months of idleness.

It was suggested that agriculturists of Bengal are in every respect happy and should remain contented so far as their conditions in other countries of the world are concerned. They pay only one-fourteenth of their produce as rent to the landlords and their rights empowering them to remain on lands make them virtual proprietors of the soil they cultivate with payment of smallest amount as rent to the superior landlords. It is landlords, to whom permanent position was given by the Permanent Settlement to receive rents and pay Government revenue whose position is becoming even under Permanent Settlement more and more unsafe in the country. If any help is to be given to anybody in Bengal it is poor landlords whose mahals will be sold at once for arrears of Government revenue mercilessly and who are the only people whose resources are tapped for any beneficent move both on behalf of Government or the public for the general good and in the best interests of the country. Without entering into the biggest controversial question of the day in Bengal whether Permanent Settlement should remain or have its decent and compensatory burial, the sense of the House was that landlords should remain and as peasants or cultivators have not and cannot have any fear from the superior landlords, we will be unwise and wrong to give the go-bye to the landlords as they do not and cannot be tyrannical to tenants at their pleasure and as they form as a body motive-force of many a beneficent move in the country both on behalf of the people and the Government. It was therefore unanimously resolved that landlord system should remain and should not be disturbed with respect to their right or possession.

To another question whether the principle of barga system followed in Bengal's land system can stem the tide of subinfeudation or further subdivision of the land, it was agreed to after some discussion that the principle of barga system will help the cultivators and arrest further division and subdivision of tenancy of the agriculturists.

Cottage industries having local market and capable of starting with a small capital should be encouraged and agriculturists should be trained in these industries to profitably utilise the long period of idleness in the year and these special industries should be chosen and the public and the Government should in all possible ways train the



agriculturists for bringing out products in the open market so that the income of the agriculturists may increase and their leisure may be under the circumstances, most profitably utilised.

The President thanked the learned Speaker Dr. R. K. Mookerji and the Speaker thanked the members for their attention and participation in the discussion on the important topics of the day.

**On board steamer SS. "Nilla" on way to Adinath, dated 12th April 1939.**

On the steamer I met many raiyats and had had a full discussion with them and as a result I came across a few interesting cases which I cannot help mentioning here.

1. One Syedulla, a grandson of Khan Sahib Makbul Ali Chowdhuri of Chota Chana, a paddy king, stated that his grandfather, instead of settling his khas dakhali lands measuring 400 drones (=2,560 acres), gets the entire area cultivated through hired labourers, ekshona tenants and bargadars (150 drones; i.e., 960 acres by the latter). His grandfather has to engage 100 labourers and to keep 300 buffaloes and 150 bullocks for this farming on a big scale. He gets 20,000 to 25,000 maunds of paddy valued at Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 37,500 from his khas dakhali lands for which his grandfather has to pay as rent Rs. 14,000 (including cess). The latter had not introduced any improved, scientific methods of cultivation however, though his cultivation is on such a big scale.

2. One Abdul Kader said that he owns 2 drones, i.e., 12·80 acres of land for which he has to pay Rs. 64 as annual rent. He gets 250 maunds of paddy valued at Rs. 375 only from his lands. He requires 4 ploughs and has to keep 8 bullocks for tilling these 12·80 acres. He has a family of 35 members and he requires Rs. 2·8 per *hat* for purchasing other necessities of life like oil, salt, etc. He has no debts, however, because he has another source of income, as he works as a tahsildar on account of local Noabad talukdar named Ijjat Ali Chawdhuri of Rajakhali.

3. One Golam Haidar told me that he too owns 2 drones, i.e., 12·80 acres of land. He has to pay Rs. 100 as annual rent and requires 2 ploughs and keeps 5 buffaloes and 2 bullocks and has to engage 2 labourers for 7 months in the year for tilling his lands. He gets 320 maunds of paddy valued at Rs. 480 only from his 12·80 acres. He has a family of 10 members for feeding whom he requires 15 seers of rice daily. He has to spend Rs. 1·4 per *hat* for the purchase of other necessities of life. He added further that his deficits were met by his brothers who were earning elsewhere in various capacities.

**R. K. M.**

**R. CHATTERJEE.**

**Camp Adinath, dated 12th April 1939.**

On arrival at Adinath I examined Babu Manindra Lal Chakravarti, Naib, K. C. Ray Estate, Chittagong, and scrutinised the papers produced by him.

1. It was seen that the estate was running a model agricultural farm on nearly 600 acres of khas lands at an annual cost of Rs. 3,000. From this farm are being distributed free seeds of various new experimental crops including sugarcane (Coimbatore 213 variety) to the tenants.

2. Remission of rents on account of failure of crops is granted as a rule by the estate.

3. Remissions allowed by the Government for damage to crops from flood water, saline deposit (what is locally known as *kos*) are followed by the zamindar in allowing corresponding remissions to the tenants of the estate.

4. Rates of rent per drone charged by the estate vary from Rs. 8 (minimum), i.e., 8 annas per kani to Rs. 28 (maximum), i.e., Rs. 1-12 per kani. Where maximum rent of Rs. 28 per drone, i.e., Rs. 1-12 per kani is charged, it is on the basis of the produce of 60 aris of amon and 40 aris of aus crop per kani. As 100 aris of paddy of both varieties sell at the average market price of Rs. 35 on this basis the rent charged amounts to about 1/20th of the produce. Out of the rent of Rs. 28 only realised for each drone of land by the estate, Rs. 7 per drone are spent in maintenance of embankments. The net rent is thus reduced to Re. 1-5 = 1/21st part of the produce.

5. Where the minimum rent of 8 annas per kani is charged, it is on the basis of produce estimated at 16 aris per kani. As 16 aris can fetch Rs. 6 in the market, it is evident that the rent charged amounts to about 1/12th of the produce.

6. Rents are not enhanced in case the cultivator grows additional crops or even when the prices go up.

7. The estate is maintaining 1 charitable dispensary (paying for its upkeep), several roads, 40 ring wells and 1 M. E. school.

R. K. M.

R. CHATTERJEE.

**Camp Adinath-Mahishkhali, dated 13th April 1939.**

I met a group of 26 occupancy raiyats who all cultivate their holdings themselves. In course of my talks with them I ascertained some facts which I am noting below by describing what 3 of those typical cultivators told me.

\* 1. One Golam Bari said that he owns 30 drones, i.e., 192 acres of land for which he has to pay Rs. 700 roughly as rent. He has his lands cultivated through hired labourers engaged for 6 months in the year on a pay of Rs. 8-10 per month without food. He grows 6 varieties of local rice, tobacco, chillies, and brinjals. He has no debts.

2. One Ali Mia stated that he owns 1 drone 4 kanis=8 acres for which he has to pay Rs. 25 as rent. He grows 4 local varieties of rice, tobacco, potato, chillies, brinjals, watermelons and betels. He has a supplementary income of Rs. 4 per month by working as a teacher. He too has no debts.

\* 3. One Mangal Chand told me that he owns  $1\frac{1}{2}$  drones= $9\frac{1}{2}$  acres for which he has to pay Rs. 35 as rent per year. He has to engage 2 labourers for 4 months on Rs. 3 per month in addition to food. He grows 4 local varieties of rice, chillies, tobacco and betels. He has a family of 14 members consuming 10 seers of rice per day and spends 12 annas per hat. His 3 sons work as day-labourers here and in Aracan. His debts incurred for marriages only amount to Rs. 200. His main complaint is that very often by periodic epidemic cattle diseases, he loses his cattle.

His net income may be calculated as follows:—

	Rs.
350 maunds of paddy valued at	... 525
Tobacco, chillies and betels valued at roughly	... 100 per year.
	<hr/>
Gross income	... 625
	<hr/>
<i>Deduct—</i>	
	Rs.
Wages of labourers Rs. 40 <i>plus</i> rent Rs. 35	... 75
Costs of maintaining 6 bullocks	... 144
Costs of 3 ploughs including repair charges	... 15
	<hr/>
Total	... 234
	<hr/>

The net income, therefore, amounts to Rs. 391 or at least Rs. 350 (minimum).

#### *General remarks.*

Adinath may be considered as a typical permanently settled estate in Chittagong. In other parts of the district there are found tenants who cultivate lands under owners of permanently settled estates as well

as under owners of temporarily settled noabad talukdars or etmamdars. I chose Adinath for this reason only. Adinath derives its name from the deity whose temple is situated there. The place is visited by thousands of Hindu pilgrims from all parts of Bengal during the mela period which commences from the Siba-Chaturdāsi-day. The inhabitants of the island, therefore, can easily derive additional profits by selling various articles to these annual visitors.

The island locally known as Maheshkhali from which the channel that laps its shores borrows its name, is about 12 miles long and  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles broad and is owned by Rai Bahadur K. C. Roy, M.L.A., who has to pay about Rs. 3,000 as rent and cess for it to the Government and the District Board. The total rent roll of the island comes up to just a little over Rs. 1,00,000 (gross). As it is a seagirt island, costly embankments have to be maintained by the zamindar on portions which are exposed to the sea. As the entire island is very fertile, the tenants inhabiting it are all fairly prosperous. The rate of rental charged by the estate is very low being only  $1/12$ th to  $1/21$ st portion of the produce.

R. K. M.

R. CHATTERJEE,

*Deposition of Babu Jitendranath Dastidar, son of Priyakanta Dastidar,  
Forester of K. C. Roy Estate Moishkhali.*

When we get any remission from the khas mahal, we grant corresponding remission to our tenants on condition that they would also grant similar remission to their under-tenants till it passes to the lowest stratum, i.e., to the tiller of the soil. I do not know of any single instance that our tenant getting remission did not pass it on to his under-tenants.

We make public the notices issued by the khas mahal authorities granting remission.

Deposition taken by me.

M. BANERJEE,

Khas Tahsildar,

Cox's Bazar,

Camp Moishkhali.

12-4-39.

I examined Afazuddin, son of Kaderbux of Bharamaheshkhali, police-station Moishkhali. He is an under-tenant of one Majidali Fakir

of Jafarali Munshi dail (Bharamoiskhali). Majidali is a tenant of Roy K. C. Roy Bahadur's Estate for T. K. No. 6. His rent for 1936-37 and 1937-38 had been entirely remitted as the lands were exposed due to breach of embankments and khal. The under-tenant Afazuddin deposes that he too got complete remission for 2 years.

Read over and admitted to be correct.

Thumb impression of Afazuddin taken in my presence.

M. BANERJEE,

*Khas Tahsildar,*

*Cox's Bazar,*

*Camp Moishkhali.*

12-4-39.

The remission that I had allowed as khas mahal officer to the superior landlord Ray Bahadur K. C. Roy for failure of crops to T.K. Nos. 956, 34958 and Jote No. 1 of Kutubjum was granted on the condition that it must be passed on by him to his under-tenants. I also generally make sure that this remission would be passed by the under-tenant to his under-raiyats at the time when remission is granted.

I also follow the above noted procedure.

R. CHATTERJEE,

*Khas Tahsildar, Sadar.*

M. BANERJEE,

*Khas Tahsildar,*

*Cox's Bazar,*

*Camp Moishkhali.*

12-4-39.

*Deposition of Jahirulla, son of Fazalar Rahman of Barkhope, police-station Kutubdia, aged about 40.*

1. I hold  $1\frac{1}{2}$  drones of lands, i.e., 9.60 acres under my direct cultivation. Of these lands 7.60 acres are under khas mahal and 2.00 acres under a private landlord. I pay Rs. 52-8 as my annual rent for the entire area held by me. Lands under khas mahal bear a rate of Rs. 5 per acre, whereas those under Talukdars under khas mahal about Rs. 6. I grow only one crop, viz., aman paddy in all my lands though it is possible to grow two crops. Average yield per acre in my lands is 100 aris (23 maunds)=Rs. 35. I have work for only 6 months, on

cultivation. I have got subsidiary occupation (1) Sampan plying and (2) running a small grocer's shop on hat days twice in the week with a stock of articles worth Rs. 200 renewed according to needs throughout the year.

2. The family of this man consists of 15 members including children. Total annual gross income of this family comes up to Rs. 340 as price of crops grown by him in his lands, and this is supplemented by the income derived by him from sampan plying and shopping which fetch an annual income of Rs. 200 and Rs. 100 respectively in the average and thus the total gross income of this family comes up to Rs. 640. The members of this family consume 8 seers of rice daily and have got to spend annas 8 to 10 per hat day which takes place twice in the week for purchase of other necessities besides expenses of clothes and ceremonies. He has got 4 heads of buffaloes for cultivation, but he grazes them in his own lands and have very little to spend on that account and he has got to spend some Rs. 5 or so on that account annually. Annual gross expenditure of this family would be Rs. 188 as price of rice, Rs. 58 as bazar expense, Rs. 100 as cost of cultivation, Rs. 100 for clothes, Rs. 100 for other expenses including educational expenses of children and Rs. 52-8 as rent, thus totalling Rs. 598-8. Thus he has a surplus of Rs. 41-8.

3. It transpires that peasants can easily get a higher price for the paddy they grow if they can wait till the next sowing season, viz., Jaistha (May). By thus waiting for 4 months they can get Rs. 1-14 per maund instead of Re. 1-9. This would mean an addition of Rs. 7 to the price of paddy per acre. It is worth considering whether the burden of this waiting can be thrown on the parties best able to bear it, i.e., the landlords and moneylenders who may realise their dues in the season of higher price. Present financial year expires on the 31st of March and the landlords insist on payment by March whereas price of paddy goes up generally in May and hence it may be considered if the last kist and the latest date of payment of the last kist might not be shifted up to May. It is also the case that peasants may seek to evade payment and spend the sale price of their produce in other ways at once, before paying their legitimate dues of rent and interest.

R. K. M:

M. BANERJEE,

Khas Tahsildar,

Cox's Bazar,

Camp Maheshkhali.

13-4-39.

Inspection Bungalow, Cox's Bazar, dated 13th April 1939, 4 p.m.

*I.—Deposition of Rai Bahadur Bepin Behari Raksit, Chairman,  
Cox's Bazar Municipality.*

1. He owns 4 kanis direct under khas mahal. Rent Rs. 6 for the total area. Rate Rs. 3-12 per acre. These are homestead lands.

2. He owns  $7\frac{1}{2}$  drones, i.e., 48-00 acres under 2 different tenureholders. Rate Rs. 2 per kani, i.e., Rs. 5 per acre.

3. These are all for growing one kind of paddy, yielding 40 aris per kani, (i.e. 9 maunds per acre) worth Rs. 16. Rent is  $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the produce. He states that it is not possible for Talukdar to deny him the remission which he gets from Government.

*II.—Statement of Babu Nalini Ranjan Dutta, B.L., Pleader of  
5 years' standing at Cox's Bazar.*

1. He has stated that he has known of a case (rent-suit) where the raiyat did not grant his under-raiyat the amount of remission which he had secured from Government at the time of special Jamabandi Operation, which was legally due to the under-tenants. This fraud was detected in the course of legal proceeding. The raiyat was compelled by Court to grant the remission withheld.

I, however, gather that such cases of fraud are somewhat exceptional and not general. They are connected only with special Jamabandi Operation, where, in some cases lump reduction was granted to tenureholders as a relief without any condition to pass it on to his raiyats and in some cases post-card notices issued to under-raiyats were not properly distributed. In these latter cases, the fact of remission was not widely circulated.

*Statement of Moulvi Makbulali Chowdhury of North Mithasari,  
police-station Ramoo.*

1. He charges Re. 1 to Rs. 1-4 per kani on lands growing one rice and yielding 40 to 45 aris, i.e., 10 maunds worth Rs. 16. This means that rent is one-fourteenth of the produce. His raiyats remain idle for about 7 months in the year.

2. Moulvi Kabiruddin Ahamad, zamindar, Harbhag, states the same facts as above.

R. K. M.

13-4-39.

**Camp Sitakunda, dated 15th April 1939.**

On arrival at Sitakunda I first examined the Manager, Treasurer and Tahsildar, Mohanta estate. The estate comprised mainly noabad lands which had been leased out to raiyats on rentals varying from Rs. 4 to Rs. 8 per kani. There is only one permanently settled estate which consists of 173.28 acres of land for which the Mohanta has to pay Rs. 187-2-7 as revenue to the Government. Out of those 173.28 acres, 149.53 acres had been leased out to tenants on a total rental of Rs. 293-6-3, i.e., the raiyats pay to the Mohanta rents at the rate of about Rs. 2 only per acre. As on lands of this side on the average 16 maunds of aus and amon paddy can be grown valued at Rs. 24, it is clear that the rental payable by the raiyats of the permanently settled estate amounts to only 1/12th of the produce as compared to the rental charged from raiyats of noabad lands (i.e., temporarily settled estate) who have to pay at a much higher rate, viz., Rs. 10 to Rs. 20 per acre.

I met many cultivators of this side and I am noting below what I ascertained from a few typical raiyats by examination and cross-examination:—

1. One Syed Obaidar Rahaman stated that he along with 15 other agriculturists had started a farm on a co-operative basis for the cultivation of sugarcane and marketing and selling of *gur* produced from that sugarcane.

The farm comprises 7.10 acres of noabad land for which the Society has to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 15 per acre. The Society grows sugarcane on 4.80 acres of land and gets 240 jars of *gur* valued at Rs. 480 from those 4.80 acres. On the remaining portion two varieties of paddy and several rabi crops are grown.

The yield of both aus and amon paddy per acre amounts to only 16 maunds according to this witness and yet paddy is grown on a portion of the farm-lands which were taken for growing sugarcane. Apparently the crop yield per acre must have been underestimated by this raiyat who is the Secretary of the Society. He works as a teacher in the local High Madrasah and is fairly educated. Rabi crops grown comprise mainly—(1) cabbages and cauli-flowers, (2) potato and (3) chillies. He admitted freely that he did not work on the land himself and added that there is a system of leasing of lands at competition rents to annual tenants-at-will who sometimes have to pay rents at the rate of even up to Rs. 40 per acre. The other cultivators examined by me did not support this statement. Hence it could not be ascertained conclusively wherefrom Syed Obaidar Rahaman got his impression about charging as much as Rs. 40 per acre by land-owners of this side.



2. Nur Ahamed Choudhury said that he owns 36 acres of land which he cultivated himself with the help of his grown up family members and hired labourers. He gets only 15 to 20 aris (=5 to 6 maunds) of aus and 8 to 10 aris of pous paddy (=3 or a little over 3 maunds) valued at only Rs. 15 per kani (=2/5th of an acre) though he has to pay rents at the rate of Rs. 2-8 per kani to owners of permanently settled estates or as much as Rs. 6 per kani to the khas mahal authorities. His supplementary occupation is pisciculture. He is not indebted to anybody and is known to be one of the richest cultivators of the thana.

3. One Dinabandhu Das told me that he owns a farm of 5 acres within a permanently settled estate. He has to pay Rs. 36 as annual rent and gets in all only 80 maunds of aus and amon paddy valued at Rs. 100. His family consists of only 5 members and he has no debts because he has additional income. He works as the local tahsildar of two noabad talukdars on a commission basis.

The local Thana Officer who came to meet me and who was in charge of the thana for over a year stated that the miseries of the peasantry of the Sitakunda side are mainly due to 5 reasons, viz.: (1) illiteracy, (2) useless litigation, (3) profiteering from litigation as touts, (4) polygamy; marrying at harvest time and divorcing when out of work with the result that most of the cultivators have on an average more than 2 wives and (5) idleness for at least 6 months in the year.

Babu R. Chatterjee, Sadar Khas Tahsildar was present all along throughout the enquiry.

R. K. M.

R. CHATTERJEE,

Khas Tahsildar,

Sadar, Chittagong.

16-4-39.

### **Evidence of Babu Kumud Behari Choudhury, Estate Ramkamal Ramballav Shaha, Chittagong.**

#### *Opinion as to rent being paid in kind.*

1. Tenants generally do not like to pay in kind. In litigation it has been found in innumerable cases whenever landlord sues a tenant for price of paddy at market rate tenant has opposed the claim by all means at his disposal and insisted on payment of rent not at market value of the paddy but at money value supposed to be mentioned in

the *habliyat* for the purpose of registration. It is a common experience that tenants withhold delivery of paddy and later on insist on acceptance of the money value of the paddy. This occurs specially when on account of excessive rain or want of rain or some other natural calamity the tenants do not get full yield. The tenants are actuated by the desire to keep in store sufficient paddy for maintenance and if possible to sell surplus paddy not required for maintenance at better price.

2. Landlords obviously do not like to collect paddy. The reason is (1) it means extra expenditure in collection and storage, (2) zamindars have got lands scattered all over the districts and cannot maintain a kutchery in every village of their zamindari. In case of money rent one office or kutchery is sufficient for one thana or several villages but in cases of paddy rent, the staff will have to be increased and number of kutcheries multiplied. Storing of paddy in the villages means not only extra expenditure in the shape of erecting or making granary or store houses, but also in the matter of sale, the zamindar will have to depend on the mercy of his tahsilar who may sell at any price he chooses on various pretexts.

3. The tenants of the district hold lands at a very low rate but the zamindar pays a high revenue to the Government. If the money rent which the tenant is paying to the zamindar is now converted into paddy rent, the result will be that the zamindar will be compelled to sell paddy at an uneconomic price and his income will dwindle in proportion although the revenue and the rent payable by him to the Government for permanently and non-permanently settled lands will remain the same. Consequently default in payment of revenue to the Government and rent to the khas mahal will go on increasing. In course of time the zamindar will be unable to meet the claims of the Government and the result will be that they will be deprived of their property on account of the compulsory sale under *Sunset Law*.

4. In this district measure of an ari is not uniform: in some locality 13 seers make an ari, in some locality 14 seers 10 chittaks. In case of money rent, the want of uniformity cannot exist. Besides during harvesting season paddy will have one weight whereas the weight comes down by nearly 10 per cent. in course of 2 or 3 months after storage: this will obviously work a great hardship on the landlord.

*Opinion as to the imposition of the proposed Agricultural Cess.*

5. Zamindars are paying numerous cesses. It has been seen during the several revaluations under the Cess Act, cesses have been enhanced almost arbitrarily in many cases. In some cases cesses have been increased more than double. Present Cess Act is operating very harshly on the zamindars. It is submitted that the imposition of cesses

under the Cess Act is an inroad upon the zamindar's rights under the Permanent Settlement. Besides, the Government imposes cesses as occasion requires under various Acts such as Embankment Act, &c. Zamindars have to pay the cesses in the first instance otherwise the Government realise the same by summary process of law irrespective of the question whether the tenants have paid the cesses due by them to the zamindars. The tenants usually hold up the rent for 3 or 4 years and zamindars institute rent suits. They can hardly realise the decretal amounts within 3 years of the decree under the normal procedure. This means normally the zamindars have to wait for 5 to 7 years for the realisation of rent and cess, although they have paid the cess in due time. The situation becomes worse when tenants seek the protection of Agricultural Debtors Act either before or after the rent decree involving as it does delay for any number of years 8, 10, 15, and so on in realisation of cess, rent etc. In this state of affairs the zamindars cannot agree to imposition of a further cess which will have the effect of impoverishing the zamindars without proportionate benefit. The lure of enhancement of rent does not appeal to the zamindars because tenants have already acquired the habit of non-payment and been encouraged to withhold payment on account of the operation of Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and debt relieving activities of the Government. Zamindars are unable to bear the strain of cesses hitherto imposed and view with grave suspicion that the agricultural cess will do them any benefit. It may be suggested that if the real interest and benefit of tenants be intended by imposition of such cess, then the local Union Boards who are in close touch with the tenantry may be placed in charge of collection of such cess, like chowkidari tax, union rate, etc.

*Opinion as to the imposition of Agricultural Income-tax.*

We are opposed to the imposition of agricultural income-tax. Income-tax is by its nature arbitrary and unjust and ignores expenses incurred for the maintenance of the family of the assessee. Agricultural income-tax will add to the burden without any compensating advantage.

The poverty of the zamindars will go on increasing and they will have no funds to meet the demands of the income-tax authorities: it will ultimately affect the tenants adversely.

*Opinion as to whether Permanent Settlement is obstructing industrial development.*

The Government has hitherto not taken effective steps in industrial organisation of the country. Proper education for the purposes has

not so long been given. If Permanent Settlement obstructs industrial development, we would expect great industrial developments by this time in non-permanently settled areas. Chittagong is non-permanently settled for the major portion. Khas Mahal in the name of Government is the biggest landed proprietor in Chittagong but Government ownership of large proportion of land in Chittagong has not made it more industrially developed than places where almost all the lands are permanently settled. The reason is Permanent Settlement is not to blame for industrial backwardness. The people have not been made to think of industrial development at all and the root of the evil lies in the method of education which has so long aimed at creating clerks sufficiently able to help the Government to carry on its day-to-day administration. Chittagong was the first to go under the British administration. Chittagong was taken over by the East India Company in 1760 and during these years of occupation khas mahal, the largest landed proprietor or the Government has not thought it necessary or fit to establish a single industrial school at Chittagong. Chittagong had ship building industry in bye-gone days but it is ruined by introduction of steamships. It can very well have salt industry, but so far nothing has been done by the Government to educate or help the people in the said industry. Tannery and fishery could also be established and developed in spite of the Permanent Settlement: has the khas mahal, i.e., the zamindar of the non-Permanently Settled lands done anything?

*Opinion as to price of paddy being too low.*

As a matter of fact the price of paddy cannot be said to be low now. The present market rate is Rs. 2-6 per maund of average paddy whereas some 20 years back its price was rarely higher than a rupee per maund and yet the tenancy were much better off in those days inasmuch as they could afford to stock a decent quantity of gold and silver every year but at present in spite of the higher market price of paddy, they have had to part with whatever ancestral stock of gold and silver they possessed, not to speak of purchasing anew any gold or silver.

*Subinfeudation.*

Actual number of sub-tenures prevalent in the district is as follows:—

1. Highest Sadar Patni.
2. Sadar Patni.
3. Patni Taluk.
4. Taluk.

5. Dar Taluk.
6. Etmam.
7. Dar Etmam.
8. Tapa.
9. Dar Tapa.

*Annual cost of living of a family of 5 members.*

	Rs.
Rice (37 maunds) at Rs. 3-8	130
Dal (2 maunds)	10
Dry fish, etc.	20
Salt species, etc.	15
Clothing	25
Total	200

Chittagong, dated 16th April 1939.

I

Ramesh Chandra Sen. Manager, Court of Wards, South Group, gave the following evidence:—

- (1) Rate of rent per acre = Rs. 3-8.
- (2) Produce per acre = 24 maunds = Rs. 24. Rent = Rs. 5-8.
- (3) Tenureholder pays Rs. 5 to superior landlord, gets Rs. 7 from under-tenant who gets Rs. 10 to Rs. 15 from his under-raiyat.

The under-raiyat thus pays Rs. 10 out of Rs. 24 as value of produce.

- (4) Remissions are notified by printed post cards and beat of drum by the zamindar. The effect of this notification is sometimes the claim for remissions from neighbouring raiyats who are not granted such remission.

- (5) Where the zamindar gets a rent of 5 annas to Rs. 2-8 per acre from tenureholder, the tenureholder realises in some cases Rs. 6 to Rs. 9 per acre from his raiyat who may even get Rs. 9 to Rs. 12 from the under-raiyat.

- (6) Permanently settled estate No. 1270 has been assessed by Government at more than 74 per cent.

Permanently settled estate No. 1023 has been assessed by Government at more than 50 per cent.

The above statement is agreed to by Mr. Kiran Chandra Chakravarty, Manager, Court of Wards, North Group.

•• RAMESH CH. SEN.

KIRAN CH. CHAKRAVARTY.

R. K. MOOKERJI.

Replies to the questionnaire of Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji, by Babu Jnanatosh Roy Choudhury on behalf of Estate Jogendra Nath Roy Choudhury and others, Dhoom, Chittagong.

Q. 1.—Receipts and expenses on one holding of best soil of 5 acres.

A. 1.—The Receipts and expenses for 5 acres of lands of best soil are estimated as follows calculating two main crops and rabi crop:—

#### Receipts.

	Rs.
Main two crops—	
40 maunds of paddy per acre of best lands for one main crop $40 \times 5 = 200$ maunds at Rs. 2 per maund	400
30 maunds of paddy per acre of best lands for aush crop $30 \times 5 = 150$ maunds at Rs. 2 per maund	300
For rabi crops—at Rs. 15 per acre $15 \times 5$	75
Fodder value at Rs. 10 per acre $10 \times 5$	50
Total	825

#### Expenses.

	Rs. a.
Rent at Rs. 3-2 per acre	15 10
Seeds at Rs. 3 per acre	15 0
Bullock (two only) including fodder, etc.	72 0
Manuring and other improvements at Rs. 3 per acre	15 0
Cost of labour including ploughing, sowing and harvesting the crops	80 0
Interest on the capital to be invested at 6 per cent. per annum	30 0
Total	227 10

\* It will be seen from the above figures that calculated at a modest figure the agriculturist can easily maintain himself after defraying all his expenses and can easily discharge his liabilities to the landlord and other people.

Q. 2.—Minimum size of a holding (under cultivation).

A. 2.—The minimum size of a holding under cultivation is one decimal of an acre.

Q. 3.—Period of cultivation on a worst type of land.

A. 3.—The maximum period required for cultivation of worst type of land is 5 months.

Q. 4.—Idle period of a cultivator depending on an average land.

A. 4.—The idle period of a cultivator depending on an average land is about 7 months in a year.

Q. 5.—Average size (number of dependants) of a cultivator family.

A. 5.—The family of a cultivator on an average consists of 6 members only.

Q. 6.—Causes of indebtedness of cultivators.

A. 6.—It is curious that the agriculturists in Bengal are involved in heavy debts although in my opinion the lands yield an income sufficient to maintain them. After a very careful study of this intricate subject which is receiving the best attention of the present Government and the public the reason for agricultural indebtedness can be attributed to the following causes:—

(1) Multiplication (as the result of the last census will show).

(2) Polygamy among the agriculturists.

(3) Idleness and indolence for about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a year.

(4) Social ceremonies and other social obligations.

(5) Purchasing lands at a time when the value of crops was most favourable by borrowing money at an exorbitant interest which they failed to repay on account of a sudden fall in prices of jute and paddy and other crops.

(6) Improvidence, viz., purchasing fancy goods; and unproductive litigation.

(7) Pilgrimage.

(8) Death of cattle due to ignorance of rearing and want of grazing fields.

**Q. 7.**—Suggested industry for idle period of the cultivators that may be introduced immediately without much capital investment.

**A. 7.**—It is suggested that the agriculturists should be encouraged to employ themselves in cottage industries, which do not require much capital investment, during the idle period of the year such as charka, hand-loom, basket and chatai making, shati food making, making of fishing implements, poultry, fisheries, making of safety matches and salt (free from excise duty) improved system of cattle and sheep rearing, paper making (indigenous system), toy making.

**Q. 8.**—Different kinds of "Barga" systems prevailing in the locality.

**A. 8.**—There are four systems of barga—viz. (a) adhi barga, half the crop for the landlords and the other half for the cultivator, (b) thika barga or payment of a fixed quantity of crop, (c) fixed money payment and (d) part money and part crop.

**Q. 9.**—Irrigation facilities:—If and how possible and with what result.

**A. 9.**—Irrigation plays a very important part in agriculture and it is suggested that canals should be excavated and where necessary re-excavated through the agency of the Union Boards and District Boards with public help which is sure to produce very good result in the matter of yielding good crops. In hill areas, reservoirs of water coming down from the hills and making pipe connections with distant culturable lands at a considerable low cost are sure to produce good result.

**Q. 10.**—Question of statutory obligation of realisation of cess from zamindars provided enhancement of rent is allowed.

**A. 10.**—It is generally believed without any reference to statutory figures that the peasantry of Bengal pay a heavy rent to their respective zamindars and legislative measures are being resorted to for redressing their grievances and by recent legislation the position of the raiyats has been improved so much so that with their only obligation to pay rent to the zamindars they are the masters of the situation with further protection and facilities to withhold timely payment of rent afforded by the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. So the landlords may have no objection to realisation of statutory cess from them provided enhancement of rent is allowed and a summary procedure for realisation of rent and cess can be adopted; but the trend of the present day legislative measures is otherwise and public feeling is against enhancement of rent. So we do not agree to statutory obligation realising any new form of cess from the zamindars.



**Q. 11.**—Question of agricultural income-tax—what do you think about it?

**A. 11.**—We do not advocate imposition of agricultural income-tax as there are too many taxes such as road cess, chowkidari tax, union rates and education cess. Any such imposition will be ruinous to both the landlords and the actual cultivators of the soil.

**Q. 12.**—Actual number of sub-tenures prevalent in the district:—

**A. 12.**—

**A.**

(1) Sadar Patni.

(2) Taluk.

(3) Dar Taluk.

**B.**

(1) Taluk.

(2) Etman.

(3) Dar Etman.

**C.**

(1) Taluk.

(2) Tapa.

(3) Dar Tapa.

From the above table it will be seen that ordinarily these three under tenureholders intervene between the zamindar and the actual cultivators of the soil but under exceptional circumstances sometimes the number of intermediaries vary from 5 to 7 including the dar raiyat.

**Q. 13.**—Cost of cultivation and living expenses of an agricultural family of five members (having 3 acres of land).

**A. 13.**—A family consisting of 5 members, with 3 acres of land can under ordinary circumstances live very happily discharging all their monetary obligations, and the cost of cultivation and living expenses of such a family is shown below:—

				Rs.
(1) Cost of cultivation	...	...	...	30*
Cost of harvesting	...	...	...	6
				<hr/>
		Total	...	36
(2) Living expenses calculated at Rs. 3 per head per month	$5 \times 3 = 15 \times 12$	...	...	180

\*N. B.—Having no bullocks.

**Q. 14.**—Bullock account of one actual family (two bullocks).

**A. 14.**—One actual family of cultivators generally owns two bulls and the cost of purchasing two bulls is Rs. 75 and the cost of rearing and fodder is Rs. 72 but it may be noted here that generally the cultivators have not to spend much on fodder and rearing as they get sufficient fodder from their own cultivation. On the other hand they earn something by giving them on hire to other cultivators owning no bulls.

**Q. 15.**—Payment of rent in kind—arguments for and against.

**A. 15.**—Payment of rent in kind is very difficult to realise specially in our locality where the zamindari lands are scattered all over the district, and further it shall bring in difficulties in assessment of crop valued and loss to the tenants when the price of the crop goes up. Zamindars pay their revenue to Government on a fixed date in cash. If crop fails or grows late zamindars are put to great difficulties to collect rent and pay revenue in time.

**Q. 16.**—Permanent Settlement is obstructing industry of the country—Your opinion about it.

**A. 16.**—The Permanent Settlement has not impeded the industry of the country and in my opinion the Permanent Settlement has raised the value of land to a very great extent which rendered sufficient help in raising money from banks and other sources for bigger industries. For big industrial concerns Permanent Settlement is a boon in view of the fact that at a moment's notice big loans can be raised in commercial towns by simply depositing the title deeds (equitable mortgage). In rural areas the cultivators could easily raise loans whenever required against lands because of the Permanent Settlement.

**Q. 17.**—Actual cause of ruin of rural credit resulting in sale of lands of cultivators at abnormally low price.

**A. 17.**—The actual causes of the ruin of rural credit are the high rate of interest, compound interest at which the cultivators borrowed money from the village mahajans, secondly the fall of prices of the produce and lastly the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is mainly responsible for the ruin of rural credit. The village mahajans have tightened their hands and stopped money lending altogether. We do strongly desire that the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act should be repealed and co-operative land mortgage banks should be introduced to give money facilities to the cultivators at a lower rate of interest not exceeding 6 per cent. per annum against lands and on short terms loans on hypothecation of crops.

**Q. 18.—Percentage of collection for the last five years.—**

**A. 18.—**

			Per cent.
1341 B.S.	...	...	79
1342 B.S.	...	...	120
1343 B.S.	...	...	102.
1344 B.S.	...	...	96
1345 B.S.	...	...	48

The above figures will clearly show that the certificate procedure was effective in the matter of realisation of current and arrear dues. When the power to issue certificates was withdrawn the percentage of collections fell down at once to 48 per cent. and the result is disastrous as the zamindar will not be in a position to fulfil his obligations towards the Paramount Power in paying revenue in due time. The Debt Conciliation Boards—creatures of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act—are also responsible for the fall of collections and the Boards are always fraught with danger to the zamindars.

**Q. 19.—Prices of agricultural produce too low—what remedy you suggest?**

**A. 19.—**It is a pity that the agriculturists cannot get a good price for their products—I suggest the following remedies:—

- (1) Fixing up the lowest price of paddy, jute and other crops.
- (2) Imposition of import duty on agricultural products imported in this country from outside.
- (3) Arrangement of advances to the agriculturist to withhold sale of products for a better price.

**Q. 20.—**Formerly (about 30 years ago) there was considerable sale of gold and silver in Chittagong area (amongst the cultivators) when the prices of agricultural produce were still lower. At present this has stopped—what reason.

**A. 20.—**I do not agree that 30 years ago agriculturists in Chittagong used to purchase a considerable quantity of gold but it is true that they used to purchase considerable quantity of silver—but at present the whole market has been flooded by ready-made ornaments of alloyed metals and other chemicals and the price of gold has gone so high that they cannot think of new purchases; rather they sold away whatever ancestral stock of gold and silver they had when they got a very good price for them.

In conclusion I beg to submit that in Chittagong the Khas Mahal who is the biggest landlord has done nothing to our knowledge for the

industrial development of the district. So it can never be argued that Permanent Settlement is detrimental to such development, rather it is the want of impetus and lack of opportunities of industrial training that are primarily responsible for the industrial backwardness of the country. Chittagong popularly known as the Grand Port of the East had various industrial activities, viz.:—Ship-building, dry fish, rope making, salt, etc., but gradually by foreign competition they do no longer exist. It now lies with the Government to educate the people again and help the people willing to undertake these industries. It can therefore be said definitely that Permanent Settlement is not responsible for industrial backwardness of the country.

Noakhali, dated 16th April 1939. \*

I.

Khalil Ahmad, Khas Mahal Deputy Collector, states:

- (1) Rent per acre=Rs. 3-2 to Rs. 6; rent for under-raiyat is double.
- (2) Produce per acre=18 maunds on 1 crop=Rs. 36.
- (3) Rent=1/13th of produce.
- (4) Aus and chilli grow alternatively, as also jute and aman.
- (5) Areca nuts per *kani* (=1 1/5th acre) yield an income of Rs. 100—300 together with cocoanuts. Rent per *kani*=Rs. 5 for raiyat. Rent per *kani*=Rs. 15 for under-raiyat.

II.

Messrs. Mohammad Fazlullah, Jamini Ranjan Sen, M.A., Chittaranjan Das, Rasamay Majumdar, B.A. (ex-detenus), members of District Krishak Samiti, were examined.

1. Cultivation of commercial crops like areca-nut, cocoanut, betels and jute are subjected to rack-renting which at places amount to Rs. 150 per *kani* (=1 1/2 acre), e.g., Char Shahabhikari in Feni subdivision.

2. There are also farms and homesteads for which rent charged is Rs. 50 per *kani* at Ramganj, Raipur and other places.

3. Paddy land also bears a rent of Rs. 10 to Rs. 20 per acre against 10 maunds of produce.

4. New settlements should be with landless people by preference.

5. Noakhali is stronger in jute than in betels and areca nuts, as generally believed.

R. K. M.

C. D.

J. S.

B. M.

M. I.

16-4-39.

Chaumuhani, Noakhali, dated 16th April 1939.

### III.

Kamini Kumar Mondal, merchant, made a statement. He stated that on an average 1 areca nut tree produces crop yielding about 2 as. per year. An ordinary peasant grows 200—300 such trees round his homestead. These trees do not require much space or care for their growth. They bear fruit in 4 years. Lemon trees also grow between them.

### IV.

A meeting of peasants was cross-examined by me. They complained that the rate of rent ranged between Rs. 20 to Rs. 30 per *kani*. The rate was enhanced at every transfer of the holding. These peasants are all under-raiyats.

### V.

Raj Kumar Ghosh, supari merchant, was next examined. An ordinary peasant owning 5 *kanis* will grow areca nuts on 2 *kanis* and paddy on 3 *kanis*. 1 *kani* can grow 1,000 areca trees, yielding Rs. 60 to Rs. 70, 1 *kani* produces 20-25 maunds=Rs. 50.

This obtains at Raipur.

This witness confirms the statement made by the peasants, as recorded above.

### VI.

A meeting of landless labourers at Saheberhat in Noakhali town complained that they were not given lands available in newly-formed *Char* areas by Government who preferred settlement with the more well-to-do classes of rent receivers.

R. K. MOOKERJI.

### Evidence recorded at Chandpur on 16th April 1939.

Name of tenant.	Rate of rent per acre.	Remarks.
Matbar Haji	Rate of rent= Rs. 3-8 per acre Growing 15 maunds of jute=Rs. 75. If it grows paddy it will be at 15 maunds per acre =Rs. 30.	Mouza Char Bhairabi, police-station Chandpur.

*Programme of work for 12 months.*

*1st Kartic to Pous*—Growing fodder for bullocks (কলাই কলাই এবং  
মতন মতন).

*Agrahayana*—Growing Chilli.

*Magh*—Ploughing.

*Falgun and Chaitra*—Growing of Aus paddy and Jute.

*Bohisakh-Jyostha*—Clearing jungles in the fields.

*Ashar-Sraban*—Aus paddy cutting.

*Bhadra*—Jute cutting.

*Ashin*—No work.

*Note by Babu Hara Dayal Nag of Chandpur, on the present condition  
of Bengal peasantry.*

Generally the Bengal peasantry is better fed, better clad, and better housed than the peasantry of the other parts of India. The simple reason is, the lands of Bengal especially Eastern Bengal are more productive than those of the other provinces. The Bengal peasantry can mainly be divided into two classes. I take the liberty of naming the first as the "haves" and the second as the "have-nots". By the "haves" I mean those peasants who have sufficient lands for maintaining themselves with the industry of agriculture; the "have-nots" have no such lands, in short they are called landless peasants. When Bengal was full of waste lands the most industrious peasant was the most well-to-do. Now the time has so changed that the industry of agriculture is not sufficiently remunerative for the maintenance of a peasant even though he be as industrious as his predecessors. The simple reason is that he has to purchase everything except his agricultural produce. The price he gets by sale of his surplus agricultural produce does not at all cover the price he pays for his other necessities of life. At the same time a considerable portion of his time is wasted and a valuable part of his labour is lost on account of his having nothing to do except the pursuit of agriculture. All the cottage industries in which he profitably used to spend his savings of labour and thereby earn some additional income, are now devoured by the wolf of the foreign trade. This makes the debit side of his life over-balance the credit side. Necessarily he falls into debt. Once in debt always in debt; a peasant can scarcely recover himself from it. His debt steadily increases and he becomes heavily involved in it.

Ultimately he sells his land and becomes landless. On the other hand with a little thrift and some other additional profession or pursuit a peasant can make both ends meet and make some savings. With these

savings when made he sometimes purchases lands of those who are compelled to sell them. Gradually he becomes richer and richer by making his unfortunate ignorant neighbours poorer and poorer. The most ambitious of the peasants who thus make savings and purchase lands become in course of time peasant-proprietors in the village.

In Bengal the moneylenders are dead. They no longer molest the peasants. They are now entirely at the mercy of the Arbitration Boards established and working throughout the province. The zamindars and other landholders are more dead than alive. They can hardly realize their rents, not to speak of any "*abwab*". They are also not free from the process of the Arbitration Boards. The peasants have nothing to fear from the moneylenders and landlords. They are now mercilessly exploited by the peasant-proprietors. The landless peasants principally live upon hires of their labours. They are the actual tillers of the lands. The peasant-proprietors often possess more than one hundred "*bighas*" of lands. They scarcely till those lands with their own hands and cultivate their lands with hired labourers.

The hire they pay to the landless labourers is very small, sometimes not more than two annas per day. The peasant-proprietors also lend food-grains to the landless labourers, i.e., their actual producers for extravagant profits. Sometimes an actual tiller of the land borrows from his master, the peasant-proprietor, during the non-harvest time, food-grains on condition of repaying them in food-grains with 50 per cent. profit. The actual tiller of the land, if perchance he has any small bits of lands, pays with the food-grains of those lands, the loan of his master, the peasant-proprietor, not being able to keep any for his own maintenance. Thus the actual tiller of the land becomes a slave labourer of the peasant-proprietor for ever.

There was a time when rent was paid in kind. Originally  $1/5$ th of the produce was paid, then it came up to  $1/4$ .

At that time barter system prevailed and the payment of rent in kind did not cause much inconvenience either to the payer or to the payee. At that the landholders used to maintain "*Dharmagolas*" full of food grains entirely for the benefit of the peasants.

From these "*Dharmagolas*" food-grains were distributed among the peasants—either for price or as loans for small profits only to cover the expenses and losses of those "*Dharmagolas*", not only during the food scarcity and famine but also during the ordinary times whenever the peasants needed such distributions. This was a system of rural co-operation with the landholders as the central figures. These institutions were regarded as religious institutions and religious necessity. In course of time when the barter system was displaced by the money system and the "*Dharmagolas*" lost their religious sanctity they vanished and the rural co-operation disappeared with them.

At the present time the tenants know as "bargadars" pay half the produce as rent. These "bargadars" are generally landless peasants and the lands they take in barga are generally let out by those peasant-proprietors and holders of khas khamar lands. The "bargadars" after payment of the half produce to their lessors make absolutely no profit by the other half that hardly cover the bare price of their labour.

These "bargadars" sometimes take barga even at a loss simply because they have no other work to do. The average rate of rent paid by the occupancy rajyat to his private landlord is about a rupee per "bigha."

The average gross produce of an agricultural land is about Rs. 10 per "bigha," so the rent is about 1/10th of the gross produce of the land. The peasant agriculturist does not work more than 6 months in the year for cultivating, weeding, reaping and storing the harvest. Although he has almost nothing to do in the other 6 months of the year, he has to live throughout the year for the work of his agriculture. The most important factor of his life is not the rent he pays to his landlord but it is the daily increasing cost of his living. His necessities of life have appallingly increased and are still increasing. The heaviest expenditure lies in his feeding the wolf of the foreign trade. Apart from the rent he pays, he pays Union Board rates, road cess, public work cess, and in some districts the education tax is added or is about to be added. In addition to these direct taxes he has to pay many indirect taxes, such as, salt tax. Salt cannot be manufactured in the country freely for the sake of Government revenue, although there are ample materials and facilities for its free production.

Imported and indigenous salt is sold at a price of more than three rupees per maund about half of which is Government revenue.

For many other necessities of life which the peasant-agriculturist has to buy to feed the wolf of the foreign trade, he has to pay indirect taxes in the shape of customs and excise duties.

Thus he has to pay an enormous penalty for his enforced unemployment during the 6 months of the year for feeding the wolf, i.e., for purchasing his other necessities of life than his food stuffs he requires ready money for which he sometimes sells his food stuffs at a low price to its agents and buy them again at a higher price from them. Thus it is conclusively proved that the high cost of living enforced upon him by the above mentioned circumstances and the like, is more responsible for his economic misery than anything else.

A considerable number of the now defunct moneylenders grew from the agents of the wolf of foreign trade, namely, the cloth merchants. These cloth merchants made piles by selling foreign cloths on credit and took bonds for accumulated arrears of the prices.



The moneylenders had flourished for a few decades and then began to decline. So long as the occupancy right of the peasant-agriculturist was a non-transferable personal right he could not be deprived of his cultural lands by his exploiter whose number is legion, and is still increasing. The godless education without any vocational training is rapidly adding to the number of exploiters of the peasant-agriculturists who are so illiterate and ignorant that they do not know the use of money. The money comes to their pockets only to be picked by the pick-pockets—their exploiters. They generally fall prey to the lusty money makers, such as, peasant-proprietors, store-keepers of food grains, merchants of foreign and indigenous goods, loafers, unscrupulous well-to-do people of the village and the last but not least is the priest. It is not possible to exhaust the list of the exploiters of the peasant-agriculturists. In short the only source of making money in the village is the exploitation of the peasant-agriculturists. Now after passing through various stages the transferability of the occupancy right has become most complete. The complete transferability of the occupancy right has been achieved by the so-called friends of the peasant-agriculturists more for the benefit of the former than the latter. Now the sale of the agricultural lands of the peasant-agriculturists has become so easy that whenever he is in need of money he sells bits of them and ultimately becomes landless.

The rents paid by the khas mahal tenants are certainly higher than the rents paid by the tenants of the private landlords. But that does not make much difference between the economic condition of a khas mahal tenant and that of a tenant of the private landlords for the reason stated above because the costs of living and other conditions of life of both of them are the same. I do not know whether the state is legally empowered to abolish the Permanent Settlement but I do know that the abolition will not at all benefit the peasant-agriculturists.

It will undoubtedly increase the revenue. The abolition will enable the estate to bring the abolished estates under khas management and increase the rents of the tenants of those estates to the level of the khas mahal lands with the addition of the unhappy process of certificate. Thus the Government revenue will be enormously increased but the peasant-agriculturists under the private landlords will have to pay increased rents and under certificate procedure. There is nothing like collective security among the peasant-agriculturists. There is no such thing as league of peasant-agriculturists in the village. The co-operative village life based on the barter system has entirely been destroyed.

In short there is nothing common among them that binds them together into a homogenous whole for their own protection.

**Efficient rule in a spirit of social service does not require any policy of divide and rule but an effective rule with the object of exploitation does.**

Exploitation implies a sort of domination or rule. The exploiters often adopt the policy of divide and rule to make their exploitation effective. Healthy competition in a friendly spirit is conducive to co-operative village life but unhealthy rivalry at the instance and for the benefit of the exploiters is destructive of it. The peasant-agriculturists, illiterate and ignorant as they are, are often misled by their exploiters and are engaged in unhealthy rivalry. Their all round exploitation of various brands and varieties simply kills the bliss of their home and co-operative life. Every peasant-agriculturist draws the inspiration from his exploiters of growing into a peasant-proprietor and exploit his next-door neighbour. The peasant-agriculturists belong to the "lower classes" and their exploiters not excepting the peasant-proprietors belong to the "upper classes".

The net result of this process of exploitation of the lower classes by the upper classes is that the actual tillers of the land have the right to till the land but not the right to live upon the fruits of their labour. They often starve in the midst of plenty of foodstuffs produced by themselves.

They are born in poverty, they live in poverty, they die in poverty. With miseries they begin their life, with miseries they pursue and end it.

HARA DAYAL NAG.

### **On board "Afghan", dated 18th April 1939.**

*Evidence of Syamendra Lal Roy, Esq., Zamindar and Banker, son of Rai Bahadur Harendra Lal Roy of Bhagyakul, Munshigan subdivision.*

1. There are generally 2 crops, either paddy or jute and *rabi* crops, e.g., pulses ( *খেসারি* ), mustard, ( *খনে, কল জিহু* ) onions, garlic, etc.

2. One acre of such double-cropped land yields (i) 20 maunds of paddy = Rs. 40, (ii) 12 maunds of jute = Rs. 60, (iii) Rs. 15, totalling about Rs. 60 against which the rent is about Rs. 2-8 (Rs. 2 to Rs. 3).

Thus rent equals about 1/20th of produce.

3. The raiyat charges to the under-raiyat or bargadar much higher rent under the following systems: (a) Half share of produce,

(b) *Takli* or cash payment amounting to Rs. 20 per acre which represents his net profit from land unaffected by fluctuations of produce.

4. The cultivator is out of work for about half the year.

5. The cultivator has ordinarily at least 2 wives.

G. L. R.

**Local enquiry in Naogaon subdivision (Rajshahi district) by  
Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji.**

At Mahadebpur village, 16 miles from Naogaon.

1. Jogendra Nath Khan of village Enaitpur, 3 miles from Mahadebpur, and the Manager of Shamanath Estate, made the following statement:—

(1) The main crop here is aman. Subsidiary crops are—(1) sugarcane, (2) jute, (3) aus, (4) mustard, (5) pulses, (6) potato, (7) brinjals, (8) tomato, (9) cabbages and (10) groundnuts.

(2) Paddy-husking is very common and there is no rice-mill in the locality.

(3) Oil-pressing is a prosperous industry.

(4) Cane-crushing is an established industry here on the basis of co-operation among villagers outside the Government Co-operative Department.

(5) Rent is 2 as.—Re. 1 per bigha irrespective of number of crops. One bigha produces 6 maunds of paddy=Rs. 9 *plus* 20 maunds of cane=Rs. 50. Cane grows in Kartick-Chaitra; paddy occupies Asadh-Bhadra. A cultivator owning 15 bighas can profitably grow aus and jute on same land=4 bighas. These two crops are followed by aman on the whole land. He gets a total produce of (1) 12 maunds of aus on 2 bighas, (2) 12 maunds of jute on 2 bighas and (3) 90 maunds of aman on 15 bighas. His total income will be Rs. 125 from paddy and Rs. 36 from jute=Rs. 161 on which he pays a rent of Rs. 15. This makes rent about 1/11th of produce.

(6) Barga is on half produce for paddy and one-fourth for sugarcane.

(7) Rates of rent are those fixed at the last settlement.

(8) Where a new settlement is called for in respect of a holding transferred or surrendered, rent is enhanced at 1 anna extra per rupee.

(9) Proportion of revenue to gross collection=43 per cent. including cesses, and 30 per cent. without cesses.

(10) Amount of losses on account of cesses=about Rs. 4,000 per year.

(11) There is no regular machinery for granting remissions of rent due to failure of crops; though such remissions are granted.

(12) Percentage of collections is above 80 per cent., while tenants do not generally take advantage of limitation.

R. K. M.

JOGENDRANATH KHAN, M.A. (Advocate),

*Jotedar, President, Enaitpur Union Board, and Ex-Honorary*

*Manager, Mahadebpur Roy Bahadur's Estate.*

J. C. CHATTERJEE,

*S.D.O., Naogaon.*

SUPRASANNA RAY, M.A., B.L.,

*Manager, Shamnath Estate, Mahadebpur.*

*The 22nd April 1939.*

---

Village Baghdona, 8 miles from Naogaon.

1. Harendra Mandal under zamindars—

- (1) owns 40 bighas,
- (2) grows aus, aman, jute, sugarcane;
- (3) gets 20 maunds of aus at 5 maunds per bigha on 4 bighas; 180 maunds of aman at 9 maunds per bigha; 5 maunds of jute on 1 bigha; 2 maunds of sugarcane;
- (4) gets a price of Rs. 1-4 per maund for aus; Rs. 1-7 for aman; Rs. 4 per maund of jute; Rs. 4 per maund of sugarcane;
- (5) has a family of 8 members; consumes  $6\frac{1}{2}$  seers of rice per day; spends Rs. 1-4 per hat;
- (6) owns 2 bullocks; and
- (7) has a debt of Rs. 400 incurred for building a house destroyed by flood and also for living expenses; on mortgage of 16 bighas.

2. Chiru Mandal—

- (1) owns 25 bighas on rent of Rs. 22 per year— $\frac{1}{12}$ th of produce;
- (2) has a family of 7 members;
- (3) grows aus, pous and cane;
- (4) consumes 8 seers of rice and spends Re. 1 per hat; and
- (5) has a debt of Rs. 400 due to bullocks and failure of crops.

3. Faiyis Sardar is dispossessed of land for a debt of Rs. 200; now works as a bargadar on 10 bighas and gets 30 maunds of aman as half-produce; has a family of 4 members; works for 5 months (August-December) as bargadar and as a day-labourer for the rest of the year on 4as. a day.

4. Nausar Ali Mondal belongs to a family of 18 members; his father married 4 wives; owns 80 bighas under debt of Rs. 8,000; debt due to flood; cultivates by barga.

5. Mansur Ali Sardar owns 40 bighas of land; grows aus, aman, jute, potato, pulses; mustard, chillies, brinjals; employs 2 labourers; owns 2 cows, 6 bullocks, 2 ploughs; has a family of 10 members; and has no debt. A self-supporting family. Has lent Rs. 200, spends Rs. 2 per hat, pays rent of (a) Rs. 33 on 11 bighas, (b) Rs. 32 on 12 bighas and (c) Rs. 25 on 17 bighas.

R. K. M.

J. C. CHATTERJEE,

S. D. O., Naogaon.

The 22nd April 1939.

Dubalhati, 6 miles from Naogaon.

*Evidence of Jogesh Chandra Rai, B.A., Manager, Dubalhati Raj.*

1. The Dubalhati Raj family traces its history for 54 generations, i.e., to times much earlier than the Permanent Settlement. There is a tradition about its annual revenue payable to the Moghul Emperor being fixed in the form of *koi* fish, of which 22,000 had to be supplied in lieu of cash.

This is one of the estates which has thus kept up its historic continuity from the Permanent Settlement and even from earlier times.

2. The estate has about 400 tanks within its area and 4 large *bils* or lakes from which cultivators can get free the water for irrigation.

The estate does not charge any rent for lands excavated for construction of tanks and wells by cultivators.

Within the last ten years the estate has spent Rs. 6,000 on the construction of tanks; about a dozen pucca masonry wells at a cost of about Rs. 2,000; and spent about Rs. 600 on the sinking of 5 tube-wells in response to the demands of tenants but the estate has not enhanced rent for these.

It also gives grants-in-aid of irrigation facilities constructed by cultivators.

The estate has established 1 Dispensary, 1 High School, and contributes Rs. 5,000 annually to the Rajshahi College.

•• Since 1872 the estate has spent a total sum of over Rs. 12 lakhs of rupees on various public utilities both in and outside the estate.

3. The proportion of revenue (with cess) to total collection is about 20 per cent.

The rates of rent vary from 10 annas to Rs. 3 per bigha (for *ganja* and sugarcane areas).

4. Between the zamindar and the occupancy raiyat there are no intermediaries in about 95 per cent. of the tenancies. The occupancy raiyat charges to the under-raiyats in the "*bora*" areas a rent of Rs. 10 per bigha which amounts to about a third of the produce. The bargadar here pays half the produce as rent.

5. The amount of interest due on arrears of rent and written off during the last eight years appears on a rough estimate to be Rs. 2,28,925.

6. The average percentage of collections for the last 8 years is stated to about 65 per cent.

R. K. M.

M. SEN,

*Superintendent of Excise, Rajshahi*

JOGESH CHANDRA ROY,

*Manager, Dubalhati Raj Estate, Rajshahi*

*The 23rd April 1939.*

*Evidence of tenants.*

1. Troilakya Bairagi (Mahisya) under Dubalhati Estate—

He owns 22½ bighas and pays rent at the rate of about 10 annas per bigha. Produce is 5 maunds per bigha = Rs. 6-4. He has a family of 3 persons and 2 children.

2. Golap Mondal (Mahisya) under Dubalhati—

Owns 8 bighas of which rent is Rs. 8. His is a family of two members. He has a debt of Rs. 8.

3. Dwarikanath Hazra—

Owns 10 bighas. Pays Rs. 2-8 annually as rent in all = 4 annas per bigha. Produce = 60 maunds of aman paddy = Rs. 75. He has a family of four. He works as a bargadar on half-produce. He has incurred a debt of Rs. 15 for purchase of seeds from Government.

4. **Sriram Pramanik—**

Owms 9 bighas for which he pays rent of Rs. 5-10 as rent—9 annas per bigha.

He earns a supplementary income by bargadari.

R. K. M.

M. SEN,

*Superintendent of Excise, Rajshahi.*

*The 23rd April 1939.*

The Congress Committee of Mahadebpur brought to my notice the fact that the Dubalhati estate sometimes charges very high rents ranging from Rs. 5 to Rs. 8 per bigha; and has also submitted a statement to that effect. I made an enquiry on the subject and the Manager of the Dubalhati Estate explained to me a case (Mouza Akhra, No. 191, Khatian No. 137, P. S. Mahadebpur) where the tenant concerned pays a rent of Rs. 8-8-6 for 1 bigha 11 cottahs 7 ch. of land which was however registered as homestead land. The complaint on the subject is therefore not proved by the record-of-rights shown. It is due to the confusion made between homestead land and cultivated land. This distinction has escaped the notice of the Congress Committee concerned.

R. K. M.

M. SEN,

*Superintendent of Excise, Rajshahi.*

*The 23rd April 1939.*

Badalgachi, 12 miles from Naogaon, 14 miles from Mahadebpur,  
dated the 24th April 1939.

1. Jharu Mondal, having a family of five, works as a bargadar on eight bighas of land on half-produce—

Gets 3 maunds of paddy for 8 bighas and 2 maunds of jute and a little mustard. He works as a day-labourer for 9 months and 3 months as a bargadar. He has a small debt of Rs. 15.

2. Md. Jahanatulla of Chakrai—

Has 300 bighas of land and pays a rent of Rs. 300 a year: main produce is aman, gets 3 maunds of paddy per bigha by barga.

3. Md. Badaruddin of Badalgachi—

Has 24 bighas of land. Aman, aus and jute are grown on his lands; pays a rent of Rs. 24 a year to his landlord. Has let out his lands in

barga and works as a tahsildar under samindar Ram Chariat Bhakat. He gets a total quantity of paddy of 100 maunds out of his barga lands.

4. Faisuddin Mondal of Jeol—

Has 6 bighas of land and pays a rent of Rs. 7 per year. He grows aus, potato and jute on his lands and gets 24 maunds of aus paddy and 5 maunds of jute. Has 5 members in his family. Jute alternates with potato of which he gets about 25 maunds. Has no debts.

5. Safedulla Sardar of Badalgachi—

Has about 22 to 28 bighas of land, grows jute on 3 bighas of land and aus on 2½ bighas of land and paddy on 5 bighas of lands, gets 8 maunds of paddy and 12 maunds of aus paddy and 50 maunds of aman paddy and he also gets potato, chillies and bamboos. He has no debts.

R. K. M.

J. C. CHATTERJEE,

*Subdivisional Officer, Naogaon.*

*The 24th April 1939.*









